USA: Quel avenir, quel destin ?

What future awaits the US? But more so, what fate? The USA is undeniably one of the two greatest economic powers in the world.

It's by far the world's top geopolitical powerhouse. Beyond its current issues and recent election cycle, the US is deeply rooted in this geopolitical world. The question is: what is the future of this country in the world and, above all, what will be its fate in terms of geopolitical power?

To answer this question, I have the pleasure to be joined by Fabrice Ravel. -Hello, Fabrice. -Hello, Olivier.

Hello, everyone. We're dealing with subtle nuances when talking about future and fate. The word 'fate' immediately brings us back to Classical Antiquity.

So I should ask you a question: Are Rome and Athens valid scenarios for thinking about the situation in the United States? I'll be more precise: the existential situation of the USA. Or should we consider other scenarios?

Let's start with Rome. If Sparta and Rome perished, what state can hope to last forever? As you pose that question, Olivier, my mind immediately goes to these words of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, from The Social Contract, which clearly set off a kind of resonance, yet also a sort of alarm.

It seems as if a shroud is being woven as an inevitable future for every state, and that the real peril looming over it is proportional to the power it could have acquired. Building upon this, it may even be beneficial to merge our ideas with a recent work by Paul Kennedy, whose title, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, effectively conveys this idea, reminding us that the vocation of the US was never designed to be eternal, a term we still associate with the eternal city, Rome. Instead, it is destined to meet a dramatic end.

It's now essential to acknowledge that, starting in 1945, the perception has been that the US has established a dominant role in global affairs, at least in living memory, because obviously everything could be relative in terms of the short, medium and long terms. In reality, it has been as long as anyone can remember. From that perspective, it’s understandable if our inquiry appears somewhat out of the blue, since we have grown accustomed to the significant presence and influence of the USA.

So much so that we might assume that there's no need to even pose the question. Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Paul Kennedy thus help us realise that the question is pertinent and we could thus touch back upon your introduction, since it goes well beyond the elections. In this regard, there are long-term issues at stake, which we need to grasp about American power in order to examine how it could evolve and even end.

On what path? What end awaits the USA? In what timeframe?

And how could this come about? We could easily make a comparison with Rome. There's already a very prominent, common symbol: the Capitol, which is obviously the name symbolising Roman political power, the Senate and the Roman people, under a Latin acronym SPQR (Senatus Populusque Romanus).

Interestingly enough, it's also the current seat of power in the United States of America. To extend this image a little further, I would encourage our audience to check out the opening sequence of this series, House of Cards, which is quite extraordinary at the outset, with a bird's-eye view of the Capitol, and beginning with a backdrop of bright sunlight. As the credits roll, there's a sort of shadow that hovers or settles in the clouds and soon takes us into the night.

The dramatic music composed by Jeff Beal adds to the ambience, making us wonder why this seat of power seems to be slipping into twilight. We're already there, we mustn't forget, in the greatness and decadence of Rome. We'll come back to that.

Symbols aside, we now need to question the relevance or appropriateness of such a comparison. This is where I think we should come back to Paul Kennedy's book, because one thing is quite palpable: Today, the United States is in the process of becoming a military power. The most important part of that, or the most important logic to understand, is: the US is becoming a military power or in a process of confirming that it is one.

A fortiori, they were not initially a military power, because that was not the major axis, though today it has become so. We can confirm this further with our first reference, which should be viewed to complement the image conjured up by Capitol, namely the 2023 US military budget. Because, as we explored in previous sessions, the US military budget for 2023, i.

e. from the military balance, is 905. 5 billion dollars.

That figure is for the year 2023 alone. To ensure that this figure truly resonates, I'll also say that it reflects a total that is more than the cumulative total of the subsequent 14 budgets, extending from the second power to the 15th power. We could also go further and point out that the US budget alone accounts for 40.

5% of global military spending. Bringing that up is clearly a way to understand a contrast with the US back in 1945, which accounted for 49% of all industrial production in the world, and thus both industrial power and economic power. Today, it’s a country with a military budget representing 40%, drifting from a situation of predominantly economic power, which certainly had a military component, to a predominantly military power, which certainly has an economic component.

Now things are heating up. Let's go back to Paul Kennedy's book, what do we find? He points out that states or great powers go from birth to peak to decline, because in reality, in these sequences, states are first born on the basis of of industrial economic power, and then manage to concretise this power from a political point of view.

