120 warships. That is how many Iranian vessels the United States Navy has destroyed or disabled since February 28th. Two carrier strike groups, eight Eegis destroyers, $40 billion of naval firepower deployed across two oceans.
And the result, the Straight of Hormuz is still closed. 95% of commercial shipping has vanished. 3,200 vessels, including 250 oil tankers, sit anchored in the Gulf, going nowhere.
We did not lose a single ship. We did not lose a single engagement. We eliminated the entire Iranian submarine fleet, every Solommani class corvette, every drone carrier, every major surface combatant Thrron ever built.
And yet the shipping lane stays shut. The oil stays stuck. The world economy bleeds $40 billion a week.
Why? Because the most powerful navy in human history had to pick up the phone and call the Air Force. Specifically, they needed an aircraft the Air Force had been begging Congress to let them retire.
A 50-year-old airplane designed in the 1970s to kill Soviet tanks on the planes of Europe. An airplane that top Pentagon officials called obsolete, redundant, and unfit for modern warfare, right up until the moment they needed it more than anything else in the inventory. Subscribe to Navy Decoded.
We do not celebrate weapons. We calculate whether they work. And this equation is one of the most counterintuitive we have ever run.
Type proud if the Warthog earned it. To understand why a carrier airwing cannot solve a problem that a cold war relic solves in its first sorty, we first need to understand the problem. The straight of Hormuz is 21 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point.
But that number is misleading. The actual shipping lane, the corridor where tankers must pass, is 6 nautical miles, 2 mi inbound, 2 m outbound, and a 2-m buffer between them. That is the entire playable space.
Everything else is Iranian territorial water. Now consider the adversary inside that space. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy operates more than 1,500 fast attack craft.
Not warships, speedboats, fiberglass, and composite hulls, most under 15 tons. The slowest ones run at 50 knots. The fastest exceeds 70.
And Iran claims some of its newest designs can break a 100. These are not targets a radar was designed to track. They are small, low to the water, and they move faster than most pleasure boats in Miami.
Each one costs somewhere between 50,000 and half a million dollars. And each one carries an anti-ship missile, the Nazer 1, with a 35 km range and a terminal speed of Mach 0. 9.
That is enough to mission kill a frigot. Their doctrine is simple. Swarm 30 to 50 boats attack simultaneously from every direction.
Overwhelm the sensors. Saturate the defenses. Force the destroyer to choose which boat to shoot, knowing that every missile it fires costs more than every boat it aims at.
And that is the real problem. Let us look at the math. An SM6 interceptor costs $5.
3 million. Firing it at a $50,000 speedboat is a 100 to1 cost ratio in Iran's favor. A harpoon costs 1.
5 million and was designed to track cruiserized targets, not composite skiffs doing 70 knots between container ships. The Mark 45 5-in gun fires 16 to 20 rounds per minute, respectable against one target, hopeless against 50. The Failank CIWS empties its magazine in 20 seconds and takes 4 minutes to reload.
And the FA18E Super Hornet, the carrier's primary strike aircraft, costs $30,000 per flight hour, flies too fast to visually distinguish an IRGC boat from a fishing twler among 3,200 civilian vessels, and its onstation time at combat loadout is a fraction of what this mission demands. The Navy does have one tool designed for this kind of fight, the MH60R Seah Hawk helicopter. It carries Hellfire missiles and a cabin-mounted machine gun.
It can patrol, identify, and engage small surface targets. But the Seah Hawk was built primarily for anti-ubmarine warfare, not for hunting 50 fast boats at once. It carries four to eight hellfires per sorty depending on configuration, has limited loiter time compared to a fixedwing aircraft, and it is vulnerable to the same 12.
7 mm and 14. 5 mm gunfire that saturates Hormuz without the 12,200lb titanium cocoon that keeps an A-10 pilot alive. The seahawk is a scalpel.
The swarm problem needs a chainsaw. So the missiles are too expensive, the guns are too slow, the jets are too fast, and the helicopter is too small. That is not a list of bad weapons.
