Good evening everybody Welcome to the collegio car Alberto I'm really pleased to open this forum which is the CPR European conference on household Finance for 2023 I'm very pleased that uh uh that the the colleg car Alberto has been the seat for several European CPR European conferences this year we had awit we are having another one on industrial organization later on and we keep Organizing conferences jointly with CPR which is very important because the collegio is an institution that is at the heart and at the core of European intellectual thinking and European economic analysis so
CPR is the obvious partner and we're very very pleased to work with them of course this uh this conference has been organized by many different institutions from the National Bank of Denmark from ADC business school and Queen Mary and other institution the List is very long so I certainly forgot some of them and I'm sorry about this and uh I'm really pleased that we have a very extraordinary International audience and uh I have to thank joavan nikano for really uh being behind this conference I think we wanted to organize it if I don't remember if
I don't remember wrongly we already wanted to organize it when Co started and so we couldn't do it because there was coid so finally we Manage a lot of things are happening after coid and uh and and really thinking out about pensions you want to say something no yeah also lauron calve lauron calve yes I was about to read your notes gave me very detailed notes of all the people I should I should be I should be thanking so yes Francisco Gomez L exactly it was written on the paper so I haven't said it yet
but I was going to say it and I Also very it's very important that we're talking about pension because really this house is the house of the Italian pension forms and as you all know and Elsa and before her and with her her master or nor castellino were really two big drivers two big triggers and to they made most of the analytical thinking for a lot of the pension reforms in Italy and their work was extremely influential so it's very interesting that we discuss pension here uh and uh in in this International framework and I'm
really please we do that this is a good accomplishment for IL Coler and thank you Elsa for all the work you have been doing and you're doing for IL Colo actually we are having a a policy panel today and uh with Elsa and Mario padulla and Steven zeldes that will be the panelist and Monica Pella will be the moderator of this panel and of course then tomorrow and and tomorrow there will be a lot of tomorrow and Friday a Very very intense program with very interesting paper so I'm really pleased that we are having all
this activity here um I I I want to thank all the staff of Il Colo of course for as I see Sylvia somewhere there for organizing all this and for working on that on this program and also CPR that of course was very active in organizing the conference and besides for Colo the other sponsors are also and then CPR of course also esas who is the Department of Economics One of the two Department of Economics of the University of tyin so welcome to you all and I'm not going to say any more silly things here
as an introduction so I leave you the floor and uh I I'm sure it would be a very interesting and fascinating panel and Conference thank you very much for being here thank you okay should be okay so thank you very much it's really a pleasure to chare This panel on pensions and thinking forward and um I will uh start by introducing the panelist and then uh motivate the discussion for uh which is the topic of the the panel so the first panelist is uh Professor Elsa foro Elsa foro is honorary professor of Economics at uh
the University of Torino so a university here and she's the the scientific coordinator of the center for research on pension and uh welfare policy which She uh is she started in 1999 and uh this was the first center um devoted to search on pensions in Italy from November 2011 through April 2013 Elsa served as minister of Labor social policies and equal opportunities and in this role she conceived and implemented a major pension reform that was an important step towards uh intergenerational equity in pensions and towards balancing the budget Now the second panelist is Professor mar
Mario padulla who's professor of Economics at the University of Venice kusari and uh uh Mario's research is mainly in the area of pension uh and the financial literacy until last March Mario uh acted as chairman of the National Authority responsible for the supervision of the supplementary pension system and uh among other things he act actively contributed to the consolidation of the Market for Pension funds and to increase second and third uh pillar participation by those segments uh of workers who participate the least and would benefit the most from participation which are uh young workers now
um the third panelist is uh Professor Zelda who is uh Benjamin Rosen professor of economics and finance at Columbia University he his research actively examined a wide range of issues related To Social Security reforms the design of benefit of defined benefit contribution systems and the measurement of defined benefit pension liabilities Steve co-authored two studies awarded the ti AA craft Paul Samuelson Awards a paper on precautionary saving and social insurance winner of the 1996 certificate of excellence award and then a study with title Social Security money's worth which was the winner of The Paul samelson award
so it's really a pleasure to have you here now before um handing the floor to Elsa and then Mario and Steve I would like to uh show to present a few slides to motivate the need to think forward when it comes to pension now what is a probably the main reason is uh the well-known phenomenon of uh aging populations but uh uh there is also a Second reason which is uh more strictly related to the current economic situation uh but can be expected to have a long-term impact on pensions which has to do with uh
the recent surge of inflation and the fact that in defined contribution or uh notional defined contribution systems uh contributions are related to earnings and earnings are only partially indexed to inflation or um indexed with some delay and as a Consequence contributions paid in now may result inadequate for pensions 20 or 30 years ahead but uh let me start with uh the Aging of population wait okay so this is an issue for most industrialized country and it is the result of two Trends one is increased longevity people living longer and uh the other is the declining
the decline In fertility so fewer children being born and the latest figures for Italy set the fertility rate of Italian women at 1.3 so this sh these charts show the uh old age dependency ratio which is the ratio of people above 64 to the number of people of working age aged 14 to 64 and uh what we can see is that the old age dependency ratio has increased dramatically everywhere between so we have the first sorry the first chart is 1950 then uh we have 197 20 2000 and 2021 and actually on the UN website
there was a nice video with a progression but I wasn't able to include it in the slides so I took a few snapshots but uh this gives you an idea of uh how the phenomenon has uh progressed over time and uh here there are a few numbers we can see that between 1950 and 19 and 2020 the old age dependency ratio has gone from um sorry from 13 to 26 in the US has gone from 16 to 30 in the UK 14 to 30 in Germany and from 8 to 51% in Japan so from the
perspective of social protect protection uh an aging population raises several issues that range from Health uh labor market but uh if we stick to pensions the main problems are related to the fact that most P most retire most people rely on retire on retirement benefits which are paid which are paid by the the state and Most public pension systems are B are pay as you go and with aging population what we have what we have is that the number of benefit recipients increases whereas the number of uh people contributing to the system shrinks so what
governments do to pay pensions they rely on general tax revenues and this creates or raises budgetary Problems to address this got most governments have adopted a set of reforms and essentially there are two main types of reforms that governments can adopt and that have been adopted by most governments in industrialized countries in the recent past which go from the parametric adjustments of a structural characteristics of the pension system which means raising retirement age raising the r rates of contribution revising the benefit Calculation formulas and alternative has been to take more systemic reform moving the system
towards defined contribution fully funded pillar inside or more often outside existing publish public pension schemes however related to these two reforms we can make a couple of points the first is that the effect of these reforms is not immediate what we can see here is that despite the fact that most governments especially in the EU area Have adopted quite dramatic reforms to keep uh to address the fiscal uh the budgetary problem linked to the payment of Pensions still what we see is that uh public pension expenditure as a share of GDP is increasing in many
countries and uh if we take the EU we see that on average pension expenditure is going to Peck around 200 uh around 2045 and only in 20 7 2070 is going to be back to the current levels which are considered high and uh unsustainable for Many countries but the second issue related to this reform is that what the reforms have done has been either to reduce the um pension coverage ratio or to reduce the benefit ratio pens reducing the the coverage the pension coverage ratio means reducing the number of people receiving a pension and this
is typically done uh either uh raising retirement age or moving the systems Towards a second pillar outside the public system um but more importantly what has happened is that there has been a decrease in the benefit ratio the benefit ratio is uh the ratio of pension expenditure to wages and uh we see here what is the expected to happen from now and 2007 what we see is that over the next 50 year the average EU pension benefit ratio will decline by 10 percentage Points with a peaks of over 20 percentage points in Spain Portugal Greece
and Poland which is not in this uh in this chart now the public pension benefit ratio is a measure of the generosity of a pension system and when it declines too much issues of pension adequacy arise pension adequacy refers to the capacity of a pension system to keep uh to uh keep living standard for retire is adequate and high Enough now um to offset this or to uh reduce this or to address dispension adequacy issue that are the second and third pillar which are uh which are typ uh whose investment is uh strongly encouraged by
governments but whose diffusion especially in Europe remains quite low and what we have here is a chart that shows the distribution of a pension assets which in at the end of 2021 amounted to over 60 trillions dollar worldwide but we can see from the chart that in Europe if we exclude the UK uh Norway sorry Sweden Switzerland and Belgium and the Netherlands essentially there is very limited participation and uh among the possible explanations for this there are the contribution rates to public pensions which have been rising which many governments have been rising over time and
