American Democracy and the Crisis of Majority Rule - Daniel Ziblatt

- Okay, good afternoon, everybody. Welcome to this fall semester Jefferson Lecture. My name is Chris Tomlins. I'm professor of law here at Berkeley and the current chair of the Jefferson Memorial Lectures Committee. And in just a couple of minutes, it'll be my great pleasure to introduce our lecturer this afternoon. Before I begin that introduction, it is a requirement of the job, like all of those flight attendants on your next venture, To make a public service announcement, in fact, several. First of all, we are recording the lecture. And so we would greatly appreciate it if you

could take a moment, please, to ensure your phone ringer is off. Second, just a brief sketch of the order of business, my introduction, my formal introduction will resume in just a moment. After that, our lecturer will speak for about 40 minutes. We will then have a Q and A period. And finally, you are all invited to join us At a reception immediately after the conclusion of the lecture, which will take place here in the hotel. So now to business, I'm delighted to have this opportunity on behalf of the Jefferson Lectures Committee, on behalf of Berkeley's

Graduate Council and Graduate Division, to welcome today's lecturer, Daniel Ziblatt, to Berkeley. In fact, I should say, back to Berkeley, for Professor Ziblatt is not only a California native, but he is also a Berkeley alum, which means we are not just delighted he is here. We are also very proud to welcome him back to campus. The Jefferson Memorial Lectures were established in 1944 through a bequest from Elizabeth Bonestell and her husband, Cutler Bonestell. The Bonestells were a prominent San Francisco couple who cared deeply for history, who hoped that the lectures would encourage students, faculty, scholars,

members of the extended Berkeley community to study the legacy of Thomas Jefferson, and in particular, to explore the values inherent in American democracy. We might all agree, Never has that objective being more pressing than in the times in which we live. As the lecture has matured, the range of lecture topics has matured with it. Our lecturers have spoken on the subject of Thomas Jefferson himself, on early American history, but they've also ranged far and wide on American institutions and policy, on politics, on economics, on education, and on law. Our lecturers have come from all points

of the political compass. Many have come from the academy, but many more from beyond it, from the worlds of politics and law, from media, and from active civic engagement. The role of past lecturers stretches back more than 60 years. It includes such names as Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, Senator Alan Simpson, Representative Thomas Foley, Senator Elizabeth Warren, Richard Hofstadter, Carole Pateman, Walter La Faber, Archibald Cox, Annette Gordon-Reed, Judith Heumann, and most recently, Ezra Klein. Daniel Ziblatt, our lecturer this afternoon, received his PhD from Berkeley in Political Science in 2002. He's currently Eaton Professor of Government at Harvard

University, and he is director of the Transformations of Democracy Group at Berlin's WZB Social Science Center. He's the author of four books, which have received prizes and glowing reviews, and he was recently elected a member of the American Academy for Arts and Sciences. Professor Ziblatt's first book, which he published in 2006, Focused on how states are created. It was titled "Structuring the State- the Formation of Italy and Germany and the Puzzle of Federalism." 10 years later, he published "Conservative Parties and The Birth of Democracy," an account of the history of the spread of democracy in

Europe. But then just a year later, in 2018, came his book, "How Democracies Die," co-authored with Steve Levitsky. And that book, you might say, hit a nerve, and not just in this country, but all over the world. "How Democracies Die" quickly became a New York Times best seller. It's been translated into 30 languages. That speaks to a spreading anxiety about the stability of democratically organized states when confronted from within by authoritarian challengers. If former Jefferson lecturers like Jeane Kirkpatrick many years ago cut their young teeth on the challenge of communism from the left, now what

the liberal democratic world worries about is the authoritarianism of the right. Professor Ziblatt's most recent book published this year, And once again, co-authored with Steven Levitsky, it offers us some clues to his current thinking on the matters of challenges and responses. It's entitled "Tyranny of the Minority." We look forward to hearing more this afternoon as he tells us about American democracy and the crisis of majority rule. Please join me in welcoming Daniel Ziblatt back to Berkeley. (audience clapping) - Thank you for the very kind introduction, Chris, and thank you for the committee For selecting me

to give this lecture. My father, a few years ago, or actually I guess, I was in graduate school, gave me a copy of the book by Richard Hofstadter, "The Idea of the Party System," and that book, in the preface, says it originated as a Jefferson Lecture. So this lecture series has always held a really esteemed status in my mind. So getting this invitation really is really an honor. So it is nice to be back among friends. I spent countless hours at the cafe next door. I was trying to think, what did we spend all that

time talking about? I can't really remember, but it was very important, I'm sure. So I'm a scholar of comparative politics. I study democracy around the world and the history of democracy. But I want to use that comparative lens today to talk about, to turn it around and look at our own country, America, the United States. And I thought I would actually begin with some numbers, some data. So the international organization Freedom House, every year, produces a global freedom index. It assigns countries a score, a democracy score ranging from zero to 100. A decade ago, the

US received a score of 94 out 100, which put it on par with the United Kingdom, Canada and Germany. And that's really where the US has sat for decades. Today, the US' score, according to Freedom House, is 83, which is tied with Romania and Mongolia and two points below Argentina. So this may shock you, But when you have government efforts to restrict voting, violent threats against election workers and an attempt by an incumbent to overturn an election, you fall to the point where Freedom House scores you below Argentina. So this score, this drop in score

from 94 to 83 means that the American political system has experienced what political scientists call backsliding. Now, to be clear, the US hasn't experienced the kind of extreme backsliding that has struck places like Turkey, like Hungary, like India, but all major international indices register A pretty significant decline of the US democracy score since 2016. So question is, how did we end up here? That we even have to actually ask this question is actually very surprising from a perspective of social science. You know, social scientists disagree about most things, but there's two things that seem to

be really rock solid findings. First of all, rich democracies never die. No country with a GDP per capita above $17,000 per year has ever broken down. The US has a score, of course, of about four times higher than that. The second seemingly rock solid finding is that old democracies never die. No democracy in the 20th century over the age of 50 has ever broken down. Now, even if we date the birth of American democracy in the mid-1960s, which I think is appropriate, given the passage of the voting rights and the civil rights acts, American democracy

is over 50. So given all of that, the crisis that people feel about American democracy raises an important and a genuine puzzle. And that puzzle really is this, that the US departs company from its peer nations, the rich, old democracies of Western Europe, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Netherlands, Scandinavia, and Asia, Japan, Australia, New Zealand. Unique among this cluster of countries, only the US experienced democratic backsliding over the last recent years. Now, it's striking that, Even the democracies of Southern Europe, Greece, Spain, and Portugal, which are relatively new democracies, withstood the crisis, the financial crisis of 2008,

