Philosophy of Mind by G.W.F. HEGEL [AudioBook & PDF eBook]

This is audible philosophy of mind by georg friedrich hagel read by peter wickham for uk me audiobooks introduction 377 the knowledge of mind is the highest and hardest just because it is the most concrete of sciences the significance of that absolute commandment know thyself Whether we look at it in itself or under the historical circumstances of its first utterance is not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect of the particular capacities character propensities and foibles of the single self the knowledge it commands means that of man's genuine reality of what is essentially and ultimately true and

real of mind as the true and essential being Equally little is at the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called knowledge of men the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities passions and foibles of other men and they bear what are called the recesses of the human heart information of this kind is for one thing meaningless unless on the assumption that we know the universal man as man and that always must be as Mind and for another being only engaged with casual insignificant and untrue aspects of mental life it fails to reach

the underlying essence of them all the mind itself 378 pneumatology or as it was also called rational psychology has been already alluded to in the introduction to the logic as an abstract and generalizing Metaphysic of the subject empirical or inductive psychology on the other hand deals with the concrete mind and after the revival of the sciences where observation and experience had been made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality such psychology was worked on the same lines as other sciences in this way it came about that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the

Inductive science and so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detail whilst at the same time the inductive science clung to the conventional common sense metaphysics with its analysis into forces various activities etc and rejected any attempt at a speculative treatment the books of aristotle on the soul along with his discussions on its special aspects and states Are for this reason still by far the most admirable perhaps even the sole work of philosophical value on this topic the main aim of a philosophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into

the theory of mind and so reinterpret the lesson of those aristotelian books 379 even our own sense of the mind's living unity naturally protests against any Attempt to break it up into different faculties forces or what comes to the same thing activities conceived as independent of each other but the craving for a comprehension of the unity is still further stimulated as we soon come across distinctions between mental freedom and mental determinism antithesis between free psychic agency and the cooperative that lies external to it Whilst we equally note the intimate interdependence of the one upon the

other in modern times especially the phenomena of animal magnetism have given even in experience a lively and visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul and of the power of its ideality before these facts the rigid distinctions of practical common sense are struck with confusion And the necessity of a speculative examination with a view to the removal of difficulties is more directly forced upon the student 380 the concrete nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficulty that the several grades and special types which develop its intelligible unity in detail are not left standing

as so many separate existences confronting its more advanced aspects It is otherwise in external nature their matter and movement for example have a manifestation all their own it is the solar system and similarly the differential of sense perception have a sort of earlier existence in the properties of bodies and still more independently in the four elements the species and grades of mental evolution on the contrary lose their separate existence and become factors States and features in the higher grades of development as a consequence of this a lower and more abstract aspect of mind betrays the

presence in it even to experience of a higher grade under the guise of sensation for example we may find the very highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment and so sensation which is but a mere form and vehicle made to the superficial glance seemed to Be the proper seat and as it were the source of those moral and religious principles with which it is charged and the moral and religious principles thus modified may seem to call for treatment as species of sensation but at the same time when lower grades of mental life are

under examination it becomes necessary if we desire to point to actual cases of them in experience to direct attention to more advanced grades for which they are mere forms In this way subjects will be treated off by anticipation which properly belong to later stages of development e.g in dealing with natural awakening from sleep we speak by anticipation of consciousness or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of intellect what mind or spirit is 381 from our point of view mind has for its presupposition nature of which it is the Truth and for that reason

its absolute prios in this its truth nature is vanished and mind has resulted as the idea entered on possession of itself here the subject and object of the idea are one either is the intelligent unity the notion this identity is absolute negativity for whereas in nature the intelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but Externalized this self-externalization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a return out of nature 382 for this reason

the essential but formally essential feature of mind is liberty i.e it is the notion's absolute Negativity or self-identity considered as this formal aspect it may withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality its very existence it can thus submit to infinite pain the negation of its individual immediacy in other words it can keep itself affirmative in this negativity and possess its own identity all this is possible so long as it is considered in its abstract Self-contained universality 383 this universality is also its determinate sphere of being having a being of its own the

universal is self-particularizing whilst it still remains self-identical hence the special mode of mental being is manifestation the spirit is not some one mode or meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a form distinct from Itself it does not manifest or reveal something but its very mode and meaning is this revelation and thus in its mere possibility mind is at the same moment an infinite absolute actuality 384 revelation taken to me in the revelation of the abstract idea is an unmediated transition to nature which comes to be As mind is free its manifestation is to

set forth nature as its world but because it is reflection it in thus setting forth its world at the same time presupposes the world as a nature independently existing in the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being a being in which the mind procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom the absolute is mind spirit this is the supreme definition of the Absolute to find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burden was we may say the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy it was the point

to which turned the impulse of all religion and science and it is this impulse that must explain the history of the world the word mind spirit and some glimpse of its meaning was found at an early period and the spirituality of god is the Lesson of christianity it remains for philosophy in its own element of intelligible unity to get hold of what was thus given as a mental image and what implicitly is the ultimate reality and that problem is not genuinely and by rational methods solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the

theme and the soul of philosophy subdivision 385 the development of mind spirit is in three stages one in the form of self-relation within it it has the ideal totality of the idea i.e it has before it all that its notion contains its being is to be self-contained and free this is mind subjective Two in the form of reality realized i.e in a world produced and to be produced by it in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity this is mind objective three in that unity of mind as objectivity and of mind is

ideality and concept which essentially and actually is and forever produces itself mind in its Absolute truth this is mind absolute 386 the two first parts of the doctrine of mind embrace the finite mind mind is the infinite idea and finitude here means the disproportion between the concept and the reality but with the qualification that it is a shadow cast by the mind's own light a show or illusion which the mind Implicitly imposes as a barrier to itself in order by its removal actually to realize and become conscious of freedom as its very being i.e to

be fully manifested the several steps of this activity on each of which with their semblance of being it is the function of the finite mind to linger and through which it has to pass are steps in its Liberation in the full truth of that liberation is given the identification of the three stages finding a world presupposed before us generating a world as our own creation and gaining freedom from it and in it to the infinite form of this truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness of it a rigid application of the category

of finitude by the abstract logician is chiefly seen in dealing with mind and Reason it is held not a mere matter of strict logic but treated also as a moral and religious concern to adhere to the point of view of finitude and the wish to go further is reckoned a mark of audacity if not of insanity of thought whereas in fact such a modesty of thought as treats the finite as something altogether fixed and absolute is the worst of virtues and to stick to a post which has no Sound ground in itself is the most

unsung sort of theory the category of finitude was at a much earlier period elucidated and explained at its place in the logic an elucidation which as in logic for the more specific those still simple thought forms of finitude so in the rest of philosophy for the concrete forms as merely to show that the finite is not i.e is not the truth but merely a Transition and an emergence to something higher this finitude of the spheres so far examined is the dialectic that makes a thing have its cessation by another and in another but spirit the

intelligent unity and the implicit eternal is itself just the consummation of that internal act by which nullity is nullified and vanity is made vain And so the modesty alluded to is a retention of this vanity the finite in opposition to the true it is itself therefore vanity in the course of the mind's development we shall see this vanity appear as wickedness at that turning point at which mind has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its most central contradiction section 1 mind subjective 387 Mind on the ideal stage of its development is mined as

cognitive cognition however being taken here not as a merely logical category of the idea but in the sense appropriate to the concrete mind subjective mind is a immediate or implicit a soul the spirit in nature the object treated by anthropology be immediate or explicit Still as identical reflection into itself and into other things mind in correlation or particularization consciousness the object treated by the phenomenology of mind see mind defining itself in itself as an independent subject the object treated by psychology in the soul is the awaking of consciousness Consciousness sets itself up as reason awaking

at one bound to the sense of its rationality and this reason by its activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the consciousness of its intelligent unity for an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification it presents is an advance of development and so in mind every character under which it appears is a stage in a process Of specification and development a step forward towards its goal in order to make itself into and to realize in itself what it implicitly is each step again is itself such a process and its product is that what the mind

was implicitly at the beginning and so for the observer is for itself for the special form vis which the mind has in that step the ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is What happens to it what it does the soul is presupposed as a ready-made agent which displays such features as its acts and utterances from which we can learn what it is what sort of faculties and powers it possesses all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the soul is really invests it with that character in

our conception and makes it reach a higher Stage of being than it explicitly had before we must however distinguish and keep apart from the progress here to be studied what we call education and instruction the sphere of education is the individuals only and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist in them but in the philosophic theory of mind mind is studied as self-instruction and Self-education in very essence and its acts and utterances are stages in the process which brings it forward to itself links it in unity with itself and so makes it

actual mind subsection a anthropology the soul a anthropology the soul Section one mind subjective 388 spirit mind came into being as the truth of nature but not merely is it as such a result to be held the true and real first of what went before this becoming what transition bears in the sphere of the notion the special meaning of free judgment mind thus come into being means Therefore that nature in its own self realizes its untruth and sets itself aside it means that mind presupposes itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is

always self-externalized but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple at such a stage it is not yet mind but soul 389 the soul is no separate immaterial entity wherever there is nature the soul is its universal immaterialism its simple ideal life soul is the substance or absolute basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought And the soul remains the pervading identical ideality of it all but as it is still conceived thus abstractly the

soul is only the sleep of mind the passive of aristotle which is potentially all things question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest except where on the one hand matter is regarded as something true and mind conceived as a thing on the Other but in modern times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands they have come upon imponderable matters like heat light etc to which they might perhaps add space and time these imponderables which have lost the property peculiar to matter of gravity and in a sense even the capacity

of offering resistance Have still however a sensible existence and outness of part to part whereas the vital matter which may also be found enumerated among them not merely lacks gravity but even every other aspect of existence which might lead us to treat it as material the fact is that in the idea of life the self-externalism of nature is implicitly at an end subjectivity is the very substance and Conception of life with this proviso however that its existence or objectivity is still at the same time forfeited to the away of self-externalism it is otherwise with mind

there in the intelligible unity which exists as freedom as absolute negativity and not as the immediate or natural individual the object or the reality of the intelligible unity is the unity itself And so the self-externalism which is the fundamental feature of matter has been completely dissipated and transmuted into universality or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity mind is the existent truth of matter the truth that matter itself has no truth a cognate question is that of the community of soul and body This community interdependence was assumed as a fact and the only problem was

how to comprehend it the usual answer perhaps was to call it an incomprehensible mystery and indeed if we take them to be absolutely antithetical and absolutely independent they are as impenetrable to each other as one piece of matter to another each being supposed to be found only in the pores of the other I.e where the other is not whence epicurus when attributing to the gods a residence in the pause was consistent in not imposing on them any connection with the world a somewhat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this relation came to

be expressly discussed descartes malboros spindles and leibniz have all indicated god as this nexus they meant that the finitude of soul and Matter were only ideal and unreal distinctions and so holding these philosophers took god not as so often as done merely as another word for the incomprehensible but rather as the sole true identity of finite mind and matter but either this identity as in the case of spinoza is too abstract or as in the case of leibniz though his monad of monadz brings things into being it does so only by an act of judgment

or Choice hence with leibniz the result is the distinction between soul and the corporeal or material and the identity is only like the copula of a judgment and does not rise or develop into system into the absolute syllogism 390 the soul is at first a in its immediate natural mode the natural soul which only is Be secondly it is the soul which feels as individualized enters into correlation with its immediate being and in the modes of that being retains an abstract independence see thirdly its immediate being or corporati is molded into it and with that

cooperative it exists as actual soul a the physical soul One three nine one the soul universal described it may be as an anima mundai a world soul must not be fixed on that account as a single subject it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects thus when it presents itself as a single soul it is a single soul which is merely Its only modes are modes of natural life these have so to speak behind its ideality of free existence i.e they are natural objects for consciousness but

objects to which the soul is such does not behave as to something external these features rather are physical qualities of which it finds itself possessed hey Physical qualities 2 392 1 while still a substance i.e a physical soul the mind takes part in the general planetary life feels the difference of climates the changes of the season and the periods of the day etc this life of nature for the main shows itself only an occasional strain or disturbance of mental tone In recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical sidereal and telluric life

of man in such a sympathy with nature the animals essentially live their specific characters and their particular phases of growth depend in many cases completely and always more or less upon it in the case of man these points of dependence lose importance just in proportion to his civilization and the More his whole frame of soul is based upon a substructure of mental freedom the history of the world is not bound up with revolutions in the solar system any more than the destinies of individuals with the positions of the planets the difference of climate has a

more solid and vigorous influence but the response to the changes of the season and hours of the day is found only in faint changes of mood Which come expressly to the fore only in morbid states including insanity and at periods when the self-conscious life suffers depression in nations less intellectually emancipated which therefore live more in harmony with nature we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of imbecility a few real cases of such sympathy and on that foundation what seems to be marvelous prophetic vision of coming Conditions and of events arising therefrom but as mental freedom

gets a deeper hold even these few and slight susceptibilities based upon participation in the common life of nature disappear animals and plants on the contrary remain forever subject to such influences three nine three Two according to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe the general planetary life of the nature governed mind specializes itself and breaks up into the several nature governed minds which on the whole give expression to the nature of the geographical continents and constitute the diversities of race the contrast between the earth's poles the land towards the north pole being More aggregated and

preponderant over sea whereas in the southern hemisphere it runs out in sharp points widely distant from each other introduces into the differences of continents a further modification which treviranus biology part 2 has exhibited in the case of the flora and fauna 394 this diversity descends into specialities that may be termed local minds Shown in the outward modes of life and occupation bodily structure and disposition but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and moral character of the several peoples back to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations

each possessing a persistent type of its own three nine five three the soul is further De-universalized into the individualized subject but this subjectivity is here only considered as a differentiation and singling out of the modes which nature gives we find it as the special temperament talent character physionomy or other disposition and idiosyncrasy of families or single individuals b physical alterations 396 taking the soul as an individual we find its diversities as alterations in it the one permanent subject and as stages in its development as they are at once physical and mental diversities a more concrete

definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the formed and matured mind one the first of these is the natural lapse Of the ages in man's life he begins with childhood mind wrapped up in itself his next step is the fully developed antithesis the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjective as seen in ideals fancies hopes ambitions against his immediate individuality and that individuality marks both the world which as it exists Fails to meet his ideal requirements and the position of the individual himself who is still short

of independence and not fully equipped for the party has to play youth thirdly we see man in his true relation to his environment recognizing the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it a world no longer incomplete but able in the work which it collectively achieves To afford the individual a place and a security for his performance by his share in this collective work he first is really somebody gaining an effective existence and an objective value manhood last of all comes the finishing touch to this unity with objectivity a unity which while

on its realist side it passes into the inertia of deadening habit On its idealist side gains freedom from the limited interests and entanglements of the outward present old age 397 to next we find the individual subject to a real antithesis leading it to seek and find itself in another individual this the sexual relation on a physical basis shows on its one Side subjectivity remaining in an instinctive and emotional harmony of moral life and love and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme universal phase in purposes political scientific or artistic and on the other shows an

active half where the individual is the vehicle of a struggle of universal and objective interests with the given conditions both of his own existence and of that of the external world Carrying out these universal principles into a unity with the world which is his own work the sexual tie acquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the family three nine eight three when the individuality or self-centralized being distinguishes itself from its mere being this immediate judgment is the waking of The soul which confronts its self-absorbed natural life in the first instance as one natural

quality and state confronts another state phys sleep the waking is not merely for the observer or externally distinct from the sleep it is itself the judgment primary partition of the individual soul which is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to its mere existence Distinguishing itself from its still undifferentiated universality the waking state includes generally all self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realizes its own distinct self sleep is an invigoration of this activity not as a merely negative rest from it but as a return back from the world of specialization from dispersion into

phases where it is Grown hard and stiff a return into the general nature of subjectivity which is the substance of those specialized energies and their absolute master the distinction between sleep and waking is one of those poses as they may be called which are often addressed to philosophy napoleon for example on a visit to the university of pavia put this question to the class of ideology The characterization given in the section is abstract it primarily treats waking merely as a natural fact containing the mental element implicate but not yet as invested with a special being

of its own if we are to speak more concretely of this distinction in fundamentals it remains the same we must take the self-existence of the individual soul in its higher aspects as the ego of consciousness and as Intelligent mind the difficulty raised and lent the distinction of the two states properly arises only when we also take into account the dreams in sleep and describe these dreams as well as the mental representations in the sober waking consciousness under one and the same title of mental representations thus superficially classified as states of mental representation the two coincide

Because we have lost sight of the difference and in the case of any assignable distinction of waking consciousness we can always return to the trivial remark that all this is nothing more than mental idea but the concrete theory of the waking soul in its realized being views it as consciousness and intellect and the world of intelligent consciousness is something quite Different from a picture of mere ideas and images the latter are in the main only externally conjoined in an unintelligent way by the laws of the so-called association of ideas though here and there of course

logical principles may also be operative but in the waking state man behaves essentially as a concrete ego an intelligence and because of this intelligence his Sense perception stands before him as a concrete totality of features in which each member each point takes up its place as at the same time determined through and with all the rest thus the facts embodied in his sensation are authenticated not by his mere subjective representation and distinction of the facts as something external from the person but by virtue of the concrete interconnection in which each part Stands with all parts

of this complex the waking state is the concrete consciousness of this mutual corroboration of each single factor of its content by all the others in the picture as perceived the consciousness of this interdependence need not be explicit and distinct still this general setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete feeling of self In order to see the difference between dreaming and waking we need only keep in view the canteen distinction between subjectivity and objectivity of mental representation the latter depending upon determination through categories remembering has already noted that what is actually present in

mind need not be therefore explicitly realized in consciousness just as little as the exaltation of the Intellectual sense to god he'd stand before consciousness in the shape of proofs of god's existence although as before explained these proofs only serve to express the net worth and content of that feeling c sensibility three three nine nine sleep and waking are primarily it is true not mere alterations but Alternating conditions a progression in infinite this is their formal and negative relationship but in it the affirmative relationship is also involved in the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere

existence is implicit as an ideal factor the features which make up its sleeping nature where they are implicitly as in their substance are found by the waking Soul in its own self and be it noted for itself the fact that these particulars though as a mode of mind they are distinguished from the self-identity of our self-centered being are yet simply contained in its simplicity is what we call sensibility 400 sensibility feeling is the form of the dull stirring the Inarticulate breathing of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality where every definite feature is still

immediate neither specially developed in its contents nor set in distinction as objective to subject but treated as belonging to its most special its natural peculiarity the content of sensation is thus limited and transient belonging as it does to Natural immediate being to what is therefore qualitative and finite everything is in sensation feeling if you will everything that emerges in conscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation for source and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears let it not be enough to have principles and religion only

in the head They must also be in the heart in the feeling what we merely have in the head is in consciousness in a general way the facts of it are objective set over against consciousness so that as it is put in me my abstract ego it can also be kept away and apart from me from my concrete subjectivity but if put in the feeling the fact is a mode of my individuality however crude That individuality be in such a form it is thus treated as my very own my own is something inseparable from the

actual concrete self and this immediate unity of the soul with its underlying self in all its definite content is just this inseparability which however yet falls short of the ego of developed consciousness and still more of the freedom of rational mind life It is with a quite different intensity and permanency that the will the conscience and the character are our very own than can ever be true of feeling and of the group of feelings the heart and this we need no philosophy to tell us no doubt it is correct to say that above everything the

heart must be good but feeling and heart is not the form by which anything is legitimated as Religious moral true just etc and an appeal to heart and feeling either means nothing or means something bad this should hardly need enforcing can any experience be more trite than that feelings and hearts are also bad evil godless mean etc that the heart is the source only of such feelings is stated in the words from the heart proceed evil thoughts Murder adultery fornication blasphemy etc in such times when scientific theology and philosophy make the heart and feeling the

criterion of what is good moral and religious it is necessary to remind them of these trite experiences just as it is nowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic property by which man is distinguished from the beasts And that he has feeling in common wisdom 401 what the sentient soul finds within it is on one hand the naturally immediate as ideally in it and made its own on the other hand and conversely what originally belongs to the central individuality which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free mind gets the features

of the natural cooperative and is so felt In this way we have two spheres of feeling one where what at first is a corporeal affection eg of the eye or of any bodily part whatever is made feeling sensation by being driven inward memorized in the soul's self-centered part another where affections originating in the mind and belonging to it are in order to be felt and to be as if found invested with cooperative thus the mode or affection gets a place In the subject it is felt in the soul the detailed specification of the former branch

of sensibility is seen in the system of the senses but the other or inwardly originated modes of feeling no less necessarily systematize themselves and their corporation has put in the living and concretely developed natural being works itself out following the special character of the mental mode in a special system of bodily organs Sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in the life of its bodily part the senses form the simple system of cooperative specified a the ideal side of physical things breaks up into two because in it as immediate and not

yet subjective ideality distinction appears as mere variety the senses of definite light and of sound The real aspect similarly is with its difference double b the senses of smell and taste c the sense of solid reality of heavy matter of heat and shape around the center of the sentient individuality these specifications arrange themselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural cooperative The system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific bodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science a psychical physiology somewhat pointing to such a

system is implied in the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate sensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility the pleasant and unpleasant as also in the distinct parallelism Which underlies the symbolical employment of sensations eg of colors tones smells but the most interesting side of a psychical physiology would lie in studying not the mere sympathy but more definitely the bodily form adopted by certain mental modifications especially the passions or emotions we should have for example to explain the line of connection by which anger And courage are felt in the breast the blood

the irritable system just as thinking and mental occupation are felt in the head the center of the sensible system we should want a more satisfactory explanation than hitherto of the most familiar connections by which tears and voice in general with its varieties of language laughter size with many other specializations lying in the line Of pathogeny and physiology are formed from their mental source in physiology the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism but they form at the same time a physical system for the expression of mental states and

in this way they get quite another interpretation 402 sensations just because they are Immediate and are found existing are single and transient aspects of psychic life alterations in the substantiality of the soul set in its self-centered life with which that substance is one but this self-centered being is not merely a formal factor of sensation the soul is virtually a reflected totality of sensations it feels in itself the total substantiality which it virtually is It is a soul which feels in the usage of ordinary language sensation and feeling are not clearly distinguished still we do not

speak of the sensation but of the feeling sense of right of self sentimentality sensibility is connected with sensation we may therefore say sensation emphasizes rather the side of passivity the fact that we find ourselves feeling I.e the immediacy of mode in feeling whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves who feel be the feeling soul soul as sentiency for 403 the feeling or sentient individual is the simple ideality or subjective side of sensation what it has to do therefore is to raise Its substantiality it's merely virtual filling up

to the character of subjectivity to take possession of it to realize its mastery over its own as sentient the soul is no longer a mere natural but an inward individuality the individuality which in the merely substantial totality was only formal to it has to be liberated and made independent nowhere so much as in the case of the Soul and still more of the mind if we are to understand it must that feature of ideality be kept in view which represents it as the negation of the real but a negation where the real is put past

virtually retained although it does not exist the feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental ideas or to memory every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations ideas acquired law Thoughts etc and yet the ego is one and uncompounded a deep featureless characterless mind in which all this is stored up without existing it is only when i call to mind an idea that i bring it out of that interior to existence before consciousness sometimes in sickness ideas and information supposed to have been forgotten years ago because for so long they

had not been brought into Consciousness once more come to light they were not in our possession nor by such reproduction as occurs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession and yet they were in us and continue to be in us still thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him should he have once forgotten them they Belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such but only to his implicit self and under all the superstructure of specialized and instrumental consciousness that may subsequently

be added to it the individuality always remains this single souled inner life at the present stage this singleness is primarily to be defined as one of feeling As embracing the corporeal in itself thus denying the view that this body is something material with parts outside parts and outside the soul just as the number and variety of mental representations is no argument for an extended and real multitude in the ego so the real outerness of parts in the body has no truth for the sentient soul as sentient the soul is characterized as immediate and so is

natural and corporeal But the outness of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for the soul as it counts for the intelligible unity not as anything real and therefore not as a barrier the soul is this intelligible unity in existence the existence speculative principle thus in the body it is one simple omnipresent unity as to the representative faculty the Body is but one representation and the infinite variety of its material structure and organization is reduced to the simplicity of one definite conception so in the sentient soul the cooperative and all that outness of parts

to paths which belongs to it is reduced to ideality the truth of the natural multiplicity the soul is virtually the totality of nature As an individual soul it is a monarch it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world that world being included in it and filling it up and to that world it stands but as to itself 404 as individual the soul is exclusive and always exclusive any difference there is it brings within itself What is differentiated from it is as yet no external object as in consciousness but only the aspects of