here we have a summary of the Contribution rates of some European countries and we can see that they range from 177% of Sweden to 35% of Portugal so this could explain why in countries such as Italy where the contribution rate is around 33% invest investment and participation in the second and third pillar are very low and uh investment or participation In the second and third pillar is the topic that Mario and Steve will address in their contribution uh but now I'm leaving here a couple of points for discussion later and um and over to Elsa
who will tell us about first pillar reform okay okay thank you very much uh I'm happy to be here I like uh participating in discussion with particularly with the young because I've Discovered that uh their knowledge and their confidence on pensions in almost all countries that I visited being invited to um is very low generally there is no confidence the young say well I will not have any penion so why do you ask me my opinion on public pension this is the typical answer uh but this is also due to a lot of misunderstanding and
the misunderstanding in terms of Pensions And pension reforms are quite widespread first I would like to say one thing believe me believe me there is a huge huge difference between studying pension reforms in your office in a university discussing with colleagues developing ideas and having to enact a reform which changes individual plans uh not marginally and uh when you have to do This in 15 20 days it's really difficult it's something that in a model cannot be embedded cannot be formalized um so in case they ask you to become a pension Minister think twice this
is my first advice um where do I move this ah thank you so there is in my presentation some overlapping with what Monica has just said but I want to start with basic Because I said there is a lot of misunderstanding so first I would like to say what is a pension a pension is not a financial product a pension as inherently an insurance component because it's something that can give you a kind of security for a period in which normally you don't earn an income and it says okay I will pay this maybe an
amount which is fixed nominally and so it does not guarantee against inflation but until you are Alive I provide you this flow until you are alive and if you want I can give more I can give a Survivor benefit in case you have a dependent wife or dependent children when you die and so it's quite important to have this insurance in mind I say this again because many people think I've paid I want my money back your money back can be given but it does not guarantee you until you are alive first second a public
pension okay we can buy anui is In the marketplace but we you all know being Economist being young Economist to do research you know that the market for annuities is thin everywhere and has a lot of uh uh shortages a lot of defects and so well sometimes governments try to promote participation in in funded pillars in private components but it's not the same thing so I I do not go into the origin of These public schemes but the origin were the mutuality people wanted to share risk and they understood that if they were let's say
workers in a given sector in a a coal mine they needed to stick together to share risk risk that somebody would be uh disabled following an accident or would left a widow and so on and so on so this uh sharing of risk is fundamental the state at one point well No the third element is risk is everywhere is everywhere in the funded and unfunded pillars of the pension scheme in the micro perspective as well as in the macro perspective because we have shocks um that were not predicted and they are big shocks and they
are macro shocks um and uh the only possibility is to try to have integrated schemes so that risk is differentiated as much much as possible but the origin of a public Pension scheme was a financial crisis we have to remember this because uh um in the middle of the two World War many schemes were funded but at one point it was uh it was seen that the reserves were not enough to pay they were simply not enough so the State the government said but do we really need reserves to pay for pensions no we well
the state has infinite Horizon not like an insurance company and so we may say okay you are the Workers you pay contribution I I establish compulsory participation so that no one can escape the scheme but I use immediately the money that I get from your contribution to pay for their pensions this is the origin of the payo you pay they receive why do you pay because you have well first of all because you are obliged but second nobody ask you whether you want or not but in any case what happens is that you Also pay
because you have confidence that in the future there will be when you will be here here there will be other young people paying contribution which will be used to pay for your pension so it's a a kind of schemes that uh nourishes itself in a way so this is the pay as you go Monica has already said that there are three uh basic elements that can support a Pugo uh scheme one is demography and we have demographic Problems particularly Southern European countries Italy in particular Greece also uh we have demographic problems um of course world
population is still increasing but I also have a graph and you see that on the left hand side you see that word population will go into negative rate of change around two well now now almost now and so a total population will start likely very likely to decrease but look at the Blue Line uh we have been for well a decade now 10 years now we have been in the negative so our population is projected to decrease someone say by 20 million out of 60 million people Italy will decrease by 20 million uh by 200100
I don't know we'll see you will see not me in any case uh the difference between the the birth rate and mortality is uh the reason okay but going back again the first element is demography if you rely on this Intergenerational contract I said before you need to know that when you will be there among the old there will be enough young people who work and who pay contributions to pay for your pensions because no reserves are set aside except in Norway where they found a very well very nice um uh fund from petrol from
oil and so they established a fund which was established exactly for future generation they were thinking ahead Before we did in any case second growth economic growth that is often forgotten but I said before intergenerational contract so you pay contribution on your earnings an established tax rate payroll tax rate 33% in Italy uh okay and then you will be there and imagine that the Next Generation following you as labor force is increasing by n the rate of growth of The labor force okay and then it's also increasing its productivity so next generation will be more
productive and so the earnings will be higher so they will pay higher pension to you because the system does not need to have surpluses and so it's like you are now invested investing in human capital you are investing you will get a return which is the internal equilibrium rate Of return of a pay youo system a return which is approximately n the rate of population growth the labor force growth plus G productivity growth so when people say well but if I put my money in financial activities assets I get a return I get a return
which is r and if I put my money at the imps which is our pension Institute what do I get it is very very difficult to explain that potentially they get a return and the return is given by the rate of growth of The economy approximated by the rate of growth of the labor force and the productivity okay the sum of the two uh so I say in one case if you follow Pension funds uh then you invest in financial activity but if you are in the pension peso pension system in this intergenerational contract your
return is given is given by investment in human capital it's number of workers plus the rate of increase in Productivity and the third element is public no Market here so it's public where do we democracies established rules laws in Parliament so the third element is democracy and politics okay and so Pol politics establish the retirement age establish the tax rate establishes the pension formula the generosity of the pension formula is given by the difference between the present value of your future Benefit and the present value of the contribution that you have paid we said that
in equilibrium you can get and plus G and this is sustainable but if politics say no I want to give them more then your rate of return is increased somewhat artificially and it is not sustainable if it is permanent if you don't have let's say a source of income supporting the promises then the system becomes unsus Sustainable okay uh if it is here demographic winter in Europe we have most of countries in Europe will lose put the migration into the perspective of Europe as a whole losing something like 40 million people in the next 4
years while the opposite side of the Mediterranean Sea the African countries facing the Mediterranean Sea will increase their population by 200 million no way to stop them no way okay uh that can be my my let's say very Short um assertion for migration is that no migration can fix a pension system which per se is unsustainable but migration can be useful to oppose the effect of population aging on pension here is the old age dependency already Monica has thought about this this I've already uh told you um investing in human capital and getting n plus
G so it means that economics matter and look here what I call the Italian disease which is lack of growth if I take here We stop before the coid coid changed everything and even now the good uh uh the good growth that we have is not sufficient to compensate for the 20 years of very very moderate growth that in comparison with other countries we have had so our problem when when we say it is structural and our problem main problem is called lack of growth and this is why parenthesis the PNR that is the plan
for um resilience And recovery and resilience for us is very important because it is structural and because it can be an investment to raise potential growth okay directions for reform so reforms are needed because sustainability is not uh uh defined precisely but uh when you have as a country you have all International Organization the EU commission the World Bank the IMF uh all of them the Evaluators they say you have to to enact reforms you have to enact reforms every time a report is issued the recommendation is this and what do you do you do
a reform and what are the direction for reform if increase effective retirement age this is more controversial link retirement age to longevity which we did now it is it has been stopped and till 2026 this um U indexation of retirement age to Longevity has been stopped by the way we had a reduction of longevity During the coid period so it would that would have been uh let's say positive element in the calculation but uh it it is stopped anyway this is quite controversial we made discuss this if you want boost employment opportunities encourage participation in
supplementary private pension then reduce Privileges and made Make redistribution clear we are talking of a public pension system so solidarity needs to be a feature of a public pension system even when you move in the direction of DC formula which means you pay a 100 and in Actuarial term you receive a 100 that is Actuarial neutrality of the DC it's not perfect of course but then you need to have a solidarity what kind of forms can solidarity take for example you are unemployed you are looking for a job but You are unemployed and and the
