UKRAINE : Quels objectifs pour les États-Unis ?

Ukraine: where does the USA stand? While the media often cite a number of reasons to explain the involvement and commitment of the United States and its position on the war in Ukraine, a recontextualised geopolitical context may also serve to better understand how the USA views this conflict. We'll undertake this task today at Rendez-Vous de la Géopolitique with Fabrice Ravel.

-Hello, Fabrice. -Hello, Olivier. Hello, everyone.

Washington has been supporting the Ukrainians since February 2022. That support has taken a very tangible shape, thanks in particular to a seemingly considerable budget earmarked specifically for the Ukrainians. I believe that emphasising the budget right at the very beginning is important.

Our audience will certainly benefit from scrutinising what may seem relatively banal or classic, yet I think it's essential, since ultimately, having a sensation that the approach is always obvious might perhaps keep us from thinking more deeply about the underlying logic that may drive a country to assume positions from a geopolitical point of view. For our specific topic today concerning the objectives that the USA is pursuing in Ukraine, we shall see how things are not necessarily as clear-cut as they may seem to be. We may have to start by re-examining the aid that the USA agreed to send Ukraine, which was slow to get rolling.

In fact, it took several months. That's also an interesting point. To put it another way, this aid was not as automatic as you might have first imagined.

In any case, Washington made $60 billion worth of aid available to Ukraine in early 2024. Our initial impression considers a relatively enormous sum in absolute terms, which is objectively true. Yet things get interesting when we extend this first perspective or dynamic, especially since the sum is the equivalent of the entire amount allocated between 24 February 2022 and the end of 2023.

This appears as an acceleration, because in such a short space of time, we are talking about the equivalent of all sums previously given, and then doubled. What’s particularly noteworthy in this comparison is that, when expressed in constant dollars, the overall sum is greater than all the American investments in the Marshall Plan post-World War II. These specific points thus give us a clear sense of just how substantial this aid really is, though we still need to break it down further, which we'll get to soon enough.

We could, of course, go one step further and say that this aid is normal, since there are reasons that objectively appear right away as self evident. By this, I mean defending and coming to the aid of a country that has been attacked; taking a moral stand; and then, quite simply, safeguarding international law. However, we could even examine things a little more closely, checking for a more nuanced view of our first impression of this loan package.

If you'd like to go down this route, then perhaps we should ask a few more questions. Because if it turns out that the aid isn't necessarily as substantial as we thought, then perhaps we'll have to accept that it is indeed more nuanced than we first imagined. Two comparisons should be made to illustrate what I mean.

The first comparison could certainly involve the investments that the Americans have made in Afghanistan over the past 20 years. Regarding Afghanistan, you may recall that we've already held two sessions on it. It's such an important yet often overlooked topic today.

In this regard, John Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), produced a document of well over a hundred pages containing two very interesting figures. First of all, the US Department of Defence reported that the total cost of military operations over the 2 decades of war amounted to 837 billion dollars. This puts things into perspective, which I find quite enlightening, especially since we can also add another 145 billion dollars for rebuilding Afghanistan.

In light of this, the perspective has clearly shifted. We can continue in this direction with another intriguing document. It's nevertheless fairly standard, a military balance issued by an international institute of strategic studies.

Its objective is to monitor all spending set to be made by every nation in 2024. The first observation is that in the US military budget (page 29), the US defence budget for 2024 is $863. 5 billion.

I'll ask our audience to recall the 60 billion mentioned earlier. Put into perspective, this aid no longer has the same significance or importance as before. This vantage point makes it much easier to recognise how this sum of 60 billion, which is certainly significant in absolute terms, is totally misleading and much less significant than you might have thought.

That might lead us to reason that, ultimately, American aid (can we call it that? ) appears to be more tempered, more reserved and even more cautious than it might have originally appeared. That legitimises our issue at hand.

Because if that's the case, then there's also a need to analyse potential underlying reasons for this form of American intervention and just what its objectives are. Because here, we have focused solely on the financial aspect. Understanding the geopolitical framework that the United States employs when it supports or intervenes in Ukraine is also quite fascinating.

Yes, and there's a point that should be made here: The financial aspect is, in the end, a result or reflection of choices made upstream. So, what is the culture? This question should echo a session we held on Russia.

Historically speaking, what is the USA's strategic culture? Knowing will certainly give us a better understanding of their approach. We'll also touch upon aspects that are more closely linked to short-term temporal or historical events.

