like in a nightmare so many things went wrong here on so many levels but why what actually happened stay tuned I often get asked which the safest and least safe airline in the world is and I always answer the same thing all airlines are forced to follow very similar standards so as long as they are allowed to operate they are all safe but there are some out there who definitely get into more accidents than others and one of them is the Colombian Airline Aros sukra this is a cargo airline that has been serving less developed parts of Colombia since all the way back in 1969 and they have done so using a fleet that has varied over the years but now consist of several boing 727s as well as 737 200s 300s and 400s since it was found that osuka has had 11 fatal accidents and many many more nonfatal ones meaning that the airline has actually written off significantly more airplanes over its history than it has ever owned at any given time for example back in 1989 five crew and two people on the ground died when an aerosucre Caravel suffered a load shift lost control and then crashed into several houses and later that same year another Aeros flight flew straight into a mountain killing six people then in 1991 two persons died and several were injured when an aosc DC C6 landed short of the runway in bangia and that flight which was supposed to be a pure cargo flight turned out to also be carrying at least 19 unauthorized passengers who had all gotten handwritten tickets through relatives that worked with the company and these poor passengers had according to report been sitting on the floor of the cargo area next to some crates of newspapers during the crash since there were no seats fitted later another deadly accident took place in 2006 when an AOS super 727 on approach hit the radio tower killing all six crew members on board and if that wasn't enough they have also written off quite a few aircraft due to landing gear collapses plus they've had a number of other emergencies like in 2021 when the cargo door of the 737 came open in flight now it is important to keep in mind that throughout most of Aros suu's existence Colombia has been embroiled in a long runn Civil War that strained its infrastructure and oversight so it wasn't always easy to operate safely even if they were trying and that's a big if now despite their poor safety record osuk provides a vital service to some remote towns and cities in Colombia that would otherwise struggle to maintain supplies of basic Goods or be unable to export their local products to Market and for that reason eros's longtime owner was actually given a state award in 2013 for service to the country but 2 years after receiving that award he himself nearly died in a plane crash where he was Pilot Flying anyway this is just supposed to give you some background which might make the story that I'm about to tell you a bit easier to understand and for that story we need to go back to the 20th of December of 2016 on that day an aerosucre boing 727 and its crew were scheduled to operate a round trip between El Dorado International Airport in buot to German otano airport in the remote town of Puerto Keno situated in the Far Eastern part of the country Puerto Keno is located along the Orinoco River which forms part of Colombia's border with Venezuela and German alono airport is actually surrounded by Venezuelan territory on three sides when the inbound flight arrived at the airport they flew the approach from the Colombian side using r07 like most aircraft who use this airport tends to do and that's an issue that I'll get back to later anyway after the aircraft landed at 1448 local time the crew then supervised the ground personnel as they unloaded 9,300 kg of perishable foods and Sundries to resupply the town that was UN followed by the loading of nine pallets containing 19,800 kg of local products going for export meaning that the crew knew that they would be substantially heavier on the homebound flight than they had been when they arrived but who were the crew members who were operating on this afternoon then well we don't actually know that much about them except that they were supposed to be five crew members on board a captain a first officer a flight engineer a mechanic and finally a load Master the captain was 58 years old and had 878 total flying hours including 6,822 hours on the boying 727 but he was the only crew member whose full records were actually available the first officer was 39 years old and according to arizuka's company records he had 3,285 hours all of which had been flown on the boing 727 but there were no record of any experience he might have gained before joining the company lastly the flight engineer was 72 years old and had 1,612 hours on the boing 727 at aukra but again there was no information about what he had done before that and he had joined osuk in 200 13 3 years before this flight so he almost certainly had extensive experience with previous employers given his age and when we're on the subject of his age the fact that he was 72 years old might surprise a few of you guys out there since Pilots normally retire by either 60 or 65 years old well it turns out that in a lot of countries there actually is no age limit for flight engineers and even in the places where there is a limit it's often much higher than it is for pilots in fact in the United States it used to be somewhat common for captains who had aged out of the left seat to become flight Engineers so that they could keep flying for a couple of more years but having said that 72 definitely makes him the oldest flight engineer that I've ever heard of in active duty as for the mechanic and the load Master we don't know anything about them at all and that's likely because their roles didn't make much of a difference to the outcome of this story interestingly though while the flight was only supposed to have five crew members a sixth person was later found to have been on board and the sources we have looked at doesn't say who that person was but it might have been an undocumented passenger since aukra had like I mentioned earlier a history of carrying those now while we are on the subject of sources I want to take this opportunity