state out of General taxation which is Progressive and not proportional as um payroll taxes are can pay uh contributions for you during the period in which you are unemployed or the period in which you are out of work because you have care activities to do for example maternity or well parental leaves or um absence for work because you have a person in the house that needs to be Looked after permanently okay uh and then attention to transitional issues this I I can just say that if you are in an emergency and you have to do
in a fortnite attention to transitional um issues is difficult to be obtained okay um Europe is converging towards a good design there is some convergence I do not want to take much time but what I say is that there have been a general movement toward DC more DC pensions Retirement ages have been raised access condition to early retirement have been tightened um benefit indexation this is everywhere once the indexation of pension benefits uh was to wages meaning that there were two components prices and real wage growth the second one is been cut almost everywhere in
Europe uh well decades ago now we have only prices and very very imperfectly then transparency prefunding it means participating in um Now I have three minutes more or no yes tell me three minutes why is pension reform so difficult think of macron in the end he succeeded uh but it was very difficult he said that the pension reform should have been the first thing in his first mandate not the second one it did in the second one and he had the country against and he wanted and he did uh increase the retirement age by two
years so by some other country standard this Is not a very harsh reform in any case uh it's difficult because mainly because you know in politics there is a tendency toward looking not in to the future but looking in the very short term because typically they look at the next election and the next election are month um away not years not decades away so um you you talk to the electorate and uh one of the most popular thing for the elector is to say that either you reduce retirement age or You increase pension or you
improve indexation and this makes the political party supporting this measure quite popular if you have to say no we have to increase we have to increase retirement age or to this is very unpopular also because as I said well um the reform is mainly in the interest of the young but the Young electorally are uh well weit less and participate less to the election this is everywhere in Europe true I don't know In the US and then it's a it's an issue per permeated by ideological value um judgments so people for example think in terms
of acquired right it is my own right I was promised this and if you say okay it was promised but it was promised to you without specifying that those who need or will need or are just now paying for your pions are poorer than you are poorer is this social justice no in my view not but it is Difficult to convince people and so well the final thing is this is about the famous um jeanclaude Yun aphorism you know this because it's is quite famous now he said um well we all know what has to
be done what we don't know is how to get reelected once we have done it which is very very um cynical I say and the answer is quite simple well if you know and they don't why don't you Explain that's why I am really convinced that social dialogue but also um education Financial education basic Financial education is essential in a paper we try to demonstrate that where financial literacy not just um general education is higher pension reforms are politically less costly and we demonstrated it and so I'm very proud and I think there is a
cause to change the Paradigm for pension Reform I am finished thank you very [Applause] much so now I'm uh very happy to hand over to my who will talk about issues related to his experience at the National Authority supervising the market for Pension funds okay thanks uh thanks a lot let me start with you know a few things first I want to uh thank professors nikano Cal and Gomez for for the invitation I really appreciated that I mean it's for Me it's a way to be back home I work on these topics and you know
I I know the group from its very start it's a it's an an excellent group made of excellent researchers and I warmly invite all of you to come you know tomorrow and the day after tomorrow to the conference because there are number of very nice papers uh that will be presented then I I want to thank Professor georgo baranti for the introduction Professor Pella for the nice word for doing an excellent job In setting the stage for our you know panel for for the conversation that hopefully we're going to have afterwards from you know from
with your contribution as well and of course I'm it's a pleasure and an honor for me to share the the panel with professor foro and Professor zeldes which I I want to thank them for for accepting to be here despite I was here as well and um and of course I thank all of you for for having the patience and Being here and with us and and possibly chatting with us afterwards on on pension and um now you know acknowledgements are fine now it's apologies uh let me apologize for the title you know it's not
very exciting and the subtitle is possibly even worse I mean he hting at you know an ancient Greek Greece meth but it's just a for lack of better ideas but anyway I try to you know talk about a little bit what I You know about how the private pension system in Italy works also trying to write you know to draw comparisons with with other countries just to make you to appreciate what is you know special in in the Italian system what is different from what happens in other countries and also what is actually similar because
in many dimensions we as Italians are not that special as we think actually we are similar to many others in um in many respects I think I need to okay that's The machine to sorry sorry okay very good okay to do so you know to provide you with some knowledge of the private pension system let me give you first some institutional background okay first of all you know enrollments and contributions to the private pension system in Italy are not mandatory are completely voluntary I mean people might decide to be or not to be enrolled to
a private Pension funds and I will clarify in a Second what do we mean by private Pension funds they might decide whether or not they want to contribute as a matter of fact one issue that we have in Italy is that actually many people were actually a r do not contribute which for the reason I'm going to give you in a second is is a pathology of the system it's not very good thing and private pension system were existing I mean are existing in Italy actually since a lot lot of time actually it's They are
very uh old in some for some uh group of workers especially for workers in the banking and insurance sectors I mean for obvious reasons while for the generality of workers you know the Pension funds started become available in in the late '90s I mean the the major reforms in for Pension funds is in dates 199 3 that phase is it's not by chance I mean that that phase was the phase in which you know the transition from the pure pay DB system towards the a more DC System started also for public uh pensions and um
you know the the the the Pension funds which were already existing in in the '90s are called pre-existing Pension funds I want to give you the name not because the name is important in itself but because it's going it's going to help me to give you some some numbers after afterward the the system as I was mentioning you know started taking off at the end of the 9s The the the most important the largest uh Italian pension fund was funded in 1997 is the Fonda that's what it's called it's the Pension funds for metal workers
and mechanical engineers Pension funds in Italy are um you know as I will mention in a second but anyway let me say this now is um you know many Pension funds are based on the National Labor contracts and are sector for industrial sector Pension funds this is different from from what happens in Other countries where you know employer Pension funds are actually sort of firm pension funds um but in Italy I mean that the idea was to to have this sort of very large um sector pension Pension funds Beyond Pension funds the other pension fund
Beyond pre-existing Pension funds and the closed Pension funds which are you know the funds I was mentioning anchored to the initial contracts which are comparable to the 401K in the US if Some of you is familiar with with it uh there are you know the so-called open Pension funds which are offered by Banks insurance and asset management companies which are both Collective and uh individual in terms of enrollment and then the the the third category is this um uh pip individual pension plans these are more Insurance products which are offered by uh by insurance company
and the enrollment is on an individual basis okay let me Give some numbers about the system just to sort of um to give you an idea of how the system is you know if it is large or not um in in total in Italy there are 332 Pension funds okay operating this number has been decreased the number of Pension funds operating in Italy has been decreasing over time okay because the the system is actually consolidating which is a good news actually because consolidating means basically making you know saving in in costs basically the Number of
accounts is is about 10 Millions accounts are different it's a different number from Members because there are you know people who are actually workers who are actually enrolled in more than one pension fund which is not necessarily actually a good idea because you pay some fees basically twice without you know getting much in terms of diversification and then the asset under management are around 200 billions I mean the first question you May ask and and I asked myself when I started you know working on on on on the private pension system is you know whether
or not the system is it's large is it large or is it small what do you think is it large or is it small okay you know how do we judge whether it's large one way to judge it is is basically to to look at um you know to compare the uh to compare the Italian pension system with uh you know with a private pension system with You know private pension systems of other countries around the world okay and which is something I will do in a second before let me provide you with some uh
some other numbers which are also telling me something about the dimension of the Italian private pension system uh numbers which have to do with the with participation both at the extensive and at the Intensive margin you know the participation rate you know tells us how many workers are actually Covered you know Pension funds one way or another in in general pension systems as Professor foro was telling us are designed are conceived to ensure against longevity risk you know the risk of surviving uh you know the resources that you accumulated during you your uh your working
life that's what you know pension systems um actually actually do then the question is you know what is the fraction of population which is active population workers population Which is covered by by Pension funds in Italy this fraction is uh 36.2% which is um again I leave it for for later on to say whether this is a large or a small number contributions are on average uh just below 3,000 EUR per year you know these numbers takes into account the fact that there are many as I was mentioning before actually there there is a large