2009, these democracies persisted with their democracies intact. So why is the US alone among rich democracies in this position? So I'm gonna offer an answer this afternoon, and I'm gonna develop some of the themes in the book that I recently wrote, "Tyranny of the Minority" with my co-author Steve Levitsky. And I'm going to contend That a main culprit is a particular feature of our political institutions, which is making us vulnerable to a democratic crisis. Now, I certainly agree with, as many others have argued, that the rise of an ethnonationalist radical movement within the American Republican

Party is part of the problem, but the rise of such an ethnonationalist movement is only half the story. First of all, it's really important to recognize that the rise of radical forces within the Republican Party represent only a minority of American voters. So in principle, this shouldn't be a problem for democracy. And even more to the point, the rise of that 30% faction is actually very similar to what's happening in democracies all around the world. So as a scholar of comparative politics, I can tell you that this 30% figure, 30% of the electorate is actually

a near constant among democracies, among rich democracies, roughly 20 to 30%, 35% of voters in most established democracies are supportive of radical right or populous parties. The number's sometimes a little more, Sometimes a little less, but it's a near constant across established democracies. That's the same number that support the Alternative for Germany in Germany. Geert Wilders' party in Netherlands, Meloni's party in Italy, the Swedish Democrats in Sweden. So the problem isn't our voters. It's something else. Again, my contention is that it's our political institutions, in particular, a growing misalignment of our institutions That protect political

majorities and minorities, that make our democracy more vulnerable than other old, rich democracies to anti-democratic forces. Indeed, I would argue that our political institutions amplify these forces. So I'm gonna talk about now why. So I think I can begin with just a little bit of democratic theory. You know, modern democracy consists, is, simple, is more than majority rule. It combines majority rule and minority rights. Early defenders of limited government Feared excessive concentrations of power in the hands of kings and in the hands of popular majorities. And so the form of democracy that emerged in the

West between the late 18th century and the 20th centuries, what we today call liberal democracy, is based on two core pillars. First, collective self rule or majority rule, and second, civil liberties or minority rights. Although liberal democracy can't exist without free and fair elections, it's undeniable that not everything should be up For grabs in elections. In the words of former Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson in a famous decision written in the 1940s, "Some domains of political life should be placed beyond the reach of majorities." This is the role of what we call counter-majoritarian institutions. The

idea that certain facets of political life are beyond the reach of majorities. This is essential for democracy but, and this is a big but, I believe this is a point That's not sufficiently appreciated. Not all counter-majoritarian institutions strengthen democracy. We must distinguish between those, what I'll call good counter-majoritarian institutions, that protect minorities and preserve democracy, and those that privilege minorities by granting them an unfair advantage, thereby subverting democracy. So let me use an analogy that I hope is helpful. In a professional soccer match, rules that ensure fair competition and protect players By banning dangerous and

unfair play are essential. These are what I would, again, call good counter-majoritarian institutions, just for shorthand purposes. But in that same soccer match, rules that allow one team to begin with a goal advantage or that even allow one team to win when it scores fewer points would be considered unfair. I would consider these bad or unfair counter-majoritarian or unjustifiable counter-majoritarian institutions. Now, how do we distinguish and practice between these good and bad counter-majoritarian institutions? Now, that is a tall task, but I think actually we can do it. So let me try. First, I'll talk about

where counter-majoritarian institutions should operate. Two domains in particular must be protected from majorities. The first is individual liberties. This includes the core civil liberties that are necessary for any democracy, such as freedom of speech, press, association and assembly, but also includes a whole range of other domains, in which our individual life choices should be free from the interference of a kind of temporary majority. So elected governments shouldn't have the power to regulate our religious practices. They shouldn't decide what books we can read, what movies we can watch, or what can be taught in universities. Although

the scope of rights to be protected will always be a matter of dispute and always in a process of evolution, there exists a clearly broad range of individual liberties than the words, again, of Justice Jackson, quote, "May be not submitted to vote. They depend on the outcome of no election." The US Bill of Rights, in principle, enshrines those individual liberties, in effect roping them off from the whims of temporary majorities. So that is one important domain where majorities should not always govern. There's also, though, a second domain where majorities, the power of majorities should be

limited, and those have to do with the rules of democracy itself. Elective governments must not be able to use their temporary majorities or parliamentary majorities to entrench themselves in power By changing the rules of the game in ways that weaken their opponents or undermine fair competition. It's exactly this, specter of this, that is what's sometimes called majority tyranny. The possibility that a government will use its popular majority to vote the opposition and democracy itself out of existence. This is the danger that Justice Jackson, in the same decision, called the problem of the village tyrant. This

is what we saw in Chavez's Venezuela, Orban's Hungary, And what Netanyahu's government was trying to do with its judicial reform before October 7th. Since the opposition's right to compete on a level playing field is essential, it's an essential minority right, we need mechanisms in place to prevent present day incumbents from recasting the rules of the game to their benefit. These mechanisms include, as I mentioned before, a Bill of Rights, also independent judiciaries with constitutional review power, federalism, staggered elections In which different offices are up for election in different years, and a constitution that is fairly

hard to change. So individual liberties and an opposition's right to fair competition must be placed beyond the reach of majorities. And all democracies, as a result, need to be tempered by some forms of counter-majoritarianism. But here's the hitch. As I said, not all counter-majoritarian institutions are essential for democracy. So just as some domains must be placed beyond the reach of majorities, other domains must remain within the reach of majorities. So, which? I'll just mention two. One is elections. If you're going to have a first past the post electoral system, as we have in the United