to give a real shout out to today's sponsor Nord VPN you see when we're researching these videos specifically incidents that have happened on other continents we frequently run into Geo blocked content which is super frustrating but with the help of nordvpn we can quickly change our virtual location and bypass these restrictions giving us full access to what we need I also use it to be able to see some Swedish TV programs from back home and it works just like a charm I just love things that work like advertised awesome but nor is not just about breaking down digital barriers they now also have added some truly great cyber security tools which of course includes encryption and securing of your personal information whether you're browsing streaming or shopping online you can also use no to save some money on flights rental cars and hotels by trying to book from different locations but remember to clear your Casher before trying that if this sounds good and you want to try Nord out for yourself well then I have a fantastic offer for you if you sign up for their 2-year plan using my link below which is nordvpn. com pilot you'll get four extra month absolutely free and with that 30-day money back guarantee you don't risk anything by trying so remember nordvpn. com pilot thank you Nord now let's get back to the story the aircraft they were operating on this day was a 41-year-old beautiful three engine Boeing 7272 200 which had been originally manufactured back in 1975 it had then been operated for many years in the United States before it was retired in 2007 at which point Eros sura bought it and re-registered it in Colombia possibly to replace one of the company's other 727s that had crashed a year earlier then in 2015 Eros sura modified this aircraft according to a thirdparty retrofit package called quiet Wing which came with a supplemental type certificate basically an addition to the original Boeing 727 type specifications approved by the FAA the idea behind the quiet Wing was to reduce the amount of noise generated during takeoff and landing and also to improve its performance this was done in part by adding new takeoff flap settings which would allow the 7 to7 to take off from shorter runways using lower speeds and therefore requiring less engine power and fuel on the standard 727 the maximum takeoff flap setting was 25° but with the Quiet Wing modifications it now became possible to also take off with flaps 30 now the flap settings that we Pilots choose to use affects how we determine the takeoff or V speeds that is V1 the decision speed VR rotation speed and V2 the safe engine outspeed generally speaking the higher the flap setting the lower these speeds will become since the wings will be able to provide more lift and therefore allow the aircraft to get airborne earlier but with the addition of lap 30 this also meant that the flight crew needed a new set of tables in order to determine these VP speeds tables taking weight temperature and wind into account the designers of The Quiet Wing modification had provided a supplement to the aircraft flight manual that included instructions for how to calculate this new vsps with flaps 30 which Aeros sura should have used to then develop new quick reference takeoff cards for its Pilots these cards allow the pilots to quickly reference the required takeoff speeds without having to flip through pages and pages in the performance manuals and pour over complicated charts but Eros had never made made this new takeoff card so the only way that the pilots could determine the correct flap 30v speed was by examining those charts in the manuals which was pretty inconvenient on a daily basis now to me as someone who flies in a well regulated environment it's almost inconceivable that an airline would fail to do something that basic but not only did Aeros sura fail to do this apparently Colombia's civil aviation Authority didn't exercise any oversight of the modification process at all even though they signed off on it meaning that they also failed to catch this obvious error but that wasn't the only major problem with AOS 727 operation into Herman anano airport because it turns out that they actually never had permission to fly this particular aircraft in there in the first place you see the runway width and pavement strength at the airport were both below the minimum values required for the Boeing 727 so it wasn't actually legal to conduct routine 727 operations there at all now like any Airline aruka had to acquire operational authorization from the civil aviation authorities for the relevant country in this case Colombia for every aircraft type and Route combination that they intended to fly but the operational authorization document approved by Colombia C clearly specified that only boing 737 operations were permitted at Herman olano airport and despite this Eros just ignored that and started flying there with its 7 to SS anyway and not only that before every flight the airline submitted a flight plan to the ca for air traffic control purposes and these flight plans seem to have then been just approved apparently without any checking which aircraft type was actually being used now neither the runway width nor the payment strength was a factor in this accident but obviously if the regulations had been properly enforced this flight would have never taken place and this accident would therefore have been prevented it is worth pointing out here that Aviation is as safe as it is today because we build safety margins into every part of the operation that ethos is supposed to start at the international level and then move down through the national Regulators out to the Airlines and then finally to the operating Crews through laws regulations procedures and training when this works well there are so much margins in there that as singular or even several errors can slip through without something really bad happening but when these rules are ignored then the margins are thinned out until finally it comes down to a singular human mistake after the cargo was loaded the crew of Aeros flight 157 carried out their pre-flight checks and then started up the 727s 3 pratton Whitney JTA Delta engines once they were up and