fraction of members who do not contribute at all on an on on a yearly basis and even for More years um for several years however you know these numbers and this is very typical with Italian numbers uh hide large differences for instance this is one difference I want to point out to you but there are other differences which are equally relevant here I I'll plot you know basically two graphs for to to show you the differences in terms of you know the Intensive and the extensive margin of participation to Pension funds across Geographic areas and
you know this is the the usual divides that we see for Italy north in the Northern Italy participation rate are higher and average contribution are higher compared to Southern Italy you have similar divide between males and females according to age I mean you know in many ways the private the Italian private pension systems reflects the many divides that we see in the Italian Society then these are these number Numbers are not really surprising but just to tell you that you know as usual the average numbers then hide you know profound uh differences between people people
and then let me get to the answer to the question is the system big okay this graph is plotting asset under management over GDP which is a measure of uh arguably is a measure of the size of penion system for for a number of countries first you know new apology the the the labels are are in Italian but Are very I think are quite easy to to to understand Italy is basically not very you know asset under management divided by by uh by GDP is not a very uh large number it's below 10% then it's
not a very large number by International comparison which you know leads uh which you know drives many people to think okay the system is is small compared to the other to the other countries but then let me give you this other graph and this is plotting um um on on The on the vertical axis the uh contribution rate to the Social Security to the first pillar to be precise and to the against on the horizontal axis asset and their management divided by GTP and you see that there is a gradient which is an negative uh
gradient which is uh you know perhaps not very surprising I mean in countries where the Social Security or the first pillar contribution rate is higher and Italy is the example in that front because Italy Is one of the highest uh social security contribution rate um the the size of the um of the other pillars uh is uh is um is small okay then you know the Italian private pension system is small but is not that small because we have to factor in the fact that you know that the contribution to the first pillar is uh
is is very high the first pillar is is big uh is big in Italy okay now let me move on to something on uh uh tax and and and Financial regulation I I try to be as quick as possible and not giving you too many details but just the most important things because I think this are you know that's useful for for us to you know to have a discussion later on maybe te tax regulation tax regulation in Italy is is entirely set by the national law okay this is because I mean Italy is part
of the European Community but you know the tax law is outside the it's not it's not the kind of matter uh The European um you know the EU um cannot be legislated at the U level I mean it's legislated at at the mostly at the national level while Financial regulation is both National and and European level why this is important to take into account because you know when it comes to I mean we are very far from that actually but when it comes to you know conceiving um a European you know pension system we are
very far from that But but when it comes to that I mean we need uh you know the standard the rules to be the same across across uh across you know European countries I mean of course we are very far from that we are not like the us there is I mean the yes there is one social security number for all states then you have state p funds as well but the Social Security is one for us in in Europe that's not the case but there are you know there something has been done in the
last few years in Trying at least on the uh private pension second and third pillar Dimension trying to do some pan European product it's not easy it's not easy because for instance since the tax regulation is National based we have different you know across European countries there are different tax uh regimes different tax models and I think Steve is going to talk about you know the tax models the tax regimes for Pension funds lat on in Italy we have You know the so-called uh ET model uh Italy is a bit uh strange in that respect
because in most of most of European countries actually adopt the E model the uh and actually most countries in general adopt the ET model the ET model means that contributions to Pension funds are taxed deductible up to a maximum which is uh about 5,000 Euro returns are taxed 20% and benefit are taxed um I mean it's a you know with a with I mean it's it's Not the standard tax rate it's a separate Taxation and the tax rate varies is between 15% to 9% depending on number of years of enrollment okay Financial regulation I mean
just in in a single word I mean it's complicated animal but in a single word is based in a single sentence is based on The Prudent man approach even though there are uh in you know in the in the National Financial regulation there are some portfolio Constraints okay there are for inance I mean I would say for instance there are portfolio constraints on liquid assets are not really binding I mean the portfolio says for liquid assets states that you know Pension funds cannot invest more than 30% 30% of their asset in liquid asset I mean
30% in of you know it's a lot actually you know any sensible Pension funds should not go that far anyway Uh but anyway I mean there are these uh this these constraints how the system work okay a few words about how the system work before going to the issue I want to talk about okay Pension funds in Italy are defined contribution schemes okay there are very few exceptions among the pre-existing funds but the system is a defined contribution system is uh is based on individual capitalization I mean this you know belongs basically to the transition
from from the more DB kind of systems to more DC kind of system I mean in Italy from its very start the system was designed to be a DC system but this is not the you know the prevalent DC you know uh individual capitalization fully funded this is not the prevalent model in Europe for instance there are countries for instance in the Netherlands for years the preent model has been uh DB now also In the Netherlands there is a transition I mean there the transition is actually it's a long lasting transition which is not ended
yet towards you know a more DC kind of um based model the contributions are invested in financial markets in international financial markets which is good because that's a way for for for for members to diversify their portfolio because you know the first pillar is comp as Professor horo was telling us The first pillar is you know is completely anchored to the Italian economy then if the Italian economy goes well uh you know the pension benefits uh the expected pension benefits increase if the the Italian economy does not grow then the expected uh pension F benefit
relatively decrease then you know having a second and the third pillar uh investing in international Capital markets is a way for you know for for Pension funds Members to to diversify their their pension portfolio the investment is uh again this is a bit different from what happens in other in other countries the investment is actually uh in a closer uh in contractual closer Pension funds is not direct is indirect invest they they invest through mandates they don't do it on their on their own while of course you know the the open Pension funds which are
offered by Banks insurance or asset management companies of course They're they directly invest in financial markets pension Ben benefits are paid as a lump sum up to 50% of the capitalized sum of contribution or as an annuity okay I will not talk about you know the annuity market today but I think this is you know the annuity Market is really an issue in Italy because it's virtually not existent is a you know for a number of reasons that we know very well I mean it's a difficult Market everywhere there Are a number of failures but
you know this is a little bit of a a big problem but I will I prefer to focus on something else uh today they might you know Pension funds okay let me uh skip this provideed and and what I want to focus on now is basically the investment choices okay uh again in that respect Italy is different to other countries but similar uh to you know there are difference and Similarities with other countries in Italy the way it works is that Pension funds offer at most for investment choices to pension fund members okay which means
and this four choices are ranked according to the posture to to equity you know there is one portfolio one line which is basically no equity which is very similar to what is called the guaranteed contract investment in the US and then there is a there is a second line which is more Bond oriented With less than 30% uh equities then there is a third line which is called balanced between 30 and 50% and then the equity oriented which is at least 50% % okay these are called also sub funds okay and here is what you
know this is for uh um the last year 200 last year is 2022 but more or less the same picture is for for for every year you know most clarify question is this new new Investment or is it the stock stock the stock yeah okay uh the the stock is is basically out of the the asset is is divided between you know um actually this is the yes is the stock and uh you know most people actually are in the guaranteed you know the no equity uh line okay I leave it up to you to
judge whether this is good or not my judgment is uh that that this is not entirely good for several reasons okay let me Show you first uh this graph this graph is uh giving us um is giving us the annualized returns you know uh from computed from using data from 2013 and 2022 and you see that this guarantee contract is is earning very little compared to uh to the other to the other uh uh to the other lines which is not surprising one thing that three minutes okay I manage one thing that I should say
is that and again this is different From what happens for instance in the US you know in the US people uh tend to or might tend to spread you know the contribution across the different uh lines this is also possible in Italy I mean you can spread the contribution across the different lines can switch without incurring any additional cost from one line to the other then there is plenty of flexibility however Italians don't do I mean what happens is that people end up Staying in the enrollment uh in the enrollment line and uh the guaranteed
um uh contract is actually the default enrollment line because we also have the default op option in Italy which is important um to understand why many people are actually in the default in in the guarantee contract but it's not the only reason it's not the only reason I mean it's not that we see all these people in the Guaranteed investment Contex not just because this is default option because actually out enrollment self enrollment in Italy is not very pervasive you know people make an explicit enrollment they they want they say they want to a rooll