States, where one side wins and another side loses, then those with the most votes should prevail over those with fewer votes In determining who holds political office. No theory of liberal democracy can justify any other outcome. Put differently, office holding should reflect how voters vote. The second domain where majorities should govern is inside legislatures. Those parties who win elections should actually be able to govern. Partisan minorities shouldn't be able to permanently veto regular legislation backed by parliamentary majorities, Provided that the legislation doesn't violate basic minority rights. Institutions that prevent electoral majorities from winning or parliamentary

majorities from governing are not essential to democracy. In fact, they're probably antithetical to democracy. So again, two types of counter-majoritarian institutions, those that protect civil liberties and fair democratic competition and those that don't. Now, the US, in comparative perspective, has an unusual number of these latter types of counter-majoritarian institutions, Domains where majorities ought to govern, but don't. The electoral college, which allows losers of the popular vote to win the presidency, a severely malapportioned Senate, which provides equal representation of states regardless of population. The Senate filibuster, which allows a partisan minority to permanently block legislation backed

by the majority, a first past the post electoral system instead of proportional representation that often inflates majorities Or have, actually, even manufactures majorities for a party that has fewer votes, and a powerful Supreme Court with extensive review powers and lifetime tenure for justices, which allows justices appointed in one generation to thwart majorities for generations to come. So you might be asking yourself, now, if these are all so antithetical to democracy, why would a political system ever have these in their constitution or in their political structures? Why would a constitution or what political system have so

many of these bad counter-majoritarian institutions where these two sacrosanct domains of majorities are violated? Now, we might be tempted to think that this reflects the kind of farsighted vision of political founders with a grand vision or a blueprint for how to balance majority rule and minority rights. But the history, the answer to that question, why would systems ever have this, Is actually much more mundane. The emergence of such institutions is often rooted in the strategic calculations of those setting up a state. So what I mean by that is the creators of any new constitutional order

often face a serious challenge. They must secure cooperation of diverse groups which are powerful enough to, so to speak, knock over the playing board and abruptly end the game if their demands aren't met. So when small but influential groups can credibly threaten to derail a difficult transition, Founding leaders often conclude they have no choice but to grant concessions and outsized privileges. So consider the country of Poland, its 1989 transition from communism. Here, The anti-communist opposition agreed to a pact guaranteeing the outgoing communist party 65% of the seats in the first elected parliament. Or consider Chile

in the late 1980s. Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet agreed to leave power after being assured that he could remain in charge of the military, the armed forces would retain considerable power, And that nine of the country's 47 senators would be appointed by the outgoing authoritarian government. Or consider South Africa in the early 1990s. The National Party agreed to the dismantling of apartheid once they had secured a range of protections for the white minority, including cabinet representation and a vice presidency in the first elected government. So in each of these cases, counter-majoritarian institutions are not the product

Of a kind of high-minded effort to balance majority rights and minority rights, but rather a series of concessions aimed at placating a powerful minority that threatened to sabotage a transition. Now, we don't normally think of the US founding in these terms. We don't think of the America's counter-majoritarian institutions in this way. Again, we think of them as being a kind of part of a farsighted design By the founders to create a kind of blueprint for a republic. But that's largely a myth. The framers weren't trying to design the perfect republic. They were trying to hold

the union together and prevent civil war for an invasion. And to do that, they had to do two things that founders often have to do. They had to improvise, and they had to compromise. If the convention failed and the union broke apart, America risked descent into instability and violence. Not only would the emerging economy be destroyed, but the founders were very, they were, a lot of them were former military people. They were very afraid of the geopolitical ambitions of Great Britain, of France, and of Spain. So under intense pressure to reach an agreement, the convention's

55 delegates did what leaders overseeing transitions often do. They improvised. And there were two explosive issues in particular that were poised to wreck the framers' plans in that summer of 1787, The role of smaller states in the union and the role of slavery. So representatives of smaller states like Delaware worried that the interests of the small states would be swamped by big states of Virginia and Pennsylvania. And likewise, the demands of the five southern slave states centered on protecting slavery as an institution. So to get to an agreement, without shattering the entire convention, the representatives

of small states and southern slave states would have to be mollified. And so they were granted a range of concessions. And I think it's important here to emphasize that Madison and Hamilton, you know, the architects of our famous system of checks and balances, opposed equal state representation in the Senate. But when small states threatened to bolt the union, they had to compromise. According to Hamilton, I'll read you a quote, "People, not territories, deserve representation." As Hamilton wrote, "As states are a collection of individual men, which ought we respect the most, the rights of the people

composing them Or the artificial beings resulting from that composition? Nothing could be more preposterous or absurd than to sacrifice the former to the latter." Hamilton further argued that equal representation of states violates, quote, "That fundamental maxim of Republican government, which requires the sense that the majority should prevail." Those are Hamilton. James Wilson of Pennsylvania also rejected equal representation. I like this quote in particular. "Can we forget for whom we are forming a government? Is it for men or for the imaginary beings called states?" But equal representation of the states, obviously, won out. Similarly, when it

came to the electing a president, James Madison wanted Congress to select the president itself, in a kind of like a contemporary parliamentary system. This was part of his Virginia plan. This was the first proposal on the table. He also preferred direct presidential election over the electoral college, but the southern slave states rejected direct elections, As did some of the small states. So the electoral college ended up being the third best solution, after all the others were voted down. And then finally, the filibuster, just to mention another institution, was certainly not part of the framers' vision

of checks and balances. Indeed, Hamilton and Madison both opposed super majority rules for legislatures. They were spooked by the 18th century experience of Poland, of, and this was kind of very live in their minds In the 18th century. And the institution of the liberum veto, which in the Polish parliament, up until the 18th century, required parliamentary supermajority rule of unanimity to come to any decision, which ultimately, in Poland, had led to the dismemberment of Poland by Poland's neighbors, bad neighborhood, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. So super majority rules were not included in the Constitution or the

original Senate for normal legislation. And the filibuster only emerged later. So with these two explosive issues of state size and slavery, the delegates concluded, if they wanted to keep the union together, they had to make concessions to the small states. So a kind of compromise was struck. At the end of the day, then, these institutions were not the product entirely of farsighted design. They were a product of a pact, of what scholars of comparative politics call a transition game. But unlike the pacts that I described earlier, Poland, South Africa, Chile, were, many of which were

temporary, many of America's counter-majoritarian institutions have become permanent. And those permanent concessions meant that small states were overrepresented and sparsely populated territories became overrepresented. So the electoral college overrepresents, favors sparsely populated states. The US Senate favors, even more so, sparsely populated states. And because the Senate approves the presidential nominees For the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court is also biased towards sparsely populated states. So our institutions allow those who win, and we're in a situation where we've seen this quite often in recent years, those with fewer votes to govern those with more votes. Now, the question

then is, why is this a problem now? I mean, this has been the case for a long time. Why is this a problem now? Why are we talking about this now? The US system has always contained these institutions That empower minorities over majorities. The answer is that it's only in the 21st century that counter-majoritarianism has taken on a partisan cast, that is regularly benefiting one political party over another political party. The framers certainly did not intend to create a system that benefited one party over another. They really didn't even create a system with parties in