running that also activated the cockpit voice recording which means that we know what was said in the cockpit from that point onwards the time was now 1,700 and the control tower had actually closed for the day at500 meaning that the airport was now uncontrolled so to let other aircraft know their intentions the first officer sent out a blind message addressed to all Aircraft in the Puerto Keno area on the common terminal frequency and he stated flight 157's intention to tax it to the active Runway via taxiway Bravo the pilots then completed their standard control checks and also double checked the take of items including flaps which they had set to the maximum 30° in order to help them take off from the short 1,800 M long Runway they also reviewed the previously calculated engine power settings or eprs and the captain then called out a value of 23 for both wi1 and VR he likely meant 123 kns here but the first officer corrected him to 127 knots which is what they had calculated before after accepting that the captain who was going to be Pilot Flying for the leg then conducted a takeoff briefing in which he explained that the flight engineer would add takeoff power the first officer would then call out 60 and 80 knots then V1 and VR at 127 knots and finally V2 at 141 knots he also discussed who would monitor the instruments and what they would do in the event of an engine failure both before and after decision speed so so far so good now there are three things about this briefing that is worth pointing out before we continue the first is that the V speeds they were using corresponded to an aircraft weight of 75,200 kilos but the cargo and fuel information suggested that the weight of the aircraft was only 74,2 kilos a full 1.
1 ton less based on the runway length and the outside temperature of 31° C the maximum takeoff weight for this Runway would have been 74,000 700 kilos which was higher than the aircraft actual weight calculated by investigators but it was apparently very common for Aeros to overload its aircraft with extra cargo that wasn't on the Manifest in order to make the take of weight appear to be within limits so the crew possibly used VP speeds corresponding to 75,200 kilos in order to count for this it's hard to know for sure now the higher VSP speeds resulting from us this higher weight would have slightly extended the takeoff roll but it was still possible to take off even with a 600 kilo overweight but here we come to the second problem because it turns out that the speed selected by the crew were actually for a flaps 25 takeoff and not a flaps 30 takeoff this was probably because remember aukra hadn't updated the takeoff card for flaps 30 so the pilots were just using the flaps 25 speeds from the old takeoff carts instead now this should be safe since those speeds were actually higher but if the crew would have used the correct V speeds here then the V1 and VR speeds would have been 122 instead of 127 knots allowing them to rotate 5 knots sooner investigators later calculated that in the time required to accelerate these extra 5 knots the aircraft would eat up an extra 103 M of Runway which on a run way that's short isn't really something they could afford now the next thing I want to note about the captain's takeoff briefing is what wasn't in it a takeoff briefing should include discussions of the runway news possibly the weight but definitely the existing weather conditions and wind at the time the aircraft was taxing Out The Runway used for takeoff was Runway 07 since the wind was out of the Northeast but at this point the crew hadn't discussed the weather conditions at all in fact on this day aros's dispatch Department never provided flight 157 with any weather information at all before departure and the tower was like I mentioned closed so as the pilots were taxiing out toward Runway 25 the opposite Runway than the one that was in use the captain actually asked uh don't know what the wind is but none of the other crew members even acknowledged him a few moments later he asked uh but it's light yes or no to which the first officer replied yeah it is light apparently the pilots had decided without much data to back it up that the wind was light enough that they didn't even have to take it into account even though there was a weather office that they could have called in order to get the actual wind information now this is the attitude that most of us have when we're out driving our cars maybe we'll glance outside before we go to see if it's sunny raining or snowing and then we might modify our driving style a little bit depending on what we see but that's about it most of the time that's absolutely fine but sometimes we end up in a ditch and we need toll because it was just a little bit more slippery than we thought in an aircraft though we just can't afford to operate that way remember what I said about margins earlier on we should always make sure that we have the margins with us and not against us so when we fly we have to be super diligent with all details like wind in this case there was a 4 knot wind out of Northeast which slightly favored Runway 07 for takeoff instead of Runway 25 which the crew were now going for now four knots isn't a lot but when you are in overweight 727 taking off from a 1,800 M Runway with v speeds that are too high it just means again smaller margins the pilots likely noticed that there was a light Tailwind from with 25 because they taxied passed a wind sock on their way out to the takeoff position but that didn't change their minds now there are a few factors that I think could possibly have contributed to that decision you see taking off from rway 07 wasn't as simple as using rway 25 not only because it pointed away from their destination but also because of the proximity to the Venezuelan Border located only 2. 