I mean by the way actually the system is is designed of course you know there is an implicit message I mean if the message is you know the guaranteed contract is the default option that must mean to Many people that this is the right investment um line I mean it's a framing problem but it's I think it's what explains uh what we see in the data and um also I mean this is part of some new work I'm doing uh you see some um positive age gradient you know the the the the percentage of people
investing in the guaranteed investment contract is actually increasing with age Which might sound sensible except that it's very difficult to you know attach any structural interpretation to this age gradients because as you know it's basically without further assumption is impossible to disentangle from this data this are the administrative data uh it's impossible to the anang are repeated csection there is also a pet Dimension but this is you know it's impossible to disentangle age court and Time effect then you know sort of estimating a positive age gradient this positive age gradient could actually be driven entirely
by for instance Court effects then without imposing you know restrictions you don't really know where this gradient is is coming from and this is something we are doing U we are doing uh now but let me just I have to conclude I guess very quick asset under man M you know how Italy fars compared the other countries again apologies the Labels are in Italian but the main message of this graph is telling you that precisely because you know many most people are in the guaranteed contract which is the no equity lines the exposure to equity
how much Pension funds invest in equity in Italy is limited compared to many other to many other countries which is a bit paradoxical because Pension funds should be long term investors and then equity in a way is the right asset for them Okay and then I'm out of the time uh just let me conclude with this final sentence and then I think we're going to have plenty of time to discuss there is room I think to improve uh household uh portfolio Choice uh you know uh and there are two uh ways to do it one
is and I think these two ways are not alternative one is actually through Financial education we should make an effort to sort of try to people teach what is um uh what are you know sound And good and wise financial services but but then the other Avenue is actually Financial architecture I mean we should design options in such a way to make people to make um the right choices okay thanks a lot thank you and uh I'm very happy to hand over to Steve who will be talking about the transition from DB to DC Systems
and uh about taxation with an eye towards policy proposals thank you st great thank thank you very much uh It's very nice to be back here uh last time I was here was about five years ago in this same room uh I really enjoy being here with this group and also like like the area and the region and uh have some Family Ties here so uh thank you for inviting me back um so some of the things that that I'm going to talk about have been touched on already so I'll be able to to uh
go a little faster on on those parts uh before I start I just wanted to get a sense of the room here Uh how how many students here how many people here are students and how about faculty or otherwise associated with the university okay and how about neither of those categories Okay so one a couple and we have people online I can't see so I can't ask you that question but um anyway it's nice uh nice to be here and uh uh of the of the people who are students anybody Interested in studying pensions one
okay good let's talk uh hopefully hopefully we can persuade the some of the some of the rest of you that uh it's an important topic so I'm going to talk about uh three different things one is the transformation from defined benefit to defined contribution we've already talked a little bit about that but I'm going to show you some U some things in the US uh second is about reforming Defined contribution plans and uh third is reforming uh Social Security the first first pillar so talk about both the second pillar and and the first pillar so
uh begin with and I'm going to touch on a bunch of different topics uh many of which I've done work on and am doing work on and so uh hopefully this this will I thought I'd touch a bunch of different areas that give us uh you know whatever people want to talk about afterwards in terms of everything that We've all talked about I look forward to some quick conversations afterwards so uh this just shows you the the transformation in private pensions in the US and this is the percent of workers covered by uh traditional defined
benefit Pension Plan uh defined contribution plan and and both and what you can see is this like big x-shaped pattern so it's been a huge transformation you know you go back to the beginning of the graph basically This is this is of all workers in private sect in the private sector who are covered by a pension plan so this is conditional on being covered by a plan you know we saw the vast majority were covered by defined benefit plans when when this graph starts and now almost none of current workers are covered only by defined
benefit plan uh whereas defined contribution plans were were small in terms of coverage aage and and now it's the you know the vast majority Of workers are in in a defined contribution plan with with some fraction that have been in both the whole time but a massive massive shift in the uh in the United States and uh this graph is taken from a paper that Josh Rowan and Arena stefanescu and I did um in the Journal of public economics and we asked the question of you know why is it why did this happen uh let
me just show you one other graph before I give you some of the answers uh This is just looking at the total retirement Assets in the United States back in 1980 about 23% of it was in defined contribution in IRAs and now about 63% of the assets are UND defined contribution in IAS and the reason IAS are individual retirement accounts and basically the reason those are so big are because when people leave their defined contribution their occupational plan their defined contribution plan they roll over ass assets into Individual retirement accounts so almost all that money
that's in IAS is money that's been rolled over from from DC plans so we see uh 63% of the assets are now in DC and I planes again a a big a big shift so what caused the transformation uh what we what we argued in uh in this paper I just mentioned was that it actually saved firms a bunch of money uh why did it save firms money because when they froze uh existing plans they basically uh did Not give older workers as much in terms of defined contribution benefits as they had acred in or
were going to acre in defined benefit plans so def the cruls and defined benefit plans steep highly toward seasoned workers and older workers and uh that that uh those workers instead of getting those high acrs that they would have gotten under DB and instead got much lower acrs under DC so it actually saved firms money that's one argument uh there seems to be A general lack of interest in annuitization and there's a whole literature on that like why don't people like to get lifetime income but they when given the choice they seem seem not to
and the idea of having uh so so that I think is part of the explanation I think there was there's concern over counterparty risk that workers were worried that that the pension wasn't going to the defined benefit pension wasn't going to be there for them Uh and I think there's just something about the tangibility of DC assets you you look at your account you log in you see you have you know $100,000 in there and it's very tangible H having that so I think that was a draw as well but I think there are other
reasons that that still we don't fully understand as to why this transformation is is happening and it's not just by the way it's not just I I showed it to you in the us but as we heard earlier it's happened in Italy it's happening in many other countries around around the world this this big shift okay so um sorry this doesn't oh this way it goes backwards okay so the uh ongoing challenges for the system for the DC system uh one is about coverage and and takeup a second is about the fairness and progressivity of
the system a third is about the kind of choices that people Make uh or don't make in the plans and a fourth relates to fees I'll just touch on some of these uh briefly so first of all access this is data from the from the US uh about only about half the workforce has access and participates in a retirement plan at work okay uh there's another 177% that have access but but don't participate so that brings us to 70% of the population and then there are about 30% of workers who in these are in private
Private Industry workers who don't have have access to a plan So the plan is just not offered at their uh at their institution so access is one issue participation is a is a second issue next next point I want to make has to do with uh fairness and progressivity the tax benefits when you look at defined contribution plans the tax benefits uh as well as the The Firm contributions are tilted quite heavily toward High lifetime income households And also towards sophisticated households because there are a lot of things you have to do in order in
order to get the full amount uh and and so sometimes that's complicated and and therefore more sophisticated households tend to take advantage more of the of the system and and the various tax benefits that are allowed so the tax benefits are are are tilted both toward High lifetime income and sophisticated households many of whom are the same um And the if you look at uh dig deep into the system and who benefits from from the various incentives there's a nice new paper uh by uh the the authors that are listed up there there too many
to to mention but uh there's a very nice new paper that just came out that sort of details how uh again how it's tilted toward High income households and they they connect not just pension data but also tax data to be able to look at at Household so I'd encourage you to take a look I think there's a lot of scope for improvement and I'm going to give one suggestion a little bit later this is a uh we already talked a little bit about you heard earlier about some of the the way that the different
tax treatment and there's you know te te which is you know you tax the money up front and then it's exempt from there on after there's e which is you get a tax break early on and then it comes later And there's tte and there various other things anyway here's here's a a picture from the oecd of what various countries do in different countries do different things the US is primarily EET it's called traditional in in the US uh it's backloaded Taxation and we we do have some component of of te which is called Roth
in the US after the name of the senator who first proposed it uh and that's front loaded taxation so we're primarily te H sorry EET uh in Italy as We just saw uh Prim we're e so variety of uh different ways of doing things around the world um does it matter so I'm going to compare now and this is based on a paper with uh with Matia landoni uh that's that's listed here uh there's the question of does it matter whether we have te or E and uh there's a simple Benchmark model that's not new