its own sentient totality etc in this partition judgment of itself it is always subject its object is its substance which is at the same time its predicate this substance is still the content of its natural life but turned into the content of the individual sensation laden soul Yet as the soul is in that content still particular the content is its particular world so far as that is in an implicit mode included in the ideality of the subject by itself this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness its features are not developed to consciousness

and intelligent content so far it is formal and only formal it acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it is as a form and appears as a Special state of mind to which the soul which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence may again sink down but when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more subordinate and abstract one it implies a want of adaptation which is disease in the present stage we must treat first of the abstract psychical modifications By themselves secondly as morbid states of mind the latter being only explicable by

means of the former a the feeling soul in its immediacy 405 a.a though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic individual it is because immediate not yet as itself not a true subject reflected into itself And is therefore passive hence the individuality of its true self is a different subject from it a subject which may even exist as another individual by the selfhood of the latter it a substance which is only a non-independent predicate is then set in vibration and controlled without the least resistance on its part this other subject by which it is so

controlled may be called its genius In the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its mother's womb a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental but psychical a correlation of soul to soul here are two individuals yet in undivided psychic unity the one as yet no self as yet nothing impenetrable incapable of resistance the other is its actuating subject the single self of the two The mother is the genius of the child for by genius we commonly mean the total mental selfhood as it has existence of its own and constitutes

the subjective substantiality of someone else who is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal independence the underlying essence of the genius is the sum total of existence of life and of character not as a mere possibility or capacity or virtuality but as efficiency and realized activity As concrete subjectivity if we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child's existence as an embryo in its special integuments and as connected with the mother by means of umbilical cord placenta etc all that is presented to the senses and reflection are certain

anatomical and physiological facts externalities and instrumentalities in The sensible and material which are insignificant as regards the main point the psychical relationship what ought to be noted as regards this psychical tie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions injuries etc of the mother but the whole cyclical judgment partition of the underlying nature by which the female like the monocotyledons Among vegetables can suffer disruption in twain so that the child has not merely got communicated to it but has originally received morbid dispositions as well as other predispositions

of shape temper character talent idiosyncrasies etc sporadic examples and traces of this magic tie appear elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life say between friends especially female friends with delicate Nerves a tie which may go so far is to show magnetic phenomena between husband and wife and between members of the same family the total sensitivity has itself here in a separate subjectivity which in the case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature is visibly present as another and a different individual but this sensitive totality is meant to Elevate its selfhood

out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same individual which is then its indwelling consciousness self-possessed intelligent and reasonable for such a consciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only implicitly existent material and the self-possessed subjectivity is the rational self-conscious controlling genius thereof But this sensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious congenital disposition and temperament but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retains also inhabit as to which we see later all further ties and essential relationships fortunes principles everything in short belonging to the character and in whose elaboration self-conscious

activity has most effectively Participated the sensitivity is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is condensed the total individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing and actual play of his consciousness his secular ideas developed interests inclinations etc as contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more intensive form of individuality is termed the genius Whose decision is ultimate whatever may be the show of reasons intentions means of which the more public consciousness is so liberal this concentrated individuality also reveals itself under the aspect of what is called the

heart and soul of feeling a man is said to be heartless and unfeeling when he looks at things with self-possession and acts according to his permanent purposes be they great substantial aims or petty And unjust interests a good-hearted man on the other hand means rather one who is at the mercy of his individual sentiment even when it is of narrow range and is wholly made up of particularities of such good nature or goodness of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the indulgence 406 bb the sensitive life when it

becomes a Form or state of the self-conscious educated self-possessed human being is a disease the individual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the concrete contents of his own self whilst he keeps his self-possessed consciousness of self and of the causal order of things apart as a distinct state of mind this morbid condition is seen in magnetic sonambialism and cognate states In this summary encyclopedic account it is impossible to supply a demonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable condition produced chiefly by animal magnetism to show in other

words that it is in harmony with the facts to that end the phenomena so complex in their nature and so very different one from another would have first of all to be brought under their general points of view The facts it might seem first of all call for verification but such a verification would it must be added be superfluous for those on whose account it was called for for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring the narratives infinitely numerous so they be and accredited by the education and character of the witnesses to be mere

deception and impostor the a priori conceptions of these Inquirers are so rooted that no testimony can avail against them and they have even denied what they have seen with their own eyes in order to believe in this department even what one's own eyes have seen and still more to understand it the first requisite is not to be in bondage to the hard and fast categories of the practical intellect the chief points on which discussion turns may here be given A to the concrete existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of his fundamental interests both the

essential and the particular empirical ties which connecting with other men and the world at large this totality forms his actuality in the sense that it lies in fact imminent in him it has already been called his genius this genius is not the free mind which Wills and thinks the form of sensitivity in which the individual here appears immersed is on the contrary a surrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence the first conclusion to which these considerations lead with reference to the contents of consciousness in the somnambulist stage is that it is only the range of his

individually molded world of his private interests and narrow Relationships which appear there scientific theories and philosophic conceptions or general truths require a different soil require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarticulate mass of mere sensitivity to free consciousness it is foolish therefore to expect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist state b where a human being senses and intellect Are sound he is fully and intelligently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to his individuality but he is awake to it in the form of interconnection between himself and the

features of that reality conceived as an external and a separate world and he is aware that this world is in itself also a complex of interconnections of a practically intelligible kind in his subjective ideas and plans he has Also before him this causally connected scheme of things he calls his world and the series of means which bring his ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the objective existences which are also means and ends to each other at the same time this world which is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that

it is these threads which make him what he really is He too would become extinct if these externalities were to disappear unless by the aid of religion subjective reason and character he is in a remarkable degree self-supporting and independent of them but then in the latter case he is less susceptible of the psychical state he has spoken of as an illustration of that identity with the surroundings may be noted the effect produced by the death of beloved Relatives friends etc on those left behind so that the one dies or pines away with the loss of

the other thus cato after the downfall of the roman republic could live no longer his inner reality was neither wider nor higher than it compare homesickness and the like see but when all that occupies the waking consciousness the world outside it and Its relationship to that world is under a veil and the soul is thus sunk in sleep in magnetic sleep in catalepsy and other diseases for example those connected with female development or of the approach of death etc then that imminent actuality of the individual remains the same substantial total as before but now as

a purely sensitive life with An inward vision and an inward consciousness and because it is the adult formed and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of sensitivity it retains along with its content a certain nominal selfhood a formal vision and awareness which however does not go so far as the conscious judgment or discernment by which its contents when it is healthy and awake exist for it as an outward Objectivity the individual is thus a monarch which is inwardly aware of its actuality a genius which beholds itself the characteristic point in such knowledge is

that the very same facts which for the healthy consciousness are an objective practical reality and to know which in its sober moods it needs the intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion are now immediately known and perceived In this imminence this perception is a sort of clairvoyance for it is a consciousness living in the undivided substantiality of the genius and finding itself in the very heart of the interconnection and so can dispense with the series of conditions external one to another which lead up to the result conditions which cool reflection has

in succession to traverse And in doing so feels the limits of its own external individuality but such clairvoyance just because it's dim and turbid vision does not present the facts in a rational interconnection is for that very reason at the mercy of every private contingency of feeling and fancy etc not to mention that foreign suggestions see later intrude into its vision it is thus impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants really see Preponderates over what they deceive themselves in but it is absurd to treat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as

a truer state capable of conveying general truths five d an essential feature of this sensitivity with its absence of intelligent and volitional personality is this that it is a state of passivity Like that of the child in the womb the patient in this condition is accordingly made and continues to be subject to the power of another person the magnetizer so that when the two are thus in psychical rapport the selfless individual not really a person has for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other this latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of

The former and the genius which may even supply him with a train of ideas that the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which are present in the person with whom he stands on rapport and that he is aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if they were his own shows the substantial identity which the soul Which even in its concreteness is also truly immaterial is capable of holding with another when the substance of both is thus made one there is only one subjectivity of consciousness the patient has a

sort of individuality but it is empty not on the spot not actual and this nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the sensations and ideas of the other in Whom it sees smells tastes reads and hears it is further to be noted on this point that the somnambulist is thus brought into rapport with two genii and a two-fold set of ideas his own and that of the magnetizer but it is impossible to say precisely which sensations and which visions he in this nominal perception receives beholds and brings to knowledge from his own

inward self And which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stands in relation this uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions and accounts among other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among somnambulists from different countries and under rapport with persons of different education as regards their views on morbid states and the methods of cure or medicines for them as well as on scientific and intellectual topics E as in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external objectivity so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all varieties of

sensation have disappeared and hence when the activity of the sense organs is asleep the common sense or general feeling specifies itself to several functions one sees and hears with the fingers And especially with the pit of the stomach etc to comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to be able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and some other existence on which it depends to discover what is called the ordinary course of nature in compliance with the laws and relations of the intellect for example causality reasons etc the purely

sensitive life on the Contrary even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness as in the morbid state alluded to is just this form of immediacy without any distinctions between subjective and objective between intelligent personality and objective world and without the aforementioned finite ties between them hence to understand this intimate conjunction which though all embracing is without any Definite points of attachment is impossible so long as we assume independent personalities independent one of another and of the objective world which is their content so long as we assume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part

of being to another b self-feeling sense of self six 407 a a the sensitive totality is in its capacity as individual essentially the tendency to distinguish itself in itself and to wake up to the judgment in itself in virtue of which it has particular feelings and stands as a subject in respect of these aspects of itself the subject as such gives these feelings a place as its own in itself in these private and personal sensations It is immersed and at the same time because of the ideality of the particulars it combines itself in them with

itself as a subjective unit in this way it is self-feeling and is so at the same time only in the particular feeling 408 bb in consequence of the immediacy which still marks the self-feeling i.e in Consequence of the element of corporeality which is still undetached from the mental life and as the feeling too is itself particular and bound up with a special corporeal form it follows that although the subject has been brought to acquire intelligent consciousness it is still susceptible of disease so far as to remain fast in a special phase of its self-feeling unable

to refine it To ideality and get the better of it the fully furnished self of intelligent consciousness is a conscious subject which is consistent in itself according to an order and behavior which follows from its individual position and its connection with the external world which is no less a world of law but when it is engrossed with a single phase of feeling it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due subordination in the individual system Of the world which a conscious subject is in this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between the

totality systematized in its consciousness and the single phase or fixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank this is insanity or mental derangement in considering insanity we must as in other cases anticipate the full grown and intelligent conscious subject Which is at the same time the natural self of self feeling in such a phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a particularity which instead of being idealized in the former remains as a fixed element in self-feeling mind as such is free and therefore not

susceptible of this malady but in older metaphysics mind was Treated as a soul as a thing and it is only as a thing i.e as something natural and existent that it is liable to insanity the settled fixture of some finite element in it insanity is therefore a cyclical disease i.e a disease of body and mind alike the commencement may appear to start from the one more than the other and so also may the cure the self-possessed and healthy subject Has an active and present consciousness of the ordered whole of his individual world into the system

of which he subsumes each special content of sensation idea desire inclination etc as it arises so as to insert them in their proper place he is the dominant genius over these particularities between this and insanity the difference is like that between waking and dreaming only that in insanity the dream falls Within the waking limits and so makes part of the actual self-feeling error and that sort of thing is a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective interconnection of things in the concrete however it is often difficult to say where it begins to become

derangement a violent but groundless and senseless outburst of hatred etc may In contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and stability of character make its victim seem to be beside himself with frenzy but the main point in derangement is the contradiction which a feeling with a fixed corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole massive adjustments forming the concrete consciousness the mind which is in a condition of mere being And where such being is not rendered fluid in its consciousness is diseased the contents which are set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking affections

of the heart such as vanity pride and the rest of the passions fancies and hopes merely personal love and hatred when the influence of self-possession and of general principles moral and theoretical is relaxed and ceases to Keep the natural temper under lock and key the earthly elements are set free that evil which is always latent in the heart because the heart as immediate is natural and selfish it is the evil genius of man which gains the upper hand in insanity but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more intelligent part which is there

also hence this state is mental derangement And distress the right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that insanity is not an abstract loss of reason neither in the point of intelligence nor of will and its responsibility but only derangement only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason just as physical disease is not an abstract i.e mere and total loss of health If it were that it would be death but a contradiction in it this humane treatment no less benevolent and reasonable the services of pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgement presupposes the patient's

rationality and in that assumption has the sound basis for dealing with him on this side just as in the case of bodily disease the physician bases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains Health c habit 7 409 self-feeling immersed in the detail of the feelings in simple sensations and also desires instincts passions and their gratification is undistinguished from them but in the self there is latent a simple self-relation of ideality a nominal Universality which is the truth of these details and as so universal the self is to be stamped upon and made

appear in this life of feeling yet so as to distinguish itself from the particular details and be a realized universality but this universality is not the full and sterling truth of the specific feelings and desires what they specifically contain is as yet Left out of account and so too the particularity is as now regarded equally formal it counts only as the particular being or immediacy of the soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realization this particular being of the soul is the factor of its cooperative here we have it breaking with this cooperative

distinguishing it from itself Itself a simple being and becoming the ideal subjective substantiality of it just as in its latent notion it was the substance and the mere substance of it but this abstract realization of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not yet the self not the existence of the universal which is for the universal it is the cooperative reduced to its mere ideality And so far only does cooperative belong to the soul as such that is to say just as space and time as the abstract one outside another as therefore empty space and

empty time are only subjective forms a pure act of intuition so is that pure being which through the supersession in it of the particularity of the cooperative or of the immediate cooperative as such has realized itself Mere intuition and no more lacking consciousness but the basis of consciousness and consciousness it becomes when the corporati of which it is the subjective substance and which still continues to exist and that as a barrier for it has been absorbed by it and it has been invested with the character of self-centered subject 410 The soul's making itself an abstract

universal being and reducing the particulars of feelings and of consciousness to a mere feature of its being is habit in this manner the soul has the contents in possession and contains them in such manner that in these features it is not as sentient nor does it stand in relationship with them as distinguishing itself from them nor is absorbed in them But has them and moves in them without feeling or consciousness of the fact the soul is freed from them so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them and whilst existing in these

forms as its possession it is at the same time open to be otherwise occupied and engaged say with feeling and with mental consciousness in general this process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of Feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them and the generation of habit as practice for this being of the soul if in respect of the natural particular phase it be called an abstract universality to which the former is transmuted is a reflexive universality i.e the one and the same that recurs in a series of units

of sensation is reduced to unity and this abstract unity expressly stated Habit like memory is a difficult point in mental organization habit is the mechanism of self-feeling as memory is the mechanism of intelligence the natural qualities and alterations of age sleep and waking are immediately natural habit on the contrary is the mode of feeling as well as intelligence will etc so far as they belong to self-feeling Made into a natural and mechanical existence habit is rightly called a second nature nature because it is an immediate being of the soul a second nature because it is

an immediacy created by the soul impressing and molding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form Inhabit the human being's mode of existence is natural and for that reason not free but still frees so far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by habit reduced to a mere being of his and he is no longer involuntarily attracted or repelled by it and so no longer interested occupied or dependent in regard to it the want of freedom inhabit is

partly merely formal as habit merely attaches To the being of the soul partly only relative so far as its strictly speaking arises only in the case of bad habits or so far as a habit is opposed by another purpose whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of liberty the main point about habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from the feelings even in being affected by them the different forms of this may be described as follows A the immediate feeling is negated and treated as indifferent one who gets inured against

external sensations frost heat weariness of the limbs etc sweet tastes etc and who hardens the heart against misfortune acquires a strength which consists in this that although the frost etc or the Misfortune is felt the affection is deposed to a mere externality and immediacy the universal psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it and the self-feeling as such consciousness reflection and any other purposes and activity are no longer bothered with it b there is indifference towards the satisfaction The desires and impulses are by the habit of their satisfaction deadened this is the rational liberation

from them whereas monastic renunciation and forcible interference do not free from them nor are they in conception rational of course in all this it is assumed that the impulses are kept as the finite modes they naturally are and that they like their satisfaction Are subordinated as partial factors to the reasonable will c inhabit regarded as aptitude or skill not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept intact per se but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim to be made a power in the bodily part which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious

to it conceived as having the inward purpose Of the subjective soul thus imposed upon it the body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier thus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul a simple self-concentration and its earlier naturalness and immediacy it has lost its original and immediate identity with the bodily nature and as external has first to be reduced to that Position specific feelings can only get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way and the immediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific aim a particular aspect of its

differentiated structure a particular organ of its organic system to mold such an aim in the organic body is to bring out and express the ideality which is implicit in matter always And especially so in the specific bodily part and thus to enable the soul under its volitional and conceptual characters to exist as substance in its corporate in this way an aptitude shows the corporati rendered completely pervious made into an instrument so that when the conception e.g a series of musical notes is in me then without resistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance

The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action the most external of them i.e the spatial direction of an individual this his upright posture has been by will made a habit a position taken without adjustment and without consciousness which continues to be an affair of his persistent will for the man stands only because and insofar as he wills to stand And only so long as he wills it without consciousness similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which without an express adjustment combines in a single act for several modifications of sensation consciousness

intuition intelligence etc which make it up thinking too however free and active in its own pure element it becomes no less Requires habit and familiarity this impromptuity or form of immediacy by which it is the property of my single self where i can freely and in all directions range it is through this habit that i come to realize my existence as a thinking being even here in this spontaneity of self-centered thought there is a partnership of soul and body hence want of habit and too long continued thinking cause headache Habit diminishes this feeling by making

the natural function an immediacy of the soul habit on an ample scale and carried out in the strictly intellectual range is recollection and memory whereof we shall speak later abbot is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless casual and particular and it is true that the form of habit like any other is open to anything we chance to put into it And it is habit of living which brings on death or if quite abstract is death itself and yet habit is indispensable for the existence of all intellectual life in the individual enabling the subject to

be a concrete immediacy an ideality of soul enabling the matter of consciousness religious moral etc to be his as this self this soul and no other and be neither a mere latent possibility nor a Transient emotion or idea nor an abstract inwardness cut off from action and reality but part and parcel of his being in scientific studies of the soul and the mind habit is usually passed over either as something contemptible or rather for the further reason that it is one of the most difficult questions of psychology c the actual soul Eight four one one

the soul when its corporati has been molded and made thoroughly its own finds itself there a single subject and the corporati is an externality which stands as a predicate in being related to which it is related to itself this externality in other words represents not itself but the soul of which it is the sign in this identity of interior and Exterior the latter subject to the former the soul is actual in its cooperative it has its free shape in which it feels itself and makes itself felt and which as the soul's work of art has

human pathogenomic and physionomic expression under the head of human expression are included for example the upright figure in general and the formation of the limbs especially the hand as the absolute instrument Of the mouth laughter weeping etc and the note of mentality diffused over the whole which at once announces the body as the externality of a higher nature this note is so slight indefinite and inexpressible a modification because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural and can therefore only be an indefinite and quite imperfect sign for the mind unable to represent it

in its actual universality Seen from the animal world the human figure is the supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance but for the mind it is only its first appearance while language is its perfect expression and the human figure though the proximate phase of mind's existence is at the same time in its physionomic and pathognomic quality something contingent to it to try to raise physionomy and above all Cranioscopy phrenology to the rank of sciences was therefore one of the vainest fancies still vainer than a signatura rarum which supposed the shape of a plant to

afford indication of its medicinal value 412 implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter for the soul in its concentrated self cuts itself off from its immediate being placing the latter over against it as a Cooperative incapable of offering resistance to its molding influence the soul thus setting an opposition its being to its conscious self absorbing it and making it its own has lost the meaning of mere soul or the immediacy of mind the actual soul with its sensation and its concrete self-feeling turned into habit has implicitly realized the ideality of its qualities

In this externality it is recollected and inwardized itself and is infinite self-relation this free universality thus made explicit shows the soul awakened to the highest stage of the ego or abstract universality insofar as it is for the abstract universality in this way it gains the position of thinker and subject especially a subject of the judgment in which the ego excludes from itself the Sum total of its merely natural features as an object a world external to it but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediately reflected into itself thus soul rises

to become consciousness plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the state of sober consciousness than many moderns who supposed that the platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorized their belief in the sublimity of the Revelations of somnambulistic vision plato says in the timaeus page 71 the author of our beings so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measure of truth and in the liver place their oracle the power of divination by dreams and herein is a proof that god has given the art of divination not to

the wisdom but to the foolishness of man for no man when in his wits attains prophetic truth and inspiration But when he receives the inspired word either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep or he is demented by some distemper or possession enthusiasm plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily conditions on which such visionary knowledge depends and the possibility of the truth of the dreams but also the inferiority of them to the reasonable frame of mind subsection b phenomenology of mind consciousness Consciousness 4-1-3 consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind the grade of

mind as appearance ego is infinite self-relation of mind but as subjective or as self-certainty the immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure ideal self-identity and what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set Forth as an object the pure abstract freedom of mind lets go from it its specific qualities the soul's natural life to an equal freedom as an independent object it is of this latter as external to it that the ego is in the first instance aware conscious and as such it is consciousness ego as this absolute negativity

is Implicitly the identity in the otherness the ego is itself that other and stretches over the object as if that object were implicitly cancelled it is one side of the relationship and the whole relationship the light which manifests itself and something else too four one four the self-identity of the mind thus first made explicit as the ego is only its abstract formal ideality As soul it was under the phase of substantial universality now as subjective reflection in itself it is referred to this substantiality as to its negative something dark and beyond it hence consciousness like

reciprocal dependence in general is the contradiction between the independence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one the mind as ego is essence But since reality in the sphere of essence is represented as in immediate being and at the same time as ideal it is as consciousness only the appearance phenomenon of mind 415 as the ego is by itself only a formal identity the dialectical movement of its intelligible unity i.e the successive steps in further specification of consciousness does not To it seem to be its own activity but is

implicit and to the ego it seems an alteration of the object consciousness consequently appears differently modified according to the difference of the given object and the gradual specification of consciousness appears as a variation in the characteristics of its objects ego the subject of consciousness is thinking The logical process of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and object their absolute interdependence what makes the object the subject's own the kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the mind as consciousness and as containing the propositions only of a phenomenology not of a

philosophy of mind the ego can't regards as reference to Something away and beyond which in its abstract description is termed the thing in itself and it is only from this finite point of view that he treats both intellect and will though in the notion of a power of reflective judgment he touches upon the idea of mind a subject objectivity an intuitive intellect etc and even the idea of nature Still this idea is again deposed to an appearance i.e to a subjective maxim reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly appreciated cantism when he treated it

as a theory of consciousness under the name of faculty of ideation fixture kept to the same point of view his non-ego is only something set over against the ego only defined as in consciousness it is made no more than an infinite Shock i.e a thing in itself both systems therefore have clearly not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it actually and essentially is but only as it is in reference to something else as against spinozism again it is to be noted that the mind in the judgment by which it constitutes itself an ego

a free subject contrasted with its qualitative affection has emerged from substance And that the philosophy which gives this judgment as the absolute characteristic of mind has emerged from spinozism 416 the aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essence to raise its self-certainty to truth the existence of mind in the stage of consciousness is finite because it is merely a nominal self-relation or mere certainty the object is only abstractly Characterized as its in other words in the object it is only as an abstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself

hence its existence there has still a content which is not as its own four one seven the grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in number first a consciousness in general with an object set against it Be self-consciousness for which ego is the object c unity of consciousness and self-consciousness where the mind sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself as implicitly and explicitly determine it as reason the notion of mind a consciousness proper A sensuous consciousness 418 consciousness is first immediate consciousness and its reference to the object accordingly the simple

and underrived certainty of it the object similarly being immediate and existent reflected in itself is further characterized as immediately singular this is sense consciousness Consciousness as a case of correlation comprises only the categories belonging to the abstract ego or formal thinking and these it treats as features of the object sense consciousness therefore is aware of the object as an existent a something an existing thing a singular and so on it appears as wealthiest in matter but as poorest in thought that wealth of matter is made out of Sensations they are the material of consciousness the

substantial and qualitative what the soul in its anthropological sphere is and finds in itself this material the ego the reflection of the soul in itself separates from itself and puts it first under the category of being spatial and temporal singularness here and now the terms by which in the phenomenology Of the mind verca 2 page 73 i described the object of sense consciousness strictly belongs to intuition at present the object is at first to be viewed only in its correlation to consciousness i.e a something external to it and not yet as external on its own