That is a pattern. And the pattern points to something deeper. Every weapon in the carrier strike group's arsenal is designed for blue water, open ocean, high-v value targets, long range, expensive munitions matched to expensive threats.
The Straight of Hormuz is brown water, a six-mile corridor filled with cheap, fast, numerous targets hiding among thousands of civilian ships. The Navy brought a surgical laser to a knife fight, and the knife fight needed a shotgun. The ironic part, the shotgun already existed.
The Pentagon just wanted to throw it away. The A10 Thunderbolt 2, the Wartthog, is built around a gun, literally. The GA AU8A Avenger was designed first.
The airplane was designed around it. That sevenb barrel Gatling cannon fires 30 millimeter depleted uranium rounds at 3,900 per minute, 65 rounds per second. The aircraft carries,50 rounds in a drum the size of a Volkswagen Beetle.
At a 2se secondond burst, the standard engagement, the pilot puts roughly 130 rounds downrange. Cost per round about $137 for the armor-piercing DU variant. Let us do the math that changes everything.
70 rounds into a fiberglass fastboat equals under $10,000. The same kill with an SM6 costs 5. 3 million.
That is a 500 to1 cost advantage. Not a marginal improvement, a categorical shift in the economics of engagement. But the gun is only part of the equation.
The A-10 carries 16,000 lbs of ordinance across 11 hard points. For medium-range targets, a pay cap at 12 nautical miles, the pilot fires an AGM65 Maverick, an infrared guided missile that costs between 150 and $170,000. Still 30 times cheaper than an SM6.
For fast boats mixed with drones, the A-10 carries APKWS, a laser guidance kit bolted onto a standard Hydra70 rocket. Cost per shot, about $35,000. Precision guidance at the price of a mid-range sedan.
Now, consider the physics that make those weapons possible at Hormuz. The A10's maximum speed is Mach 0. 75, roughly 420 mph.
But when it drops to low altitude and begins its patrol loops, it flies around 300 knots. And this is an advantage, not a limitation. When an FA18E crosses the shipping lane at 500 plus knots, every target on the surface stays in the pilot's field of view for less than 2 seconds.
At that speed, distinguishing an IRGC pay from a Kuwaiti fishing dow among 3,200 civilian vessels is essentially impossible. The A-10 at 300 knots gives the pilot two to three times longer to identify, confirm, and engage. The pilot does not rely on sensor readouts in a heads down display.
The pilot looks out the canopy, sees the rocket launchers bolted to the gunnel, sees the military paint, pulls the trigger. Compare that to the Navy's MH60R Sea Hawk, the tool we discussed earlier. The Seah Hawk cruises at around 140 knots and carries four to eight hellfires.
It can identify and engage, but it covers less than half the ground the A-10 covers in the same time. Carries a tenth of the weapons and must return to the ship after 90 minutes. An A10 at 300 knots with 1150 cannon rounds, six Mavericks, and external fuel tanks does not replace the Seahawk.
It operates in a category the Seahawk was never built to enter. That is what Liter means in engineering terms. The A10 stays on station for approximately 1 hour and 50 minutes on internal fuel with 600-gal external tanks that extends to 2 and 1/2 hours over the straight, flying racetrack patterns, scanning, waiting, selecting.
The aircraft does not burn through its fuel, racing to and from a carrier 200 m away. It stays in the kill zone persistently, and the wings explain why it does this so efficiently. The A-10 uses straight wings, not the swept wings of the FA18 or F-35.
Swept wings reduce drag at high mock numbers, but increase it at low speeds. The A10 never needs high mock. At 300 knots, straight wings generate lift more efficiently, burn less fuel, and deliver a tighter turn radius.
That last point matters enormously. With the shipping lane only 6 nautical miles wide, the A10 can bank, reverse, and re-enter its patrol loop without ever leaving the engagement corridor. The straight wing also creates a more stable gun platform.