However, this political power always ends up being transformed into military power. Why would Paul Kennedy consider this to be so important? Because, paradoxically, it symbolises a decline.

This astonishing view holds that a country apparently slips into a decline as it bolsters its military power. Why? Because first of all, to have a military power that grows considerably, you have to invest considerably.

And the amount earmarked for the ever-growing military power is clearly growing exponentially. Ironically, though, if this military power seems credible, it will never be needed. Money is thus being wasted instead of being better spent on logistics —we'll come back to that— or even in terms of other investments.

Another interesting and relevant point is that if a state needs to over-invest from a military point of view, it is because its power no longer naturally appears credible. Otherwise, there would be no need to back it up with the obvious, to use terms we might associate with Rome, the presence of an ever-mightier sword. There's also a third point, which asks the question: what are we looking at?

Extending our hold or our political hegemony means that we must be able to consolidate it further in terms of security, to secure these supply lines which are always being stretched thinner. In the early 21st century, Peter Bender's l'Amérique, Nouvelle Rome: l'engrenage de la puissance (America, the New Rome: Gearing up for Power), uses a metaphor of a gear that is being installed, locking in a path from past success to future defeat because, in reality, what we have here is an imperial overextension and it is this imperial overextension which, in the end, is much more synonymous with decline than it would be with strengthened hold. Of course, Rome falls in the end.

As Gibbon, one of the greatest historians of the 18th century, reminds us, the decadence of Rome leads to the fall of Rome. What's being plotted here is hardly the most cheerful outlook for the United States. Certainly.

I thus suggest we leave Rome and consider another scenario. Perhaps Athens will be more optimistic. The scenario is rather interesting because, first of all, it's an earlier period.

We can date Athens' golden age as within the 5th century BC, whereas the peak quintessence of Roman power spans from the 2nd century BC into the 2nd century AD. Somewhat paradoxically, we're going back in time but also making progress. Interestingly enough, we also see a situation involving a military power.

Let me refine this point with a very important detail that our audience should keep in mind as we move forward to a conclusion: it was not initially a military power, but a military power that came to reinforce first of all a cultural power, an artistic power, and a political power. The message of this image of Athens is now rather clear. What makes this example of Athens even more interesting is that this power is not self-sufficient.

It really comes into its own in the context of an alliance: the League of Delos. Emmanuel Todd explains this well in After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order. Here's the idea: in the wars against the Persian Empire, Athens is the main Greek power but obviously cannot fight the Persian Empire on its own, so it will need the help of a whole community of Greek cities that are individually too small and entrust their security to Athens through the Treasury of Delos, which is ultimately responsible for financing the Greek coalition.

That might naturally bring to mind the United States and NATO, and even all the allies who are joining the United States. We can extend that analogy to AUKUS and the Quad alliance, even if their logics differ. It gets even more interesting when realising that, as Emmanuel Todd points out, it has been trending this way for twenty years, and the United States is thus becoming poorer because of a negative trade balance, which the United States perceives as a deficit.

Pay attention regarding this deficit, as it covers the primary, secondary and also tertiary economic sectors with all other countries. The US has therefore been living on credit and can only afford the hefty military budget because of this trade deficit, which countries always only allow the US to have because of its economic power and military might for financing their military machine. This makes it rather intriguing.

But here, too, the example leads us to an end that may seem a little paradoxical, because we should notice that by strengthening its military base so much, ultimately, as in the previous example, Athens is really paving the path to its future demise, because it's really over-investing militarily and thus emptying itself of a substratum that had been its real attraction, namely all those capabilities that today we would call soft power or political power. This second example also gives us the impression that the future is not looking much brighter. Rome, Athens.

Perhaps we should stay in the same historical period and take a look at Athens' enemy: Sparta. The comparison here becomes a bit more surprising, but not as evident. In simple terms, Athens is a democracy.

Sparta is very atypical compared with the other Greek cities, since Spartan society is a total construct. That's a difference our audience should appreciate. It's not just about having an army.

Sparta was built entirely on a society in which military values, the military hierarchy and, I'd almost go so far as to say, references, as poetry and communication are all military. It's society is also fairly directive or centralised in terms of political system. It may be a surprising comparison to some, since it doesn't seem to be anywhere near the United States of America.

This is why such a comparison, if I may say so, could only be indirect. It may be a surprising indirect comparison, but it is one nonetheless. Think back to Graham Allison's Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?