to us that basically says no that if under certain Assumptions it doesn't matter whether you tax up front or tax at the end it it turns out the same okay uh we argue in this paper that even though the simple Benchmark says no when you when you do one small change to the to that simple Benchmark model which is to take into account that asset managers charge fees on their on their financial products when you when you just take into account one that one additional feature uh it basically they no longer these two Systems are
no longer equivalent and the intuition is if you have money in a in a uh uh a te sorry an EET plan part of that money that you have in there kind of belongs to the government right because you're going to pay taxes on that if you if you're going to be in a 20% tax bracket when you retire 20% of your money in your account is actually owned by the government right whereas the the other 80% is yours so the government just like you are paying uh Asset Management fees on your amount the government
is paying Asset Management fees on its amount and and so it turns out that that that uh you know it's turns out to be a fair amount of money that asset asset managers end up charging fees to the government on the simplicit account and uh that's kind of a a dead weight loss it turns out or largely not completely but largely dead dead weight loss so I don't think I'm G to have time to go through the the um The examples but but I'll in detail but I'll just flash them up here for you um
and there's a this is there's kind of a benchmark result under here's Roth here's traditional and it turns out that Under The Benchmark you end up with the same money either either way uh whether you get taxed at the beginning or tax at the end and it's just like if you had a Roth account having a traditional or having an uh te account is like having an EET account plus an extra little Piece that's just owned by the government as I as I just mentioned uh so uh but when you when you have investment fees
and again I won't through work through the numbers but it turns out that that you know individuals pay the same fees but the government ends up paying fees to the asset managers so what this is by by having uh a uh te account it basically is is a subsidy by the government to asset managers and it's a pretty substantial Subsidy and we do some calculations uh so so the the total assets under management are significantly larger under a te because part of that money is just money you put in and the government's going to take
away at the end and it's not really your money okay so so it's the assets under management are quite a bit larger uh in the US it's about uh the implicit account of the government is about two and a half is about3 trillion 3.8 trillion and about Two and a half trillion of that is in stocks uh the average fees that are charged on uh on these accounts on all retail accounts in in retirement accounts is about 77 basis points it's much higher in Italy by the way uh but but even this in the United
States is is pretty high and so it turns out when you do all the calculations you get that the annual subsidy to the asset management industry from having they have much more assets under management the implicit Extra fees is about $23 billion of of money in the US okay so there's a substantial amount of sort of extra fees that are paid it's it's basically a subsidy from the government to the asset management industry as a result of this and we argue that that uh you know we we'd be better off if we had it in
uh EET rather than te as long as it's done right uh so here's the the subsidies for other countries too uh as you see the the the fees in in uh Italy uh sorry I Don't have Italy in this graph but the fees in Italy are substantially higher you look at the fees in in uh some of the other European countries it's one 100 150 basis points uh candidates about 200 basis points uh so those fees add add up uh when you when you add them up so uh you might think well there's a lot
more fees there a lot more assets under under uh te and so maybe that uh you know maybe they'll charge uh lower sorry low maybe They'll charge lower fees this is supposed to be te up there maybe they'll charge lower fees under te right because uh they a lot more assets so they have a lot more assets to management their economies to scale maybe they would just lower their percentage fees will they no we argue in in a uh in a model we prove a what's called a supply side fee equivalence result that there's no
incentive even though they have a lot more money that they're managing and They're increasing returns to scale there's no incentive to lower fees in fact we we Prov in a model that they're they'll basically keep the fees the same uh the percent fees the same uh even though they're gaining these economies to scale and it all comes up in in the markup of uh of over over costs um so firms charge higher markups and get higher profits um what happens in general equilibrium I have this little picture Of of milk and cow up there because
you could imagine the same kind of question what happens if the government subsidizes milk uh by buying one one quart of milk for every five quarts that the that the public buys the government just buys the cord of milk it's sort of a similar kind of story here uh and so the question is what happens in equilibrium well we argue that basically as I just said the assets uh under management uh of asset managers is Higher the profits are higher Andor the size of the whole size the asset management industry grows so the asset management
are either either they make more profits or they grow in scale more firms enter and that and that involves higher higher costs per firm uh but in anyway there's an expansion of both profits Andor the size of the industry and we argue that social welfare is lower so people are worse off as a result and if you instead flip to te the Government could afford to create a 6% government match with all the money that it saved on on the fees that it was paying so it could just give out six cents on every dollar
that was contributed on average in the in the retirement system and that's just my graphic of the asset management get industry getting big uh okay so our proposal here is uh te with a progressive government match uh so sorry uh yes te with a Progressive government match so you tax it all up front um and then then it's exempt from there on we argue that the government should have a large government match directly and that the match should decline with current income and should decline with cumulative lifetime contributions in order to be based basically on
Lifetime resources so so uh we think this can reduce the dependence of the subsidy that's out there um on on the tax rate and enhance Progressivity uh there's a recent plan that that was put into place in 2022 in the US called the Savers match uh and this kind of expands on that idea it's it's a it's a larger and more more Progressive Savers match and you know there I I put this article because up on the bottom right there was uh Peter tile who's a tech Mogul in the US has a retirement account a
Roth retirement account uh that's five billion dollars in it just himself right and he got this Because he bought he took some some non-publicly traded stock early on in in one of these companies that grew very fast and and uh and it just screwed immensely so we argue that you should restrict first of all restrict when you're going to do this we have to restrict it to hold only publicly traded assets you can't put privately traded we we don't think you should be able to put privately traded Assets in there and second we think you
should limit the Total size of the tax advantage that you get so that someone doesn't have A5 billion do uh retirement account individual retirement account so that's our proposal and uh there's our little graphic of the match with the piggy bank up there to remind you about it uh there's been some move toward what's called rific in the US but it's still in the early stages thing uh next thing I want to just mention in one minute is what happens With asset allocation we already heard a little bit of that discussion in the US there's
uh a lot more investment in equity about two-thirds of all retirement assets are held in in in all DC assets are held in in stocks uh so there's a lot more Equity Holdings in the US part of that but not by any means all of it is due to the rise in in Target date funds that basically automatically adjust the equity share uh as people age and I'm starting we've Done I've done some work on this in the past but starting some work new work on this looking at a large asset manager in the US
and and looking at what's happening with uh how how the introduction of Target date funds and the growth of Target date funds is actually influencing allocations uh if of asset allocations in the US and finally in just two more minutes I want to talk about reforming the public plan since uh uh we're running a Little short on time uh in the US as as we already heard it's largely a a pgo system a peso system this is the costs and and non-interest income uh passed and and projected and you can see that you know things
have been we're running kind of surpluses for a while uh and then some small deficits but then that's just supposed to to break out we're running huge projected to run huge deficits moving forward and that's the challenge is how do we how do We deal with this uh this is the trust fund we actually build up a little trust fund in the United States it's you know it's up at around three and a half trillion but it's headed rapidly toward zero so by 2034 there's not going to be enough money in the in the public
fund to pay benefits so the qu that's going to come between now and then there's going to be a lot of political discussions in the US and what to do about that um currently There's a there's a fiscal rule that's fixed by law there the contributions are fixed rules are fixed the benefits rules are fixed and then there's a budget constraint that says the trust fund kind of takes money in and sends money out but but the trust fund can't go negative has to stay always non- negative and that was the graph I just showed
you it's scheduled to go negative so something's got to give um and what we are looking at uh currently and some Work some ongoing work with John G andopolis is to look at the system the historical system on a generational cohort basis and basically the early generation uh as Elsa was pointing out got got kind of a good deal out of this um and they got positive npvs out of the system when you look on a cohort basis and subsequent Generations were getting negative npvs but but when you look at this is this is the
data that we've been Collecting and working with and it's the net present value by cohorts this is by birth year and you see that the early Generations got that's that blue area on the right got got very positive npvs out of the system then then there was a set of cohorts that got negative but then it's scheduled to go go positive again and that's not sustainable because the sum of all these things basically the the red the blue and the green has to be zero and it looked like it was going That looked like it
was going that way with the red but it's not going that way anymore uh so something has to something has to give and uh so our proposal and this will be my last slide uh is to to uh uh we argue that that uh you know there are these promises to pass workers we we gave this money a bunch of money to past workers and and why should we why should the current workers have to pay for that right the not just I mean obviously some of their some of on a Payo basis money goes