We might even need to talk more about the nature of American power. As you suggested, let's start with a glance into a perspective of what the Anglo-American or American school of geopolitics is all about. We should first mention three prominent Anglo-American theorists, the US naval officer and historian Alfred Mahan, US political scientist Nicholas Spykman, and British political geographer John Mackinder.

I find the convergence of these three theorists to be quite thought-provoking, especially regarding the nature of the subject. As we delve deeper, we will uncover a logic that intuitively helps us understand the possible reasons for American involvement in the contexts we've just discussed. Starting with Alfred Mahan.

I'll just say that because obviously he was the first, even if it's a bit surprising that it was an American who did so, to reflect on what the French would call an Anglo-Saxon concept. It's quite a famous book: Influence of Sea Power Upon History. It's clear that we're already fully immersed in a naval power approach, and that as a naval power, by virtue of our role, we're seeking to understand the strategy we should deploy to establish our supremacy and counter the supremacy of our rivals.

This is taken further by John Mackinder. And this is where John Mackinder comes into his own, as he takes the same approach to naval power. But what's quite interesting, and I'm going to reuse a term that's quite famous, is that John Mackinder first divides the world in two, with a central island and then peripheral islands, Australia and the United States, peripheral naval power, but this central island also has the heart, the Heartland.

This pivot is crucial to Mackinder because the idea is: if you have a force that can sufficiently aggregate and synthesize that heart or pivot, then it can be driven to dominate the world. You can see there's something there. What's more, he wrote mainly in the first part of the early 20th century.

Thus, the British Mackinder had a phobia, a fearful obsession, that at some point, for various reasons, the immense expanse of Russian territory will be combined with a German power that had been emerging since 18 January 1871, and that this pairing could result in the worst fears of the English-centred world, namely a united and pivoting Heartland. What we're saying is very important, since the American reflex is clearly set up to prevent the emergence of such a power. The American Nicholas Spykman further qualifies Mackinder's position on the importance of the Heartland, but asserts that what's really important is the Rimland.

I'll come back to this, as we now ask what does that mean? Rimland is more of a concentric logic, a circle or the power of the ring. Because real power would mean control over the maritime borders encircling the entire continent, which really means the Heartland.

I get the impression that all these authors come together, especially with a closer look at containment, which was so dear to the United States since the start of the Cold War and the late 40s). We can sum containment up by saying: in order to contain this pivot, we should master the art of the circle, geographically speaking, —relevant to current events— starting with the Mediterranean, the Near and Middle East, then moving on to the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. It's almost the best way to encircle or neutralize.

That's a very American approach. We shouldn't forget a plan in the American Civil War (1861-1865) devised to quell the Southern rebellion. The Anaconda Plan was aptly named because it understood the need for a naval blockade to prevent the South from surviving its insurrection.

We're completely in line with that logic. In this regard, the first idea is to curb or hinder a power that could become a competitor to the American power, which is, in this case, the United States. I'll call this a first dynamic, which hinges on a British- -American geopolitical perception of the world, spanning 200-300 years.

This is particularly important to consider to understand what the Americans are hoping to achieve in Ukraine. Let's merge this analysis with recent history, the fall of the Iron Curtain, and thus of the Soviet Union, and a reading grid that has since been imposed? Fair enough.

There's a lot of excitement ahead, as we are about to see how certain parameters will come together quite seamlessly. If we just look at more recent history, then everything is just relative. But since the fall of the Soviet Union, we can observe that the US has implemented a very classic geopolitical approach, which can be voiced with the words: Our rival is collapsing.

The first idea thus entails keeping it from reviving. In other words, we're simply going to make sure that they can never again regain the power that the Soviet Union had during the Cold War, overall, if we go back to the classic figures or the simplest dates, 1945–1991, even though the Cold War tipped off a little later, in 1949. In this case, we're looking at classic logic.

One intriguing aspect here, and given the range of incidents in Ukraine since the early 1990s, there has been a significant uptick in American support for Ukraine in the more recent past, looking to embarrass Russian designs. The operative word here is 'embarrass'. Because a closer look will reveal massive popular movements in Ukraine in 2014 against the pro-Russian Ukrainian president.