There's one element we don't really mention so often. We can all agree that the premise begins with a comparison between an ancient geopolitical situation and a current one. We should be familiar with the dynamics and issues we discussed together at a previous Rendez-Vous de la Géopolitique devoted to Graham Allison's Destined for War.

We are well aware that war in some cases is not launched for objective reasons, but because the established and hegemonic power finds itself increasingly afraid of a swiftly rising rival power or competitor. This fear turns into an obsession, with which the established power would rather launch a pre-emptive war to prevent any serious challenge or question of its preeminent role. It is not the similarity of the societies that counts.

Rather, it's the similarity of the situation, because here is a paradoxically de facto situation in which the United States would be Sparta, which, once again, is a bit surprising. To really grasp how this comparison can be made, we should first recall that the Kingdom of Prussia is usually more associated with Sparta than the USA. I'll refer to Christopher Clark's book on Prussia (Iron Kingdom), and two sessions of ours that our audience may find helpful to rediscover the singularity of a society that is really deeply rooted in a military culture.

One session was on Frederick II, the Unique, and the other on Carl von Clausewitz, who, though he was a strategist who led us to peace, we can clearly see a society where everything is built around the military. Once again, this is not the case in the US, despite the army's increasingly important role. Clearly, it's already inviting some initial hesitation, even if the comparison in terms of geopolitical positioning is quite judicious.

However, the comparison becomes increasingly complicated, since, to be effective, Sparta would have had to be in the same situation in terms of resources. In other words, we need a truly hegemonic power with a major role to play in the world's fate. That's really what we're talking about.

There is no denying that in Thucydides' famous work aptly named The Peloponnesian War, Sparta went to war against Athens, as you pointed out, but that was in the Greek world and there was never any question of Sparta even thinking of competing with the Persian Empire. In this case, the resources and scale are so modest that it's hard to compare. In this regard, here's a useful event that might convince us of what we are setting up, one that concerns a man who will conquer the Persian Empire: Alexander the Great.

In 331, Alexander the Great was told that the Spartans were waging a local war against other Greek cities. Nicolas Richer writes in Sparte: Cité des Arts, des Armes et des Lois (Sparta: City of Arts, Arms and Law), Alexander the Great reacted cryptically, by calling it ‘a battle of mice’. To put it plainly, it's not entirely convincing.

Ultimately, the comparison with Sparta also has its limits. It thus seems that American geopolitical power cannot be compared to any one situation or example in classical antiquity. Are there any?

Yes. Which one? We can make one comparison.

In order to establish a comparison, our first step should be to define the characteristics of American society to see if it resembles any others, if any at all. Obviously, comparisons cannot be made in terms of technology or technological development, but rather societal relations or frameworks. Peter Bender's book cited before on on America (The New Rome), even goes so far as to say that the comparison isn't necessarily very easy to make.

Because Rome is a continental power, a political power and a land power. However, the United States is a naval power, a commercial power and, even more so, a cultural power. Naval power, commercial power, cultural power: that's Carthage.

I'm not entirely convinced that the comparison with Carthage assures the United States any happier fate. In fact, the examples and comparisons you've just given show that these are situations of collapse. However, it's hard to imagine this fate for the United States with its military might.

That's right. Two additional arguments may make this even more convincing to us. First of all, it's truly staggering to see just how impressive the American military is today in terms of extent.

If anyone needs further convincing, I would recommend a book by Philippe Richardot. I'll point out first that it was published in 2005. Furthermore, I'm clearly not bringing up any groundbreaking news.

It deals with everything from handguns, like the Colt and the M16, to nuclear missiles and the aircraft carrier. Richardot's 2005 book, which is also a second edition, clearly shows us that this military power has been continuously evolving, and even the summary gives an account of the state of the game with observation drones. That was some twenty years ago.

That alone should suffice to back up these arguments and validate the power of the American military. In fact, if you look at this work by Philippe Richardot, you might get the feeling that you're looking at a catalogue. Basically, we're talking about weapons and their quantities.

The quantities are quite impressive, but so are the level of technological advancement. If there are any sceptics left out there, just pull out a calculator. In this regard, let's extrapolate a few figures to make sure we understand their significance.

Earlier I mentioned that the US military budget for 2023 alone was 905. 5 billion dollars. Right, Olivier?