part or as being beside and out of itself 419 The sensible as somewhat becomes another the reflection in itself of this somewhat the thing has many properties and as a single thing in its immediacy has several predicates the muchness of the sense singular thus becomes a brex a variety of relations reflectional attributes and universalities these are logical terms introduced by the thinking principle i.e in this case By the ego to describe the sensible but the ego as itself apparent sees in all this characterization a change in the object and sensuous consciousness so construing the object

is sense perception b sense perception for duo consciousness having passed beyond the sensible wants to take the object in its Truth not as merely immediate but as mediated reflected in itself and universal such an object is a combination of sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines concrete relations and connections hence the identity of consciousness with the object passes from the abstract identity of i am sure to the definite identity of i know and I'm aware the particular grade of consciousness on which cantism conceives the mind is perception which is also the

general point of view taken by ordinary consciousness and more or less by the sciences the sensuous certitudes of single a perceptions or observations form the starting point these are supposed to be elevated to truth by being regarded in their Bearings reflected upon and on the lines of definite categories turned at the same time into something necessary and universal vis experiences four two one this conjunction of individual and universal is admixture the individual remains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal to which however it is related it is therefore a tissue of Contradictions between

the single things of sense a perception which form the alleged ground of general experience and the universality which has a higher claim to be the essence and ground between the individuality of a thing which taken in its concrete content constitutes its independence and the various properties which free from this negative link and from one another are independent universal matters This contradiction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical spheres turns out most concrete when the somewhat is defined as object c the intellect 422 the proximate truth of perception is that it is

the object which is an appearance and that the object's reflection in self is on the contrary a self-subsistent inward and universal The consciousness of such an object is intellect this inward as we called it of the thing is on one hand the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible and in that manner an abstract identity on the other hand however it also for that reason contains the multiplicity but as an interior simple difference which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance the simple difference is the realm of The laws of the phenomena a copy of

the phenomenon but brought to rest and universality four two three the law at first stating the mutual dependence of universal permanent terms has in so far as its distinction is the inward one its necessity on its own part the one of the terms as not externally different from the other lies immediately in the other But in this manner the interior distinction is what it is in truth the distinction on its own part or the distinction which is none with this new form characteristic on the whole consciousness implicitly vanishes for consciousness as such implies the reciprocal

independence of subject and object the ego in its judgment has an object which is not distinct from it it has Itself consciousness has passed into self-consciousness b self-consciousness 424 self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness the latter is a consequence of the former all consciousness of another object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness The object is my idea i am aware of the object as mine and thus in it i am aware of me the formula of self-consciousness is i equals i abstract freedom pure ideality and thus it lacks reality for as it is

its own object there is strictly speaking no object because there is no distinction between it and the object 425 abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness and for that Reason it is burdened with an external object or nominally with the negation of it thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage consciousness it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness but the latter aspect and the negation in general is in i equals i potentially suppressed and hence as this certitude of self against the object it is the impulse to Realize

its implicit nature by giving its abstract self-awareness content and objectivity and in the other direction to free itself from its sensuousness to set aside the given objectivity and identify it with itself the two processes are one and the same the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness a appetite or instinctive desire Four two six self-consciousness in its immediacy is a singular and a desire appetite the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet be objective or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external object and should be subjective the certitude of oneself which issues

from the suppression of mere consciousness pronounces the object null And the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies the abstract ideality of such self-consciousness as null 427 self-consciousness therefore knows itself implicit in the object which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite in the negation of the two one-sided moments by the ego's own activity this identity comes to be for the ego To this activity the object which implicitly and for self-consciousness is selfless can make no resistance the dialectic implicit in it towards self-suppression exists in this case as that activity of the ego

thus while the given object is rendered subjective the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness and becomes objective to itself all to eight The product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with itself its satisfaction realized and itself made actual on the external side it continues in this return upon itself primarily describable as an individual and maintains itself as such because its bearing upon the selfless object is purely negative the latter therefore being merely consumed thus appetite in its satisfaction is Always destructive and in its content selfish and as the satisfaction has only

happened in the individual and that is transient the appetite is again generated in the very act of satisfaction four to nine but on the inner side or implicitly the sense of self which the ego gets in the satisfaction does not remain in abstract self-concentration or in mere Individuality on the contrary as negation of immediacy and individuality the result involves a character of universality and of the identity of self-consciousness with its object the judgment or direction of this self-consciousness is the consciousness of a free object in which ego is aware of itself as an ego which

however is still outside it be self-consciousness recognitive 4-3-0 here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness at first immediately is one of two things for another in that other as ego i behold myself and yet also an immediately existing object another ego absolutely independent of me and opposed to me the suppression of the singleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression and it merely led to the Characterization of it as particular this contradiction gives either self-consciousness the impulse to show itself as a free self and to exist as such for the other

the process of recognition 431 the process is a battle i cannot be aware of me as myself in another individual so long as i see in that other and other and an immediate existence And i am consequently bent upon the suppression of this immediacy of his but in like measure i cannot be recognized as immediate except so far as i overcome the mere immediacy on my own part and thus give existence to my freedom but this immediacy is at the same time the cooperative self-consciousness in which as in its sign and tool the latter has

its own sense of self and its being for others And the means for entering into relation with them 432 the fight of recognition is a life and death struggle either self-consciousness imperils the other's life and incurs a like peril for its own but only peril for either is no less spent on maintaining his life as the existence of his freedom thus the death of one though by the Abstract therefore rude negation of immediacy it from one point of view solves the contradiction is yet from the essential point of view i.e the outward and visible recognition

a new contradiction for that recognition is at the same time undone by the other's death and are greater than the other 433 but because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution the fight ends In the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality while the one combatant prefers life retains his single self-consciousness but surrenders his claim for recognition the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recognized by the former as his superior thus arises the status of master and slave in the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master we see

on Their phenomenal side the emergence of man's social life and the commencement of political union force which is the basis of this phenomenon is not on that account a basis of right but only the necessary and legitimate factor in the passage from the state of self-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation into the state of universal self-consciousness force then is the external or phenomenal Commencement of states not their underlying and essential principle 434 this status in the first place implies common wants and common concern for their satisfaction for the means of mastery the slave must

likewise be kept in life in place of the rude destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition preservation and formation Of it as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence are welded together the form of universality thus arising in satisfying the want creates a permanent means and a provision which takes care for and secures the future 435 but secondly when we look to the distinction of the two the master beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his single selfhood Resulting from the suppression of immediate selfhood a suppression however

which falls on another this other the slave however in the service of the master works off his individualist self-will overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite and in this divestment of self and in the fear of his lord makes the beginning of wisdom the passage to universal self-consciousness C universal self-consciousness 436 universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in another self each self as a free individuality has his own absolute independence yet in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other each is thus universal Self-consciousness and objective each

has real universality in the shape of reciprocity so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman and is aware of this insofar as it recognizes the other and knows him to be free this universal reappearance of self-consciousness the notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself and for that Reason universal is the form of consciousness which lies at the root of all true mental or spiritual life in family fatherland state and of all virtues love friendship valor honor fame but this appearance of the underlying essence may

also be severed from that essence and be maintained apart in worthless honor idol fame etc 437 This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the first instance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other but the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague diversity or rather it is a difference which is none hence its truth is the fully and really existent universality and objectivity of self-consciousness Which is reason reason as the idea as it here appears is to be taken as meaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies has

the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated notion or consciousness and the object subsisting external and opposed to it c reason 438 the essential and actual truth which reason is lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the notion with its objectivity and universality the universality of reason therefore whilst it signifies that the object which was only given in consciousness consciousness is now itself universal permeating and encompassing the ego also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form which overlaps the object and Encompasses it 439 self-consciousness thus certified that its determinations are

no less objective or determinations of the very being of things than they are its own thoughts is reason which as such an identity is not only the absolute substance but the truth that knows it for truth here has as its peculiar mode and imminent form the self-centered pure Notion ego the certitude of self as infinite universality truth aware of what it is is mind spirit subsection c psychology mind 440 mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness the former a simple immediate totality the latter now an infinite form which is Not like

consciousness restricted by that content and does not stand in mere correlation to it as to its object but is an awareness of this substantial totality neither subjective nor objective mind therefore starts only from its own being and is in correlation only with its own features psychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental activity Qa mental mental vision ideation remembering etc desires etc apart both from the content which on the phenomenal side is found in empirical ideation in thinking also and in desire and will and from the two forms in which these modes exist

vis in the soul as a physical mode and in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that consciousness this however is not an arbitrary Abstraction by the psychologist mind is just this elevation above nature and physical modes and above the complication with an external object in one word above the material as its concept has just shown all it has now to do is to realize this notion of its freedom and get rid of the form of immediacy with which it once more begins the content which is elevated to Intuitions is its sensations it is

its intuitions also which are transmuted into representations and its representations which are transmuted again into thoughts etc 441 the soul is finite so far as its features are immediate or con natural consciousness is finite insofar as it has an object mind is finite insofar as though it no longer has an object it has a mode in Its knowledge i.e it is finite by means of its immediacy or what is the same thing by being subjective or only a notion and it is a matter of no consequence which is defined as its notion and which is

the reality of that notion say that its notion is the utterly infinite objective reason then its reality is knowledge or intelligence Say that knowledge is its notion then its reality is that reason and the realization of knowledge consists in appropriating reason hence the finitude of mind is to be placed in the temporary failure of knowledge to get hold of the full reality of its reason or equally in the temporary failure of reason to attain full manifestation in knowledge reason at the same time is only infinite So far as it is absolute freedom so far that

is as presupposing itself for its knowledge to work upon it thereby reduces itself to finitude and appears as everlasting movement of superseding this immediacy of comprehending itself and being a rational knowledge 442 the progress of mind is development in so far as its existent phase vis knowledge Involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that utter and complete autonomy which is rationality in which case the action of translating this purpose into reality is strictly only a nominal passage over into manifestation and is even there a return into itself so far as knowledge which has not shaken

off its original quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal the goal of mind is to give it objective Fulfillment and thus at the same time produce its freedom the development here meant is not that of the individual which has a certain anthropological character where faculties and forces are regarded as successively emerging and presenting themselves in external existence a series of steps on the ascertainment on which there was for a long time great stress laid by the system of condiac as if a conjectural natural emergence could Exhibit the origin of these faculties and explain

them in kondiak's method there is an unmistakable intention to show how the several modes of mental activity could be made intelligible without losing sight of mental unity and to exhibit their necessary interconnection but the categories employed in doing so are of a wretched sort their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken and with justice as The prios or the initial basis but that the later phases that follow this starting point present themselves as emerging in a solely affirmative manner and the negative aspect of mental activity by which this material is transmuted into mind and

destroyed as a sensible is misconceived and overlooked as the theory of kondiak states it the sensible is not merely the empirical first but is left as if it was a true And essential foundation similarly if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations forces perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some other interest of head or heart there is no indication of the true final aim of the whole business that can only be the intelligible unity of mind and its activity can only have itself as aim i.e Its aim can only be

to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity to reach and get hold of itself and to liberate itself to itself in this way the so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated as steps of this liberation and this is the only rational mode of studying the mind and its various activities 443 as consciousness has for its object the Stage which preceded it vis the natural soul so mind has or rather makes conscious its object i whereas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the ego with its other the mind

realizes that identity is the concrete unity which it and it only knows its productions are governed by the Principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially existent and are the mind's own in freedom thus if we consider the initial aspect of mind that aspect is twofold as being and as its own by the one the mind finds in itself something which is by the other it affirms it to be only its own the way of mind is therefore A to be theoretical it has to do with the rational as its immediate affection

which it must render its own or it has to free knowledge from its presupposedness and therefore from its abstractness and make the affection subjective when the affection has been rendered its own and the knowledge consequently characterized as free i.e intelligence Having its full and free characterization in itself it is b will practical mind which in the first place is likewise formal i.e its content is at first only its own and is immediately willed and it proceeds next to liberate its volition from its subjectivity which is the one-sided form of its contents So that it see

confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects of one-sidedness 444 the theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the general range of mind subjective they are not to be distinguished as active and passive subjective mind is productive but it is a merely nominal productivity In words the theoretical mind produces only its ideal world and gains abstract autonomy within while the practical while it has to do with autonomous products with a material which is its own has a material which is only nominally such and therefore a restricted content

for which it gains the form of universality outwards the subjective mind which has a unity of soul and consciousness is thus Also a reality a reality at once anthropological and conformable to consciousness as for its products in the theoretical range the word and in the practical not yet deed and action but enjoyment psychology like logic is one of those sciences which in modern times have yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the deeper Conception of reason it is still extremely ill off the turn which the kantian philosophy has taken has given

it greater importance it has and that in its empirical condition been claimed as the basis of metaphysics which is to consist of nothing but the empirical apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human consciousness merely as facts just as they are given This position of psychology mixing it up with forms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthropology has led to no improvement in its own condition but it has had the further effect that both for the mind as such and for metaphysics and philosophy generally all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the

necessity of essential and actual reality to get at the notion and the truth A theoretical mind 445 intelligence finds itself determined this is its apparent aspect from which in its immediacy it starts but as knowledge intelligence consists in treating what is found as its own its activity has to do with the empty form the pretense of finding reason and its aim is to realize its concept or to be reason actual Along with which the content is realized as rational this activity is cognition the nominal knowledge which is only certitude elevates itself as reason is concrete

to definite and conceptual knowledge the course of this elevation is itself rational and consists in a necessary passage governed by the concept of one grade or term of intelligent activity A so-called faculty of mind into another the refutation which such cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is found starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence in its capability of rational knowledge and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason which it and the content virtually is the distinction of intelligence from will is often incorrectly taken to mean That each has

a fixed and separate existence of its own as if volition could be without intelligence or the activity of intelligence could be without will the possibility of a culture of the intellect which leaves the heart untouched as it is said and of the heart without the intellect of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect and heartless intellects only proves at most that bad and Radically untrue existences occur but it is not philosophy which should take such on truths of existence and of mere imagining for truth take the worthless for the essential nature a host of other

phrases used of intelligence e.g that it receives and accepts impressions from outside that ideas arise through the causal Operations of external things upon it etc belong to a point of view utterly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study a favorite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul intelligence or mind faculty like power or force is the fixed quality of any object of thought conceived as reflected into self force is no doubt the infinity of form Of the inward and the outward but its essential finitude involves the indifference

of content to form in this lies the want of organic unity which by this reflectional form treating mind as a lot of forces is brought into mind as it is by the same method brought into nature any aspect which can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity and the mind thus made a skeleton-like Mechanical collection it makes absolutely no difference if we substitute the expression activities for powers and faculties isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate and treat their essential correlation as an external incident the action

of intelligence says theoretical mind has been called cognition knowledge Yet this does not mean intelligence inter alia knows besides which it also intuits conceives remembers imagines etc to take up such a position is in the first instance part and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just censored but it is also in addition connected with the great question of modern times as to whether true knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible which if Answered in the negative must lead to abandoning the effort the numerous aspects and reasons and modes of phrase with which external

reflection swells the bulk of this question are cleared up in their place the more external the attitude of understanding in the question the more diffuse it makes a simple object at the present place the simple concept of cognition is what confronts the quite General assumption taken up by the question is the assumption that the possibility of true knowledge in general is in dispute and the assumption that it is possible for us at our will either to prosecute or to abandon cognition the concept or possibility of cognition has come out as intelligence itself as the certitude

of reason the act of cognition itself is therefore The actuality of intelligence it follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligence and yet at the same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not but cognition is genuine just so far as it realizes itself or makes the concept its own this nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly where cognition has it the stages of its realizing activity are Intuition conception memory etc these activities have no other imminent meaning their aim is solely the concept of cognition if they are isolated however

then an impression is implied that they are useful for something else than cognition or that they severally procure a cognitive satisfaction of their own and that leads to a glorification of the Delights of intuition remembrance imagination it is true that even as isolated i.e as non-intelligent intuition imagination etc can afford a certain satisfaction what physical nature succeeds in doing by its fundamental quality its art of selfness exhibiting the elements or factors of imminent reason external to each other that the intelligence can do by voluntary act But the same result may happen where the intelligence is

itself only natural and untrained but the true satisfaction it is admitted is only afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind by rational conception by products of imagination which are permeated by reason and exhibit ideas in a word by cognitive intuition cognitive conception etc the truth ascribed to such satisfaction Lies in this that intuition conception etc are not isolated and exist only as moments in the totality of cognition itself alpha intuition intelligent perception 446 the mind which has soul is physically conditioned which has consciousness stands to this Condition on the same terms as to

an outward object but which is intelligence finds itself so characterized is one an inarticulate embryonic life in which it is to itself as it were palpable and has the whole material of its knowledge in consequence of the immediacy in which it is thus originally it is in this stage only as an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity It thus appears as mind in the guise of feeling if feeling formally turned up as a mode of the soul's existence the finding of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be conceived as a congenital

or corporeal condition whereas at present it is only to be taken abstractly in the general sense of immediacy 447 the characteristic form of feeling is That though it is a mode of some affection this mode is simple hence feeling even should its import be most sterling and true has the form of casual particularity not to mention that its import may also be the most scanty and most untrue it is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of its ideas but the statement is more usually Understood in a sense the opposite of

that which it has here in contrast with the simplicity of feeling it is usual rather to assume that the primary mental phase is judgment generally or the distinction of consciousness into subject and object and the special quality of sensation is derived from an independent object external or internal with us in the truth of mind the mere Consciousness point of view as opposed to true mental idealism is swallowed up and the matter of feeling has rather been supposed already as imminent in the mind it is commonly taken for granted that as regards content there is more

in feeling than in thought this being specially affirmed of moral and religious feelings now the material which the mind as it feels is to itself is here the result And the mature result of a fully organized reason hence under the head of feeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content whatever but the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the mind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have one in which it is not found as a free and infinitely universal principle but rather as subjective and private in content and value

entirely contingent Trained and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the consciousness of the true differences of things of their essential relationships and real characters and it is with such a mind that this rectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form feeling is the immediate as it were the closest contact in which the thinking subject can stand to a given content Against that content the subject reacts first of all with its particular self-feeling which so it may be of more sterling value and of wider range than a one-sided

intellectual standpoint may just as likely be narrow and poor and in any case is the form of the particular and subjective if a man on any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing or at least to reasons to the generalities of Common sense but to his feeling the only thing to do is to let him alone because by his behavior he refuses to have any lot or part in common rationality and shuts himself up in his own isolated subjectivity his private and particular self four four eight two as this immediate finding

is broken up into elements we have the one factor in Attention the abstract identical direction of mind in feeling as also in other more advanced developments of it an active self collection the factor of fixing it is our own but with an as yet only nominal autonomy of intelligence apart from such attention there is nothing for the mind the other factor is to invest the special quality of feeling as contrasted With this inwardness of mind with the character of something existent but as a negative or as the abstract otherness of itself intelligence thus defines the

content of sensation as something that is out of itself projects it into time and space which are the forms in which it is intuitive to the view of consciousness the material is only an object of consciousness a relative other From mind it receives the rational characteristic of being its very other 449 three when intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors that is to say when it is it once self-collected in this externally existing material and yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the out of selfness it is intuition or mental vision 450 As and

towards this its own art of selfness intelligence no less essentially directs its attention in this its immediacy it is an awakening to itself a recollection of itself thus intuition becomes a concretion of the material with the intelligence which makes it its own so that it no longer needs this immediacy no longer needs to find the content Beta representation or mental idea four five one representation is this recollected or inwardized intuition and as such is the middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself immediately subject to modification and that where intelligence is in its

freedom or as thought The representation is the property of intelligence with a preponderating subjectivity however as its right of property is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy and the representation cannot as it stands be said to be the path of intelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward to invest itself with intuitive action In itself and at the same time to get rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness and inwardly divest itself of it so as to be in itself in an externality of its own but as representation begins from intuition and the

ready found material of intuition the intuitional contrast still continues to affect its activity and makes its concrete products still synthesis Which do not grow to the concrete imminence of the notion till they reach the stage of thought alpha alpha recollection 452 intelligence as it at first recollects the intuition places the content of feeling in its own inwardness in a space and a time of its own in this way that content is one an image or picture Liberated from its original immediacy and abstract singleness amongst other things and received into the universality of the ego the

image loses the full complement of features proper to intuition and is arbitrary or contingent isolated we may say from the external place time and immediate context in which the intuition Stood four five three two the image is of itself transient and intelligence itself is as attention it's time and also its place it's when and where but intelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence but choir intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own specializations the image when thus kept in mind is no Longer existent but stored up out of consciousness to grasp intelligence

as this knight like mine or pit in which he stored a world of infinitely many images and representations yet without being in consciousness is from the one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat the notion as concrete in the way we treat eg the germ as affirmatively containing in virtual possibility All the qualities that come into existence in the subsequent development of the tree inability to grasp a universal like this which though intrinsically concrete still continues simple is what has led people to talk about special fibers and areas as receptacles of particular

ideas it was felt that what was diverse should in the nature of things have a local Habitation peculiar to itself but whereas the reversion of the germ from its existing specializations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence takes place only in another germ the germ of the fruit intelligence choir intelligence shows the potential coming to free existence in its development and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness hence from the other point of View intelligence is to be conceived as this subconscious mind i.e as the existent universal in which the different

has not yet been realized in its separations and it is indeed this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in mental representation four five four three an image thus abstractly treasured up Needs if it is to exist an actual intuition and what is strictly called remembrance is the reference of the image to an intuition and that as a subsumption of the immediate single intuition impression under what is in point of form universal under the representation idea with the same content thus intelligence recognizes the Specific sensation and the intuition of it as what is

already its own in them it is still within itself at the same time it is aware that what is only its primarily internal image is also an immediate object of intuition by which it is authenticated the image which in the mind of intelligence was only its property now that it has been endued with externality comes actually into its possession And so the image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and separable from the blank night in which it was originally submerged intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property and dispense with

external intuition for its existence in it this synthesis of the internal image with the recollected existence is representation proper by this synthesis the internal now has The qualification of being able to be presented before intelligence and to have its existence in it beta beta imagination four five five one the intelligence which is active in this position is the reproductive imagination where the images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego which is now the power over them the images are in the first instance Referred to this external immediate time and space which is treasured

up along with them but it is solely in the conscious subject where it is treasured up that the image has the individuality in which the features composing it are conjoined whereas their original concretion i.e at first only in space and time as a unit of intuition has been broken up the content reproduced belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of Intelligence and an output from its universal mind as a general idea representation to supply the link of association for the images which according to circumstances are more abstract or more concrete ideas the so-called laws

of the association of ideas were objects of great interest especially during that outburst of empirical psychology which was contemporaneous with the decline of Philosophy in the first place it is not ideas properly so called which are associated secondly these modes of relation are not laws just for the reason that there are so many laws about the same thing as to suggest a caprice and a contingency opposed to the very nature of law it is a matter of chance whether the link of association is something Pictorial or an intellectual category such as likeness and contrast reason

and consequence the train of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacant-minded ideation where though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal universality the matter is entirely pictorial image and idea if we leave out of account the more precise definition of those forms given above present also a Distinction in content the former is the more consciously concrete idea whereas the idea representation whatever be its content from image notion or idea has always the peculiarity though belonging to intelligence of being in respect of its content given and immediate it is still true of

this idea or representation as of all intelligence that it finds its material as a matter Of fact to be so and so and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by ideation is still abstract mental representation is the mean in the syllogism of the elevation of intelligence the link between the two significations of self-relatedness vis being and universality which in consciousness receive the title of Object and subject intelligence complements what is merely found by the attribution of universality and the internal and its own by the attribution of being but a being of its own institution

abstraction which occurs in the ideational activity by which general ideas are produced and ideas choir ideas virtually have the form of generality is frequently explained as the incidence Of many similar images one upon another and is supposed to be thus made intelligible if this superimposing is to be no mere accident and without principle a force of attraction in like images must be assumed or something of the sort which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off the dissimilar elements against each other this force is really intelligence itself the self-identical ego which

by its Internalizing recollection gives the images ipso facto generality and subsumes the single intuition under the already internalized image four five six thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a subsumption of the individual under the universal which forms their connecting link but here intelligence is more than merely a general form its inwardness is an internally definite Concrete subjectivity with the substance and value of its own derived from some interest some latent concept or ideal principle so far as we may by anticipation speak of such intelligence is the power which wields the

stores of images and ideas belonging to it and which thus too freely combines and subsumes these stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor Such is creative imagination symbolic allegoric or poetical imagination where the intelligence gets a definite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs them with its general tone these more or less concrete individualized creations are still syntheses for the material in which the subjective principles and ideas get a mentally pictorial existence is derived from the data of intuition 457 in creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as to need no helps for