The American embassy there and the US in general were clearly in favour of these popular movements. Following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Washington began taking steps to train the Ukrainian army under the standard NATO troop model, which is when intervention really began. It's clear from the various events we've seen, and last but not least, during the Russian attack on 24 February 2022, US intelligence and secret services obviously provided information that was crucial to the Ukrainian army's ability to resist the initial onslaught.

That stresses the operative word, namely, to 'embarrass' the Russians. It's also rather precise. That was conceptualised by the author Zbigniew Brzeziński.

He had an interesting career. Born in Poland, Brzeziński became a security advisor to the Jimmy Carter regime between 1977 and 1981. He wrote a book in 1997 that has become very important for understanding the topic we're exploring together: The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives.

The French subtitle is 'America and America and the rest of the world. And then there's a first card which appears and which is quite interesting, because this card, in a chapter IV, so I hasten to say that it is the “black hole”. in the work is quite interesting, appearing in Chapter IV, before anything else, I'll just say that it is a 'black hole'.

We'll explain what this black hole is, and show the Soviet Union as it imploded. shows the Soviet Union as it imploded. In fact, on this map, you can see that a number of arrows are pointing in the opposite direction.

pointing in the opposite direction. That's the term. There's a kind of maritime ebb and flow because, in the end, the Soviet Union, as a result of the various events of the late 80s and early 90s, before imploding, lost all influence in Eastern Europe as it had with the Warsaw Pact and over several states that were to become independent, in particular the Baltic States and Ukraine.

in the end, the Soviet Union, as a result of the various events of the late 80s and early 90s, before imploding, lost all influence in Eastern Europe as it had with the Warsaw Pact and over several states that were to become independent, in particular the Baltic States and Ukraine. And then the Soviet Union will implode. will implode.

And on page 121 of this book in the Pluriel collection, what is interesting is to see the evolution of Brzeziński's thinking even on this single page. French Pluriel collection, we can easily follow Brzeziński's thinking on this single page. Because then Brzeziński starts to say: First of all, there is a kind of state - I use the term - of stupefaction at the sudden implosion of this great power, which was the greatest state in the world and which is in the process of creating a strategic vacuum.

Brzeziński begins by saying that there is a kind of state of stupefaction (in my words) at the sudden implosion of such a great power, which was once the world's largest, but now creating what we can call a strategic vacuum. So Brzeziński says: we must not allow a strategic vacuum to develop. strategic vacuum to develop.

So we must try to encourage the development of democracy. the development of democracy. And then he starts to point to two threats: Never allow the possibility of a new power being born in Eurasia out of a spirit of revenge or frustration.

Do not allow an emergence of some new force in Eurasia driven by feelings of vengeance or discontent. It's very interesting, if you don't mind me saying so, because it's clear that we're completely in line with the thinking we've just been talking about: Eurasia, the pivot, Heartland. if you don't mind me saying so, because it's clear that we're completely in line with the perspective we've been discussing: Eurasia, the pivot, Heartland.

We were able, through a number of circumstances, to ensure that this power was repelled. ensure that this power was repelled. So it has to be maintained.

But there's something quite interesting at the bottom of the page: at one point he says ‘she’. on in this passage. At one point, he refers to it as: ‘she’.

So, obviously, we're talking about ‘her’, America. that ‘she’ is America. The biggest fear in this area is that political anarchy must not be allowed to take hold.

concerned the prevention of any sort of political anarchy. And here I'd like to stop for a moment, once we've closed the inverted commas, to make a point. for a second to make a point.

This means that the United States' fear is that Russia will implode. afraid that Russia would implode. And when you think about it, it's quite logical.

Because if all of a sudden, if we put ourselves in this hypothetical scenario, for the time being, of a Russia that would be defeated, or even imploded, as we have seen in a number of cases in history. let's assume this hypothetical scenario of a Russia defeated, or even imploded, as we have seen in a number of cases throughout history. Two problems would arise.

Firstly, there is the problem of managing Russia's nuclear arsenal. arsenal would be managed. If you'll excuse the pun, we're talking about 5,900 nuclear warheads.

5,900 nuclear warheads. But above all, if we imagine 15 States instead of just one, all of a sudden we create a complete imbalance, or even an air gap that could be used by another State. if we imagine 15 States instead of just one, all of a sudden it's a complete imbalance or vacuum that could be exploited by another State.