mind. The word political party's not in the US Constitution. So the original beneficiaries of the US system of counter-majoritarianism were small population states. Couple of things changed over time, though. First, as the country expanded and America's population grew, the asymmetry between low and high population states grew. So in 1790, a voter in Delaware had about 13 times more influence in the US Senate than a voter in the more populous State of Virginia. In 2000, a voter in Wyoming had nearly 70 times more influence in the US Senate than a voter in California. So that was

one change. A second change was that America urbanized. At the time of the founding, of course, America was predominantly a rural country. By 1920, the US Census Bureau announced to great fanfare that, for the first time in US history, more people lived in cities than in the countryside. So by the 20th century, the small state bias became a rural bias. Yet this, even this rural bias that has existed through most of the 20th century, did not have a clear-cut partisan bias. And this is because, for most of the 20th century, Both parties had urban and

rural bases. Since both parties had urban and rural voters and bases and wings, rural overrepresentation did not consistently favor one party over another. And it's really only in the 21st century that US parties have split along urban and rural lines. In a very important book, Jonathan Rodden, who teaches at Stanford and his book, "Why Cities Fail," we see that this partisan, urban rural divide, this divide between parties between the countryside and the city, Has emerged across the world in all major democracies, between left-leaning cities and the conservative countryside. So it's, like in other parts of

the world, then Democrats are overwhelmingly the party of metropolitan areas, and Republicans the party of sparsely populated territories. But it's only in the US, or especially the case in the US, given our Constitution, that this overrepresentation of the countryside systematically advantages one party, In this case, through the electoral college, the Senate, and the Supreme Court, which all lead to the decisive consequence that it's now possible to win and to hold onto power without necessarily winning national majorities. So Republicans have been able to win the popular vote just once since 1988, and yet, they controlled the

presidency for most of the 21st century. A majority vote wasn't enough for Biden to win the presidency. He had to, in 2020, he had to win by at least four points, or else Trump would've been reelected. The Senate is even more skewed. In recent years, the Democrats have needed to win the popular vote by five points to retain control of the Senate. Senators, as you all likely know, are elected to staggered six year terms with a third of the chamber being elected every two years. So this means it takes three election, over, three elections over

a six year cycle to fully renovate the Senate. The Democrats have won the overall popular vote in every six year cycle since 2000, and Republicans have controlled the Senate for nearly half that period. And the composition of the Supreme Court is also skewed. Four of the nine Supreme Court justices were confirmed by senators representing less than half the population, and three of them were nominated by a president who lost the popular vote and were confirmed by senators representing less than half the population. It's really hard to justify these outcomes With any theory of liberal democracy.

This bias though, in addition to that, has three specific consequences. First, pernicious consequences I should say. First, it gives rise to the misperception of partisan parity. Our politics often looks like a dead heat, where both parties look like they are stuck in a stalemate, alternating in power. But this isn't quite right. Much of this stalemate is institutionally engineered, and it's democratically unfair. The second consequence is that it's beginning, to many Americans, to feel like minority rule. Policy preferences, if we, you know, look at opinion polls, seem to be more and more out of sync with

public policy. Overwhelming majorities of American want robust gun control, want more robust efforts to address poverty and income inequality, support abortion rights of the sort promised and guaranteed by Roe versus Wade. Now, it's true that this disjuncture between what voters want and public policy has many different causes, But our institutions, our political institutions, certainly contribute to this by not allowing majorities to govern. And then finally, the third consequence of this particular arrangement in the United States, I think in some sense, perhaps the most important consequence for American democracy is that these counter-majoritarian institutions have a

feedback effect that are unintentionally reinforcing Republican extremism by shielding the Republican Party, at the national level, From competitive pressures. This is hard to compete with, music. This is important. So let me explain exactly this last point here, that these institutions are reinforcing Republican extremism. Democratic competition is supposed to work like a marketplace. Firms, when they can't sell products, they lose money. And when firms lose money, they come under pressure to fire managers And develop better products. Likewise, in a democracy, political parties are supposed to win elections. And when they can't win elections, when they repeatedly

lose, they're supposed to get rid of their, the people running for office, and they're supposed to broaden their appeals. When the Democrats lost three consecutive presidential elections in the 1980s, they moved to the center and picked Bill Clinton as their democratic candidate For president in 1992. A similar story applied to the British Labour Party in the 1980s and 1990s. And the Labour Party reformed itself, came back as new labor under Tony Blair. This process of adaptation isn't really happening within the Republican Party today. Republicans have repeatedly underperformed in presidential year races and midterm races, but

so far, there has not been any serious effort to moderate or to rethink strategy. This is in part, I would contend, Because our institutions give the Republican Party an electoral crutch. In our book, we call this constitutional protectionism. Republicans don't actually have to win national majorities. They can win power with 47 or 48% of the vote. So extremism doesn't cost them as it would in a truly national competitive environment. If the Republican Party had to actually win national majorities, national popular majorities, to wield power, they'd face much greater pressure to rein in their extremism. I

believe, ultimately, this is contributing to our democratic crisis, 'cause the genius of democracy is supposed to be that it's self-correcting. America's institutions are thwarting that process of self-correction. So my last point today I wanna make is this, that minority rule that I'm describing is a distinctly American problem. It's not unique to the US, but it's taken on a particularly distinctive form in the United States. In no other established democracy can partisan minorities thwart electoral majorities as consistently and as consequentially. Now, why is this the case? Well, excessive counter-majoritarianism used to be widespread across the world.

It's not just the US. Consider for a moment the world's second oldest written constitution. Just a few decades old, written a few decades after America's Constitution, the Norwegian Constitution, written in 1814, Second oldest written constitution in the world. It's the, Norway's constitutional framers were inspired by the American founding experience but, and their initial creation was also not entirely revolutionary. Norway, after 1814, retained a hereditary monarch. Kings retained the power to appoint cabinets and to veto legislation. Members of parliament were indirectly elected with electoral, regional electoral colleges. And voting was limited to men who met certain

property requirements. Now, Norway was not unusual. In the 19th century, in Europe, states had all sorts of undemocratic institutions, monarchical vetoes, indirect elections, aristocratic upper chambers, unelected or badly malapportioned legislative chambers, filibuster-like mechanisms that blocked majorities in parliaments. But over time, other established democracies gradually dropped these pre-democratic institutions. So consider again Norway. So in the 19th century, Norway underwent a series of far reaching democratic reforms, all under the auspices of its still existing constitution. Parliamentary sovereignty was established. 1905, a constitutional reform eliminated these regional electoral colleges and established direct elections for parliament. Property restrictions were