Less oscillation at low speed means the GAU8 puts rounds exactly where the pilot aims during a strafing run. One more thing about that gun, the recoil force of the GA AU8 at full rate is approximately 45 kons, 10,000 lb of force. Each of the A-10's two TF34 engines produces about 40 kons of thrust.
In a two- second burst, the gun generates nearly as much backward force as one engine generates forward. The airplane physically decelerates during firing. That is not a design flaw.
It is a measure of how much kinetic energy the weapon delivers. Each 30 mm DU penetrator leaves the barrel at over 1,000 m/s, carrying roughly 267 kg of energy, enough to penetrate 69 mm of rolled homogeneous armor. A fiberglass fastboat has zero armor.
This is not a fair fight. It is not designed to be. And the A-10 will take the hits that come back.
The pilot sits inside a 12,200lb titanium bathtub, the only aircraft in the American inventory that encases its cockpit in armor designed to withstand 23mm armor-piercing rounds and 57 mm fragmentation. In Desert Storm, Colonel Bobby Efferson brought home an A-10 with 378 holes in the airframe. In Iraq in 2003, Captain Kim Campbell of the 75th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron lost all hydraulic control over Baghdad, both primary and backup lines severed, and flew her A-10 home using manual reversion, a system of cranks and cables that bypasses every electronic and hydraulic control surface.
She landed safely. The Distinguished Flying Cross followed. That survivability is not academic at Hormuz.
The IRGC's coastal imp placements fire 12. 7 mm and 14. 5 mm machine guns.
An FA18 avoids that threat by flying high and loses target identification. The A10 flies low, absorbs the hits, and keeps shooting because that is what it was built to do. But one airplane, no matter how tough, cannot hold a six mile corridor alone.
But the A-10 does not operate alone. What is happening above the straight of Hormuz right now is something the American military has never done before in combat. Three branches of the armed forces operating simultaneously over a single six-mile naval corridor, each covering the gap the others cannot fill.
Layer one is the A-10 Air Force. It flies racetrack patterns at 3,000 ft, hunting fast boats and coastal missile positions. The GAU8 and APKWS handle close-range threats.
The Maverick handles targets at 12 nautical miles. The A-10 cost $19,000 per flight hour. Layer 2 is the AH64 Apache Army attack helicopters operating from expeditionary sea bases floating forward operating bases for Army Aviation.
This is a concept first tested operationally in 2020 aboard the USS Lewis B. puller and now deployed at scale. Army attack helicopters staging from a Navy platform to fight a naval battle.
Each Apache carries up to 16 Hellfire missiles at 70 to $200,000 each and a 30mm M230 chain gun. The same caliber as the Warthogs, but chain driven rather than Gatling. Highly effective against unarmored boats.
They fly at 200 ft below the A-10, picking off the targets that slip through. Layer three is the Navy itself. Eegis destroyers and latoral combat ships maintaining the air defense umbrella and surface patrol.
The destroyers keep their SM6 inventory for the threats that actually justify the cost. Anti-hship ballistic missiles, cruise missiles flying at Mach 3. Odin and Helios directed energy systems handle drones.
The LCS deploys its own drone swarms and mine clearing systems. Here is the convergence equation. Before combined arms, the Navy engaged fast boats with SM6 interceptors, 5.
3 million per shot against $50,000 targets, draining 90 to 96 VLS cells on each destroyer, many of which are already committed to tomahawks, SM2s, and ESSM quad packs. After combined arms, the A10 handles the fast boats for $10,000 per engagement. The Apache handles the close-in threats for 70,000, and the Navy preserves its missile inventory for the Mach 3 threats that nothing else can stop.
The VLS cells last 10 times longer. The math flips. Iran's strategic miscalculation was assuming the Navy would fight alone.