And what we're now realising is that we're in the process of drawing or sketching out a second nuance. drawing or sketching out a second nuance. Because the first nuance, which was rather budgetary, we realise now, and which could moreover be explained by a sort of nuance with regard to Russia, because we have the feeling that we must not let Russia win, but we must not necessarily ensure that it loses too much either.

related, and which could moreover be explained by a sort of nuance with regard to Russia, since the impression is that we shouldn't let Russia win, but we must not necessarily ensure that it loses too much either. Because we realise now, as we said at the beginning, that we are no longer totally in line with the objectives that we could spontaneously attribute to the Americans. the beginning, we can see that we are no longer totally in line with the objectives that we could easily attribute to the Americans.

There's one way of looking at things, and that's to see how we view the other, in this case Russia, the region, but there's also another way. and that's to see how we view the other, in this case Russia, the region, but there's also another way. It's about looking at the vision, the place and the nature of the United States today, the nature of its power and how that affects its objectives.

the place and the nature of the United States today, the nature of its power and how that affects its objectives. That's a fair point. The real question is: what is the nature of American power today?

what is the nature of American power today? And if we manage to define it, perhaps we'll bid on our nuance or our surprise. bid on our nuance or our surprise.

Why and what is it all about? What is your spontaneous idea of the United States? impression of the USA?

I can't help but make a connection, if you will, with an American series that is now obsolete, but whose title already says it all: Happy Days. illustrative link with an old American TV series that has now now been rendered obsolete, though its title says it all: Happy Days. Those happy or glorious times, interpreted by extension XX should I include thisZZ a golden period.

Because what are we talking about? This is the United States in the 1950s. And the United States in the 1950s, not shortened, is the United States in 1945.

is no less than the United States in 1945. And there are two figures for the United States in 1945 that are truly incredible. incredible figures for the US in 1945.

The USA accounted for 49% of global industrial output. The USA alone. And two-thirds of gold reserves are held by the United States alone.

of the world's gold reserves. So here we are dealing with a power that is first and foremost an economic or macroeconomic, monetary and industrial power. a power that is first and foremost an economic or macroeconomic, monetary and industrial power.

It's very clear. Obviously, this power is polymorphic. polymorphic.

It is a power with a military dimension. But this power has a military side and other political sides, but its fundamentals, its foundation, its first link is obviously macroeconomic power and monetary power. military dimension and other political dimensions, though its foundation and primary link is obviously macroeconomic and monetary power.

But is that still true today? true today? To perhaps extend our questioning, we're going to try to draw on the thoughts of two or three authors, if you will, who will enable us to support our thinking.

questioning by drawing on the works of two or three authors who can assist our exploration in this regard. When we look back at a book by Emmanuel Todd published in 2003, in particular the third chapter, Après l'Empire, on the decline of the United States of America, there is already some interesting thinking because it is mainly centred on an aggregate which, it's true, is important in macroeconomics, especially from a geopolitical perspective, and that is the balance of trade. in Chapter 3 of Emmanuel Todd's 2003 work After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order, mainly centred on an aggregate which, it's true, is important in macroeconomics, especially from a geopolitical perspective, namely the balance of trade.

And there's a totally interesting page here, because Emmanuel Todd's observation is that the United States is in the process of creating a new dynamic. interesting because Emmanuel Todd's observation is that the United States is in the process of creating a new dynamic. In other words, aren't they in the process of turning from a former producer to a consumer country?

the USA is shifting from a former producer to a consumer country? And to back up his point, he points out that from 2001 onwards, when you look at the figures objectively, they are very astonishing. with an objective analysis of figures from 2001 that are very astonishing.

Because when we look at the trade balance of the United States and America, we see that they are in deficit with all countries. reveals a country in deficit with every country. I said with all countries.

And I invite our audience to go and reread this third chapter, when they see the breakdown of the list of countries, which is astonishing, and across all sectors: primary, secondary and tertiary. our audience to read this third chapter, which contains an eye-opening breakdown of the list of countries, across all sectors: primary, secondary and tertiary. Todd's summary is that the United States is living on credit.

the United States is living on credit. This is the famous concept of the League of Delos. Athens ended up having a geopolitical power that could only be expressed through the credit it received from others.

with a geopolitical power that could only be be expressed through the credit it received from others. Credit that is both political and financial. 'd like to extend this line of reasoning, if I may, with a book by Graham Allison from the second decade of the 21st century.

reasoning with a book by Graham Allison from the second decade of the 21st century. Towards war, America and China in Thucydides' trap? China Escape Thucydides Trap?