limited, eliminated, and universal male and female suffrage is established in 1913. Now, this kind of reform actually wasn't so unusual. Consider Britain, also began the 20th century by weakening the House of Lords of its veto power. Like Norway, Denmark, Sweden, New Zealand, and Portugal ultimately got rid of their upper chambers altogether. Germany, Austria, and Belgium, as federal countries, democratized their upper chambers by making them more proportional to population. Britain, Canada, Australia, France, and other democracies established cloture rules, which allowed simple legislative majorities to end debates within Parliaments. Germany, Switzerland, and France imposed term limits on

their national courts, their supreme court justices, and the United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden established retirement ages for justices. In every other presidential democracy on earth, every other presidential democracy on earth got rid of its electoral college. Argentina was the last other democracy that had an electoral college for presidential elections. It eliminated it in 1994. So other democracies have become more democratic Over the last century, eliminating 18th and 19th century institutions that allowed minorities to systematically thwart majorities. The US simply hasn't done this. Today, then, the US is the world's only presidential democracy with an electoral college

for selecting our president. We have the most malapportioned Senate in the world, except for Argentina and Brazil. No other democracy allows a congressional minority to routinely veto regular legislation That's backed by a majority. And the US is the only established democracy with truly lifetime appointments for Supreme Court justices. Every other democracy has either term limits or a mandatory retirement age. Each of these institutions would make the US an outlier, but you add them up, and the US is really a distinctive outlier. It's uniquely counter-majoritarian. And I think, this in part explains why American democracy seems

to be uniquely threatened Among Western democracies. Now, I can't talk about American democracy without giving some reflections on what to do about this all. This is what people want to know the answer to. I'm really a big believer in the line from Jane Addams, the early 20th century reformer, who said, "The cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy." Americans need to do the work of democratizing their democracy, through reforms that ensure that electoral majorities can actually govern. So in our book, we propose 15 different reforms. I'm not gonna go through all of them

now, but the highlights include entrenching voting rights and ensuring equal access to the ballot, introducing different forms of proportional representation, replacing the electoral college with direct presidential elections, democratizing the Senate by eliminating or at least weakening the filibuster, establishing term limits for Supreme Court justices. Now, this is a long list that may seem very ambitious to some, But Americans have a long history of working to make our political system more democratic. It goes back to the founders. I would be remiss in a lecture series named after Thomas Jefferson to not quote Thomas Jefferson. So I'm

gonna quote Thomas Jefferson. He was one of the founders who was especially critical of those who, quote, "Look at the Constitution with sanctimonious reverence and deem the Constitution like the Ark of the Covenant, too sacred to be touched." In Jefferson's view, constitutions need to change. Jefferson wrote, "Laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. We might as well require a man to wear still the suit which fitted him when a boy, if civilized people is to remain under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors." Now, Jefferson's view of the

Constitution may have been on the radical edge of the founders. I mean, he thought that there should be, you know, constantly renewed constitutions, but he wasn't alone. And George Washington wrote a letter to his nephew in 1787, in which he described the Constitution as a, quote, "Imperfect document." And that it would be, quote, "Up to future generations to approve it, improve upon it." And generations of Americans actually have done this. The Bill of Rights, the expansion of suffrage, the reconstruction amendments, the progressive era reforms At the beginning of the 20th century. Americans have worked to

make our democracy more democratic. But what's striking, the exception is, really, over the last half century, we've stopped doing that work. Since around 1970, we've stopped trying to make our political system more democratic. And so one of the kind of broader points I would want to end with is to say, we have to restore this country's reformist tradition and put political reform back on the public agenda. And if we don't, I think our democracy will continue to be vulnerable to the kind of crises That we've been living through over the last several years. A final

word, looking forward to the 2024 election and the kind of next year, because this agenda that I've just laid out is, in some sense, a long run agenda. The kind of implications of my analysis, I think, include both some good news and some bad news. You know, in America, as in all of Western Europe, electorates are divided between a broad, what I would call a kind of broad cosmopolitan coalition ranging from the left to the center right, mostly centered in cities. On the one hand, vis-a-vis, and then on the other hand, a kind of ethnonationalist

coalition that's much smaller. And there's some good news in this, because, in all Western democracies, the cosmopolitan coalition is really the consistent majority. Our electorates are overwhelmingly committed to liberal values, for the most part, and democratic values. So that's the good news. The bad news is there's two ways in which this majority cosmopolitan coalition can get Into trouble and can be thwarted. As in the US, our institutions can sometimes give the ethnonationalist minority an artificial boost, give them outsized influence, not only in the US, but think in Hungary, Victor Orban's majorities turn into super majorities

with his electoral institutions. Think of the first past the post system in Britain, which allows the Tory Party, sometimes even with around 30% of the vote, with keys to the government. So that's one problem. The institutions can thwart the majority. A second vulnerability, though, second way democracies can get into trouble is if this cosmopolitan coalition allows itself to be fractured, even when facing serious democratic threats. So debates over immigration can do this. Debates over race can do this. And as we've seen in the last month, debates over foreign policy can do this as well. So

I think, in the US today, there's a risk that this Biden coalition could fracture Over the Israel-Hamas War. So I feel some sense of foreboding about this. Now this is a, there's a risk, you know, that his base won't, not that people will vote for Trump, but that people won't vote. People will vote for third parties and so on. And the point here is that pro-democratic coalitions have to be big. And as a result of that, they're often very diverse, and there's always the risk of fracturing. And that fracturing is, in part, what allowed Orban

to get back into power in Hungary. And it's also how I fear Donald Trump could come back into power. So facing these democratic threats across the West, I think it's key that democratic forces, pro-democratic forces, remember the stakes of the contest and are reminded here of the civil rights era song that inspired that coalition to stay together to democratize America, "Keep Your Eye on the Prize." Keep your eye on the prize. Democracy itself is at stake. Thank you. (audience clapping) So I guess I take questions now, right? - Thank you very much, indeed. And we

will have time for questions, for everyone in the audience, so please keep your questions brief (indistinct). - [Audience Member] Notwithstanding your notion, (audience laughing) - I could hear you. So okay. - Notwithstanding your notion of fracturing majorities, from even prior to the American Revolution, the concept of states rights and the notion of dual sovereignty, I think, has been also one of the greatest impediments to the transformation of American democracy. - So yeah, that, I'm happy to, that wasn't a question, but that's a good comment. I agree with you. (audience laughing) You know, and I mean,