intuition its self-sprung ideas have pictorial existence this pictorial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is subjective still lacks the side of existence but as the creation unites the internal idea with the vehicle of materialization intelligence has therein implicitly Returned both to identical self-relation and to immediacy as reason its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself i.e to universalize it and now its action as reason is from the present point directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto intuition in other words it aims at

making itself Be and be a fact acting on this view it is self-uttering intuition producing the imagination which creates signs productive imagination is the center in which the universal and being one's own and what is picked up internal and external are completely welded into one the preceding synthesis of intuition recollection etc are unifications of the same factors but they are Syntheses it is not till creative imagination that intelligence ceases to be the vague mind and the universal and becomes an individuality a concrete subjectivity in which the self-references defined both to being and to universality the

creations of imagination are on all hands recognized as such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of intuition what further and more definite aspects They have is a matter for other departments for the present this internal studio of intelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract aspects imagination when regarded as the agency of this unification is reason but only a nominal reason because the matter or theme it embodies is to imagination imagination a matter of indifference whilst reason Quire reason also insists upon the truth of its content another point calling

for special notice is that when imagination elevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition and this is expressed by saying that it gives the form of the character of an existent the phrase must not seem surprising that intelligence makes itself be as a thing for its ideal import is itself and so is The aspect which it imposes upon it the image produced by imagination of an object is a bare mental or subjective intuition in the sign or symbol it has intuit ability proper and in mechanical memory it completes so far as it is concerned

this form of being or five eight in this unity initiated by intelligence of an independent representation with an intuition The matter of the latter is in the first instance something accepted somewhat immediate or given e.g the color of the cockade etc but in the fusion of the two elements the intuition does not count positively or is representing itself but is representative of something else it is an image which has received as its soul and meaning an independent mental representation This intuition is the sign the sign is some immediate intuition representing a totally different import from

what naturally belongs to it it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been conveyed and where it is conserved the sign is different from the symbol for in the symbol the original characters in essence and conception of the visible object are more or less identical with the import which it bears As symbol whereas in the sign strictly so-called the natural attributes of the intuition and the connotation of which it is a sign have nothing to do with each other intelligence therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in the use of intuitions

when it treats them as designatory significative rather than as symbolical in logic and psychology signs and Language are usually foisted in somewhere as an appendix without any trouble being taken to display their necessity and systematic place in the economy of intelligence the right place for the sign is that just given where intelligence which as intuitive generates the form of time and space but is apparently a recipient of sensible matter out of which it forms ideas Now gives its own original ideas a definite existence from itself treating the intuition or time and space as filled full

as its own property deleting the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it and conferring on it another connotation as its soul and import this sign creating activity may be distinctively named productive memory the primarily abstract nemosenae Since memory which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable and synonymous with remembrance recollection and even with conception and imagination has always to do with signs only 459 the intuition in its natural phase a something given and given in space acquires when employed as a sign the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and subliminated Such as

the negativity of intelligence and thus the true phase of the intuition used as a sign is existence in time but its existence vanishes in the moment of being and if we consider the rest of its external psychical quality its institution by intelligence but an institution growing out of its anthropological own naturalness this institution of the natural is the Vocal note where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utterance the vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas speech and its system language gives to sensations intuitions conceptions a second and higher existence than they

naturally possess invests them with the right of existence in the ideational realm language here comes under discussion Only in the special aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium if language had to be treated in its concrete nature it would be necessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the anthropological or psychophysiological point of view and for the grammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of analytic understanding With regard to the elementary material of language while on one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared on the

other the principle of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually covers that of vocal objects yet one may still hear the german language praised for its wealth that wealth consisting in its special expression for special sounds etc There have been collected more than a hundred such words perhaps the humor of the moment creates fresh ones when it pleases such super abundance in the realm of sense and of triviality contributes nothing to form the real wealth of a cultivated language the strictly raw material of language itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than

a symbolism referring to external Objects it depends i.e on anthropological articulation as it were the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance for each vowel and consonant accordingly as well as for their more abstract elements the posture of lips palette tongue in each and for their combinations people have tried to find the appropriate signification but these dull subconscious beginnings Are deprived of their original importance and prominence by new influences it may be by external agencies or by the needs of civilization having been originally sensuous intuitions they are reduced to signs and thus have only

traces left of their original meaning if it be not altogether extinguished as to the formal element again it is the Work of analytic intellect which informs language with its categories it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar the study of languages still in their original state which we have first really begun to make acquaintance with in modern times has shown on this point that they contain a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions which are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more Civilized nations it seems as if the language of

the most civilized nations has the most imperfect grammar and that the same language has a more perfect grammar when the nation is in a more uncivilized state than when it reaches a higher civilization cf w von humboldt's essay on the duel in speaking of vocal which is the original language we may touch only in passing upon written language A further development in the particular sphere of language which borrows the help of an externally practical activity it is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs

in particular hieroglyphics uses spatial figures to designate ideas alphabetical writing on the other hand uses them to designate vocal notes which are already signs Alphabetical writing thus consists of signs of signs the words or concrete signs of vocal language being analyzed into their simple elements which severally receive designation leibniz's practical mind misled him to exaggerate the advantages which a complete written language formed on the hieroglyphic method and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing as in our Signs for the numbers the planets the chemical elements etc would have as a universal language for

the intercourse of nations and especially of scholars but we may be sure that it was rather the intercourse of nations as was probably the case in phoenicia and still takes place in canton see mccartney's travels by staunton which occasioned the need of alphabetical writing and led to its Formation at any rate a comprehensive hieroglyphic language forever completed is impracticable sensible objects no doubt admit of permanent signs but as regards signs for mental objects the progress of thought and the continual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their internal relations and thus also

of their nature and this would involve the rise of a new Hieroglyphical denotation even in the case of sense objects it happens that their names i.e their signs in vocal language are frequently changed as for example in chemistry and mineralogy now that it has been forgotten what names properly are these externalities which of themselves have no sense and only get signification as signs and now that instead of names proper people ask for terms expressing a sort Of definition which is frequently changed capriciously and fortuitously the denomination i.e the composite name formed of signs of their

generic characters or other supposed characteristic properties is altered in accordance with the differences of view with regard to the genus or other supposed specific property it is only a stationary civilization Like the chinese which admits of the hieroglyphic language of that nation and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of that small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental culture the progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing by means of which only does vocal language acquire the precision and purity of its

articulation The imperfection of the chinese vocal language is notorious numbers of its words possess several utterly different meanings as many as 10 and 20 so that in speaking the distinction is made perceptible merely by accent and intensity by speaking low and soft or crying out the european learning to speak chinese falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has mastered these absurd Refinements of accentuation affection here consists in the opposite of that bachelet son which in europe is justly required of an educated speaker the hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the chinese vocal language from reaching

that objective precision which is gained in articulation by alphabetic writing alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent in it the word The mode peculiar to the intellect of uttering its ideas most worthily is brought to consciousness and made an object of reflection engaging the attention of intelligence as it does it is analyzed the work of sign making is reduced to its few simple elements the primary postures of articulation in which the sense factor in speech is brought to the form of universality at the same time that in this elementary Phase it requires complete

precision and purity thus alphabetic writing retains at the same time the advantage of vocal language that the ideas have names strictly so-called the name is the simple sign for the exact idea i.e the simple plain idea not decomposed into its features and compounded out of them hieroglyphics instead of springing from The direct analysis of sensible signs like alphabetic writing arise from an antecedent analysis of ideas thus a theory readily arises that all ideas may be reduced to their elements or simple logical terms so that from the elementary signs chosen to express these as in the

case of the chinese kua the simple straight stroke and the stroke broken into two parts a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their composition This feature of hieroglyphic the analytical designations of ideas which misled leibniz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather an antagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language the name to want a name means that for the immediate idea which however ample a connotation it may include is still for the mind simple in the name we require a simple immediate sign which for its own Sake does not suggest anything and

has for its sole function to signify and represent sensibly the simple idea as such it is not merely the image loving and image limited intelligence that lingers over the simplicity of ideas and read integrates them from the more abstract factors into which they have been analyzed thought to reduces to the form of a simple thought the concrete connotation Which it resumes and reunites from the mere aggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it both alike requires such signs simple in respect of their meaning signs which though consisting of several letters or syllables and even

decomposed into such yet do not exhibit a combination of several ideas what has been stated is the principle for settling the value of these written Languages it also follows that in hieroglyphics the relations of concrete mental ideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perplexed and that the analysis of these and the proximate results of such analysis must again be analyzed appears to be possible in the most various and divergent ways every divergence in analysis would give rise to another formation of the written Name just as in modern times as already noted even in

the region of sense muriatic acid has undergone several changes of name a hieroglyphic written language would require a philosophy as stationary as is the civilization of the chinese what has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated educational value of learning to read And write an alphabetic character it leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements and contributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of mental life acquired habit subsequently effaces the peculiarity by which alphabetic writing

appears in the interest of vision as a roundabout way to ideas by means of Audibility it makes them a sort of hieroglyphic to us so that in using them we need not consciously realize them by means of tones whereas people unpracticed in reading utter allowed what they read in order to catch its meaning in the sound thus while with the faculty which transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics The capacity of abstraction gained by the first practice remains hieroglyphic reading is of itself a death reading and a dumb writing it is true that the audible which is

in time and the visible which is in space each have their own basis one no less authoritative than the other but in the case of alphabetic writing there is only a single basis the two aspects occupy their rightful relation to each other The visible language is related to the vocal only as a sign and intelligence expresses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking the instrumental function of the comparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows itself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage from representation to thought 460 The name combining the

intuition and intellectual production with its signification is primarily a single transient product and conjunction of the idea which is inward with the intuition which is outward is itself outward the reduction of this outwardness to inwardness is verbal memory gamma gamma memory 461 under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through the same inwardizing recollecting functions as regards the intuition of the word as representation in general does in dealing with the first immediate intuition one making its own the synthesis achieved in the sign intelligence by this inwardizing memorizing Elevates the single synthesis to a

universal i.e permanent synthesis in which name and meaning are for it objectively united and renders the intuition which the name originally is a representation thus the import connotation and sign being identified for one representation the representation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence for its import All this being the work of memory which retains names retentive memory 462 the name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the ideational realm two in the name reproductive memory has and recognizes the thing and with the thing it has the name apart

from intuition and image The name as giving an existence to the content in intelligence is the externality of intelligence to itself and the inmatizing or recollection of the name i.e of an intuition of intellectual origin is at the same time a self-externalization to which intelligence reduces itself on its own ground the association of the Particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive representative or cognitant series of which the intelligence traverses as it feels represents or thinks given the name lion we need neither the actual vision of the animal nor its image even the

name alone if we understand it is the unimaged simple representation we think in names The recent attempts already as they deserved forgotten to rehabilitate the mnemonic of the ancients consist in transforming names into images and thus again deposing memory to the level of imagination the place of the power of memory is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images fixed in the imagination to which is then attached the series of ideas forming the composition to be Learned by rote considering the heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent images and the

speed with which the attachment has to be made the attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow silly and utterly accidental links not merely is the mind put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff But what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten seeing that the same tableau is used for getting by wrote every other series of ideas and so those previously attached to it are effaced what is mnemonically impressed is not like what is retained in memory really got by heart i.e strictly produced from within outwards from the deep

pit of the ego And thus recited but is so to speak read off the tableau of fancy mnemonic is connected with the common pre-possession about memory in comparison with fancy and imagination as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity than memory on the contrary memory has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition the immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence It has rather to do with an object which is the product of intelligence itself such as a without book as remains locked up in the within book of intelligence and is within

intelligence only its outward and existing side four six three three as the interconnection of the names lies in the meaning the conjunction of their meaning with reality as names is still an external synthesis And intelligence in this its externality has not made a complete and simple return into self but intelligence is the universal the single plain truth of its particular self-divestments and its consummated appropriation of them abolishes that distinction between meaning and name this supreme inwardizing of representation is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence in which It renders itself the mere being the universal space of

names as such i.e of meaningless words the ego which is this abstract being is because subjectivity at the same time the power over the different names the link which having nothing in itself fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable order so far as they merely are and intelligence is here itself this being Of theirs its power is a merely abstract subjectivity memory which on account of the complete externality in which the members of such series stand to one another and because it is itself this externality subjective though that be is called

mechanical a composition is as we know not Thoroughly conned by rote until one attaches no meaning to the words the recitation of what has been thus got by heart is therefore of course accentless the correct accent if it is introduced suggests the meaning but this introduction of the signification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore easily throws out the reciter The faculty of conning by wrote series of words with no principle governing their succession or which are separately meaningless eg a series of proper names is so supremely marvelous because it is the very

essence of mind to have its wits about it whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself and its action is like machinery but it is only as uniting subjectivity With objectivity that the mind has its wits about it whereas in the case before us after it has in intuition been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready made and in representation inwardizes or recollects this datum and makes it its own it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself so that what is its own assumes the Guise of something

found thus one of the two dynamic factors of thought this objectivity is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it it is only a step further to treat memory as mechanical the act implying no intelligence in which case it is only justified by its uses its indispensability perhaps for other purposes and functions of mind but by doing so we overlook the proper Signification it has in the mind 464 if it is to be the fact and true objectivity the mere name as an existent requires something else to be interpreted by the representing intellect

now in the shape of mechanical memory intelligence is at once that external objectivity and the meaning in this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity i.e It is explicitly active as such an identity which is reason it is implicitly memory is in this manner the passage into the function of thought which no longer has a meaning i.e its objectivity is no longer severed from the subjective and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existence the german language has etymologically assigned memory gaddashnis of which it Has become a foregone conclusion

to speak contemptuously the high position of direct kindred with thought gadanka it is not a matter of chance that the young have a better memory than the old nor is their memories solely exercised for the sake of utility the young have a good memory because they have not yet reached the stage of reflection their memory is exercised with or Without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or to pure space in which the fact the implicit content may reign and unfold itself with no antithesis to a subjective inwardness

genuine ability is in youth generally combined with a good memory but empirical statements of this sort help little towards a knowledge of what memory intrinsically is to comprehend the position and meaning Of memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of the hardest points and he's the two one quite unregarded in the theory of mind memory memory is itself the merely external mode or merely existential aspect of thought and thus needs a complementary element the passage from it to thought is to our view or implicitly the identity of reason with this existential

mode An identity from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject and as the function of that subject thus active reason is thinking gamma thinking 465 intelligence is recognitive it cognizes an intuition but only because that intuition is already its own And in the name it rediscovers the fact but now it finds its universal in the double signification of the universal as such and of the universal as immediate or as being finds i.e the genuine universal which is its own unity overlapping and including its other this being thus intelligence is explicitly and on

its own part cognitive virtually it is the universal its Product the thought is the thing it is a plain identity of subjective and objective it knows that what is thought is and that what is only is insofar as it is a thought the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts these are its content and object 466 but cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal The universality and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence the thoughts therefore are not yet fully and freely determinate and the representations which have been inwardized to thoughts

are so far still the given content 467 as dealing with this given content thought is alpha understanding with its formal identity working up the representations that have Been memorized into species genera laws forces etc in short into categories thus indicating that the raw material does not get the truth of its being save in these thought forms as intrinsically infinite negativity thought is beta essentially an act of partition judgment which however does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis of Universality and being but distinguishes on the lines supplied by the interconnections peculiar to

the concept thirdly delta thoughts supersedes the formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the differences thus being nominal reason or inferential understanding intelligence as the act of thought Cognizes and alpha understanding out of its generalities the categories explains the individual and is then said to comprehend or understand itself beta in the judgment it explains the individual to be an universal species genus in these forms the content appears as given delta But in inference syllogism it characterizes a content from itself by superseding that form difference with the perception of the necessity the

last immediacy still attaching to formal thought has vanished in logic there was thought but in its implicitness and as reason develops itself in this distinction lacking medium so in consciousness thought occurs as a stage Here reason is as the truth of the antithetical distinction as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of philosophy because these parts are different only through the medium they are in and the antithesis they imply while thought is this one and the same center to which as to their truth

the antithesis return 468 Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of being is now that it has completed taking possession in its own property the last negation of immediacy has implicitly required that the intelligence shall itself determine its content thus thought as free notion is now also free in point of content but when intelligence is aware that it Is determinative of the content which is its mode no less than it is a mode of being it is will be mind practical 469 as will the mind is aware that it is the author of its

own conclusions the origin of its self-fulfillment thus fulfilled this independency or individuality form the side of existence Or of reality for the idea of mind as will the mind steps into actuality whereas as cognition it is on the soil of notional generality supplying its own content the will is self-possessed and in the widest sense free this is its characteristic trait its finitude lies in the formalism that the spontaneity of its self-fulfillment means no more than a general and abstract ownness Not yet identified with matured reason it is the function of the essential will to bring

liberty to exist in the formal will and it is therefore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with its essential nature i.e to make liberty its pervading character content and aim as well as its sphere of existence the essential freedom of will is and Must always be a thought hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a thinking will to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks itself true liberty in the shape of moral life consists in the will finding its

purpose in a universal content not in subjective or selfish interests but such a content is only possible in thought and through thought It is nothing short of absurd to seek to banish thought from the moral religious and abiding life 470 practical mind considered it first as formal or immediate will contains a double ought one in the contrast which the new mode of being projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its old existence and condition An antagonism which in consciousness grows to correlation with external objects two that first self-determination being itself immediate

is not at once elevated into a thinking universality the latter therefore virtually constitutes an obligation on the former in point of form as it may also constitute it in point of matter a distinction which only exists For the observer alpha practical sense or feeling 471 the autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and therefore formal i.e it finds itself as an individuality determined in its inward nature it is thus practical feeling or instinct of action in this phase as it is at bottom a Subjectivity simply identical with reason it has no doubt a

rational content but a content which as it stands is individual and for that reason also natural contingent and subjective a content which may be determined quite as much by mere personalities of want and opinion etc and by the subjectivity which selfishly sets itself against the universal as it may be virtually in conformity With reason an appeal is sometimes made to the sense feeling of right and morality as well as of religion which man is alleged to possess to his benevolent dispositions and even to his heart generally i.e to the subject so far as the various

practical feelings are in it all combined so far as this appeal implies one that these ideas are imminent in his own self and two That when feeling is opposed to the logical understanding it and not the partial abstractions of the latter may be the totality the appeal has a legitimate meaning but on the other hand feeling too may be one-sided unessential and bad the rational which exists in the shape of rationality when it is apprehended by thought is the same content as the good practical feeling has But presented in its universality and necessity in its

objectivity and truth thus it is on the one hand silly to suppose that in the passage from feeling to law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence it is this passage which lets feeling first reach its truth it is equally silly to consider intellect as superfluous or even harmful to feeling heart and will the truth and what is the same thing the Actual rationality of the heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect and not in the singleness of feeling as feeling if feelings are of the right

sort it is because of their quality or content which is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its source in the thinking mind the difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the separation It has arbitrarily imposed between the several faculties of feeling and thinking mind and coming to see that in the human being there is only one reason in feeling volition and thought another difficulty connected with this is found in the fact that the ideas which are the special property of the thinking mind this god law and morality can

also be felt but feeling is only the form of the Immediate and peculiar individuality of the subject in which these facts like any other objective facts which consciousness also sets over against itself may be placed on the other hand it is suspicious or even worse to cling to feeling and heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law right and duty because all that the former holds more than the latter is only the particular Subjectivity with its vanity and caprice for the same reason it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings

to deal with anything beyond their form and to discuss their content for the latter when thought is precisely what constitutes in the universality and necessity the rights and duties which are the true works of mental autonomy so long as we study practical feelings and dispositions specially we have only To deal with the selfish bad and evil it is these alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition to the universal their content is the reverse of rights and duties and precisely in that way do they but only an antithesis to the latter retain a

speciality of their own 472 the ought of practical feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to Control some existing mode of fact which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to that claim but as both in their immediacy lack objective determination this relation of the requirement to exist in fact is the utterly subjective and superficial feeling of pleasant or unpleasant delight joy grief etc shame repentance contentment etc are partly only modifications of the formal practical feeling in general But are partly different in the features that give the special tone and character mode

to their ought the celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world so far at least as evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful merely arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling evil is nothing but the incompatibility between what is and what ought to be ought is an ambiguous term Indeed infinitely so considering that casual aims may also come under the form of ought but where the objects sought are thus casual evil only executes what is rightfully due to the vanity and nullity of their planning for they themselves

were radically evil the finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgment the contrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in Them and thus they are the contradiction called evil in the lifeless there is neither evil nor pain for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity concept does not confront its existence and does not in the difference at the same time remain its permanent subject whereas in life and still more in mind we have this imminent distinction Present hence arises the ought and this negativity subjectivity ego freedom are the principles

of evil and pain jacob burma viewed egoity selfhood as pain and torment and as the fountain of nature and of spirit peter the impulses and choice 473 the practical ought is a real Judgment will which is essentially self-determination finds in the conformity as immediate and merely found to hand of the existing mode to its requirement a negation and something inappropriate to it if the will is to satisfy itself if the implicit unity of the universality and the special mode is to be realized the conformity of its inner requirement and of the existing thing ought to

be Its act and institution the will as regards the form of its content is at first still a natural will directly identical with its specific mode natural impulse and inclination should however the totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the many restricted forms of impulse each being always in conflict to another It is passion 474 inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as the practical feeling thus while on one hand they are based on the rational nature of the mind they on the other as part and parcel of the

still subjective and single will are infected with contingency and appear as particular to stand to the individual and to each other in an external Relation and with a necessity which creates bondage the special note in passion is its restriction to one special mode of volition in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged be the value of that mode what it may in consequence of this formalism passion is neither good nor bad the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul his interests of intellect talent Character enjoyment on one aim and

object nothing great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion it is only a dead too often indeed a hypocritical moralizing which invades against the form of passion as such but with regard to the inclinations the question is directly raised which are good and bad up to what degree the good continue good and as there are many each with its Private range in what way have they being all in one subject and hardly all as experience shows admitting of gratification to suffer at least reciprocal restriction and first of all as regards the numbers

of these impulses and propensities the case is much the same as with the psychical powers whose aggregate is to form the mind theoretical an aggregate which is now increased by The host of impulses the nominal rationality of impulse and propensity lies merely in their general impulse not to be subjective merely but to get realized overcoming the subjectivity by the subject's own agency their genuine rationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which presupposes a number of independent innate tendencies and immediate instincts and therefore is wanting in a single Principle and final purpose

for them but the imminent reflection of mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy and gives their contents a rationality and objectivity in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation as rights and duties it is this objectification which evinces their real value their mutual Connections and their truth and thus it was a true perception when plato especially including as he did the mind's whole nature under its right showed that the full reality of justice could be exhibited only in the objective phase of justice this in the construction of the state

as the ethical life the answer to the question therefore What are the good and rational propensities and how are they to be coordinated with each other resolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life produced by the mind when developing itself as objective mind a development in which the content of autonomous action loses its contingency and optionality the discussion of the true intrinsic worth of the impulses inclinations and Passions is thus essentially the theory of legal moral and social duties 475 the subject is the act of satisfying impulses an act of

at least formal rationality as it translates them from the subjectivity of content which so far is purpose into objectivity where the subject is made to close with itself if the content of the impulse is distinguished as the thing or business From this act of carrying it out and we regard the thing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of subjective individuality and its action this is what is called the interest nothing therefore is brought about without interest an action is an aim of the subject and it is his agency too which executes

this aim unless the subject were in this way even In the most disinterested action i.e unless he had an interest in it there would be no action at all the impulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated by being contrasted with the baseless chimera of a happiness the free gift of nature where once are supposed to find their satisfaction without the agent doing anything to produce a conformity between immediate existence and his own inner requirements They are sometimes contrasted on the whole to their disadvantage with the morality of duty for duty's sake but impulse and passion are

the very lifeblood of all action they are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution thereof the morality concerns the content of the aim which as such is the universal and inactive thing that finds its Actualizing in the agent and finds it only when the aim is imminent in the agent is his interest and should it claim to engross his whole efficient subjectivity his passion 476 the will as thinking and implicitly free distinguishes itself from the particularity of the impulses and places itself a simple subjectivity Of thought above their

diversified content it is thus reflecting will 477 such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum the reflective will now sees it as its own because it closes with it and thus gives itself specific individuality and actuality it is now on the standpoint of choosing between inclinations And his option or choice 478 will as choice claims to be free reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate autonomy however as the content in which its former universality concludes itself to actuality is nothing but the content of the impulses and appetites