We can break down these 905. 5 billion dollars as 51,000 dollars spent per hour over the last 2024 years. In other words, the US budget alone in 2023, if projected back to the birth of Jesus Christ, means that the US would have spent 51,000 dollars every hour of every day for the last 2024 years just for their 2023 budget.

Need I point out that we are dealing here with a military power such that, in reality, the fates we seem to see are not likely to materialise, or at least not in this form. You began by talking of living memory's perception of US power that seems perfectly established. We've skimmed across history and, there too, I get the impression that it's beyond comparison.

Isn't there some model or approach that could bring us back to the world? Yes, there is. Especially if it's about bringing us back to the American world.

There is quite simply the American example. When we look at the history of the United States, there are two or three characteristics that will help us to better understand the future that seems to be taking shape and the fate apparently in store. First of all, I think it's important to remember that American society is deeply divided today.

You may even ask if American society had ever been so divided in its history along the lines of clashes or confrontations. The answer is yes, because there is obviously one period, yet that was a war over secession, or what the Americans call their Civil War. If we look back at that civil war from 1861 to 1865, we might find Vincent Bernard's book on the American Civil War helpful.

Both title and subtitle are telling: Civil War: The American "Great War". While we've already explored this, it's worth noting that the war is considered to have claimed 800,000 lives. This makes it the deadliest conflict in the history of the United States.

It's clear that it's not necessarily an external threat that could cause this power to collapse in on itself, but rather internal dissension that could erode this power from within. We could combine this with a second parameter or a second factor that we can learn from the country's history, which is that, in reality, today US society have clearly deteriorating logistics, infrastructures and road networks because investment has been cut back much more than it should have been. Two additional points should be kept in mind: after the Great Depression of 1929, the Democratic candidate at the Chicago Convention said that it was important to introduce a new deal.

That became the famous New Deal. However, one often overlooked fact of the New Deal is that it turned the United States in on itself, erecting customs barriers and cutting itself off from the rest of the world. The intriguing part is that, regarding economic objectives, it's quite similar to a strategy that was implemented to redirect attention towards the United States and restore its former greatness.

You may recall that the slogan ‘Make America Great Again’ is hardly a new slogan of the 21st century, but rather one coined by President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. This helps my argument that regardless of whether Democrat or Republican, at the moment, the focus turns inwards on the US. That inevitably leads to a third point: the United States seems to have a sort of propensity to turn its back to the world.

This is all the more important to note, and maybe even a virtual third surprise, since this harks back to the real historical approach of the US in its relationship with the world: Isolationism. The past 20 or 30 years might have fooled some. By allowing ourselves to be misled by the last 2 or 3 decades, during which there was obviously a great deal of US interventionism, we might forget the traditional American reflex of remaining centred on itself and cutting itself off from the world.

On 2 December 1824, the fifth US President, James Monroe, gave his annual address, in which he set out the Monroe Doctrine, which I can essentially sum up as: America for the Americans and the rest of the world is ‘not our business’. What we are saying here is that, ironically, the weakening of the United States or its withdrawal from the world would certainly be due more to internal strategic choices in the US than to a rivalry, which is clearly the limit of historical relations. Two perspectives are thus emerging.

Either the withdrawal is partial, because in reality the United States considers that it must continue to pay attention to one part of the world, but that it must stop spreading itself too thinly, as it was condemned to do by its role as a superpower which invariably led it, perhaps even despite its intentions, to assume a role as the world's policeman, a role perhaps given to it precisely because of its status. The US would seem to be pooling its forces, concentrating them on the strategic axes deemed to be most important, though that would mean a considerable part of the rest of the world to be neglected. Or there could be a more complete or total withdrawal, which would return us to isolationism.

It could be the result of a singular choice, but it could also be the result of a choice combined with the pressure of having to completely remake American society. Here we are, new deals. Let's focus on rebuilding a greater America, because the country has so many infrastructure to rebuild, and we know that because of the differences in birth rates, there are some balances to be made in American society.

Ultimately, in a world where the USA was all of a sudden on its way out. We might just only now realise that it is no longer just a question of the future or fate of the United States, but also the weight of the United States in the world. We should thus wonder about the influence it's bound to have on the world's fate in 21st-century geopolitics.

Thank you, Fabrice, for pivoting on our initial question to reveal a completely different, yet just as profound, stimulating and dynamic topic for us to tackle. That wraps up this Rendez-Vous de la Géopolitique. Thank you for following us.

See you soon. Thank you, everyone.