I guess one response would be that, you know, certainly in a federal system, you know, states continue to have importance, but there are, so I think there are tensions between federalism and democracy, But you know, there's ways of making federalism and democracy more compatible. I mean, I think the German Bundesrat, you know, which is the chamber that represents the states, and right after 1945, the founders of the German, the writers of the German Constitution discussed the option of having a senate, where each state would have two representatives. This is actually something that Americans sort of,

you know, were talking about as well at the time. And Germans opted for a more representative system Where certainly, you know, the small state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern or Saarland, are under, are overrepresented, but big states have more representation even in this chamber. So I think it's, you know, certainly at the founding, states mattered a lot. But, you know, it's been a long time. So it's, you know, I sort of subscribe here to Hamilton's principle that it's humans, not states that have rights. Yes? - Should ranked choiced instant runoff voting be more widely adopted into legislatures and

things like that as opposed to just local elections? - Yeah, well, I encourage all sorts of experimentation with these kinds of institutional reforms. I mean, the way the American political system historically has changed is from the bottom up. I brought my students, a couple weeks ago, to a town hall meeting in Lexington, Massachusetts where they were deciding on whether or not to introduce ranked order voting. And they passed a, they were asking For the State of Massachusetts for permission to allow themselves to introduce this. And, you know, and I think these things should be encouraged.

You know, the empirical, a lot of political scientists have studied these kinds of reforms. There's a sense that they may increase moderation. They may, people have contended, at least, that they increase turnout. They make it less likely that incumbents will win. There'll be more challengers. The evidence is quite mixed on this, I have to say. Actually, it turns out that it's not as, it's not a kind of, certainly not a panacea, but I think reforms like this are things that people ought to be looking at and really considering. - So thank you. That's an excellent

presentation. So one of the other factors, in my view, that threatens democracy in the United States and perhaps in other countries is money in politics and a similar sort of, or a contributing factor to that threat has been recent rulings That give corporations status with individuals. In reading about this, I came to understand that this has been a long standing debate among legal scholars in the United States and among legislate, the Congress of the United States. So I'm curious as to your view on corp, on the role of corporations or the status of corporations vis-a-vis

individuals under the Constitution. - Yeah, I guess what I can, I mean, there are probably other legal scholars in the audience who could comment On the kind of interpretation of the First Amendment and corporations' rights as the freedom of speech. I mean, what I can say a little bit about what the impact that kind of thinking about how this connects to democracy. I mean, it's certainly the case that, whenever some people have more voice than others, then this is inherently undemocratic. I mean, the principle of democracy is political, underlying principle is political equality. And if

some have more voice because they have access to money than others, then that's a problem. And there is research showing that this does make a difference in how members of Congress and so on vote. One thing, though, that I'm struck by is the degree to which money is on both sides of the political, you know, among Democrats and Republicans, which is not to say it's not a problem because, for the reason I just said, but I also think there's a role for the private sector, I would hope, in helping preserve democracy. I mean, there's lots

of people who are giving lots of money to try to defeat anti-democratic candidates for office. And so, you know, if I had my kind of vision of the world, you know, there would be huge restrictions on this and you'd have publicly financed campaigns. But given the way that the court is set up and the kind of opinion of the court, that's something that's not really gonna be happening, my sense is, anytime soon. I mean, in principle, I think our democracy would work better if we had publicly financed campaigns. But, you know, given where we are,

and we sort of hope that the private sector plays a responsible role, I mean, given that it's going to have a big impact. - Thank you for a great talk. And I also like your, you know, you can make a very strong argument for the tyranny of the minority, but I was wondering also if you have thoughts about the tyranny of the majority, because, and what I'm thinking very much about is, you know, this first past the post, which actually creates two big blocks. I come from Denmark myself. - Yeah. - We have a proportional

system. And I think that's really one of also, Maybe one of the reasons why you have so much trouble reforming your system, that you simply have these blocks and that prevent, you have a strong force that prevents negotiation across the aisle, and therefore also, you know, sit down and make gradual reforms of your system. I don't know if you have any views on that. - Yeah, thank you for that question. I think, no, it's very important. I think, if the US had a proportional system And you had multiple parties, I think we'd be much better

off, for the reasons you say. But in addition to that, I mean, I think it turns out it's actually the better route to majority rule is through proportional representation. Because with proportional representation, then you, when parties form coalitions in the parliament to pass legislation, they actually, you have to have at least 50% of the vote to pass legislation. And so it's a kind, I mean, John Stuart Mill was actually the first To make this observation that proportional representation is a better, more successful route to majority rule. And ironically, these, you know, so-called majoritarian systems are

more likely to lead to minority rule. And even in Europe, and in Denmark actually is a case where this happens a lot, where you have minority governments, so governments that don't have a majority, you know, if a coalition can't be formed in the parliament across a couple of different parties And a minority party is in power, in order to pass legislation, they have to cobble together majorities on a kind of daily basis on particular bits of legislation. And sort of by definition, you have majority rule. So I really agree with that. - Thank you, professor,

for this very profound lecture. I really learned a lot. I wanted to ask you, so first of all, just some of my comments, you know, when I look around, I feel like a pervading problem In the US politics is that we have more and more extremism in our two party system, with Democrats moving further and further to the left and Republicans moving further and further to the right. So I mean, when I look around, you know, when I turn on the TV or when I just, you know, read a magazine and when I pay attention

to stuff in our sociopolitical world, I'm finding that I'm liking these independent and sort of moderate movements a lot more and No Labels being one of them. So I was just curious, it looks like These movements aren't really gaining traction. And so I was just curious, do you think the two party system in general and some of the key architects behind it are sort of suppressing the more moderate and common sense ideas? - Yeah, thank you. Well, your question actually really connects to the last question. I mean, I think in principle, we would be in

a better situation if we had more than two parties, but given the election rules that we have in place today, Voting for a third party when facing off against a threatening candidate for office, I think, is a mistake. So in other words, you know, in principle it would be great to have three, more than two parties, but we have, but you first have to change the rules before you can, I think, vote responsibly for a third party candidate, because the stakes are simply too high. Given the nature of our electoral system, with the first past

the post system, votes for third party candidates are wasted votes. And so that, you know, so that leaves me skeptical of the No Labels movement. I mean, the agenda, there may be kind of a good goal associated with it. But, you know, I think really, given that we have a system in which you really, you know, whoever wins the most votes in a state is going to win the electors for that state. By voting for a third party candidate in a presidential election, for instance, you're fracturing the vote away from the candidate you really want

to win. So I think the responsible thing to do in a two party system, from my own view, and of course, everybody has the right to vote how they want, is to vote for one of the two major candidates and to make a judgment kind of on that basis. (Daniel speaking indistinctly) - Great, thanks, Daniel, for the, - Yeah. - Professor Ziblatt, for the lecture. I really enjoyed it. I just wanted to ask you about two other forces that seem to be prevalent and, Populism and social media, especially the ability of politicians to lie directly