it is actual only as a subjective and contingent will it realizes itself in a particularity Which it regards at the same time as a nullity and finds a satisfaction in what it has at the same time emerged from as thus contradictory it is the process of distracting and suspending one desire or enjoyment by another and one satisfaction which is just as much no satisfaction by another without end but the truth of the particular satisfactions is the universal which under the name of happiness the Thinking will makes its aim delta happiness 479 in this idea which

reflection and comparison have induced of a universal satisfaction the impulses so far as their particularity goes are reduced to a mere negative and it is held that in part they are to be sacrificed to each other for the behoof Of that aim partly sacrificed to that aim directly either altogether or in part their mutual limitation on one hand proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations on the other hand as happiness has its sole affirmative contents in the springs of action it is on them that the decision turns and it is the subjective feeling

and good pleasure which must have the Casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed 480 happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of things desired a universality which only ought to be but the particularity of the satisfaction which just as much is as it is abolished and the abstract singleness the option which gives or does not give itself as it pleases an aim in happiness Find their truth in the intrinsic universality of the will i.e its very autonomy or freedom in this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity which is

pure and concrete at once by having for its contents and aim only that infinite mode of being freedom itself in this truth of its autonomy where concept and object are one the will is an actually free will free mind 481 actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind a free will which realizes its own freedom of will now that the formalism fortuitousness and contractedness of the practical content up to this point have been superseded by superseding the adjustments of means they're incontained the will is the immediate individuality self-instituted an individuality however also

purified Of all that interferes with its universalism i.e with freedom itself this universalism the will has its object and aim only so far as it thinks itself knows this its concept and his will as free intelligence 482 the mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object i.e which has its true being for characteristic and aim Is in the first instance the rational will in general or implicit idea and because implicit only the notion of absolute mind as abstract idea again it is existent only in the immediate will it is the

existential side of reason the single will as aware of this its universality constituting its contents and aim and of which it is only the formal Activity if the will therefore in which the idea thus appears is only finite that will is also the act of developing the idea and of investing its self-unfolding content with an existence which as realizing the idea is actuality it is thus objective mind No idea is so generally recognized as indefinite ambiguous and open to the greatest misconceptions to which therefore it actually falls a victim as the idea of liberty none

in common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning remembering that free mind is actual mind we can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in practice When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty there is nothing like it in its uncontrollable strength just because it is the very essence of mind and that as its very actuality all continents africa and the east have never had this idea and are without it still the greeks and romans plato and aristotle even the stoics did not have It

on the contrary they saw that it is only by birth as eg an athenian or spartan citizen or by strength of character education or philosophy the sage is free even as a slave and in chains that the human being is actually free it was through christianity that this idea came into the world according to christianity the individual as such has an infinite value as the Object and aim of divine love destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with god himself and have god's mind dwelling in him i.e man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom

if in religion as such man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being he has also even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence The divine mind present with him as the substance of the state of the family etc these institutions are due to the guidance of that spirit and are constituted after its measure whilst by their existence the moral temper comes to be indwelling in the individual so that in this sphere of particular existence of present sensation and volition He is actually free if to be aware of

the idea to be aware i.e that men are aware of freedom as their essence aim and object is matter of speculation still this very idea itself is the actuality of men not something which they have as men but which they are christianity in its adherence has realized an ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves If they are made slaves if the decision as regards their property rests with an arbitrary will not with laws or courts of justice they would find the very substance of their life outraged this will to liberty is no

longer an impulse which demands its satisfaction but the permanent character the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive nature but this freedom which the content and Aim of freedom has is itself only a notion a principle of the mind and heart intended to develop into an objective phase into legal moral religious and not less into scientific actuality section two mind objective 483 the objective mind is the absolute idea but only existing in posse and as it is thus on the territory of Finitude its actual rationality retains the aspect of external apparency the free will finds itself

immediately confronted by differences which arise from the circumstance that freedom is its inward function and aim and is in relation to an external and already subsisting objectivity which splits up into different heads vis anthropological data i.e private and personal needs External things of nature which exist for consciousness and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of their own diversity and particularity these aspects constitute the external material for the embodiment of the will 484 but the purposive action of this will is to realize its concept liberty in these externally objective aspects making the

latter a world molded by the Former which in it is thus at home with itself locked together with it the concept accordingly perfected to the idea liberty shaped into the actuality of a world receives the form of necessity the deeper substantial nexus of which is the system or organization of the principles of liberty whilst its phenomenal nexus is power or authority And the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousness 485 this unity of the rational will with the single will this being the peculiar and immediate medium in which the former is actualized constitutes the simple actuality

of liberty as it and its content belongs to thought and is the virtual universal the content has its right and true Character only in the form of universality when invested with this character for the intelligent consciousness or instituted as an authoritative power it is a law when on the other hand the content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness attaching to it in the practical feeling and in impulse and is set and grafted in the individual will Not in the form of impulse but in its universality so as to become its habit temper and character

it exists as manner and custom or usage 486 this reality in general where free will has existence is the law right the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juristic law but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom These conditions in relation to the subjective will where they being universal ought to have and can only have their existence are its duties whereas as its temper and habit they are manners what is a right is also a duty and what is a duty is also a right for a

mode of existence is a right only as a consequence of the free substantial will And the same content of fact when referred to the will distinguished as subjective and individual is a duty it is the same content which the subjective consciousness recognizes as a duty and brings into existence in these several wills the finitude of the objective will thus creates the semblance of a distinction between rights and duties In the phenomenal range right and duty are correlata at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in someone else but

in the light of the concept my right to a thing is not merely possession but as possession by a person it is property or legal possession and it is a duty to possess things as property i.e to be as a person translated into the phenomenal Relationship of his relation to another person this grows into the duty of someone else to respect my right in the morality of the conscience duty in general is in me a free subject at the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition but in this individualist moral sphere there

arises the division between what is only inward purpose disposition or intention which only has Its being in me and is merely subjective duty and the actualization of that purpose and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes the inadequacy of mere individualistic morality in social ethics these two parts have reached their truth their absolute unity although even right and duty return to one another and combine by means of certain adjustments and under the guise of necessity The rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them just as the

children's duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty of manhood the penal judicature of a government its rights of administration etc are no less its duties to punish to administer etc as the services of the members of the state in dues military services etc are duties And yet their right to the protection of their private property and of the general substantial life in which they have their root all the aims of society and the state are the private aim of the individuals but the set of adjustments by which their duties come

back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right produces an appearance of diversity and this diversity is increased by the variety of shapes which value assumes in The course of exchange though it remains intrinsically the same still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no rights has no duties and vice versa distribution 487 the free will is a itself at first immediate and hence as a single being the person the existence which the person gives to its liberty is property the right as Right law is formal abstract right be when the will is

reflected into self so as to have its existence inside it and to be thus at the same time characterized as a particular it is the right of the subjective will morality of the individual conscience see when the free will is the substantial will made actual in the subject and Conformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity it is the ethics of actual life in family civil society and state subsection a law a property 488 mind in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty is an individual but one that knows its individuality is An absolutely

free will it is a person in whom the inward sense of this freedom as in itself still abstract and empty has its particularity and fulfillment not yet on its own part but on an external thing this thing as something devoid of will has no rights against the subjectivity of intelligence and volition and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it the external sphere of Its liberty possession 489 by the judgment of possession at first in the outward appropriation the thing acquires the predicate of mine but this predicate on its own account merely practical has here

the signification that i import my personal will into the thing as so characterized possession is Property which as possession is a means but as existence of the personality is an end 490 in his property the person is brought into union with himself but the thing is an abstractly external thing and the i in it is abstractly external the concrete return of me into me and the externality is that i the infinite self-relation Am as a person the repulsion of me from myself and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons in

my relation to them and in my recognition by them which is thus mutual 491 the thing is the mean by which the extremes meet in one these extremes are the persons who in the knowledge of their identity as free are simultaneously mutually independent For them my will has its definite recognizable existence in the thing by the immediate bodily act of taking possession or by the formation of the thing or it may be by mere designation of it 492 the casual aspect of property is that i place my will in this thing so far my will

is arbitrary i can just as well put it in it as not just as well withdraw it as not But so far as my will lies in a thing it is only i who can withdraw it it is only with my will that the thing can pass to another whose property it similarly becomes only with his will contract b contract 493 the two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an internal state of mind different from its realization in the performance The comparatively ideal utterance of contract in the stipulation contains the actual surrender

of a property by the one its changing hands and its acceptance by the other will the contract is thus thoroughly binding it does not need the performance of the one or the other to become so otherwise we should have an infinite regress or infinite division of thing labor and time The utterance in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive the inwardness of the will which surrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of ideation and in that realm the word is deed and thing the full and complete deed since here the conscientiousness

of the will does not come under consideration as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or is a deception And the will refers only to the external thing 494 thus in the stipulation we have the substantial being of the contract standing out in distinction from its real utterance in the performance which is brought down to a mere sequel in this way there is put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate specific quality and its substantial being or value Meaning by value the quantitative terms into which that qualitative feature has been translated

one piece of property is thus made comparable with another and may be made equivalent to a thing which is in quality wholly heterogeneous it is thus treated in general as an abstract universal thing or commodity 495 the contract as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and deals with a casual Commodity involves at the same time that giving to this accidental will a positive fixity this will may just as well not be conformable to law right and in that case produces a wrong by which however the absolute law right is not superseded but only a

relationship originated of right to wrong c Right versus wrong 496 law right considered as the realization of liberty in externals breaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to other persons in this way there are one several titles or grounds at law of which seeing that property both on the personal and the real side is Exclusively individual only one is the right but which because they face each other each and all are invested with a show of right against which the former is defined as the intrinsically right 4 497 now so

long as compared against this show the one intrinsically right still presumed identical with the several Titles is affirmed willed and recognized the only diversity lies in this that the special thing is subsumed under the one law or right by the particular will of these several persons this is naive non-malicious wrong such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative judgment expressing the civil suit To settle it there is required a third judgment which has the judgment of the intrinsically right is disinterested and the power of giving the one right existence as against that semblance

498 but two if the semblance of right as such is willed against the right intrinsically by the particular will which thus becomes wicked then the external recognition of right Is separated from the right's true value and while the former only is respected the latter is violated this gives the wrong of fraud the infinite judgment as identical where the nominal relation is retained but the sterling value is let slip four nine nine three finally the particular will sets itself in opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as Its recognition or semblance

here there is a negatively infinite judgment in which there is denied the class as a whole and not merely the particular mode in this case the apparent recognition thus the will is violently wicked and commits a crime 500 as an outrage on right such an action is essentially and actually null in it the agent as a volitional and Intelligent being sets up a law a law however which is nominal and recognized by him only a universal which holds good for him and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action to

display the nullity of such an act to carry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right in the first instance by means of a subjective individual will is the work of revenge But revenge starting from the interest of an immediate particular personality is at the same time only a new outrage and so on without end this progression like the last abolishes itself in the third judgment which is disinterested punishment 501 the instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right is alpha that a particular will that of the judge Being conformable to the right

has an interest to turn against the crime which in the first instance in revenge is a matter of chance and beta that an executive power also in the first instance casual negates the negation of right that was created by the criminal this negation of right has its existence in the will of the criminal and consequently revenge or punishment directs itself against the person or Property of the criminal and exercises coercion upon him it is in this legal sphere that coercion in general has possible scope compulsion against the thing in seizing and maintaining it against another's

seizure for in this sphere the will has its existence immediately in externals as such or incorporatey and can be seized only in this quarter But more than possible compulsion is not so long as i can withdraw myself as free from every mode of existence even from the range of all existence i.e from life it is legal only as abolishing a first and original compulsion 502 a distinction has thus emerged between the law right and the subjective will the reality of right which the personal will in the first instance gives itself An immediate wise is seen

to be due to the instrumentality of the subjective will whose influence as on one hand it gives existence to the essential right so may on the other cut itself off from and oppose itself to it conversely the claim of the subjective will to be in this abstraction a power over the law of right is null and empty of itself it gets truth and reality essentially Only so far as that will in itself realizes the reasonable will as such it is morality proper the phrase law of nature or natural right in use for the philosophy of

law involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing ready formed in nature or write as governed by the nature of things i.e by the notion the former used to be the common meaning Accompanied with the fiction of a state of nature in which the law of nature should hold sway whereas the social and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights the real fact is that the whole law and its every article are based on free personality alone on self-determination or autonomy which is

the very contrary of Determination by nature the law of nature strictly so called is for that reason the predominance of the strong and the reign of force and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong of which nothing truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it the social state on the other hand is the condition in which alone right has its actuality what is to be restricted and sacrificed Is just the willfulness and violence of the state of nature subsection b the morality of conscience 503 the free individual who

in mere law counts only as a person is now characterized as a subject a will reflected into itself so that be its affection what it may it is distinguished as existing in it as its own from the existence of freedom in an external thing Because the affection of the will is thus inwardized the will is at the same time made a particular and there arise further particularizations of it and relations of these to one another this affection is partly the essential and implicit will the reason of the will the essential basis of law and moral

life partly it is the existent volition which is before us and throws itself into Actual deeds and thus comes into relationship with the former the subjective will is morally free so far as these features are its inward institution its own and willed by it its utterance indeed with this freedom is an action in the externality of which it only admits as its own and allows to be imputed to it so much as it has consciously willed This subjective or moral freedom is what a european especially calls freedom in virtue of the right thereto a man

must possess a personal knowledge of the distinction between good and evil in general ethical and religious principles shall not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be obeyed but have their assent recognition or even justification in his heart Sentiment conscience intelligence etc the subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme aim and absolutely essential to it the moral must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify the morally good merely in french le morale is opposed to the physique and means the mental or

intellectual in general but here the moral signifies volitional mode So far as it is in the interior of the will in general it thus includes purpose and intention and also moral wickedness a purpose 504 so far as the action comes into immediate touch with existence my part in it is to this extent formal that external existence is also independent of the agent this Externality can pervert his action and bring to light something else than lay in it now though any alteration as such which is set on foot by the subject's action is its deed still

the subject does not for that reason recognize it as its action but only admits as its own that existence in the deed which lay in its knowledge and will which was its purpose Only for that does it hold itself responsible b intention and welfare 505 as regards its empirically concrete content one the action has a variety of particular aspects and connections in point of form the agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature embracing these Individual points this is the right of intention while purpose affects only the immediate fact of existence

intention regards the underlying essence and aim thereof 2. the agent has no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the action in point of its matter is not something external to him but is a particularity of his own that it contains his needs interests and Aims these aims when similarly comprehended in a single aim as in happiness constitute his well-being this is the right to well-being happiness good fortune is distinguished from well-being only in this that happiness implies no more than some sort of immediate existence whereas well-being regards it as also

justified as regards morality 506 But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the abstract form of generality reflection can put in this form this and that particular aspect in the empirically concrete action thus making it essential to the intention or restricting the intention to it in this way the supposed essentiality of the intention and the real essentiality of the action may be brought into the Greatest contradiction eg a good intention in case of a crime similarly well-being is abstract and may be set on this or that as a pertaining to this single

agent it is always something particular see goodness and wickedness 507 the truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their formalism is the content of the universal essential And actual will the law and underlying essence of every phase of volition the essential and actual good it is thus the absolute final aim of the world and duty for the agent who ought to have insight into the good make it his intention and bring it about by his activity 508 but though the good is the universal of will A universal determined in itself and thus including

in its particularity still so far as this particularity is in the first instance still abstract there is no principle at hand to determine it such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal and as heteronomy or determinants of a will which is free and has rights of its own there awakes hear the deepest Contradiction alpha in consequence of the indeterminate determinism of the good there are always several sorts of good and many kinds of duties the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into collision at the same time because

good is one they ought to stand in harmony and yet each of them though it is a Particular duty is as good and as duty absolute it falls upon the agent to be the dialectic which superseding this absolute claim of each concludes such a combination of them as excludes the rest 509 peter to the agent who in his existence sphere of liberty is essentially as a particular his interest and welfare must on account Of that existence sphere of liberty be essentially an aim and therefore a duty but at the same time in aiming at the

good which is the not particular but only universal of the will the particular interest ought not to be a constituent motive on account of this independency of the two principles of action it is likewise an accident whether they harmonize And yet they ought to harmonize because the agent as individual and universal is always fundamentally one identity gamma but the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence it is also a form of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty an abstract reflection of freedom into himself he is thus distinct from the reason in

the will and capable of making the universal itself a particular and in That way a semblance the good is thus reduced to the level of a mere may happen for the agent who can therefore decide on something opposite to the good can be wicked 510 delta the external objectivity following the distinction which has arisen in the subjective will constitutes a peculiar world of its own another extreme which stands in no Rapport with the internal will determination it is thus a matter of chance whether it harmonizes with the subjective aims whether the good is realized and

the wicked a name essentially and actually null nullified in it it is no less a matter of chance whether the agent finds in it his well-being and more precisely whether in the world the good agent is happy and the wicked Unhappy but at the same time the world ought to allow the good action the essential thing to be carried out in it it ought to grant a good agent the satisfaction of his particular interest and refuse it to the wicked just as it ought also to make the wicked itself null and void 5-1-1 the all-round

contradiction expressed by this repeated ought with its Absoluteness which yet at the same time is not contains the most abstract analysis of the mind in itself its steepest descent into itself the only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one another is in the abstract certainty of self and for this infinitude of subjectivity the universal will good right and duty no more exists than not The subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding this pure self-certitude rising to its pitch appears in the two directly changing forms of conscience and wickedness the former is the

will of goodness but a goodness switched to this pure subjectivity is the non-objective non-universal the unutterable and over which the agent is conscious that he in his individuality has the Decision wickedness is the same awareness that the single self possesses the decision so far as the single self does not merely remain in this abstraction but takes up the content of a subjective interest contrary to the good 512 this supreme pitch of the phenomenon of will sublimating itself to this absolute vanity To a goodness which has no objectivity but is only sure of itself and a

self-assurance which involves the nullification of the universal collapses by its own force wickedness as the most intimate reflection of subjectivity itself in opposition to the objective and universal which it treats as mere sham is the same as the good sentiment of abstract goodness which reserves to the Subjectivity the determination thereof the utterly abstract semblance the bear perversion and annihilation of itself the result the truth of this semblance is on its negative side the absolute nullity of this volition which would feign hold its own against the good and of the good which would only be abstract

on the affirmative side in the notion this semblance thus collapsing is the Same simple universality of the will which is the good the subjectivity in this its identity with the good is only the infinite form which actualizes and develops it in this way the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides the standpoint of the ought is abandoned and we have passed into the field of ethical life subsection c The moral life or social ethics 513 the moral life is the perfection of spirit objective the truth of the subjective and objective spirit itself the failure

of the latter consists partly in having its freedom immediately in reality in something external therefore in a thing partly in the abstract universality of Its goodness the failure of spirit subjective similarly consists in this that it is as against the universal abstractly self-determinant in its inward individuality when these two imperfections are suppressed subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal rational will which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in the consciousness of the Individual subject whilst its practical operation and immediate universal actuality at the same time exist as moral usage manner and custom

where self-conscious liberty has become nature 514 the consciously free substance in which the absolute ought is no less than is as actuality as the spirit of a nation the abstract disruption of this spirit singles it out into persons Whose independence it however controls and entirely dominates from within but the person as an intelligent being feels that underlying essence to be his own very being ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it looks upon it as his absolute final aim in its actuality he sees not less an achieved present than somewhat he brings

about by his action yet somewhat which without all question Is thus without any selective reflection the person performs its duty as his own and does something which is and in this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom 515 because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and universality of freedom it follows that the actuality and action of each individual to keep and to take Care of his own being while it is on one hand conditioned by the presupposed total in whose complex alone he exists is on the other a transition into a universal

product the social disposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance and of the identity of all their interests with the total and that the other individuals mutually Know each other and are actual only in this identity is confidence trust the genuine ethical temper 516 the relations between individuals in the several situations to which the substance is particularized form their ethical duties the ethical personality i.e the subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life Is virtue in relation to the bare facts of external being to destiny virtue does not treat them as a mere

negation and is thus a quiet repose in itself in relation to substantial objectivity to the total of ethical actuality it exists as confidence as deliberate work for the community and the capacity of sacrificing self thereto whilst in relation to the incidental Relations of social circumstance it is in the first instance justice and then benevolence in the latter sphere and in its attitude to its own visible being and cooperative the individuality expresses its special character temperament etc as personal virtues 517 the ethical substance is a a as immediate or natural mind the family Bb the relative

totality of the relative relations of the individuals as independent persons to one another in a formal universality civil society cc the self-conscious substance as the mind developed to an organic actuality the political constitution a a the family 518 the ethical spirit in its immediacy contains the natural factor that the individual has its substantial existence in its natural universal i.e in its kind this is the sexual tie elevated however to a spiritual significance the unanimity of love and the temper of trust in the shape of the family mind appears as feeling 519 One the physical difference

of sex thus appears at the same time as a difference of intellectual and moral type with their exclusive individualities these personalities combine to form a single person the subjective union of hearts becoming a substantial unity makes this union an ethical tie marriage the substantial union of hearts makes Marriage an indivisible personal bond monogamic marriage the bodily conjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment a further sequel is community of personal and private interests 520 2 by the community in which the various members constituting the family stand in reference to property that property of the one

person Representing the family acquires an ethical interest as do also its industry labor and care for the future five two one the ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural generation of the children and which was assumed to have primary importance in first forming the marriage union is actually realized in the second or spiritual birth of the children in educating them to independent Personality five to two three the children thus invested with independence leave the concrete life and action of the family to which they primarily belong acquire an existence of their own destined however to

found a new such an actual family marriage is of course broken up by the natural element contained in it The death of husband and wife but even their union of hearts as it is a mere substantiality of feeling contains the germ of liability to chance and decay in view of such fortuitousness the members of the family take up to each other the status of persons and it is thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time the element originally foreign to it Of legal regulation bb civil society 523 as the substance being

an intelligent substance particularizes itself abstractly into many persons the family is only a single person into families or individuals who exist independent and free as private persons it loses its ethical character For these persons as such have in their consciousness and as their aim not the absolute unity but their own petty selves and particular interests thus arises the system of atomistic by which the substance is reduced to a general system of adjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their particular interests the developed totality of this connective system is the state as civil Society or state external

a the system of wants 524 alpha the particularity of the persons includes in the first instance their wants the possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the social fabric the general stock from which all derive Their satisfaction in the condition of things in which this method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realized immediate seizure of external objects as means thereto exists barely or not at all the objects are already property to acquire them is only possible by the intervention on one hand of the possessor's will which as particular has in view the satisfaction

of their Variously defined interests while on the other hand it is conditioned by the ever continued production of fresh means of exchange by the exchange's own labor this instrument by which the labor of all facilitates satisfaction of wants constitutes the general stock 525 beta the glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of wants is found in The way intellect creates differences in them and thus causes an indefinite multiplication both of wants and of means for their different phases both are thus rendered more and more abstract this mos selmo of their content by abstraction gives rise

to the division of labor the habit of this abstraction in enjoyment information feeling and Demeanor constitutes training in this sphere or nominal culture in general 526 the labor which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by its uniformity to make labor easier and to increase production on another to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill and thus produce more unconditional dependence on the social system The skill itself becomes in this way mechanical and gets the capability of letting the machine take the place of human labor 527 gamma but the concrete division

of the general stock which is also a general business of the whole society into particular masses determined by the factors of the notion masses each of which possesses its own Basis of subsistence and a corresponding mode of labor of needs and of means for satisfying them also of aims and interests as well as of mental culture and habit constitutes the difference of estates orders or ranks individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent skill option and accident as belonging to such a definite and stable sphere they have their actual Existence which as existence is

essentially a particular and in it they have their social morality which is honesty their recognition and their honor where civil society and with it the state exists there arise the several estates in their difference for the universal substance as vital exists only so far as it organically Particularizes itself the history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates of the legal relationships of individuals to them and of these estates to one another and to their center five to eight to the substantial natural estate the fruitful soil and ground supply a natural and

stable capital its action gets direction and content through natural features and its moral Life is founded on faith and trust the second the reflected estate has is its allotment the social capital the medium created by the action of middlemen of mere agents and an ensemble of contingencies where the individual has to depend on his subjective skill talent intelligence and industry the third thinking estate has for its business the general interests like the second it has a subsistence Procured by means of its own skill and like the first a certain subsistence certain however because guaranteed through

the whole society b administration of justice 529 when matured through the operation of natural need and free option into a system of universal relationships and a regular course of external necessity the principle of casual particularity gets that stable articulation which Liberty requires in the shape of formal right one the actualization which wright gets in this sphere of mere practical intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable universal that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice of authority the law The positive element in laws concerns only their form of