Their swarm doctrine was designed to drain VLS cells, 1,500 fastboats against 96 vertical launch tubes. The arithmetic was intentional. The IRGC studied the 2002 Millennium Challenge war game where a retired Marine Lieutenant General used swarmboats to sink 16 American warships in the opening phase and forced the Pentagon to restart the exercise.
Iran built an entire naval strategy around that simulation, but they built it for a scenario where the Navy answers alone. They did not account for the Air Force flying at 3,000 ft with a gun that fires 65 rounds per second or the Army flying at 200 ft with laserg guided missiles launched from a ship. The equation changes when the variables change.
So, the question that started this video deserves its answer. If this breakdown changed how you see naval warfare, subscribe to Navy Decoded and drop wartthog in the comments if you think the A-10 earned its place in this fight. So, why did the most powerful Navy in human history need to call the Air Force?
Not because the Navy is weak. The Navy was engineered for blue water, open ocean, capital ships, precision weapons measured in hundreds of nautical miles. The straight of Hormuz is brownwater, a six-mile shipping lane, 1,500 composite speedboats, cheap weapons requiring cheap answers.
A good engineer does not use a wrench to hammer a nail. A good engineer selects the right tool. The irony is that the right tool was an airplane the Air Force wanted to discard.
$19,000 per flight hour versus 30,000. $10,000 per kill versus 5. 3 million.
the answer to a problem worth billions of dollars in stranded oil. A 50-year-old aircraft flying 300 knots with a gun that weighs more than a Volkswagen Beetle. But the A-10 will retire.
Congress currently forbids the Air Force from reducing the fleet below 103 aircraft through September 2026, but the transition plan for 2027 through 2029 remains open. The question is not whether to keep the Warthog forever. The question is this.
When the A-10 leaves, what fills the gap? loitering drones with 30mm cannons, the MQ9 Reaper adapted for maritime interdiction, or does the Navy finally build its own brownwater weapon, an aircraft designed not for the deep ocean, but for the narrow, contested corridors where wars are actually fought? We do not worship the machine.
We worship the equation. And the equation says the right tool wins, not the expensive one. 120 warships.
That is how many Iranian vessels the United States Navy has destroyed or disabled since February 28th. Two carrier strike groups, eight Eegis destroyers, $40 billion of naval firepower deployed across two oceans. And the result, the Straight of Hormuz is still closed.
95% of commercial shipping has vanished. 3,200 vessels, including 250 oil tankers, sit anchored in the Gulf, going nowhere. We did not lose a single ship.
We did not lose a single engagement. We eliminated the entire Iranian submarine fleet, every Solommani class corvette, every drone carrier, every major surface combatant Thrron ever built. And yet the shipping lane stays shut.
The oil stays stuck. The world economy bleeds $40 billion a week. Why?
Because the most powerful navy in human history had to pick up the phone and call the Air Force. Specifically, they needed an aircraft the Air Force had been begging Congress to let them retire. A 50-year-old airplane designed in the 1970s to kill Soviet tanks on the planes of Europe.
An airplane that top Pentagon officials called obsolete, redundant, and unfit for modern warfare, right up until the moment they needed it more than anything else in the inventory. Subscribe to Navy Decoded. We do not celebrate weapons.
We calculate whether they work. And this equation is one of the most counterintuitive we have ever run. Type proud if the Warthog earned it.
To understand why a carrier airwing cannot solve a problem that a cold war relic solves in its first sorty, we first need to understand the problem. The straight of Hormuz is 21 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point. But that number is misleading.
The actual shipping lane, the corridor where tankers must pass, is 6 nautical miles, 2 mi inbound, 2 m outbound, and a 2-m buffer between them. That is the entire playable space. Everything else is Iranian territorial water.
Now consider the adversary inside that space. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy operates more than 1,500 fast attack craft. Not warships, speedboats, fiberglass, and composite hulls, most under 15 tons.
The slowest ones run at 50 knots. The fastest exceeds 70. And Iran claims some of its newest designs can break a 100.