in that flows in that direction as we already heard but why should should just the current workers get kind of a bad deal current and future workers a bad deal to pay for the past workers it's a debt borne by society and we argue that that we should be taxing General have a a dedicated tax on General revenues not just current workers but all income including capital gains and other forms of income that should be going to pay the Legacy tax And it shouldn't be borne on the backs of of just workers and also there's
an earnings cap so workers above the earnings cap in the US don't pay anything so we argue it's it's sort of unfairly targeting Uh current Uh current workers not at the top of the the income distribution so we argue that it should be a broader tax like a dedicated tax on General Revenue uh that'll cover about half the infinite Horizon shortfall and then we need to do Something else in terms of either cutting benefits raising taxes or uh some some form of cutting back benefits of raising taxes in order in order to uh fund the
rest of it um and we also argue for self-correcting me mechanisms so that once we adjust the rule we don't have to keep adjusting it the future and of course this poses political challenges right how do you modify we have a very strong fiscal rule in the United States right it can't no by law We cannot pay benefits more once the trust fund runs out we can only pay benefits equal to the contributions in Italy it's not quite that way it's a little looser right so so how do we modify the fiscal rule that's very
strong but then protect it again from changes in the future right because if you go if you give up too much of the you know the fiscal rule you run the risk of of you know spending getting out of hand so that's the political Challenge I don't have an answer for that yet but uh just want to raise that so let me stop here and open for discussion thank you thank you Stephen and uh so I think that uh we can uh open up to questions from the floor and while I wait to see how
I can get the questions from the virtual audience we're going to have to start asking you guys questions can I just ask a very quick question your proposals on Taxation yes uh is their party in Congress supporting it is there discussion in Parliament we haven't got we haven't gotten that far there there is um the you're talking about the the uh DC side yeah um the second pillar um there is some support for uh moving toward uh e sorry toward uh yes e toward te uh but it's not really for the reasons we think it's
important it's it's for the reasons that it generates more money up front for the politicians Right so because EET they get the money later te they get the money up front so politicians tend to like it but not necessarily for the reasons that we like it uh what we're what we are arguing for is that so I think there is potentially political support for it uh but what we're arguing is we want to make it we want to enhance the progressivity of the system um along the way at the same time that we're doing this
so I can't tell you I can't tell you yet politically how That's gonna g to play out but possibly okay yes the managers realize the difference right yes the managers what they know the difference between in terms of uh how much they heard between the two models I you know I can't say for sure what they know but I believe I believe they they aware if they don't know because it's matter it basically would scale back assets under under management for the asset managers yes so they they might right because if they Realize who realiz
they might not like it they might not support very much maybe they did Lobby for the law who knows yeah yes there is a question from thank you for very thank you yes so thank you very much for very interesting discussion very rich we got to learn a lot I mean just to kick you know kick off the discussion I mean overall what would be your you know recommendation what would Be your preference what you know how should we move forward uh given the the current situation I would say in Europe or in in the
United States what what would be the best policy reforms you would you would recommend I've already given you two so I'll I'll let the other panelists well my short sentence is that the better foundation for good pensions it is a well functioning labor market so okay try to set the architecture of Pensions um I think transparency is fundamental you have DC you know that DC is Insurance then you have solidarity and that's a way to take away Privileges and that's also a natural feature of a public pension system but then it's not just a matter
of political Pro promises it's a matter of how the labor market uh function so productivity which requires a lot but the idea that it's changing the P pension systems that delivers good Pension is not enough you have to change to make the system sustainable but then you have to work on the economy and even more difficult on demographic change migration and what we said before for example example France has a very different demographic scenario from us they are not a diminishing population we have rapidly diminishing population so um it's the economy and it's the demography
that matters yeah we've seen a Radically what a very large drop obviously in the number of children that each each abely CLE right adult 13 20 25 per woman fertility is uh and we were one of the highest fertility rate in Europe I mean my own generation so it's not to anent yes so you could all have more kids and that would Sol part of it now there are a couple of more questions can I please ask you to state your name and affiliation So that hi uh my name is Olga and I'm from labn
Institute for financial research safe in Frankfurt I have two questions actually first of all uh you mentioned financial literacy but there is a so in my mind I I'm I'm from Russia originally and I've been in Europe for a long time and every country that I come in has their specific rules and institutional setup for pension saving so I sort of have to relearn every time and if you Measure me on the financial literacy scale with a PhD in finance I would probably score quite high but still my knowledge like or complexity of the system
prevents me from uh potentially or takes me longer to actually uh contribute optimally to my pensions this is my first question so what how do you measure financial literacy in the research that you do and uh whether you think there will be difference if you actually measure literacy about pension System versus literacy overall and the second question is related to this move to green or ESG oriented pension savings because a lot of Pension funds at least I know some are moving towards providing a plan not various in Risk but also for example with ESG focus
and uh I mean there is some evidence showing that people are more likely to switch to that and start contributing using the ESG as a uh catch phrase or or they want to contribute to saving the planet and That's the way for them to to do that how do you think this would affect pension system if it can be implemented if it needs to be implemented or uh what's your opinion on that thank you thank you so maybe we can uh take also the other questions and that you can reply yes that is also hi
I'm Sasha and darte and apologies for my voice being a bit horar today I lost it recently I'm from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania and my question is about uh there's a lot of political uncertainty about the will and the and it's starting to you know become questionable the feasability of doing reforms for pensions retirement Ages social security in the US and I'm wondering what your thoughts are I'd like to ask this of everyone on the panel about how this uncertainty might affect consumers behavior are they potentially going to engage in excess
saving could that Create uh additional drags on the economy because they're saving rather than spending and what do you think the potential costs of this uncertainty are thank you and we can take the third question and then maybe we can hi I'm Martin Brown from the uh study center garrson say in s gin so I have a question to Stephen you you showed us some data that there are quite a few uh people in the US who have access to a plan but don't enroll Now supposing that you'd introduce a system where there's upfront taxation
do you think that the the share of people who don't save then would would go up because it's no longer no longer tax deductible so what do we know about imper ially about the elasticity of sort of pension savings to tax deductions or from tax deductions okay thank you maybe we can now go in reverse order and uh Steve you Can uh start sure uh so let me let me go backwards so with in terms of the last question uh the it's I think it's an interesting question whether the whether the um te versus EET
is going to produce more participation um you know as you show in the bench in The Benchmark model they're equivalent uh economically but but nevertheless they they may be perceived differently right and the question is if you have so if you have rational people Who fully foresee that they're going to pay the taxes in the future in The Benchmark at least it's there's an indifference result but but then what if you say well what happens if people don't uh really think about the future tax that they're going to have to pay they don't realize they're
going to have to pay future taxes on on the ET plan it could really go either way they're kind of income and substitution effects right on the one hand they feel richer so Maybe they save Less on the other hand they feel like they're getting a great boost so maybe they save more it there's you really have to delve into the into the area behavioral economics to to really understand it's not clear to me that there'd be such a major difference in terms of incentives uh on on those two things um in ter do you
want me to answer yeah address the other ones too so Sasha in terms of Sasha's question about uncertainty and the impact on Reform I think it's a huge problem in the US that at least that you know we we have 10 years till the system's going to run out of money and and you know there's just constant I mean there there are a lot of articles in the Press about this and it's going to get even more worse as we approach that and I think people young people kind of lose faith in the in the
system so I think it's a it's a big mistake I can't tell you exactly how that influence is saving but I can tell you I think that it's it's a mistake to uh it just it just hurts the reputation of the system because young people keep thinking oh it's not going to be there for me it's not going to be there for me so I think there are huge political costs in in Waiting this long to to reform it in terms of how it actually affects behavior I'm not I'm not quite sure um and then
the on the first question on the design uh you know Should we fix should we improve financial literacy or you know is that or should we improve pension design uh you know we can always say that it would be good for people to become more financially liter literate and I teach some of this stuff to students and I believe it believe in it but I I think it's it's very important to improve the design right we we our systems are very complicated and we shouldn't have we shouldn't have to you Shouldn't have to have a