publicity and authority which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a customary and external way their content per se may be reasonable or it may be unreasonable and so wrong but when right in the course of definite manifestation is developed in detail and its content analyzes itself to gain definiteness This analysis because of the finitude of its materials falls into the falsely infinite progress the final definiteness which is absolutely essential and causes a break in this progress of unreality can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in a way that

savers of contingency and arbitrariness thus whether three years ten tolers or only two and a half two and three quarter two and four fifth Years and so on at infinitum be the right and just thing can by no means be decided on intelligible principles and yet it should be decided hence though of course only at the final points of deciding on the side of external existence the positive principle naturally enters laws as contingency and arbitrariness this happens and has form of old happened in all legislations The only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of

it and not be misled by the talk and the pretence as if the ideal of law were or could be to be at every point determined through reason or legal intelligence on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds it is a futile perfectionism to have such expectations and to make such requirements in the sphere of the finite there are some who look upon laws as an Evil and a profanity and who regard governing and being governed from natural love heredity divinity or nobility by faith and trust as the genuine order of life while the reign of law

is held in order of corruption and injustice these people forget that the stars and the cattle too are governed and well governed too by laws laws however which are only internally in these objects not for them not as Laws set to them whereas it is man's privilege to know his law they forget therefore that he can truly obey only such known law even as his law can only be a just law as it is a known law though in other respects it must be in its essential content contingency and caprice or at least be mixed

and polluted with such elements The same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite thesis is to support the opinion that a code is impossible or impracticable in this case there comes in the additional absurdity of putting essential and universal provision in one class with the particular detail the finite material is definable on and on to the false infinite but this advance is not as in the mental images of space A generation of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those preceding them but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality by the

acumen of the analytic intellect which discovers new distinctions which again make new decisions necessary to provisions of this sort one may give the name of new decisions or new laws but in proportion to the gradual advance in specialization the interest and value Of these provisions declines they fall within the already subsisting substantial general laws like improvements on a floor or a door within the house which though something new are not a new house but there is a contrary case if the legislation of a rude age began with single provisos which go on by their very

nature always increasing their number Their arises with the advance in multitude the need of a simpler code the need i.e of embracing that lot of singulars in their general features to find and be able to express these principles well it seems an intelligent and civilized nation such a gathering up of single rules into general forms first really deserving the name of laws has lately been begun in some directions by the english minister peel Who has by doing so gained the gratitude even the admiration of his countrymen 530 2 the positive form of laws to be

promulgated and made known as laws is a condition of the external obligation to obey them in as much as being laws of strict right they touch only the abstract will itself at bottom external not the moral or ethical will The subjectivity to which the will has in this direction are right is here only publicity this subjective existence is as existence of the essential and developed truth in this sphere of right at the same time an externally objective existence as universal authority and necessity the legality of property and of private transactions concerned there with in consideration

of the principle that all Law must be promulgated recognized and thus become authoritative gets its universal guarantee through formalities 531 three legal forms get the necessity to which objective existence determines itself in the judicial system abstract right has to exhibit itself to the court to the individualized right as proven a process in which there may be a Difference between what is abstractly right and what is provably right the court takes cognizance and action in the interest of right as such deprives the existence of right of its contingency and in particular transforms this existence as this

exists as revenge into punishment the comparison of the two species or rather two elements in the judicial Conviction bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the accused one according as that conviction is based on mere circumstances and other people's witness alone or two in addition requires the confession of the accused constitutes the main point in the question of the so-called jury courts it is an essential point that the two ingredients of a judicial cognizance The judgment as to the state of the fact and the judgment as application of the law to

it should as at bottom different sides be exercised as different functions by the said institution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified from the one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are expressly excluded to carry this separation of functions up To this separation in the courts rests rather on extra essential considerations the main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially different functions it is a more important point whether the confession of the accused is or is not to be made a condition of penal judgment the institution of the jury court

loses sight of this condition the point is that on this ground Certainty is completely inseparable from truth but the confession is to be regarded as the very acme of certainty giving which in its nature is subjective the final decision therefore lies with the confession to this therefore the accused has an absolute right if the proof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced no doubt this factor is incomplete Because it is only one factor but still more incomplete is the other when no less abstractly taken this mere circumstantial evidence the jurors are

essentially judges and pronounce the judgment insofar then as all they have to go on are such objective proofs while at the same time their defect of certainty incomplete insofar as it is only in them is admitted The jury court shows traces of its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between objective proofs and subjective or so-called moral conviction it is easy to call extraordinary punishments and absurdity but the fault lies rather with the shallowness which takes offence at a mere name materially the principle involves the difference of objective probation according as it goes with or

without the Factor of absolute certification which lies in confession 532 the function of judicial administration is only to actualize to necessity the abstract side of personal liberty in civil society but this actualization rests at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge since here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right in the abstract Conversely the blind necessity of the system of wants is not lifted up into the consciousness of the universal and worked from that point of view c police and corporation 533 judicial administration naturally has no concern with

such part of actions and interests as belongs only to particularity and leaves to chance not only the Occurrence of crimes but also the care for public wheel in civil society the sole end is to satisfy want and that because it is man's want in a uniform general way so as to secure this satisfaction but the machinery of social necessity leaves in many ways a casualness about this satisfaction this is due to the variability of the wants themselves in which opinion and Subjective good pleasure play a great part it results also from circumstances of locality from

the connections between nation and nation from errors and deceptions which can be foisted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable of creating disorder in it as also and especially from the unequal Capacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock the onward march of this necessity also sacrifices the very particularities by which it is brought about and does not itself contain the affirmative aim of securing the satisfaction of individuals so far as concerns them it may be far from beneficial yet here's the individuals are the morally justifiable end 534 to keep

in view this general end to ascertain the way in which the powers composing that social necessity act and their valuable ingredients and to maintain that end in them and against them is the work of an institution which assumes on one hand to the concrete of civil society the position of an external universality such an order acts with the power of an External state which insofar as it is rooted in the higher or substantial state appears as state police on the other hand in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the aim of substantial universality

and the only carrying of it out is restricted to the business of particular branches and interests thus we have the corporation in which the particular citizen in his Private capacity finds the securing of his stock whilst at the same time he and it emerges from his single private interest and has a conscious activity for a comparatively universal end just as in his legal and professional duties he has his social morality cc the state 535 the state is the self-conscious ethical substance the unification of the family Principle with that of civil society the same unity which

is in the family as a feeling of love is its essence receiving however at the same time through the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active volition the form of conscious universality this universal principle with all its evolution in detail is the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject which Thus identifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness 536 the state is alpha it's inward structure as a self-relating development constitutional inner state law beta a particular individual and therefore in connection with other particular individuals international out of state law gamma but these

particular mines are only Stages in the general development of its mind in its actuality universal history alpha constitutional law 537 the essence of the state is the universal self-originated and self-developed the reasonable spirit of will but as self-knowing and self-actualizing sheer subjectivity and as an actuality One individual its work generally in relation to the extreme of individuality as the multitude of individuals consists in a double function first it maintains them as persons thus making right unnecessary actuality then it promotes their welfare which each originally takes care of for himself but which has a thoroughly general

side it protects the family and guides civil Society secondly it carries back both and the whole disposition and action of the individual whose tendency is to become a center of his own into the life of the universal substance and in this direction as a free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and retains them in substantial imminence 538 The laws express the special provisions for objective freedom first to the immediate agent his independence self-will and particular interest they are restrictions but secondly they are an absolute final end and the universal work here they are a

product of the functions of the various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the general particularizing and are a fruit of all the acts and Private concerns of individuals thirdly they are the substance of the volition of individuals which volition is thereby free and of their disposition being as such exhibited as current usage 539 as a living mind the state only is as an organized whole differentiated into particular agencies which proceeding from the one notion though not known as notion of the Reasonable will continually produce it as their result the constitution is this

articulation or organization of state power it provides for the reasonable will insofar as it is in the individuals only implicitly the universal will coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and being found also for that will being put in actuality through the action of the government and its several branches And not left to perish but protected both against their casual subjectivity and against that of the individuals the constitution is existent justice the actuality of liberty in the development of all its reasonable provisions liberty and equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently

concentrated what should form the fundamental principle the final aim and result of the Constitution however true this is the defect of these terms is their utter abstractness if stuck to in this abstract form they are principles which either prevent the rise of the concreteness of the state i.e its articulation into a constitution and a government in general or destroy them with the state there arises inequality the difference of governing powers and of governed Magistracies authorities directories etc the principle of equality logically carried out rejects all differences and thus allows no sort of political condition to

exist liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state but as the most abstract also the most superficial and for that very reason naturally the most familiar it is important therefore to study them closer As regards first equality the familiar proposition all men are by nature equal blunders by confusing the natural with the notion it ought rather to read by nature men are only unequal but the notion of liberty as it exists as such without further specification and development is abstract subjectivity as a person capable of property this single abstract feature of personality constitutes

the actual Equality of human beings but that this freedom should exist that it should be man and not as in greece rome etc some men that is recognized and legally regarded as a person is so little by nature that it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest principle of mind and of the universality and expansion of this consciousness that the citizens are equal before the law contains a great truth But which so expressed is a tautology it only states that the legal status in general exists but the laws rule

but as regards the concrete the citizens besides their personality are equal before the law only in these points when they are otherwise equal outside the law only that equality which in whatever way it be they as it happens otherwise having property age physical strength talent skill etc or even in crime Can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the law only it can make them as regards taxation military service eligibility to office etc punishment etc equal in the concrete the laws themselves except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality

presuppose unequal conditions and provide for the unequal legal duties and the pertinences resulting there from As regards liberty it is originally taken partly in a negative sense against arbitrary intolerance and lawless treatment partly in the affirmative sense of subjective freedom but this freedom is allowed great latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action for his particular ends and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence and a personal Share in general affairs formerly the legally defined rights private as well as public rights of a nation town etc were called its liberties really every

genuine law is a liberty it contains a reasonable principle of objective mind in other words it embodies a liberty nothing has become on the contrary more familiar than the idea that each must restrict his liberty in relation to the Liberty of others that the state is a condition of such reciprocal restriction and that the laws are restrictions to such habits of mind liberty is viewed as only casual good pleasure and self-will hence it has also been said that modern nations are only susceptible of equality or of equality more than liberty and that for no other

reason than that with an assumed definition of liberty Chiefly the participation of all in political affairs and actions it was impossible to make ends meet in actuality which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract presuppositions on the contrary it should be said that it is just the great development and maturity of form in modern states which produces the supreme concrete inequality of individuals in actuality While through the deeper reasonableness of laws and the greatest stability of the legal state it gives rise to greater and more stable liberty which it can without incompatibility

allow even the superficial distinction of the words liberty and equality points to the fact that the former tends to inequality whereas on the contrary the current notions of liberty only carry us back to Equality but the more we fortify liberty as security of property as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his talents and good qualities the more it gets taken for granted and then the sense and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a subjective direction by this is meant the liberty to attempt action on every side and to throw oneself at

pleasure in action for Particular and for general intellectual interests the removal of all checks on the individual particularity as well as the inward liberty in which the subject has principles has an insight and conviction of his own and thus gains moral independence but this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme differentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal by Education and on another it only grows up under conditions of that objective liberty and is and could grow to such height only in modern states if with this development of particularity there be

simultaneous and endless increase of the number of wants and of the difficulty of satisfying them of the lust of argument and the fancy of detecting faults with its insatiate vanity It is all but part of that indiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sphere which generates all possible complications and must deal with them as it can such as sphere is of course also the field of restrictions because liberty is there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing and has therefore to restrict itself and that not merely with regard to the naturalness self-will and self-conceit Of

others but especially and essentially with regard to reasonable liberty the term political liberty however is often used to mean formal participation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even of those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the particular aims and business of civil society and it has in part become usual to give The title constitution only to the side of the state which concerns such participation of these individuals in general affairs and to regard a state in which this is not formally done as a state without a constitution on

this use of the term the only thing to remark is that by constitution must be understood the determination of rights i.e of liberties in general and the organization of the Actualization of them and that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only constitute a part of it of it the following paragraphs will speak 540 the guarantee of a constitution i.e the necessity that the laws be reasonable and their actualization secured lies in the collective spirit of the nation Especially in the specific way in which it is itself conscious of its reason religion

is that consciousness in its absolute substantiality but the guarantee lies also at the same time in the actual organization or development of that principle in suitable institutions the constitution presupposes that consciousness of the collective spirit and conversely that spirit presupposes the constitution For the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of its principles insofar as it has them actually existent before it the question to whom to what authority and how organized belongs the power to make a constitution is the same as the question who has to make the spirit of a nation separate our idea

of a constitution from that of the collective spirit as if the latter exists or has existed without a Constitution and your fancy only proves how superficially you have apprehended the nexus between the spirit in its self-consciousness and in its actuality what is thus called making a constitution is just because of this inseparability a thing that has never happened in history just as little as the making of a code of laws a constitution only develops from the National spirit identically with that spirit's own development and runs through at the same time with it the grades of

formation and the alterations required by its concept it is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation and be it added the history is only that spirit's history by which constitutions have been and are made 541 the really living totality That which preserves in other words continually produces the state in general and its constitution is the government the organization which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the family and of the estates of civil society the government is the universal part of the constitution i.e the part which intentionally aims at preserving those

parts but at the same time gets hold of and Carries out those general aims of the whole which rise above the function of the family and of civil society the organization of the government is likewise its differentiation into powers as their peculiarities have a basis in principle yet without that difference losing touch with the actual unity they have in the notion's subjectivity as the most obvious categories of the notion are those of universality and Individuality and their relationship that of subsumption of individual under universal it has come about that in the state the legislative and

executive power have been so distinguished as to make the former exist apart as the absolute superior and to subdivide the latter again into administrative government power and judicial power according as the laws are Applied to public or private affairs the division of these powers has been treated as the condition of political equilibrium meaning by division their independence one of another in existence subject always however to the above subsumption of the powers of the individual under the power of the general the theory of such division unmistakably implies the elements of the notion But so combined by

understanding as to result in an absurd collocation instead of the self-read integration of the living spirit the one essential cannon to make liberty deep and real is to give every business belonging to the general interests of the state a separate organization wherever they are essentially distinct such real division must be for liberty is only deep when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these Differences manifested in existence but to make the business of legislation an independent power to make it the first power with the further proviso that all citizens shall have part therein and

the government be merely executive and dependent presupposes ignorance that the true idea and therefore the living and spiritual actuality is the self-red integrating notion In other words the subjectivity which contains in it universality as only one of its moments a mistake still greater if it goes with the fancy that the constitution and the fundamental laws were still one day to make in a state of society which includes an already existing development of differences individuality is the first and supreme principle which makes itself felt Through the state's organization only through the government and by its embracing

in itself the particular businesses including the abstract legislative business which taken apart is also particular is the state one these as always are the terms on which the different elements essentially and alone truly stand towards each other in the logic of reason As opposed to the external footing they stand on in understanding which never gets beyond subsuming the individual and particular under the universal what disorganizes the unity of logical reason equally disorganizes actuality 542 in the government regarded as organic totality the sovereign power principate is a Subjectivity as the infinite self-unity of the notion in

its development the all-sustaining all-decreeing will of the state its highest peak and all pervasive unity in the perfect form of the state in which each and every element of the notion has reached free existence this subjectivity is not a so-called moral person or a decree issuing from a majority forms in which the unity of the Decreeing will has not an actual existence but an actual individual the will of a decreeing individual monarchy the monarchical constitution is therefore the constitution of developed reason all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason

unification of all concrete state powers Into one existence as in the patriarchal society or as in a democratic constitution the participation of all in all affairs impugns the principle of the division of powers i.e the developed liberty of the constituent factors of the idea but no wit less must the division the working out of these factors each to a free totality be reduced to ideal unity i.e to subjectivity The mature differentiation or realization of the idea means essentially that this subjectivity should grow to be a real moment an actual existence and this actuality is not

otherwise than as the individuality of the monarch the subjectivity of abstract and final decision existent in one person all those forms of collective decreeing and willing a common will which shall be the sum and The resultant on aristocratic or democratic principles of the atomistic of single wills have on them the mark of the unreality of an abstraction two points only are all important first to see the necessity of each of the notional factors and secondly the form in which it is actualized it is only the nature of the speculative notion which can really give light

on The matter that subjectivity being the moment which emphasizes the need of abstract deciding in general partly leads on to the proviso that the name of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything is done in the government partly being simple self-relation has attached to it the characteristic of immediacy and then of nature whereby the destination of individuals For the dignity of the princely power is fixed by inheritance 543b in the particular government power there emerges first the division of state business into its branches otherwise defined legislative power administration of justice or

judicial power administration and police and its consequent distribution between Particular boards or offices which having their business appointed by law to that end and for that reason possess independence of action without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision secondly too there arises the participation of several in state business who together constitute the general order see paragraph 528 Insofar as they take on themselves the charge of universal ends as the essential function of their particular life the further condition for being able to take individually part in this business being a certain training aptitude

and skill for such ends 544 the estate's collegium or provincial council is an institution by which all such as belong to civil society in general and are to that degree private Persons participate in the governmental power especially in legislation this such legislation is concerns the universal scope of those interests which do not like peace and war involves the as it were personal interference and action of the state as one man and therefore do not belong specially to the province of the sovereign power By virtue of this participation subjective liberty and conceit with their general opinion

can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something the division of constitutions into democracy aristocracy and monarchy is still the most definite statement of their difference in relation to sovereignty they must at the same time be regarded As necessary structures in the path of development in short in the history of the state hence it is superficial and absurd to represent them as an object of choice the pure forms necessary to the process of evolution are in so far as they are finite and in course of change conjoined both

with forms of their degeneration such as oculocracy etc and with earlier transition forms These two forms are not to be confused with those legitimate structures thus it may be if we look only to the fact that the will of one individual stands at the head of the state oriental despotism is included under the vague name monarchy as also feudal monarchy to which indeed even the favorite name of constitutional monarchy cannot be refused the true difference of these forms from genuine monarchy depends on the true Value of those principles of right which are in vogue and

have their actuality and guarantee in the state power these principles of those expounded earlier liberty of property and above all personal liberty civil society with its industry and its communities and the regulated efficiency of the particular bureaus in subordination to the laws the question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand the Participation of private persons in state affairs for it is as private persons that the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be taken be they treated as mere individuals or as representatives of a number of people or of

the nation the aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the nation but as such an aggregate it is vulgars not populous And in this direction it is the one sole aim of the state that a nation should not come to existence to power and action as such an aggregate such a condition of a nation is a condition of lawlessness demoralization brutishness in it the nation would only be a shapeless wild blind force like that of the stormy elemental sea which however is not self-destructive as the nation a spiritual element would be Yet such

a condition may be often heard described as that of true freedom if there is to be any sense in embarking upon the question of the participation of private persons in public affairs it is not a brutish mass but an already organized nation one in which a governmental power exists which should be presupposed the desirability of such participation however is not to be put in the superiority of particular intelligence Which private persons are supposed to have over state officials the contrary may be the case nor in the superiority of their good will for the general best

the members of civil society as such are rather people who find their nearest duty in their private interest and as especially in the feudal society in the interest of their privileged corporation take the case of england which because Private persons have a predominant share in public affairs has been regarded as having the freest of all constitutions experience shows that that country as compared with the other civilized states of europe is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation in the law and liberty of property in arrangements for art and science and that objective freedom or

rational right Is rather sacrificed to formal right and particular private interest and that this happens even in the institutions and possessions supposed to be dedicated to religion the desirability of private persons taking part in public affairs is partly to be put in their concrete and therefore more urgent sense of general wants but the true motive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an Externally universal will acting with orderly and express efficacy for the public concerns by this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life quickened and at the same time breathes

fresh life in the administrative officials who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they to enforce duties but also to have regard to rights private citizens are in the state the incomparably greater number and form the Multitude of such as are recognized as persons hence the will reason exhibits its existence in them as a preponderating majority of free men or in its reflectional universality which has its actuality without safety as a participation in the sovereignty but it has already been noted as a moment of civil society that the individuals rise from

external intersubstantial universality and form a Particular kind the estates and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such after the democratic fashion of election but as organic factors as it states that they enter upon that participation in the state a power or agency must never appear and act as a formless inorganic shape i.e basing itself on the principle of multaity and mere numbers assemblies of estates have been wrongly Designated as the legislative power so far as they form only one branch of that power a branch in which the special government officials

have an ex-officio share while the sovereign power has the privilege of final decision in a civilized state moreover legislation can only be a further modification of existing law and so-called new laws can only deal with the minutiae of detail and Particularities the main drift of which has been already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the law courts the so-called financial law in so far as it requires the assent of the estates is really a government affair it is only improperly called a law in the general sense of embracing a wide indeed the whole

range of the external means of government the finances deal with what in their Nature are only particular needs ever newly recurring even if they touch on the sum total of such needs if the main part of the requirement were as it very likely is regarded as permanent the provision for it would have more the nature of a law but to be a law it would have to be made once for all and not be made yearly or every few years afresh the part which varies according to time And circumstances concerns in reality the smallest part

of the amount and the provisions with regard to it have even less the character of a law and yet it is and may be only this slight variable part which is matter of dispute and can be subjected to a varying yearly estimate it is this last then which falsely bears the high sounding name of the grant of the budget I.e of the whole of the finances a law for one year and made each year has even to the plain man something palpably absurd for he distinguishes the essential and developed universal as content of a true

law from the reflectional universality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many to give the name of a law to the annual fixing of financial requirements only Serves with the presupposed separation of legislative from executive to keep up the illusion of that separation having real existence and to conceal the fact that the legislative power when it makes a decree about finance is really engaged with strict executive business but the importance attached to the power of from time to time granting supply On the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a check

on the government and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence this importance is in one way rather plausible than real the financial measures necessary for the state's subsistence cannot be made conditional on any other circumstances nor can the state's subsistence be put yearly in doubt it would be a parallel absurdity if the Government were for instance to grant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a limited time merely and thus by the threat of suspending the activity of such an institution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage reserve for itself a means of

coercing private individuals then again the pictures of a condition of affairs in which it might be useful and necessary to have in hand means of compulsion Are partly based on the false conception of a contract between rulers and ruled and partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence in spirit between these two parties as would may constitution and government quite out of the question if we suppose the empty possibility of getting help by such compulsive means brought into existence such hope would rather be the derangement and dissolution of the state In which there would no

longer be a government but only parties and the violence and depression of one party would only be helped away by the other to fit together the several parts of the state into a constitution after the fashion of mere understanding i.e to adjust within it the machinery of a balance of powers external to each other is to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is 545 the final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality as a single nation marked by physical conditions as a single individual it is exclusive against other like individuals

in their mutual relations waywardness and chance have a place for each person in the aggregate is autonomous the universal of law is only postulated Between them and not actually existent this independence of a central authority reduces disputes between them to terms of mutual violence a state of war to meet which the general estate in the community assumes the particular function of maintaining the state's independence against other states and becomes the estate of bravery 546 this state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its individuality an Individuality that goes even to abstract negativity country

and fatherland then appear as the power by which the particular independence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence of possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity as the power which procures the maintenance of the general substance by the patriotic sacrifice on the part of These individuals of this natural and particular existence so making nugatory the nugatoriness that confronts it beta external public law 547 in the game of war the independence of states is at stake in one case the result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities and

by peace conventions supposed to be Forever both this general recognition and the special claims of nations one on another are settled and fixed external state rights rest partly on these positive treaties but to that extent contain only rights falling short of true actuality partly on so-called international law the general principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the several states it thus restricts their otherwise Unchecked action against one another in such a way that the possibility of peace is left and distinguishes individuals as private persons non-belligerents from the state in general international law rests on

social usage gamma universal history 548 as the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under natural Conditions it admits on this nature side the influence of geographical and climatic qualities it is in time and as regards its range and scope has essentially a particular principle on the lines of which it must run through a development of its consciousness and its actuality it has in short a history of its own but as a restricted mind its Independence is something secondary it passes into universal world history the events of which exhibit the dialectic

of the several national minds the judgment of the world 549 this movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance the deed by which the absolute final aim of the world is realized in it and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and self-consciousness It is thus the revelation and actuality of its essential and completed essence whereby it becomes to the outward eye a universal spirit a world mind as this development is in time and in real existence as it is a history it's several stages and steps are the national minds each of which as

single and endued by nature with a specific character is appointed to occupy only one grade And accomplish one task in the whole deed the presupposition that history has an essential and actual end from the principles of which certain characteristic results logically flow is called an a priori view of it and philosophy is reproached with a priori history writing on this point and on history writing in general this note must go into further detail That history and above all universal history is founded on an essential and actual aim which actually is and will be realized in