These are not targets a radar was designed to track. They are small, low to the water, and they move faster than most pleasure boats in Miami. Each one costs somewhere between 50,000 and half a million dollars.
And each one carries an anti-ship missile, the Nazer 1, with a 35 km range and a terminal speed of Mach 0. 9. That is enough to mission kill a frigot.
Their doctrine is simple. Swarm 30 to 50 boats attack simultaneously from every direction. Overwhelm the sensors.
Saturate the defenses. Force the destroyer to choose which boat to shoot, knowing that every missile it fires costs more than every boat it aims at. And that is the real problem.
Let us look at the math. An SM6 interceptor costs $5. 3 million.
Firing it at a $50,000 speedboat is a 100 to1 cost ratio in Iran's favor. A harpoon costs 1. 5 million and was designed to track cruiserized targets, not composite skiffs doing 70 knots between container ships.
The Mark 45 5-in gun fires 16 to 20 rounds per minute, respectable against one target, hopeless against 50. The Failank CIWS empties its magazine in 20 seconds and takes 4 minutes to reload. And the FA18E Super Hornet, the carrier's primary strike aircraft, costs $30,000 per flight hour, flies too fast to visually distinguish an IRGC boat from a fishing twler among 3,200 civilian vessels, and its onstation time at combat loadout is a fraction of what this mission demands.
The Navy does have one tool designed for this kind of fight, the MH60R Seah Hawk helicopter. It carries Hellfire missiles and a cabin-mounted machine gun. It can patrol, identify, and engage small surface targets.
But the Seah Hawk was built primarily for anti-ubmarine warfare, not for hunting 50 fast boats at once. It carries four to eight hellfires per sorty depending on configuration, has limited loiter time compared to a fixedwing aircraft, and it is vulnerable to the same 12. 7 mm and 14.
5 mm gunfire that saturates Hormuz without the 12,200lb titanium cocoon that keeps an A-10 pilot alive. The seahawk is a scalpel. The swarm problem needs a chainsaw.
So the missiles are too expensive, the guns are too slow, the jets are too fast, and the helicopter is too small. That is not a list of bad weapons. That is a pattern.
And the pattern points to something deeper. Every weapon in the carrier strike group's arsenal is designed for blue water, open ocean, high-v value targets, long range, expensive munitions matched to expensive threats. The Straight of Hormuz is brown water, a six-mile corridor filled with cheap, fast, numerous targets hiding among thousands of civilian ships.
The Navy brought a surgical laser to a knife fight, and the knife fight needed a shotgun. The ironic part, the shotgun already existed. The Pentagon just wanted to throw it away.
The A10 Thunderbolt 2, the Wartthog, is built around a gun, literally. The GA AU8A Avenger was designed first. The airplane was designed around it.
That sevenb barrel Gatling cannon fires 30 millimeter depleted uranium rounds at 3,900 per minute, 65 rounds per second. The aircraft carries,50 rounds in a drum the size of a Volkswagen Beetle. At a 2se secondond burst, the standard engagement, the pilot puts roughly 130 rounds downrange.
Cost per round about $137 for the armor-piercing DU variant. Let us do the math that changes everything. 70 rounds into a fiberglass fastboat equals under $10,000.
The same kill with an SM6 costs 5. 3 million. That is a 500 to1 cost advantage.
Not a marginal improvement, a categorical shift in the economics of engagement. But the gun is only part of the equation. The A-10 carries 16,000 lbs of ordinance across 11 hard points.
For medium-range targets, a pay cap at 12 nautical miles, the pilot fires an AGM65 Maverick, an infrared guided missile that costs between 150 and $170,000. Still 30 times cheaper than an SM6. For fast boats mixed with drones, the A-10 carries APKWS, a laser guidance kit bolted onto a standard Hydra70 rocket.
Cost per shot, about $35,000. Precision guidance at the price of a mid-range sedan. Now, consider the physics that make those weapons possible at Hormuz.