to their supporters, - To lie directly to their supporters? - Yeah or to, like a direct form of propaganda - Yeah. - That's partisan in nature. And I wanted to ask if, specifically about how you think that affects the 30% that you referenced of the, - Right. - That exists in a lot of countries around the world, and also how you think it might influence The cosmopolitan coalition that you referenced at the end. - Yeah. - Thank you. - Yeah, I think, this, all of this matters a lot. I mean, I've sort of, in a

sense, sort of bracketed this 30% movement and where it comes from and when, why it's sometimes more and why it's sometimes less. You know, if the a AFD in Germany gets 20% of the vote, that's one thing. If it gets 30% of the vote, that 10% difference makes a huge difference In the German political system. Just to give you one example why, the way that that judges are picked in the national political system, you have to have two thirds of the vote. So if a party wins 40% of the vote, let's say, even that can

be incredibly dangerous, because they, this radical right party could help pick Supreme Court justices. So coming to grips with why this number is sometimes higher, sometimes lower is really important. And I think all of the factors, I mean, there's lots of research on these things, but certainly media plays a big role, you know, how voters interpret the state of the economy seems to be increasingly a big, play a big role, you know? So, and that I think is shaped by media, media structures. You know, the decline of kind of local community seems to be, you

know, correlated. I mean, all of the research on this, there's lots of factors that, and what's, again, striking is the degree To which it's similar across democracies. You know, whether one's studying the radical right in Germany, in Sweden, or you know, the core Trump MAGA voters in the United States, the places where people are that vote for these kinds of parties are very similar, you know, and the types of, the demographic profile of these voters is also very similar. So I think the, from my, because of all of that, you know, and so I think

it's a concern everywhere, but the biggest concern is how these parties get Into national power without being in coalitions, for instance. And so that's why I focus more on institutions, although these other factors are certainly very important. - Thanks, Daniel. - Yes. - So kind of two closely related things. So I agree with your diagnosis, but I wanna push you more on the solution, you know, like your remedy. - Yeah. - So, you know, there is a way to change things, as you mentioned. There is a way to change the Constitution. And so, you know,

why isn't the remedy to create a coalition to create the conditions necessary to change the Constitution? So it's not like it's out there and can't be, like, this structural, permanent thing. It's like, there is a way to do it. Why isn't, you know, that being pushed as something? And then relatedly, you know, you imply that the problem is small red states, at least today, is smaller red, you know, Wyoming, Idaho, et cetera. So like, why not turn some Of those states purple or blue, as we've seen, for example, in Virginia, in our lifetimes, Virginia is

now at a minimum purple, if not mostly blue. And so, you know, why isn't there, you know, why not advocate a movement to, like, give something to red state voters from the other side that would then question their apparent, you know, loyalty to the Republican Party, so that they actually support the Democrats? And then the Democrats can, may, might actually benefit in the future from this, What you call the malapportionment, you know, in the US Senate, so that it can go both ways. And so I just would like you to say a couple of words

about that. Thank you. - Yeah. Yeah. Thank you. So, I mean, I wanna be clear, I mean my, there, my diagnosis here is not, you know, maybe it sounds partisan or it's, you know, there has partisan implications. But the point is, I'm making a point from democratic theory. I mean, how can one justify that the loser of a vote becomes president? I mean, it's really, I, you know, and that's not a point about partisanship. That's a point about democratic fairness. I mean, when I go out to dinner with my wife and kids, we have a

vote. Are we gonna go have Chinese food or sushi? We have a vote. Everyone knows, whoever gets the most votes, wins. I mean, this is a principle of democratic theory that is universal. And you know what's, it's clear that the partisan consequences of this is the thing that have alerted people to this. And I think that it's, the reason it's concerning at a partisan level is that it allows one party to entrench itself into power. Now, sure, Democrats should win in red states. I mean, this is what the work of democratic operatives is, is to

figure out how to do this. I mean, if I were advising Joe Biden, I would figure out, you know, tell him how to, figure out how to do that. And, you know, but it's still worth pointing out That Democrats have to win more votes in order to win. And that's just really sort of, given this, and it's, you know, it's from a perspective of democratic fairness, that's really the critique. That's the problem, but you know, I think you're right that, as a kind of strategic matter, if you're the Democratic Party, this makes sense to try

to do this. But I think still the same principle applies that the system is in some way distorting of the kind of competitive nature of democratic politics. On your first point, yeah, I agree that it's important. I mean, again, I'm not, you know, I think we, you know, we do need to think about how movements for change come along. And you know, we do this a little bit in this book. In the book, we kind of look at, you know, the progressive era, and there are broad social movements that push for reform. You know, I

think actually the direct election of US senators is very interesting. Actually, the movement for prohibition, although that was not a particularly, you know, Great constitutional amendment, is also instructive. I mean, these are broad social movements that cut across many states, that the reform efforts, you know, people require, you know, decades, often, of mobilization, and in order to have a constitutional amendment, you need two thirds of the House and the Senate. So sort of by definition, it has to be bipartisan. And so the question of how to get there, of course, is hard. But I think

politicians and political leaders change their behavior when they feel their voters want them To change their behavior. And so the only way that happens is through kind of an engagement with this and voters being concerned about this and putting pressures on political leaders, and that's the way constitutional change has happened in the past, and I think that's the only way it can happen now. - Yeah. Thank you. One thing that stuck out to me was, you kind of talked about how there's this, you know, 20 to 30% constant kind of, you know, For these kind

of more authoritarian movements and kind of this more cosmopolitan, liberal democracy supporting majority or something like that. And I'm wondering if you think that's some sort of constant amongst wealthy democracies, or if, what would happen, say if that was flipped, those numbers were flipped and that kind of thing? I guess is my question. - Yeah, it's, you know, I don't think it's, you know, not sort of a permanent kind of reality, but it just really seems to be the case. I mean, I think often we forget as well that, you know, the Nazi party in