Because even if it's not the primary objective, I recognise it. recognisable, after all. What's interesting is that Graham Allison, in order to show that we're heading for an increasingly intense rivalry between the two states mentioned above, is obliged to start with the first part, the awakening of China, which shows that the United States‘ economy is slowing down, while, on the other hand, we are reminded of the importance of speed if we are to avoid the temptation of Thucydides’ trap: the rise of a Chinese economy.

interesting rendition of the impending and increasingly intense rivalry between the USA and China, where he is obliged to start by describing the awakening of China, which shows that the United States‘ economy is slowing down, while, on the other hand, reminding us of just how important speed is to avoid the temptation of Thucydides’ trap: the rise of a Chinese economy. And we can see that over the twenty or so pages of this first part, we are presented with a succession of data and figures on the Chinese economy, each more astonishing than the last, not only in terms of the size of the figures they express, but also in terms of the speed at which they are evolving and the rise in power of China. so pages with a succession of data and figures on the Chinese economy, each more astonishing than the last, not only in terms of the magnitude of the figures they express, but also in terms of the speed at which they are evolving and the rise in Chinese power.

So we are, and I would insist with Allison, in the continuity of a nuance of American power which, a priori, would no longer be economic. in the continuity of a nuance of US power which, a priori, would no longer be economic. And then the question arises: what is its nature?

what is its nature? And then Paul Kennedy comes to our rescue in a major work in geopolitics that I really recommend to all our audiences: XXXXXXXXXX rescue with a recommended seminal work in geopolitics: The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change & Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. And here, in particular, there is an area that is very important to understand.

crucial to gain an understanding. What is this axis? Geopolitical power can be expressed in three main ways: economic and macroeconomic, political and military.

three main ways: economic and macroeconomic, political and military. And what is quite interesting is that Paul Kennedy's analysis of the great powers of geopolitics and the fundamental logics of geopolitics from the 16th century to the end of the 20th century points out that when powers, if they are born on monetary, industrial and economic logics, lose their economic power, they tend to compensate for this loss of economic power by outbidding themselves in military power. of the great powers of geopolitics and the fundamental logics of geopolitics from the 16th century to the end of the 20th century points out that if powers that are born on monetary, industrial and economic logics should lose their economic power, they tend to compensate for this loss of economic power by outbidding themselves in military power.

And in reality, they are seeking to maintain their political base, but by relying more on military power than on economic power. This is a key to understanding what the United States is doing in Ukraine, which I will explain further. Because to put it plainly, especially with the figures mentioned earlier, I want to make one more clarification.

This concerns the figure of 909. 4 billion dollars indicated on page 15 of the military balance of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. This is a particularly important piece of information.

The US military budget is slightly higher than the combined sum of the 14 budgets of the next states in terms of spending. Let's not misunderstand each other, so I will put this in other words. This means that from the second to the fifteenth largest military power in the world, the cumulative budget, shown on the chart, the American budget alone exceeds the cumulative sum of the 14 other largest military powers.

In light of this fact, the United States today is first and foremost a military power. Let's turn back to the logic, admittedly with a macroeconomic counterpart, admittedly a polymorphous power, but what we're realising is that in reality we're dealing with a power that has completely reversed its vectors. It's not the same at all.

Why should that be crucial to our topic? Because it poses the question of objectives. A fortiori in a war, we can legitimately expect a military power to invest enormously, including from a military point of view.

The impression we get is one of restraint. However, another factor should be taken into account. We focused on Europe and Eastern Europe.

One further geopolitical player should not be overlooked. You mentioned it in passing, particularly in relation to the economic question. Right.

In fact, it is the sole player with which the United States is concerned right now. To ensure that our audience fully grasps our approach, everything the United States is doing in Ukraine today can only be understood by looking at another player that Washington considers as its main competitor: China. Because with a good look at current events, we cannot fail to note this US intervention (a term which I'll stress now but perhaps I'll use another later in my conclusion), and that it is measured.

But why? I'd like to point out three reasons for this perspective. The first is that the Americans, in relation to China, and I do mean in relation to China, cannot 'not' intervene in Ukraine.

I mean that the Americans are not intervening in Ukraine. Of course for the Ukrainians, yet they have clearly grasped the implications of a failure to intervene in Ukraine, especially in the wake of the perceived setback in Afghanistan with the withdrawal from Kabul on 15 August 2021. China could interpret that as either weakness or disinterest, which would then encourage China to pursue its objectives further, which refers directly to Taiwan.