The A10's maximum speed is Mach 0. 75, roughly 420 mph. But when it drops to low altitude and begins its patrol loops, it flies around 300 knots.
And this is an advantage, not a limitation. When an FA18E crosses the shipping lane at 500 plus knots, every target on the surface stays in the pilot's field of view for less than 2 seconds. At that speed, distinguishing an IRGC pay from a Kuwaiti fishing dow among 3,200 civilian vessels is essentially impossible.
The A-10 at 300 knots gives the pilot two to three times longer to identify, confirm, and engage. The pilot does not rely on sensor readouts in a heads down display. The pilot looks out the canopy, sees the rocket launchers bolted to the gunnel, sees the military paint, pulls the trigger.
Compare that to the Navy's MH60R Sea Hawk, the tool we discussed earlier. The Seah Hawk cruises at around 140 knots and carries four to eight hellfires. It can identify and engage, but it covers less than half the ground the A-10 covers in the same time.
Carries a tenth of the weapons and must return to the ship after 90 minutes. An A10 at 300 knots with 1150 cannon rounds, six Mavericks, and external fuel tanks does not replace the Seahawk. It operates in a category the Seahawk was never built to enter.
That is what Liter means in engineering terms. The A10 stays on station for approximately 1 hour and 50 minutes on internal fuel with 600-gal external tanks that extends to 2 and 1/2 hours over the straight, flying racetrack patterns, scanning, waiting, selecting. The aircraft does not burn through its fuel, racing to and from a carrier 200 m away.
It stays in the kill zone persistently, and the wings explain why it does this so efficiently. The A-10 uses straight wings, not the swept wings of the FA18 or F-35. Swept wings reduce drag at high mock numbers, but increase it at low speeds.
The A10 never needs high mock. At 300 knots, straight wings generate lift more efficiently, burn less fuel, and deliver a tighter turn radius. That last point matters enormously.
With the shipping lane only 6 nautical miles wide, the A10 can bank, reverse, and re-enter its patrol loop without ever leaving the engagement corridor. The straight wing also creates a more stable gun platform. Less oscillation at low speed means the GAU8 puts rounds exactly where the pilot aims during a strafing run.
One more thing about that gun, the recoil force of the GA AU8 at full rate is approximately 45 kons, 10,000 lb of force. Each of the A-10's two TF34 engines produces about 40 kons of thrust. In a two- second burst, the gun generates nearly as much backward force as one engine generates forward.
The airplane physically decelerates during firing. That is not a design flaw. It is a measure of how much kinetic energy the weapon delivers.
Each 30 mm DU penetrator leaves the barrel at over 1,000 m/s, carrying roughly 267 kg of energy, enough to penetrate 69 mm of rolled homogeneous armor. A fiberglass fastboat has zero armor. This is not a fair fight.
It is not designed to be. And the A-10 will take the hits that come back. The pilot sits inside a 12,200lb titanium bathtub, the only aircraft in the American inventory that encases its cockpit in armor designed to withstand 23mm armor-piercing rounds and 57 mm fragmentation.
In Desert Storm, Colonel Bobby Efferson brought home an A-10 with 378 holes in the airframe. In Iraq in 2003, Captain Kim Campbell of the 75th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron lost all hydraulic control over Baghdad, both primary and backup lines severed, and flew her A-10 home using manual reversion, a system of cranks and cables that bypasses every electronic and hydraulic control surface. She landed safely.
The Distinguished Flying Cross followed. That survivability is not academic at Hormuz. The IRGC's coastal imp placements fire 12.
7 mm and 14. 5 mm machine guns. An FA18 avoids that threat by flying high and loses target identification.
The A10 flies low, absorbs the hits, and keeps shooting because that is what it was built to do. But one airplane, no matter how tough, cannot hold a six mile corridor alone. But the A-10 does not operate alone.
What is happening above the straight of Hormuz right now is something the American military has never done before in combat. Three branches of the armed forces operating simultaneously over a single six-mile naval corridor, each covering the gap the others cannot fill. Layer one is the A-10 Air Force.