it the plan of providence that in short there is reason in history must be decided on strictly philosophical ground and thus shown to be essentially and in fact necessary to presuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed conceptions or thoughts are arbitrarily adopted and when a determined attempt is made to Force events and actions into conformity with such conceptions for such a priori methods of treatment of the present day however those are chiefly to blame who profess to be purely historical and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to raise their voice against

the habit of philosophizing first in general and then in history philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbor for it is an enemy of all Arbitrariness and hasty suggestions such a priori history writing has sometimes burst out in quarters where one would least have expected it especially on the philological side and in germany more than in france and england where the art of historical writing has gone through a process of purification to a firmer and mature character fictions like that of a primitive age and its Primitive people possessed from the first of the true knowledge of

god and all the sciences of sacidotal races and when we come to minutiae of a roman epic supposed to be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of ancient rome etc have taken the place of the pragmatizing which detected psychological motives and associations there is a wide circle of persons who seem to consider it incumbent on a Learned and ingenious historian drawing from the original sources to concoct such baseless fences and form bold combinations of them from a learned rubber sheep of out of the way and trivial facts in defiance of

the best accredited history setting aside this subjective treatment of history we find what is properly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an objective purpose this is after all synonymous with what Seems to be the still more legitimate demand that the historian should proceed with impartiality this is a requirement often and especially made on the history of philosophy where it is insisted there should be no pre-possession in favor of an idea or opinion just as a judge should have no special sympathy for one of the contending parties In the case of the judge

it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office ill and foolishly if he had not an interest and an exclusive interest in justice if he had not that for his aim and one's sole aim or if he declined to judge at all this requirement which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for justice and there is no difficulty here in Distinguishing it from subjective partiality but in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian this self-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear and rejects both kinds of interest it

demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite aim and view by which he may sort out state and criticize events but shall narrate them exactly in the Casual mode he finds them in their incoherent and unintelligent particularity now it is at least admitted that a history must have an object e.g rome and its fortunes or the decline of the grandeur of the roman empire but little reflection is needed to discover that this is the presupposed end which lies at the basis of the events themselves as of the critical examination into Their comparative importance

i.e their nearer or more remote relation to it a history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbecile mental divergation not as good as a fairy tale for even children expect a motif in their stories a purpose at least dimly surmisable with which events and actions are put in relation in the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state and Preserve itself as such a nation with no state formation a mere nation has strictly speaking no history like the nations which existed before the rise of states and others

which still exist in a condition of savagery what happens to a nation and takes place within it has its essential significance in relation to the state whereas the mere particularities of individuals are at the greatest distance From the true object of history it is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its imprint in the character of its celebrated individuals and even their particularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which the collective light still plays in fainter colors i even such singularities as a petty occurrence a word express not a

subjective particularity but an age a nation a civilization in striking Portraiture and brevity and to select such trifles shows the hand of historian of genius but on the other hand the main mass of singularities is a futile and useless mass by the painstaking accumulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed and obscured the essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is always contained in the great events It was a correct instinct which sought to banish such portraiture of the particular and the gleaning of insignificant traits into the novel as in the

celebrated romances of walter scott etc where the picture presents an unessential aspect of life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it with an unessential material such as the romance takes from private events and subjective passions But to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the persons in it and in the interest of so-called truth we them into the picture of general interests is not only against taste and judgment but violates the principles of objective truth the only truth for mind is the substantial and underlying essence and not the trivialities of external

existence and contingency It is therefore completely indifferent whether such insignificances are duly vouched for by documents or as in the romance invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that name and circumstances the point of interest of biography to say a word on that here appears to run directly counter to any universal scope and aim but biography 2 has for its background the historical world with which the Individual is intimately bound up even purely personal originality the freak of humor etc suggests by illusion that central reality and has its interest heightened by the

suggestion the mere play of sentiment on the contrary has another ground and interest and history the requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy and also we may add to the history of religion first in general and secondly To church history generally implies an even more decided bar against presupposition of any objective aim as the state was already called the point to which in political history criticism had to refer all events so here the truth must be the object to which the several deeds and events of the spirit would have to be referred what

is actually done is rather to make the contrary presupposition Histories with such an object as religion or philosophy are understood to have only subjective aims for their theme i.e only opinions and mere ideas not an essential and realized object like the truth and that with the mere excuse that there is no truth on this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as only a partiality of the usual sort A partiality for opinion and mere ideas which all alike have no stuff in them and are all treated as indifferent in that way historical truth means but correctness

an accurate report of externals without critical treatment save as regards this correctness admitting in this case only qualitative and quantitative judgments no judgments of necessity or notion but really if rome or the german empire etc are an actual and genuine object of Political history and the aim to which the phenomena are to be related and by which they are to be judged then in universal history the genuine spirit the consciousness of it and of its essence is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme and an aim to which all other

phenomena are essentially and actually subservient only therefore through their relationship to it i.e through the judgment in which they Are subsumed under it while it inherits in them have they their value and even their existence it is the spirit which not merely broods over history as over the waters but lives in it and is alone its principle of movement and in the path of that spirit liberty i.e a development determined by the notion of spirit is the guiding principle and only its notion its final aim i.e truth For spirit is consciousness such a doctrine or

in other words that reason is in history will be partly at least a plausible faith partly it is a cognition of philosophy 550 this liberation of mind in which it proceeds to come to itself and to realize its truth and the business of so doing is the supreme right the absolute law the self-consciousness of a particular Nation is a vehicle for the contemporary development of the collective spirit in its actual existence it is the objective actuality in which that spirit for the time invests its will against this absolute will the other particular natural minds have

no rights that nation dominates the world but yet the universal will steps onward over its property for the time being as over a special grade And then delivers it over to its chance and doom to such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action and therefore as a work of individuals these individuals as regards the substantial issue of their labor are instruments and their subjectivity which is what is peculiar to them is the empty form of activity what they personally have gained Therefore through the individual share they took in the substantial business prepared

and appointed independently of them is a formal universality or subjective mental idea fame which is their reward 552 the national spirit contains nature necessity and stands in eternal existence The ethical substance potentially infinite is actually a particular and limited substance on its subjective side it labors under contingency in the shape of its unreflective natural usages and its content is presented to it as something existing in time and tied to an external nature and external world the spirit however which thinks in this moral organism overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to It as national

spirit in its state and the state's temporal interests in the system of laws and usages it rises to apprehend itself in its essentiality such apprehension however still has the imminent limitedness of the national spirit but the spirit which thinks in universal history stripping off at the same time those limitations of the several national minds and its own temporal Restrictions lays hold of its concrete universality and rises to apprehend the absolute mind as the eternally actual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom while the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only ministering

to its revelation and the vessels of its honor the strictly technical aspects of the mind's elevation to god have been spoken of in the introduction to the logic As regards the starting point of that elevation kant has on the whole adopted the most correct when he treats belief in god as proceeding from the practical reason but that starting point contains the material or content which constitutes the content of the notion of god but the true concrete material is neither being as in the cosmological nor mere action by design as in the physical theological proof But

the mind the absolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason i.e the self-determining and self-realizing notion itself liberty that the elevation of subjective mind to god which these considerations give is by can't again deposed to a postulate amir ort is the peculiar perversity formerly noticed of calmly and simply reinstating As true and valid that very antithesis of finitude the supersession of which into truth is the essence of that elevation as regards the mediation which as it has been already shown that elevation to god really involves the point specially calling for note is the moment

of negation through which the essential content of the starting point is purged of its finitude so as to come forth free This factor abstract in the formal treatment of logic now gets its most concrete interpretation the finite from which the start is now made is the real ethical self-consciousness the negation through which that consciousness raises its spirit to truth is the purification actually accomplished in the ethical world whereby its conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed From the selfishness of desire genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life religion

is that life rising to think i.e becoming aware of the free universality of its concrete essence only from the moral life and by the moral life is the idea of god seen to be free spirit outside the ethical spirit therefore it is vain to seek for true religion and religiosity But as is the case with all speculative process this development of one thing out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated by and here in mind known as its truth here then

is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations between the state and religion and in doing so to elucidate the Terminology which is familiar and current on that topic it is evident and apparent from what has preceded that moral life is the state retracted into its inner heart and substance while the state is the organization and actualization of moral life and that religion is the very substance of the moral life itself and of the state at this rate the state rests on the Ethical sentiment and that on the religious if religion then is

the consciousness of absolute truth then whatever is to rank as right and justice as law and duty i.e as true in the world of free will can be so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth as it is subsumed under it and is its sequel but if the truly moral life is to be a sequel of religion then perforce religion must have the Genuine content i.e the idea of god it knows must be the true and real the ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelling in self-consciousness and it is actually present in

a nation and in its individual members this self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical actuality and bringing its truth to consciousness has in its faith and in its conscience Only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual actuality the two are inseparable there cannot be two kinds of conscience one religious and another ethical differing from the former in body and value of truth but in point of form i.e for thought and knowledge and religion and ethical life belong to intelligence and our thinking and knowing The body of religious truth as the pure self-subsisting and

therefore supreme truth exercises a sanction over the moral life which lies in empirical actuality thus for self-consciousness religion is the basis of moral life and of the state it has been the monstrous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as separable from one another and even as mutually indifferent The view taken of the relationship of religion and the state has been that whereas the state had an independent existence of its own springing from some force and power religion was a later addition something desirable perhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks but purely

subjective in individuals or it may be religion is treated as something without effect on the moral life of the state I.e its reasonable law and constitution which are based on the ground of their own as the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated it may be worthwhile to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion it is primarily a point of form the attitude which self-consciousness takes to the body of truth so long as this body of truth is the very substance or indwelling spirit of Self-consciousness in its actuality then self-consciousness

in this content has the certainty of itself and is free but if this present self-consciousness is lacking then there may be created in point of form a condition of spiritual slavery even though the implicit content of religion is absolute spirit this great difference to cite a specific case comes out within the christian religion Itself even though here it is not the nature element in which the idea of god is embodied and though nothing of the sort even enters as a factor into its central dogma and soul theme of a god who is known in spirit

and in truth and yet in catholicism this spirit of all truth is in actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit and first of all God is in the host presented to religious adoration as an external thing in the lutheran church on the contrary the host as such is not at first consecrated but in the moment of enjoyment i.e in the annihilation of its externality and in the act of faith i.e in the free self-certain spirit only then is it consecrated and exalted to be present god from that first and supreme status of externalization

flows every other phase Of externality of bondage non-spirituality and superstition it leads to a laity receiving its knowledge of divine truth as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without and from another order which order again does not get possession of that knowledge in a spiritual way only but to that end essentially requires an external consecration It leads to the non-spiritual style of praying partly as mere moving of the lips partly in the way that the subject foregoes his right of directly addressing god and praise others to pray addressing his devotion to

miracle-working images even to bones and expecting miracles from them it leads generally to justification by external works A merit which is supposed to be gained by acts and even to be capable of being transferred to others all this binds the spirit under an externalism by which the very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at its source and law and justice morality and conscience responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root along with this principle of spiritual Bondage and these applications of it in the religious life there can only go in the legislative and constitutional

system illegal and moral bondage and a state of lawlessness and immorality in political life catholicism has been loudly praised and is still often praised logically enough as the one religion which secures the stability of governments but in reality this applies only to governments which are bound up with the Institutions founded on the bondage of the spirit of that spirit which should have legal and moral liberty i.e with institutions that embody injustice and with a morally corrupt and barbaric state of society but these governments are not aware that in fanaticism they have a terrible power which

does not rise in hostility against them only so long as and only on condition That they remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and immorality but in mind there is a very different power available against that externalism and dismemberment induced by a false religion mind collects itself into its inward free actuality philosophy awakes in the spirit of governments and nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially and actually right and reasonable in the real world It was well to call these products of thought and in a special sense philosophy the wisdom of the world for

thought makes the spirit's truth an actual present leads it into the real world and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self thus set free the content of religion assumes quite another shape so long as the form i.e our consciousness and subjectivity Lacked liberty it followed necessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not imminent in the ethical principles which religion embodies and these principles were set at such a distance as to seem to have true being only as negative to actual self-consciousness in this unreality ethical content gets the name of holiness but once

the divine spirit introduces itself into actuality And actuality emancipates itself to spirit then what in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the actuality of moral life instead of the vow of chastity marriage now ranks as the ethical relation and therefore as the highest on this side of humanity stands the family instead of the vow of poverty modeled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away Goods to the poor i.e whosoever enriches them is the precept of action to acquire goods through one's own intelligence and industry of honesty in

commercial dealing and in the use of property in short moral life in the socio-economic sphere and instead of the vow of obedience true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state And obedience which is itself the true freedom because the state is a self-possessed self-realizing reason in short moral life in the state thus and thus only can law and morality exist the precept of religion give to caesar what is seizes and to god what is god's is not enough the question is to settle what is caesar's what belongs to the

secular Authority and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than the ecclesiastical authority have claimed almost everything as their own the divine spirit must interpenetrate the entire secular life whereby wisdom is concrete within it and it carries the terms of its own justification but that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical organizations It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a celibate order the morality of economic and industrial action against the sanctity of poverty and its indolence the morality of an obedience dedicated to the law of the state as against

the sanctity of an obedience from which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved with the growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit's Essential liberty there sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of unfreedom it is no use to organize political laws and arrangements on principles of equity and reason so long as in religion the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned a free state and a slavish religion are incompatible it is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them separate spheres under the Impression that

their diverse natures will maintain an attitude of tranquility one to another and not break out in contradiction and battle principles of civil freedom can be but abstract and superficial and political institutions deduced from them must be if taken alone untenable so long as those principles in their wisdom mistake religion so much as not to know that the maxims of the reason in actuality Have their last and supreme sanction in the religious conscience in subsumption under the consciousness of absolute truth let us suppose even that no matter how a code of law should arise so to

speak a priori founded on principles of reason but in contradiction with an established religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom still as the duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual Members of the government and of the various classes of the administrative personnel it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty assumption that the individuals will act only according to the letter or meaning of the law and not in the spirit of their religion where their inmost conscience and supreme obligation lies opposed to what religion pronounces holy the laws

appear something made by human Hands even though backed by penalties and externally introduced they could offer no lasting resistance to the contradiction and attacks of the religious spirit such laws however sound their provisions may be thus founder on the conscience whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and refuses to sanction them It is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter a corrupt moral organization by offering its political constitution and code of laws without changing the religion to make a revolution without having made a reformation to suppose that a political constitution

opposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and its sanctities and that stability could be procured for The laws by external guarantees eg so-called chambers and the power given them to fix the budget and etc at best it is only a temporary expedient when it is obviously too great a task to descend into the depths of the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth to seek to separate law and justice from religion those guarantees are but rotten bulwarks against the consciences of the persons Charged with administering

the laws among which laws these guarantees are included it is indeed the height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the secular code the religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing profane the perception had dawned upon plato with great clearness of the gulf which in his day had commenced to divide the established religion and the political Constitution on one hand from those deeper requirements which on the other hand were made upon religion and politics by liberty which had learned to recognize its inner life plato gets hold of the

thought that a genuine constitution and a sound political life have their deeper foundation on the idea on the essentially and actually universal and genuine principles of eternal righteousness Now to see and ascertain what these are is certainly the function and the business of philosophy it is from this point of view that plato breaks out into the celebrated or notorious passage where he makes socrates emphatically state that philosophy and political power must coincide that the idea must be regent if the distress of nations is to see its end what plato thus definitely set before His mind

was that the idea which implicitly indeed is the free self-determining thought could not get into consciousness save only in the form of a thought that the substance of the thought could only be true when set forth as a universal and as such brought to consciousness under its most abstract form to compare the platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point of View from which the relationship of state and religion is here regarded the notional differences on which everything turns must be recalled to mind the first of these is that in natural things their substance

or genus is different from their existence in which that substance is as subject further that the subjective existence of the genus is distinct from that which it gets when specially set in relief as Genus or to put it simply as the universal in a mental concept or idea this additional individuality the soil on which the universal and underlying principle freely and expressly exists is the intellectual and thinking self in the case of natural things their truth and reality does not get the form of universality and essentiality through themselves and their individuality is not itself The

form the form is only found in subjective thinking which in philosophy gives that universal truth and reality an existence of its own in man's case it is otherwise his truth and reality is the free mind itself and it comes to existence in his self-consciousness this absolute nucleus of man mind intrinsically concrete Is just this to have the form to have thinking itself for a content to the height of the thinking consciousness of this principle aristotle ascended in his notion of the antelopy of thought thus surmounting the platonic idea the genus or essential being but thought

always and that on account of this very principle contains the immediate self-subsistence Of subjectivity no less than it contains universality the genuine idea of the intrinsically concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms subjective consciousness as under the other universality and in the one as in the other it is the same substantial content under the subjective form however fall feeling intuition pictorial representation And it is in fact necessary that in point of time the consciousness of the absolute idea should be first reached and apprehended in this form in other words it

must exist in its immediate reality as religion earlier than it does as philosophy philosophy is a later development from this basis just as greek philosophy itself is later than greek religion and in fact reaches its completion by catching and Comprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit which first manifests itself in religion but greek philosophy could set itself up only in opposition to greek religion the unity of thought and the substantiality of the idea could take up none but a hostile attitude to an imaginative polytheism and to the gladsome and frivolous humors of

its poetic creations the form in its infinite truth the Subjectivity of mind broke forth at first only as a subjective free thinking which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself and thus this underlying principle was not yet apprehended as absolute mind thus religion might appear as first purified only through philosophy through pure self-existent thought but the form pervading this underlying principle The form which philosophy attacked was that creative imagination political power which is developed similarly but earlier than philosophy from religion exhibits the one-sidedness which in the actual world may infect its implicitly true idea

as demoralization plato in common with all his thinking contemporaries perceived this demoralization of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle He set in relief accordingly the underlying principle of the state but could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of subjectivity which still escaped his intelligence his state is therefore on its own showing wanting in subjective liberty the truth which should be imminent in the state should knit it together and control it he for these reasons got hold of only the form of thought out Truth of philosophy and hence he makes

that utterance that so long as philosophers do not rule in the states or those who are now called kings and rulers do not soundly and comprehensively philosophize so long neither the state nor the race of men can be liberated from evils so long will the idea of the political constitution fall short of possibility and not see the light of the sun it was not safe to plato to go on so far As to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world and hold sway in political life so long the

genuine principle of the state had not come into actuality but so long too this principle could not emerge even in thought nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea of the state the idea of the substantial moral life with which is identical the liberty of an independent self-consciousness Only in the principle of mind which is aware of its own essence is implicitly an absolute liberty and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power religion and the principles of philosophy coinciding in one and for accomplishing

the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mind of the state with religious conscience as well as with the philosophical Consciousness self-realizing subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial universality hence religion as such and the state as such both as forms in which the principle exists each contained the absolute truth so that the truth in its philosophic phase is after all only in one of its forms but even religion as it grows and Expands lets other aspects of the idea of humanity grow and expand also as it is left therefore behind in its

first immediate and so also one-sided phase religion may or rather must appear in its existence degraded to sensuous externality and thus in the sequel become an influence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life still the principle has in it the infinite elasticity of the absolute form So as to overcome this depraving of the form determination and of the content by these means and to bring about the reconciliation of the spirit in itself thus ultimately in the protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of the ethical conscience come to be one of

the same the free spirit learning to see itself in its reasonableness and truth in the protestant state the constitution And the code as well as their several applications embody the principle and the development of the moral life which proceeds and can only proceed from the truth of religion when reinstated in its original principle and in that way as such first become actual the moral life of the state and the religious spirituality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength section 3 absolute mind 553 the notion of mind has its reality in the mind if

this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the absolute idea then the necessary aspect is that the implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality liberated to its notion if that actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it the subjective and the objective spirit Are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of reality or existence rises to maturity 554 the absolute mind while it is self-centered identity is always also identity returning and ever returned into itself if it is the one and universal substance it is

so as a spirit discerning itself into a self and a consciousness for which it is as Substance religion as this supreme sphere may be in general designated if it has on one hand to be studied as issuing from the subject and having its home in the subject must no less be regarded as objectively issuing from the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community that here as always belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or knowledge but rather to a sort of Knowledge and that belief is only a particular form of the latter

has been remarked already if nowadays there is so little consciousness of god and his objective essence is so little dwelt upon while people speak so much more of the subjective side of religion i.e of god's indwelling in us and if that and not the truth as such is called for in this there is at least the correct Principle that god must be apprehended as spirit in his community 555 the subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially and intrinsically a process the immediate and substantial unity of which is the belief in the witness of the

spirit as the certainty of objective truth belief at once this immediate unity and containing it as a reciprocal dependence Of these different terms has in devotion the implicit or more explicit act of worship cultures passed over into the process of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation the process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation and of gaining its concrete determination viz Reconciliation the actuality of the spirit subsection a art 556 as this consciousness of the absolute first takes shape its immediacy produces the factor of finitude in art on one hand that is

it breaks up into a work of external common existence into the subject which produces that work and the subject which contemplates and Worships it but on the other hand it is the concrete contemplation and mental picture of implicitly absolute spirit as the ideal in this ideal or the concrete shape borne of the subjective spirit its natural immediacy which is only a sign of the idea is so transfigured by the informing spirit in order to express the idea that the figure shows it and it alone the shape or form of beauty 557 the sensuous externality attaching

to the beautiful the form of immediacy as such at the same time qualifies what it embodies and the god of art has with his spirituality at the same time the stump upon him of a natural medium or natural phase of existence he contains the so-called unity of nature and spirit I.e the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form hence not the spiritual unity in which the natural would be put only as ideal as superseded in spirit and the spiritual content would be only in self-relation it is not the absolute spirit which enters this consciousness on the

subjective side the community has of course an ethical life aware as it is of the spirituality of Its essence and its self-consciousness and actuality are in it elevated to substantial liberty but with the stigma of immediacy upon it the subject's liberty is only a manner of life without the infinite self-reflection and the subjective inwardness of conscience these considerations govern in their further developments the devotion and the worship in the religion of fine art 558 the objects of contemplation it has to produce art requires not only an external given material under which are also included subjective

images and ideas but for the expression of spiritual truth must use the given forms of nature with the significance which art must divine and possess of all such forms the human is the Highest and the true because only in it can the spirit have its cooperative and thus its visible expression this disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art a point on which it is impossible to come to an understanding while a distinction is left thus abstract in other words so long as the natural is only taken in its externality not as

the characteristic meaningful Nature form which is significant of spirit 559 in such single shapes the absolute mind cannot be made explicit in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose implicit universality when steps are taken to specify its fullness in detail breaks up into an indeterminate polytheism with the essential restrictedness of its Content beauty in general goes no further than a penetration of the vision or image by the spiritual principle something formal so that the thought embodied or the idea can like the material which it uses to work in be as

the most diverse and unessential kind and still the work be something beautiful and a work of art 560. the one-sidedness of immediacy on the Part of the ideal involves the opposite one-sidedness that it is something made by the artist the subject or agent is the mere technical activity and the work of art is only then an expression of the god when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it and the net power of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the world without admixture and unspotted from its contingency But as liberty only goes

as far as there is thought the action inspired with the fullness of this indwelling power the artist's enthusiasm is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive the artistic production has on its part the form of natural immediacy it belongs to the genius or particular endowment of the artist and is at the same time a labor Concerned with technical cleverness and mechanical externalities the work of art therefore is just as much a work due to free option and the artist is the master of the god five six one in work so inspired

the reconciliation appears so obvious in its initial stage that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness which is thus self-confident and of good cheer without the depths and without the Sense of its antithesis to the absolute essence on the further side of the perfection which is reached in such reconciliation in the beauty of classical art lies the art of sublimity symbolic art in which the figuration suitable to the idea is not yet found and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it and

yet all the while toiling to work Itself into it the meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reached the infinite form is not yet known not yet conscious of itself as free spirit the artist's theme only is as the abstract god of pure thought or an effort towards him a restless and unappeased effort which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal 562 in another way the idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are incompatible and that is where the infinite form subjectivity is not as in

the first extreme a mere superficial personality but it's in most depth and god is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form but is only finding himself in himself And thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty it presents him as only condescending to appearance and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself thus the external can here appear as Contingent

towards its significance the philosophy of religion has to discover the logical necessity in the progress by which the being known as the absolute assumes fuller and firmer features it has to note what particular feature the kind of cultist corresponds and then to see how the secular self-consciousness the consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man In short how the nature of a nation's moral life the principle of its law of its actual liberty and of its constitution as well as of its art and science corresponds to the principle which constitutes the substance of a

religion that all these elements of a nation's actuality constitute one systematic totality that one spirit creates and informs them is a truth on which follows the further Truth that the history of religions coincides with the world history as regards the close connection of art with the various religions it may be specially noted that beautiful art can only belong to those religions in which the spiritual principle though concrete and intrinsically free is not yet absolute in religions where the idea has not yet been revealed and known in its free character Though the craving for art is

felt in order to bring in imaginative visibility to consciousness the idea of the supreme being and though art is the soul organ in which the abstract and radically indistinct content a mixture from natural and spiritual sources can try to bring itself to consciousness still this art is defective its form is defective because its Subject matter and theme is so for the defect in subject matter comes from the form not being imminent in it the representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and solidity but the principle it embodies is itself solid and dull and

hence has not the power freely to transmute the external to significance and shape beautiful art on the contrary has for Its condition the self-consciousness of the free spirit the consciousness that compared with it the natural and sensuous has no standing of its own it makes the natural wholly into the mere expression of spirit which is thus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alone but with a further and deeper study we see that the advent of art in a religion still in the bonds of sensuous Externality shows that such religion is on the decline

at the very time it seems to give religion the supreme glorification expression and brilliancy it has lifted the religion away over its limitation in the sublime divinity to which the work of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the spectator Find themselves at home with their personal sense and feeling satisfied and liberated to them the vision and the consciousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and attained beautiful art from its side has thus performed the same service as philosophy it has purified the spirit from its thraldom the older religion in which the need

of fine art and just for that reason is First generated looks up in its principle to an other world which is sensuous and unmeaning the images adored by its devotees are hideous idols regarded as wonder working talismans which point to the unspiritual objectivity of that other world and bones perform a similar or even a better service than such images but even fine art is only a grade of liberation not the supreme liberation Itself the genuine objectivity which is only in the medium of thought the medium in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit

and where the liberation is accompanied with reverence is still absent in the sensuous beauty of the work of art still more in that external unbeautiful sensuousness 563 beautiful art like the religion peculiar to it has its future in true religion The restricted value of the idea passes utterly and naturally into the universality identical with the infinite form the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge into an existence which is itself knowledge into revelation thus the principle which gives the idea its content is that it embody free intelligence