We explored the vital importance of Taiwan in geopolitics right now in one of our previous sessions. A balance is struck by not interfering too much either. Because that could be the knee-jerk response to what we're saying.

Because if you intervene too much, what happens? You may give the impression that you are totally sucked into a local situation, bogged down, to use the image of Vietnam. That would also encourage a rival power, who will get the impression that it may be the right right moment or the right strategic time to intervene while you are actually bogged down entirely elsewhere.

Moving from this first argument of balance in the intervention, putting all the arguments mentioned today into perspective, we clearly see that the intervention is relatively measured in terms of figures, geostrategic culture and even historical perspective. The second interesting point concerns the lesson that the USA has taken from its respective campaigns in the first and second decades of the 21st century, namely that it cannot continue spreading itself out too thin. As we explored in the session on the Chinese army, the Chinese rise as an economic and military power makes the need to stop spreading itself out too thin absolutely imperative.

In fact, this was the thrust of US President Biden's speech in late August 2021. He said that it was absolutely essential for the US to regroup and refocus on the real geopolitical issues. In fact, it was quite clear, even if the innuendo was still there.

A third vector also merits mentioning, because it adds to everything we've just explored. Let's thus turn to the resources and dynamics that the USA is setting up in South-East Asia. 50,000 US soldiers are currently stationed in Japan.

There are 30,000 US soldiers in South Korea right now. Let's examine where the USA is really concentrating its efforts to weave a network of alliances, also in efforts to contain a power that seems to be in its way: AUKUS and QUAD. AUKUS and QUAD, which were also mentioned in a previous session, and which we can clearly see that if we combine them both at the same time, even if they have different rationales, we see Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom and India.

If I may. The United States of America is no doubt fixated on China's rise to power and that, paradoxically perhaps, everything taking place in Ukraine, which would by extension also apply to other sectors, is being staged primarily in view of the rivalry with China. This last point reveals the coherence of American policy and geopolitics.

Shall we now summarise all this to gain a wider perspective? Yes. That would be important.

A qualification that most closely describes American action in Ukraine and US objectives in Ukraine is that they are calibrated. They are calibrated with great care and precision. Because what do we see when we look closely?

Can you really say that they are calibrated? It is because the Americans don't want a Russian victory, which they think would lead to the rebirth of a great power in Eastern Europe in terms of Heartland and the Containment we explored earlier. Yet it's calibrated because they don't want a decisive defeat of Russia.

This conclusion can be drawn from Brzeziński's comments, a vantage point that helps us see much further. The vacuum that was euphemistically referred to earlier would obviously make China much more powerful in the regions of Eastern Siberia if Russia were to implode. We would end up with exactly the opposite of what the Americans want.

Also calibrated because we can clearly see that, in line with previous comments, if Washington does not intervene at all in Ukraine, we can only be surprised at the lack of reaction from a power that is still the world's leading geopolitical power, though less of a unilateral power than we might have realised 10 or 15 years ago. Hubert Védrine called the USA a hyper-power, but it remains a power with a response that is calibrated, because it should not get too involved either, because we can clearly see a dispersion that could encourage China. This brings us to a second very important point.

It is clear that the American objectives in relation to Ukraine are politically driven. This political objective, which is obviously legitimate for the Americans from the USA's point of view, is that for the Americans it is necessary, through these actions, to remain the leading geopolitical power in the world and that all actions are taken to show that the Americans should able to perpetuate this role. And frankly, you can't blame the United States for defending American interests.

This leads us to a conclusion. Recall how Carl Von Clausewitz made it clear that in all matters of war or geopolitics, if you wanted to win and indeed end the war, you must have a clear political objective. We can thus complete the circle in terms of dynamics, by mentioning yet another player we haven't mentioned at all.

Is it really that obvious? You could also ask them the same question. Because when we start understanding what the American objectives are and the American political reasons for intervening in Ukraine, we could perhaps ask ourselves what the objectives of the European Union and the Europeans are in Ukraine.

I think that, given everything we've said, this becomes a real question. I don't have the answer. Perhaps we'll be able to answer in a future Rendez-Vous de la Géopolitique.

Thanks, Fabrice. Thank you. That wraps up another session of Rendez-Vous de la Géopolitique.

Thank you, everyone, for following us.