It flies racetrack patterns at 3,000 ft, hunting fast boats and coastal missile positions. The GAU8 and APKWS handle close-range threats. The Maverick handles targets at 12 nautical miles.
The A-10 cost $19,000 per flight hour. Layer 2 is the AH64 Apache Army attack helicopters operating from expeditionary sea bases floating forward operating bases for Army Aviation. This is a concept first tested operationally in 2020 aboard the USS Lewis B.
puller and now deployed at scale. Army attack helicopters staging from a Navy platform to fight a naval battle. Each Apache carries up to 16 Hellfire missiles at 70 to $200,000 each and a 30mm M230 chain gun.
The same caliber as the Warthogs, but chain driven rather than Gatling. Highly effective against unarmored boats. They fly at 200 ft below the A-10, picking off the targets that slip through.
Layer three is the Navy itself. Eegis destroyers and latoral combat ships maintaining the air defense umbrella and surface patrol. The destroyers keep their SM6 inventory for the threats that actually justify the cost.
Anti-hship ballistic missiles, cruise missiles flying at Mach 3. Odin and Helios directed energy systems handle drones. The LCS deploys its own drone swarms and mine clearing systems.
Here is the convergence equation. Before combined arms, the Navy engaged fast boats with SM6 interceptors, 5. 3 million per shot against $50,000 targets, draining 90 to 96 VLS cells on each destroyer, many of which are already committed to tomahawks, SM2s, and ESSM quad packs.
After combined arms, the A10 handles the fast boats for $10,000 per engagement. The Apache handles the close-in threats for 70,000, and the Navy preserves its missile inventory for the Mach 3 threats that nothing else can stop. The VLS cells last 10 times longer.
The math flips. Iran's strategic miscalculation was assuming the Navy would fight alone. Their swarm doctrine was designed to drain VLS cells, 1,500 fastboats against 96 vertical launch tubes.
The arithmetic was intentional. The IRGC studied the 2002 Millennium Challenge war game where a retired Marine Lieutenant General used swarmboats to sink 16 American warships in the opening phase and forced the Pentagon to restart the exercise. Iran built an entire naval strategy around that simulation, but they built it for a scenario where the Navy answers alone.
They did not account for the Air Force flying at 3,000 ft with a gun that fires 65 rounds per second or the Army flying at 200 ft with laserg guided missiles launched from a ship. The equation changes when the variables change. So, the question that started this video deserves its answer.
If this breakdown changed how you see naval warfare, subscribe to Navy Decoded and drop wartthog in the comments if you think the A-10 earned its place in this fight. So, why did the most powerful Navy in human history need to call the Air Force? Not because the Navy is weak.
The Navy was engineered for blue water, open ocean, capital ships, precision weapons measured in hundreds of nautical miles. The straight of Hormuz is brownwater, a six-mile shipping lane, 1,500 composite speedboats, cheap weapons requiring cheap answers. A good engineer does not use a wrench to hammer a nail.
A good engineer selects the right tool. The irony is that the right tool was an airplane the Air Force wanted to discard. $19,000 per flight hour versus 30,000.
$10,000 per kill versus 5. 3 million. the answer to a problem worth billions of dollars in stranded oil.
A 50-year-old aircraft flying 300 knots with a gun that weighs more than a Volkswagen Beetle. But the A-10 will retire. Congress currently forbids the Air Force from reducing the fleet below 103 aircraft through September 2026, but the transition plan for 2027 through 2029 remains open.
The question is not whether to keep the Warthog forever. The question is this. When the A-10 leaves, what fills the gap?
loitering drones with 30mm cannons, the MQ9 Reaper adapted for maritime interdiction, or does the Navy finally build its own brownwater weapon, an aircraft designed not for the deep ocean, but for the narrow, contested corridors where wars are actually fought? We do not worship the machine. We worship the equation.
And the equation says the right tool wins, not the expensive one.