And as absolute spirit it is for the spirit subsection b revealed religion 564 it lies essentially in the notion of religion the religion i.e whose content is absolute mind that it be revealed and what is more revealed by god knowledge the principle by which the substance is mind is a self-determining Principle as infinite self-realizing form it therefore is manifestation out and out the spirit is only spirit insofar as it is for the spirit and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract elements of its being but itself the old

conception due to a one-sided survey of human life of nemesis Which made the divinity and its action in the world only a leveling power dashing to pieces everything high and great was confronted by plato and aristotle with the doctrine that god is not envious the same answer may be given to the modern assertions that man cannot ascertain god these assertions and more than assertions they are not Are the more illogical because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed for according to them it would rather be the religion in which nothing of god

was revealed in which he had not revealed himself and those belonging to it would be the heathen who know not god if the word god is taken in earnest in religion at all it is from him the theme and center of Religion that the method of divine knowledge may and must begin and if self-revelation is refused him then the only thing left to constitute his nature would be to ascribe envy to him but clearly if the word mind is to have a meaning it implies the revelation of him if we recollect how intricate is the

knowledge of the divine mind for those who are not content with the homely Pictures of faith but proceed to thought at first only rationalizing reflection but afterwards as in duty bound to speculative comprehension it may almost create surprise that so many and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these ideas have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof and nothing serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man Knows nothing of god to know what god as spirit is to apprehend this accurately

and distinctly in sorts requires careful and thorough speculation it includes in its forefront the propositions god is god only so far as he knows himself his self-knowledge is further his self-consciousness in man And man's knowledge of god which proceeds to man's self-knowledge in god see the profound elucidation of these propositions in the work from which they are taken aphorisms on knowing and not knowing etc by cfg berlin 1829 565 when the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded god is in point of content The essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit while

in point of form he is first of all presented to consciousness as a mental representation this quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content on one hand a separate being making them presuppositions towards each other and phenomena which succeed each other their relationship makes a series of Events according to finite reflective categories but on the other hand such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realizes one's spirit and in the devotion of worship 566 in this separating the form parts from the content and in the form the

different functions of the notion part off into special Spheres or media in each of which the absolute spirit exhibits itself alpha as eternal content abiding self-centered even in its manifestation beta as distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation which by this difference becomes the phenomenal world into which the content enters gamma As infinite return and reconciliation with the eternal being of the world it gave away the withdrawal of the eternal from the phenomenal into the unity of its fullness 567 alpha under the moment of universality the sphere of pure thought or the abstract medium

of essence it is therefore the absolute spirit which is at first the presupposed Principle not however staying aloof and inert but as underlying and essential power under the reflective category of causality creator of heaven and earth but yet in this eternal sphere rather only begetting himself as his son with whom though different he still remains in original identity just as again this differentiation of him from the universal essence eternally supersedes itself And through this mediating of a self-superseding mediation the first substance is essentially as concrete individuality and subjectivity is the spirit 568 peter under the

moment of particularity or of judgment it is this concrete eternal being which is presupposed its movement is the creation of the Phenomenal world the eternal moment of mediation of the only son divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds on one hand is heaven and earth the elemental and the concrete nature on the other hand standing in action and reaction with such nature the spirit which therefore is finite that spirit as the extreme of inherent negativity completes its independence Till it becomes wickedness and is that extreme through its connection with the confronting nature

and through its own naturalness thereby investing it yet amid that naturalness it is when it thinks directed towards the eternal though for that reason only standing to it in an external connection 569 gamma under the moment of individuality as Such of subjectivity and the notion itself in which the contrast of universal and particular has sunk to its identical ground the place of presupposition one is taken by the universal substance as actualized out of its abstraction into an individual self-consciousness this individual who as such is identified with the essence in the eternal sphere he is called

the sun Is transplanted into the world of time and in him wickedness is implicitly overcome further this immediate and thus sensuous existence of the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judgment and expiring in the pain of negativity in which he as infinite subjectivity keeps himself unchanged and thus as absolute return from that negativity and as universal unity of Universal and individual essentiality has realized his being as the idea of the spirit eternal but alive and present in the world 570 2 this objective totality of the divine man who is the idea of the

spirit is the implicit presupposition for the finite immediacy of the single subject for such subject therefore it is at first and other an object of Contemplating vision but the vision of implicit truth through which witness of the spirit in him he on account of his immediate nature at first characterized himself as naught and wicked but secondly after the example of his truth by means of the faith on the unity in that example implicitly accomplished of universal and individual essence he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy his natural man and self-will To close

himself in unity with that example who is his implicit life in the pain of negativity and thus to know himself made one with the essential being thus the being of beings three through this mediation brings about its own indwelling in self-consciousness and is the actual presence of the essential and self-subsisting spirit who is all in all 571 These three syllogisms constituting the one syllogism of the absolute self-mediation of spirit are the revelation of that spirit whose life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought from this its separation into parts with

a temporal and external sequence the unfolding of the mediation contracts itself in the result where the spirit closes in unity with itself Not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling but even to thought in the imminent simplicity of thought the unfolding still has its expansion yet is all the while known as an indivisible coherence of the universal simple and eternal spirit in itself in this form of truth truth is the object of philosophy if the result the realized spirit in which all mediation has superseded Itself is taken in a merely formal contentless sense

so that the spirit is not also at the same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness knowing itself in itself is absolute irony irony which can make every objective reality naught and vain Is itself the emptiness and vanity which from itself and therefore by chance and its own good pleasure gives itself direction and content remains master over it is not bound by it and with the assertion that it stands on the very summit of religion and philosophy falls back rather into the vanity of willfulness It

is only in proportion as the pure infinite form the self-centered manifestation throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity in which it is the vanity of thought that it is the free thought which has its infinite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual content and has that content as an object in which it is also free thinking so far is only the formal aspect of the absolute content Subsection c philosophy 572 this science is the unity of art and religion whereas the vision method of art external in point of form is but subjective production and

shivers the substantial content into many separate shapes whereas religion with its separation into parts opens it out in mental Picture and mediates what is thus opened out philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a total but even unifies them into the simple spiritual vision and then in that raises them to self-conscious thought such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity cognized by thought of art and religion in which the diverse elements in the Content are cognized as necessary and this necessary as free 573 philosophy thus characterizes itself as a cognition of the necessity in the

content of the absolute picture idea as also of the necessity in the two forms on one hand immediate vision and its poetry and the objective and external revelation presupposed by representation on the other hand first the subjective Retreat inwards then the subjective movement of faith and its final identification with the presupposed object this cognition is thus the recognition of this content and its form it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms elevation of them into the absolute form which determines itself to content remains identical with it and is in that the cognition of

that essential and actual Necessity this movement which philosophy is finds itself already accomplished when at the close it seizes its own notion i.e only looks back on its knowledge here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the reciprocal relations of philosophy and religion the whole question turns entirely on the difference of the forms of speculative Thought from the forms of mental representation and reflecting intellect but it is the whole cycle of philosophy and of logic in particular which has not merely taught and made known this difference but also criticized

it or rather has let its nature develop and judge itself by these very categories it is only by an insight into the value of these forms that the true and needful conviction can be gained that the content of religion and philosophy is The same leaving out of course the further details of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of religion but religion is the truth for all men faith rests on the witness of the spirit which as witnessing is the spirit in man this witness the underlying essence in all humanity takes when

driven to expound itself its first definite form under those acquired Habits of thought which his secular consciousness and intellect otherwise employs in this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and conditions of finitude in general this does not prevent the spirit even in employing sensuous ideas and finite categories of thought from retaining its content which as religion is essentially speculative with the tenacity which does violence to Them and acts inconsistently towards them by this inconsistency it corrects their defects nothing easier therefore for the rationalist than to point out contradictions in the exposition of the

faith and then to prepare triumphs for its principle of formal identity if the spirit yields to this finite reflection which has usurped the title of reason and philosophy Rationalism it strips religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality naught religion in that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such reason and philosophy and treating them as enemies but it is another thing when religion sets us off against comprehending reason and against philosophy in general especially against a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculative and so Religious such an opposition proceeds

from failure to appreciate the difference indicated and the value of spiritual form in general and particularly of the logical form or to be more precise still from failure to note the distinction of the content which may be in both the same from these forms it is on the ground of form that philosophy has been reproached and Accused by the religious party just as conversely its speculative content has brought the same charges upon it from a self-styled philosophy and from a pitiless orthodoxy it had too little of god in it for the former too much for

the latter the charge of atheism which often used to be brought against philosophy that it has too little of god has grown rare the more widespread grows the charge of Pantheism that it has too much of him so much so that it is treated not so much as an imputation but as a proved fact or a sheer fact which needs no proof piety in particular which with its pious heirs of superiority fancies itself free to dispense with proof goes hand in hand with empty rationalism which means to be so much opposed to it though both

propose really on the same habit of mind In the wanton assertion almost as if it merely mentioned a notorious fact that philosophy is the all one doctrine or pantheism it must be said that it was more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a philosophical system eg spinozism of atheism than of pantheism though the former imputation at the first glance looks more cruel and insidious The imputation of atheism presupposes a definite idea of a full and real god and arises because the popular idea does not detect in the philosophical notion the peculiar

form to which it is attached philosophy indeed can recognize its own forms in the categories of religious consciousness and even its own teaching in the doctrine of religion which therefore it does not disparage But the converse is not true the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of thought to itself does not comprehend itself and is therefore as it stands exclusive to impute pantheism instead of atheism to philosophy is part of the modern habit of mind of the new piety and new theology for them philosophy has too much of god so much so that if

we believe them it asserts that god is everything and Everything is god this new theology which makes religion only a subjective feeling and denies the knowledge of the divine nature thus retains nothing more than a god in general without objective characteristics without interest of its own for the concrete fulfilled notion of god it treats it only as an interest which others once had and hence treats what belongs to the Doctrine of god's concrete nature as something merely historical the indeterminate god is to be found in all religions every kind of piety that of the hindu

to asses cows or to dalai lamas that of the egyptians to the ox is always adoration of an object which with all its absurdities also contains the generic abstract god in general If this theory needs no more than such a god so as to find god in everything called religion it must at least find such a god recognized even in philosophy and can no longer accuse it of atheism the mitigation of the reproach of atheism into that of pantheism has its ground therefore in the superficial idea to which this mildness has attenuated and emptied god

as that popular idea clings to its Abstract universality from which all definite quality is excluded all such definiteness is only the non-divine the secularity of things thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality on such a presupposition even after philosophy has maintained god's absolute universality and the consequent untruth of the being of external things the hearing clings as he did before to His belief that secular things still keep their being and form all that is definite in the divine universality he thus changes that universality into what he calls the pantheistic everything is empirical things without distinction

whether higher or lower in the scale are all possess substantiality and so thus he understands philosophy Each and every secular thing is god it is only his own stupidity and the falsifications due to such misconception which generate the imagination and the allegation of such pantheism but if those who give out that a certain philosophy is pantheism are unable and unwilling to see this for it is just to see the notion that they refuse they should before everything have verified the alleged fact that any one philosopher or any one man had really Ascribed substantial or objective

and inherent reality to all things and regarded them as god that such an idea had ever come into the head of anybody but themselves this allegation i will further elucidate in this exoteric discussion and the only way to do so is to set down the evidence if we want to take so-called pantheism in its most poetical most sublime or if you will its grossest shape We must as is well known consult the oriental poets and the most copious delineations of it are found in hindu literature amongst the abundant resources open to our disposal on this

topic i select as the most authentic statement accessible the bhagavat gita and amongst its effusions prolix and reiterative ad nauseam some of the most telling passages in the tenth lesson in schlegel page 162 Krishna says of himself i am the self seated in the hearts of all beings i am the beginning and the middle and the end also of all beings i am the beaming sun amongst the shining ones and the moon among the lunar mansions amongst the vaders i am the sama veda i am mind amongst the senses i am consciousness in living beings

and i am sankara shiva among the rudras Meru among the high topped mountains the himalaya among the firmly fixed mountains among beasts i am the lord of beasts among letters i am the letter a i am the spring among the seasons i am also that which is the seed of all things there is nothing movable or immovable which can exist without me even in these totally sensuous delineations krishna And we must not suppose there is besides krishna still god or a god besides as he said before he was siva or indra so it is afterwards

said that brahma too is in him makes himself out to be not everything but only the most excellent of everything everywhere there is a distinction drawn between external unessential existences and one essential amongst them which he is Even when at the beginning of the passage he is said to be the beginning middle and end of living things this totality is distinguished from the living things themselves as single existences even such a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be called pantheism we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple empirical world

everything is reduced to a limited Number of essential existences to a polytheism but even what has been quoted shows that these very substantialities of the externally existent do not retain the independence entitling them to be named gods even shiva intra etc melt into the one krishna this reduction is more expressly made in the following scene seventh lesson page seven and following Krishna says i am the producer and the destroyer of the whole universe there is nothing else higher than myself all this is woven upon me like numbers of pearls upon a thread i am the

taste in water i am the light of the sun and the moon i am om in all the vedas i am life in all beings i am the discernment of the discerning ones i am also the strength of the strong Then he adds the whole universe deluded by these three states of mind developed from the qualities s see goodness passion darkness does not know me who am beyond them and inexhaustible for this delusion of mine even the maya is his nothing independent developed from the qualities is divine and difficult to transcend Those cross beyond this

delusion who resort to me alone then the picture gathers itself up in a simple expression at the end of many lives the man possessed of knowledge approaches me believing that vasudeva is everything such a high souled mind is very hard to find those who are deprived of knowledge by various desires approach other divinities Whichever form of deity one worships with faith from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by me but the fruit thus obtained by those of little judgment is perishable the undiscerning ones not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible essence than

which there is nothing higher think me who am unperceived to have become perceptible This all which krishna calls himself is not any more than the eliatic one and the spinosan substance the everything this everything rather the infinitely manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all these pictures but defined as the accidental without essential being of its very own but having its truth in the substance the one which as different from that accidental is alone the divine and god Hinduism however has the higher conception of brahma the pure unity of thought in itself where the

empirical everything of the world as also those proximate substantialities called gods vanish on that account colebrook and many others have described the hindu religion as at bottom a monotheism that this description is not incorrect as clear from these short citations but so little concrete is this divine Unity spiritual as its idea of god is so powerless its grip so to speak that hinduism with a monstrous inconsistency is also the maddest of polytheisms but the idolatry of the wretched hindu when he adores the ape or other creature is still a long way from that wretched fancy

of a pantheism to which everything is god and god everything hindu monotheism moreover is itself an example how little comes of mere Monotheism if the idea of god is not deeply determinate in itself for that unity if it be intrinsically abstract and therefore empty tends of itself to let whatever is concrete outside it be it as a lot of gods or as secular empirical individuals keep its independence that pantheism indeed on the shallow conception of it might with a show of logic as well be called a monotheism For if god as it says is identical

with the world then as there is only one world there would be in that pantheism only one god perhaps the empty numerical unity must be predicated of the world but such abstract predication of it has no further special interest on the contrary a mere numerical unity just means that its content is an infinite multitude and variety of finitudes But it is that delusion with the empty unity which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of pantheism it is only the picture floating in the indefinite blue of the world as one thing the all that

could ever be considered capable of combining with god only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed to teach that god is the world for if the world were taken as it is as everything as the endless lot of Empirical existence then it would hardly have been even held possible to suppose a pantheism which asserted of such stuff that it is god but to go back again to the question of fact if we want to see the consciousness of the one not as with the hindus split between the featureless unity of abstract thought on one hand

and on the other the long-winded weary Story of its particular detail but in its finest purity and sublimity we must consult the muhammadans if e.g in the excellent jalaladin rumi in particular we find the unity of the soul with the one set forth and that unity described as love this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar a transfiguration of the natural and the Spiritual in which the externalism and transitoriness of immediate nature and of empirical secular spirit is discarded and absorbed i refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic conceptions

which it is customary to call pantheistic of the philosophies to which that name is given the eliatic or spinosus it has been remarked earlier that so far are They from identifying god with the world and making him finite that in these systems this everything has no truth and that we should rather call them monotheistic or in relation to the popular idea of the world a cosmical they are most accurately called systems which apprehend the absolute only a substance of the oriental especially the muhammadan modes of envisaging god We may rather say that they represent the

absolute as the utterly universal genus which dwells in the species or existences but dwells so potently that these existences have no actual reality the fault of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind these systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one need Common to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of god and secondly of the relationship of god and the world in philosophy it is specially made out that the determination of god's nature determines his relations with the

world the reflective understanding begins by rejecting all systems and modes of conception which whether they spring from the heart imagination or speculation Express the interconnection of god and the world and in order to have god pure in faith or consciousness he is as essence parted from appearance as infinite from the finite but after this partition the conviction arises also that the appearance has a relation to the essence the finite to the infinite and so on and thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of this Relation it is in the reflective form that

the whole difficulty of the affair lies and that causes this relation to be called incomprehensible by the agnostic the close of philosophy is not the place even in a general exoteric discussion to waste a word on what a notion means but as the view taken of this relation is closely connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all imputations against it We may still add the remark that though philosophy certainly has to do with unity in general it is not however with abstract unity mere identity and the empty absolute but with concrete unity

the notion and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else that each step in its advance is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete unity and that the deepest and last expression Of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself would be judges and critics of philosophy might be recommended to familiarize themselves with these phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them at least to know so much that of these terms there are a great many and that amongst them there is great variety But they

show so little acquaintance with them and still less take trouble about it that when they hear of unity and relation ipso facto implies unity they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate unity and lose sight of the chief point of interest the special mode in which unity is qualified hence all they can say about philosophy Is that dry identity is its principle and result and that it is the system of identity sticking fast to the undigested thought of identity they have laid hands on not the concrete unity the notion and content of philosophy but rather

its reverse in the philosophical field they precede as in the physical field the physicist who also is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous Properties and matters or usually matters alone but the properties get transformed into matters also for the physicist and that these matters elements also stand in relation to one another but the question is of what kind is this relation every peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things in organic and living depends solely on the different modes of This unity but instead of ascertaining these different modes the ordinary

physicist chemist included takes up only one the most external and the worst this composition applies only it in the whole range of natural structures which he thus renders forever inexplicable the aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this Shallow identity all that those who employ this invention of their own to accuse philosophy gather from the study of god's relation to the world is that the one but only the one factor of this category of relation and that the factor of indeterminateness is identity thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception and assert falsely as

a fact that philosophy teaches the Identity of god and the world and as in their judgment either of the two the world as much as god has the same solid substantiality as the other they infer that in the philosophic idea god is composed of god and the world such then is the idea they form of pantheism and which they ascribe to philosophy unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories they import them into Philosophy where they are utterly unknown they thus infect it with the disease against which they subsequently

raise an outcry if any difficulty emerge in comprehending god's relation to the world they at once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains for them an inexplicable contradiction and that hence they must stop at the Vague conception of such relation perhaps under the more familiar names of eg omnipresence providence etc faith in their use of the term means no more than a refusal to define the conception or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem that men and classes of untrained intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness is what one expects

but when a trained intellect and an Interest for reflective study is satisfied in matters admitted to be of superior if not even of supreme interest with indefinite ideas it is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest with the subject but if those who cling to this crude rationalism were in earnest eg with god's omnipresence so far as to realize their faith thereon in a definite mental idea in what difficulties would they be Involved by their belief in the true reality of the things of sense they would hardly like as epicurus does to

let god dwell in the interspaces of things i.e in the pores of the physicists said pause being the negative something supposed to exist beside the material reality this very beside would give their pantheism its spatiality their everything conceived as the mutual Exclusion of parts in space but in ascribing to god in his relation to the world an action on and in the space thus filled on the world and in it they would endlessly split up the divine actuality into infinite materiality they would really thus have the misconception they called pantheism or the all one doctrine

only as the necessary sequel of their misconceptions of god and the world but to put that sort of thing This stale gossip of oneness or identity on the shoulders of philosophy shows such recklessness about justice and truth that it can only be explained through the difficulty of getting into the head thoughts and notions i.e not abstract unity but the many shaped modes specified if statements as to facts are put forward and the facts in question are thoughts and notions it is indispensable to get hold of their Meaning but even the fulfillment of this requirement has

been rendered superfluous now that it has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism a system of identity and all one doctrine and that the person therefore who might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a matter of common notoriety Or as prevaricating for a purpose on account of this chorus of assertions then i have believed myself obliged to speak at more length and exotically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact for exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the external apprehension of notions

as mere facts by which notions are perverted into their opposite The esoteric study of god and identity as of cognitions and notions is philosophy itself 574 this notion of philosophy is the self-thinking idea the truth aware of itself the logical system but with the signification that it is universality approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality in this way the science has gone back to Its beginning its result is the logical system but as a spiritual principle out of the presupposing judgment in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning and immediate

and thus out of the appearance which it had there it is risen into its pure principle and thus also into its proper medium 575 it is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the further Development the first appearance is formed by the syllogism which is based on the logical system as starting point with nature for the middle term which couples the mind with it the logical principle turns to nature and nature to mind nature standing between the mind and its essence sunders itself not indeed to extremes of finite abstraction nor itself to something away

From them and independent which as other than they only serves as a link between them for the syllogism is in the idea and nature is essentially defined as a transition point and negative factor and as implicitly the idea still the mediation of the notion has the external form of transition and the science of nature presents itself as the course of necessity so that it is only in the one extreme That the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation 576 in the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded that the syllogism is the

standpoint of the mind itself which as the mediating agent in the process presupposes nature and couples it with the logical principle it is the syllogism where mind reflects on itself in the idea Philosophy appears as a subjective cognition of which liberty is the aim and which is itself the way to produce it 577 the third syllogism is the idea of philosophy which has self-knowing reason the absolutely universal for its middle term a middle which divides itself into mind and nature making the former its presupposition as Process of the ideas subjective activity and the latter its

universal extreme as process of the objectively and implicitly existing idea the self-judging of the idea into its two appearances characterizes both as its the self-knowing reasons manifestations and in it there is a unification of the two aspects it is the nature of the fact the notion which causes the movement and Development yet this same movement is equally the action of cognition the eternal idea in full fruition of its essence eternally sets itself to work engenders and enjoys itself as absolute mind peter wickham was reading philosophy of mind by georg friedrich hegel for ukemi audiobooks for

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