Sudan's conflict, explained

On December 19th, 2018. . .

a revolution started to spread throughout Sudan. After decades of living under President Omar Bashir’s brutal military regime. .

. civilians pushed back. They wanted a democracy in their country.

A few months later, this man and this man helped take down Bashir in a coup. . .

and then promised protesters the future they had demanded. Four years later the same two men are now at war with each other. .

. tearing Sudan apart, killing hundreds of civilians. So how did Sudan go from this.

. . to this in such a short time?

And how did these two powerful men. . .

go from partners to enemies? [overlapping] -Clashes in Sudan. -.

. . a deadly coup.

. . .

. . support forces.

. . Sudan has a long history of coups.

Leader after leader has been brought down by military officers. The country's official military now known as the Sudanese Armed Forces or SAF has held tremendous power in the country for nearly a century. And they started using that power soon after Sudan gained independence from Anglo Egyptian rule.

“Sudanese flag now replacing the flags of those two nations. ” The first successful military coup happened in 1958. Abdullah Kalil, a retired military officer and sitting prime minister.

. . overthrew his own civilian government to put Sudan under military rule.

About a decade later, Colonel Jaafar Nimeiry carried out another successful coup. . .

bringing down a short lived democracy. Then in 1985, Nimeiry was out. This military officer took him down and later installed a new democratic government.

Four years later, Colonel Omar Bashir took down this government and appointed himself as the new head of state. But Bashir ended up being different from those that came before him. Given the pattern of military takeovers.

. . Bashir knew he may suffer the same fate as previous leaders.

So he used a strategy called coup proofing. . .

where he'd surround himself with protectors but would keep each one in check so they couldn't overthrow him. It started with the SAF. Throughout his regime, Bashir bolstered the army and maintained a strong relationship with them.

He relied on them heavily to crack down on an ongoing civil war in southern Sudan. . .

where SAF and allied militias brutalized civilians on his command. Then, with the army busy in the south another war started taking shape in the West. Darfur was in crisis.

People here were historically neglected. Lack of medical supplies and necessary goods and little representation in Sudan's government left them feeling agitated for years. So in 2003 while large portions of the army were tied up in the South.

Rebel groups attacked troops in this city in Darfur. And Bashir in recognizing that this rebellion was taking place instead of relying on the Sudan Armed Forces or SAF, the conventional military he instead decided to rely and arm local Arab militias in the region that were known as the Janjaweed. This group was brutal and focused on wiping out Darfuri rebels and civilians at Bashir’s direction.

Satellite imagery shows that the Janjaweed is likely responsible for destroying over 3000 villages. SAF troops in Darfur were responsible for destruction there as well. Both groups are accused of mass killing, rape and the targeted displacement of civilians.

Together, they killed thousands of Darfuris. The events in Darfur showed Bashir how to keep his power. And he turned to the Janjaweed in search of another protector.

Among the Janjaweed militias there were a couple of men Bashir trusted and tried to bring into the central government. But there is one particular Janjaweed leader that Bashir trusted the most. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo or Hemeti.

Bashir called him “my protection”. A particular play on the Arabic word Hemmati which is “my protection” versus Hemeti, which is his nickname. By 2011, the long and gruesome civil war here ended with South Sudan gaining independence.

. . leaving Bashir in a weak position.

And soon after, Sudan's economy tanked. Many of the oil resources that sustain the country were based in the South which was no longer under Bashir's control. To strengthen his power Bashir gave Hemeti and the Janjaweed official status as a paramilitary force called the Rapid Support Forces, or RSF, in 2013.

At first, the group was placed under the NISS Sudan's intelligence agency, also one of Bashir's protectors. Even though they were supporting the SAF in the ongoing war in Darfur. Then in 2017, he passed a law placing Hemeti directly under his command.

. . making it clear that the RSF’s main purpose was to protect him.

To maintain the RSF’s loyalty Bashir gave Hemeti financial autonomy and allowed him to take control of some of Darfur's gold mines. . .

smuggle weapons and minerals into places like Chad and Libya. . .

and send troops into war torn regions in exchange for money. At the same time, Bashir continued to let the SAF have a hand in major industries. .