Germany didn't win popular majorities. I mean, so it's actually pretty rare for, you know, for societies to have overwhelming majorities voting for anti-democratic forces. You know, and it may say something about the resilience of our societies that this is the case. And so I actually, you know, when people ask me, what do you feel optimistic about, this is something I feel optimistic about. I mean, this relies on investments in education and people's high quality of living and, You know, their own resources to kind of thrive in a complex economy. I think we need to invest

in all of this stuff to expand that majority. And so in some ways, it's the fruits of, you know, of decades of economic development and so on. And so it's not, so in some sense, I guess I feel pretty optimistic about that. But you know, once you get into 20, 30, 35% of the electorate voting against these kinds of, voting against democracy, Then I think you get into trouble. - Thanks. This was really a fabulous, fabulous talk. I just wanted to ask you, Daniel, to elaborate on one aspect of the feedback loops that you were

talking about, right? - Yeah. - So one important consequence of these counter-majoritarian institutions is that the Republican Party might think we don't actually have to get a majority, and so we can keep doing what we're doing and we'll still have a lot of power. But the other, you mentioned, I think another feedback loop, potentially, when we were speaking at lunch, right? Which is that things that people might want the government to do, they can't do. Like, so even, so Democrats have a majority, they get a majority, but there are all these counter-majoritarian institutions, the filibuster,

so popular things they might want to do, they can't do, or the Supreme Court strikes down things, prevents them from doing things. So is there a feedback loop also That involves increasing kind of disgust or disappointment with government, alienation from government, that can potentially also be really corrosive and it could actually lead to a situation where Donald Trump can win the majority of the vote in a presidential election? - Right. Yeah, no, I do think it's a concern. And I think there's growing frustration with kind of the, I mean the Biden administration, partly because of

that. But I, you know, I think one area Where you could imagine this really becoming dangerous is, you know, let's say Donald Trump wins the presidency without winning the popular vote once again, you know, there's going to be increased sense, I think on the left, that this system is just not legitimate. And so I think a kind of democratic legitimacy, broadly speaking, if institutions don't reflect majorities, over time, can be kind of, can be corrosive. And so there's a world in which I can imagine, you know, the left wing of the Democratic Party saying, why

even play this game? So I mean, that's a little different than the point you're making, I guess, which is there's just sort of frustration with the political system. Actually, one of the great insights of Juan Linz, a Spanish political scientist who I often like to quote is that the thing that precedes democratic breakdowns, he says, is the perception of unsolvable problems. You know, when the political system is perceived as simply not being effective, that that, I mean, it's, you know, he sort of states it As if it's a law like reality. When that happens and

that continues over decades, then you have people turning away from democracy. So, and he made this point looking at interwar democracies, looking at Latin America in the 1960s and '70s. So I think that is a real concern. - So my question is about, like, federalism and local rule, is that the, do you think there should be more or less of that? And does it contradict with, well, I guess, I mean, it seems to me that, in politics, There's a sense that if you don't get things at one level, you move up to the next level,

and before you know, these local issues become national issues, and because they're national issues, no one can agree, so. - Yeah. I mean, I think, a large political system, like large territorial political system like the United States, federalism is probably a necessary set of structures. I mean, not unlike the European Union where you kind of, you know, it's, I mean, in fact, You know, the fact that we have a two party system in the United States today in this massive country that's incredibly diverse is, you know, is unfathomable, if you stop and really think about

it for a moment. So federalism, at least, provides some kind of decentralization and kind of, you know, the political system to be responsive to local conditions. And, you know, so I certainly don't, I mean, I wouldn't wanna be misunderstood as saying that, you know, we need, you know, we need a unitary majoritarian system. I think a federal system is really important to have, but there's ways of making federalism more or less compatible with democracy. And, you know, I think, for instance, again, I mean, I don't, there's no time is the, are we gonna get more

representatives for bigger states in the US Senate. I mean, that's essentially a unchangeable feature of the US Constitution, but we should recognize that that's pretty unique in the world, how disproportionate, how overrepresented small states are. So I think we need a federal system, and this is the avenue through which political change often comes, is from the, from these local experiments, you know, that I mentioned the town hall meeting in Lexington. I mean, it's like those kinds of things, efforts to introduce voting reforms at the state level that, I mean, that's the way in which a

proportional system, for instance, would be introduced in the United States is through the state level. - Hi, I have a question. So you mentioned, which I agree with, that across the world, typically there's about 30% of the population that tends to be on the right. Would you agree with that, in general? - Yeah, I mean, yeah, I wouldn't say the right, but you kind of, that finds the appeals of, I would say, kind of ethnonationalist forces, you know, I mean, to the extreme right, let's say. - Okay, that's the premise. - Yeah. - There's one

country that I'm aware of, Switzerland, which seems to have weathered all of this up and down, Back and forth in the world, better than most other countries. But what I've heard is they have an 85% approval rating of their government. They trust the government all directions. Do you think it's time to maybe look, they're a small country, to look at us other options and maybe really consider major changes to a lot of things to how we do in this country? - Yeah, I mean, I was in Switzerland two weeks ago, in fact, and you know,

there's a far right party That's in government in Switzerland, but it's in coalition. I mean, it's constrained by, you know, I forget what the vote share is, like 25% or something, but it's constrained by other parties. And so the proportional representation system allows both to constrain these forces and the damage they can do. And also, I mean, one of the key features of that political system also, I mean, there's two things that are distinctive about Switzerland, I don't want to go too far down the rabbit hole, Switzerland, but one, that there's a kind of lot

of informal cooperation among the parties, and this comes from the proportional system. There's also referenda, which, you know, I think, I'm not sure how critical that is, but I think the broader point, the broader message of my book, I mean, to sort of focus on what your, the spirit of your question here is that, you know, we need to look outside the US. I mean it's, you know, there's points in American history, I mean, most of the time, you know, Americans tend to think we have the best system in the world and we're kind of

insular, and we don't look at other democracies, and we don't look at other way that universities are run in other countries. But there are these moments in American history, I think the beginning of the 20th century was one of these periods, where there was a lot of interest in what was happening in other parts of the world. I mean, our university system was set up Based on people studying in Germany and Britain and realizing we need to reform our institutions. My institution, Harvard University, was totally remade after people kind of understood how German universities were

run. Similarly, the progressive era in the early 20th century, where, you know, there was people who were interested in urban reforms, you know, going to look at how municipal governments ran, were run, and you know, sewer systems, you know, public transportation systems, and a kind of openness to the rest of the world. And I think, you know, this moment that we're living in is a moment in which we need to have the kind of ambitious modesty, I would say, to look beyond our own borders, to look for inspiration, not to, no cookie cutter. Every political

system is different, but we need to look at and be curious about the rest of the world. And I think there's a lot to learn. (audience clapping) Thank you. Thank you. (audience clapping) - Thank you, Daniel, and thank you all for your attentiveness and your questions. And we Australians say, now we go informal. - (laughs) Thank you. - The reception follows.