PhD in finance to understand that that you know what to do here here and here in order to optimize the system right we should have simpler rules and better design so that doesn't happen can I thank you yes I agree I mean this is very important I mean we need to have a right mixture between I mean of course we need to educate people you know it's education is needed but it's necessary it's necess condition but then you need good designs Because you know it's important that people are put in the position of doing you
know the right choice and this should not require people to be extremely educated I mean we all go to school and but but then you know some design is needed and this is pretty much clear I think when it comes to the choice between you know talking about portfolio Choice within Pension funds this is pretty much Clear when it comes to the choice between pension plans you Know saying you know if saying that the default option is the guarantee contract is is telling a lot it's not just it's the framing there that is important because
he's saying okay if the default option is the guaranteed contract you should do the guaranteed contract and then what you see is that actually many people who are investing in the guaranteed contract are not actually those you know the default option guys I mean are people who Believe you know and they stay there forever for all their entire life you know earning ridiculous amount of money and this cannot be optimal I mean some diversification some Equity is needed and um and of course you have to teach people what Equity uh you know what you know
Equity you know what is an equity you know you have to teach people return you have to teach people the law uh interest compounding we have to teach people these things but You also have to help through the you know some adequate Financial you know design pension pension design of course you know then going back to what the other question what Elsa was doing telling us before you know good design and financial education and again not enough because you know the sort of issues that we have in Italy with our pension system men talking now
about the you know the first pillar the Social Security have to Do with the you know the demographic transition which is affecting many countries not only Italy and also the low grow I mean that's the challenges then it's not really matter of uh you know just design and doing right reforms but it's also a matter of making this country to grow more and and possibly to to you know to to sort of you know country with sort of you know with a because this is I I don't know if that was said or not but
Italy now is a Country with negative population grow it's not just lack of kids it's negative population grow I mean of course with negative population grow no system is sustainable I mean it's negative I mean negative population grow is the the perfect disaster unfortunately there are reforms but there are also counter reforms and that goes back to the question on uncertainty I mean there is a lot of political Uncertainty surrounding P you know pension policies or pensions in general yes there is uncertainty but also not I mean if I think about Italy it's pretty much
clear that in Italy if you promise people to go uh to retire before earlier than the age at which they should retire for the system to be sustainable you win the elections okay and this is uh very predictable I mean there is no uncertainty I mean you win the election With probability one that's what you know some parties regularly do I mean I against I'm not any more the chairman of the Italian Authority then I free to say whatever I like and it's then you know and and of course there are and that's more or
less the the the history of this country in the last uh decades you know there there were you know important reforms but also minor uh and counter reforms and um and people not seem not to realize that There are no free lunches I mean if I want to go if I want to before then I then you know the age which is compatible with equilibrium and then someone else has to pay the the bill that's all and then I conclude with ESG I mean ESG is um uh you know it's very I mean the regulation
in Europe is not yet completed that makes things very difficult because what is ESG and what is not ESG is very hard to tell which Which open the room to what is called green washing that said the question is okay at the end of the day you know Pension funds should invest their money to maximize uh you know expected pension benefits then whether or not this can be accomplished by you know investing in ESG it's it's an open question I mean if this is a bubble or not it's a actually there are signs that this
might be actually a bubble but uh but it's an an Open question from the financial industry Viewpoint it's a clear um profit opportunity you know that's why that's the reason why there is a lot of pressure uh you know and there are despite the fact that the regulation is not yet completed there are plenty of uh Financial products also pension products of offering selling ESG lines or stuff like like this because this is a market opportunity for uh for for the system for the industry whether or not this is Good for for for the individual
households you know this is entirely to be shown I mean it's it's not clear to me that you know investing in this ESG taking these ESG factors into account leads to better uh to better portfolios and I think we answer more thank you Elsa Okay I I am a strong supporter of financial education I ALS always had basic Financial education because we are not Going to make people Financial expert this is not the point I see there is a lot of uh business now in financial education initiatives um sometimes uh it's totally misleading what we
want is something like literacy literacy is important like it was in early 20 SEC century when uh parliaments decided that people should know how to read how to make basic calculations how to write to sign maybe So we are talking of basic Financial education economic Financial education and um in the Journal of financial education that Anna Maria lardi is now chairing and um we wrote an article with one of my Coter saying what is financial retirement education basic retirement education and I do a lot of applications with the my dialogue with people meetings because it's
the basic things for example the fact that it is an intergenerational contract the fact that In Pension funds you have Financial risks they don't understand they say but if I put my money there I want a guarantee but if it is a guarantee then it's no longer private it's like having a public system in Disguise so these Concepts you may convey to people and in the paper that we wrote with Anna L we took 202 reforms 20 years and uh it's a an empirical Exercise when in the regression you put exactly Financial literacy not general
education the um electoral cost of reforms is lower significantly lower so it means that in a way it is exactly that that make it's the opposite of what Yun care said we know but they don't the poor thing why shouldn't they know the basic thing politicians are not doing are not enacting reforms for the pleasure of being cruel to the people it is Something which is necessary and if it is necessary even if it's not perfect because no reform is perfect then you should convince people and then it should not be like you said that
if you promise um to lower retirement age you win the election why should people be so stupid not to understand they are not not stupid who said that people are stupid no some you know some may be even some politicians by the way uh so well I I tell you an an doctor do I have time Okay before coming here I had an interview with the a newspaper and they said you know because there is a a political party supporting the government and the leader of this politic iCal party has made a strong electoral success
by saying that he wants to cancel the horrible uh pension reform that has my signature and he has been saying he has been he has been saying this since uh the the law was approved In fact it was the only party not approving because at that time given the emergency situation um all the parties were together supporting the technocratic government in doing the reform so the the the reform was approved with a very large majority the treasury Minister uh is also from the same party he wrote a docu well the ministry wrote a document these
Days in which they pray is the pension reform so the this journalist said but are you aware that the minister of treasure has now become a foro supporter I said well that a paradox that they have to solve it's not my problem is their problem but the fact is very simple that the treasury Minister speak to the international audience comprising the European commission the European Central Bank the World Bank all the international Organization and the international financial markets and so they have to be straight in what they say while the other one talk to the
electorate and he can talk by slogans but slogans are not what is in the title of your conference thinking forward so that is financial education I believe it does not do the whole job so you need archite good architecture in the decision and in the framework I just want to say very few Thing on ESG I have seen a change and I am convinced now that many fir terms do not take ESG as just you know it's uh something that we have to pay to the public because it's fashionable no no they are now considering
ESG issues seriously whether this is because the evaluators are looking very finely to these things or not but but it has become a more serious so I I'm not really convinced that it is A bubble no I am convinced that it is a change which is something that demands demand us Economist not just to look at the maximizing rational agent this is the past now we have a lot of Behavioral research because people decision are much more complex and people are more complex and it is their psychology that matters it is their beliefs so it's
really um it's really more complex but it also More challenging uh going beyond the neoc classical economics it's your job thank you thank you there is a a question for iio about the pan European pension product okay I think we are really out of time I mean the person I mean these pep are basically individual product and the the idea is that you know the product could be originated in any European country and then distributed in all the others and um there are not many at the Moment going and um actually non in Italy as
far as I know the project was very is very ambitious and the product is a bit complicated that's why I think the market is not uh picking up one issue uh with this um and this and then we conclude this has to do with the with actually with the tax regimes precisely because you know the tax regimes differ across um across European countries and this is not very compatible with the With a pan European product then there is an issue with uh you know aligning basically the tax regimes between uh between between Europe if one
really wants these kind of things to to grow and to to become important okay thank you anyway any other question they can send me an email and I'll try to answer okay thank you very much it's time to to stop here and uh I would like to thank joavan Francisco and Laur For uh inviting me for helping organize the panel and goodbye and thank you to all those who have attended online thank you