. like weapon production and telecommunications. While Bashir was busy making these two forces richer civilians continue to struggle.

Protests broke out in 2018 in the middle of a really bad economic crisis. That's when Bashir faced his biggest challenge. .

. putting his protection scheme to the test. The ultimate trigger was the government's budget.

. . which allocated about 60 to 70% to the security sector.

. . which included Bashir's protectors.

While Sudanese people struggled for basic needs. This led to the biggest revolution in Sudan's history. Spontaneous protests broke out in different parts of the country.

And then they shifted to Khartoum in the capital city. Bashir refused to leave office. The RSF, SAF, and other security sectors backed him.

. . and cracked down on the protesters who ultimately wanted democracy.

But protesters didn't back down for months. . .

and it became clear to the RSF and SAF. . .

that Bashir's leadership wouldn't be as useful to them anymore. So on April 11th, 2019. .

. they made a move that surprised civilians and Bashir. SAF commanders colluded with the RSF’s Hemeti and removed Bashir from power.

Protesters celebrated Bashir's removal. . .

but they didn't trust the man who made it happen. A day after the coup, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. .

. a formal regional commander in Darfur took charge of the South. Together, the two men gained control of Sudan.

People saw them as complicit in the violence in Darfur all those years ago, where they worked together. One as a member of the Sudan Armed Forces. One as a militia leader on the same side.

. . against large proportions of the population of Darfur.

And soon, the two men turned on protesters. When pro-democracy protests kept intensifying in Khartoum. .

. Hemeti and his forces started cracking down. On June 3rd, 2019.

. . the RSF killed over 100 people at a sit in protest.

And other massacres continued throughout the country. After this. .

. these countries were forced to step in to help put Sudan on a democratic path. The United States, with its Arab allies the United Kingdom, Ethiopia, and the African Union.

. . pressured Sudan's military and protesters.

. . to accept a power sharing agreement.

In this new deal representatives from both the military and protesters. . .

would be part of a transitional council. In this plan, the military would have control for 21 months and civilians for 18. That meant the military would eventually have to hand over power to civilians who run the country.

The problem was, despite warnings from protesters. . .

these two military men were put in charge of the council with Burhan as chair and Hemeti as vice chair. At first, the council acted in line with the agreement. .

. and installed a new prime minister, Abdallah Hamdok. But after multiple military interventions by these leaders.

. . like a staged coup in October 2021.

. . Hamdok resigned in January 2022.

That made Burhan, the de facto leader of Sudan. . .

and Hemeti as his number two again. But Hemeti was never quite comfortable with playing second fiddle. Especially because he had amassed this fortune and had positioned himself to play the role of statesman.

. . almost better than Burhan himself.

As Burhan developed personal alliances with leaders in the Middle East, Europe, and Asia over the years. Hemeti did the same using his riches from the gold mines. .

. to build relationships with powerful individuals in those countries as well. After another year of protests.

. . the US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and the UK pressured Burhan, Hemeti, and protesters to sign another deal.

On December 5th, 2020 Burhan, Hemeti and political parties signed it. . .

promising a new civilian-led transitional government by April 2023. But these two men disagreed on a key part of the deal. The RSF would need to become part of Burhan’s army.

. . which would limit Hemeti’s power.

Burhan wanted that to happen in two years. But Hemeti proposed 10. That disagreement caused a big rift between Burhan and Hemeti.

. . which led to the current conflict between the two men.

They've placed hundreds of thousands of armed men across the country. Burhan and his army have an air force that's responsible for many of the casualties. And Hemeti’s finances allow him to arm more and more men on the ground.

Hundreds of civilians have been killed already. . .

and thousands have fled Sudan. Cease fires have routinely been broken. And talks between the warring parties have gone nowhere.

What was once a hopeful revolution has been interrupted by these two men. No matter who wins this war protesters are left feeling betrayed. .

. by the country's de facto leaders and also by the international community that claimed to support their hopes for democracy.