8 km away from the departure end the runway 07 now I can't say for sure whether there were any airspace restriction or anything like that but flight radar data shows that most flights using Herman wulano airport do take off from Runway 25 and the few that uses Runway s of 7 often execute a very sharp turn right off the takeoff likely to minimize entry into Venezuela it's quite possible that entering Venezuelan airspace requires some extra paperwork or communication with a traffic control which the pilots could have been aware of now two other aircraft did take off from r07 shortly before flight 157 departed but these were a cesno 208 and an Embraer 170 which are much smaller and more maneuverable and could therefore probably have made a turn that the heavier 727 just would not be able to do in any case whatever the reason was the crew was probably used to taking off from Runway 25 unless the Tailwind was very strong so as long as they perceived it to be light they likely didn't worry too much about it but investigators later calculated that that 4 knot Tailwind would add another 146 MERS to the takeoff distance so things were now starting to add up after completing the before take of checklist the pilots tax it up to the head of Runway 25 and then made a 180° turn during which the first officer again announced their intentions over the common frequency as soon as they were lined up the captain called for takeoff trust to be set and the flight engineer Advanced the trust levels to the predetermined eprs so at time 1718 they started accelerating down the runway at this point local plan spotters had gathered at the far end of the runway to watch the Sleek 7-7 takeoff and it was no coincidence that they were there to watch this particular flight aruka had a history of dramatic takeoffs from this particular Runway where on multiple occasions their 727s and 737s had been filmed making very long takeoff rols over flying plane spotters by just a few meters and on at least two of these occasions the aircraft had also nearly struck the 2 m High perimeter Fence located 60 M past the runway end as well as a tree and a military guard post 76 M further down range these earlier passes had been so close that he had enveloped the plain sporters in clouds of dust and left the tree branches swaying so for some of the enthusiasts positioned right at the end of Runway 25 this was probably a bit of a thrill-seeking adventure Ure and they ended up getting way more than they had bargained for I also want to add here that the placement of that fence tree and guard post also didn't comply with International obstacle clearance regulations since they penetrated into something known as the protected takeoff area this area is defined by a specific slope starting from the runway end and any obstacle that penetrates this slope has to be either removed or shortened or if that can't be done they must be mentioned on the airport sh included in the aircraft's takeoff performance calculations but here none of that had been done which again highlights the Colombian civil aviation authorities lack of proper enforcement as well as another safety margin removed anyway the existence of multiple videos of aircraft nearly striking these obstacles also says a lot about their ous operations since their planes had been filmed nearly overrunning this very same Runway at least twice we have to ask ourselves why and how many times that this has happened without it being caught on camera every aircraft must be able to pass the departure and Runway at a minimum altitude of 35 ft even after an engine failure but that was clearly being routinely violated here this leads me to believe that the excess weight wrong V speeds and disregard for the weather were probably also present on countless previous flights leading flight Crews to become accustomed to operating with little or maybe even no margin for error I can see how it can be attempting to dismiss the significance of 600 kilos here 5 knots difference in rotation speed there a 4not Tailwind here but the problem is that these little variations are only academic until they suddenly aren't now even with these factors in place flight 157 should still have been able to become airborne just before the end of the runway and if that would have happened we probably wouldn't be talking about this flight right now now but unfortunately there was still one last thing that tipped them over the edge remember that one human mistake as the 727 began to accelerate down the runway the first officer soon called out speed alive and then 60 knots the captain replied check followed by the first officer calling out 80 knots and also reaffirming that the decision and rotation speed were both at 127 knots 12 seconds later the first officer call out V1 rotate and the captain began to rotate the aircraft but he did so very very slowly the standard rotation rate on the boing 727 is about 2 to 3° per second until the aircraft gets Airborne at around 8 to 10° but here the captain rotated at only 1° per second less than half of the proper rate and that effectively doubled the time required to reach the takeoff angle during that time the aircraft consumed another 134 M of extra Runway only now they didn't have those 135 M to spare 7 seconds after the rotation call flight 157 ran off the end of the paved Runway with its nose in the air and just barely becoming Airborne as it crossed a short stretch of grass but it was now far too late to avoid those other obstacles at the end of the runway the rear fuselage soon crushed the airport perimeter fence as the airplane Streed across the road where the plan sporters now desperately threw themselves out of the way and through some miracle none of them were actually hurt the airplane then continued its trajectory forward where it struck both that tree and the guard post with its right main landing gear right trailing Edge flaps and the number three engine raising a huge cloud of dust and Scattered the breeze as it did so despite these impacts and the massive damage it caused the airplane then started climbing with several alarms and warnings blaring in the cockpit that the cockpit voice recorder C out for about 10 seconds right after the impact so we don't know exactly what the Pilot's initial reaction was to the Collision but when it came back online the captain exclaimed number three went engine three brother the first officer asked to confirm that engine number three had actually failed and the captain confirmed that yeah that's what he meant but the total extent of the damage to the aircraft was much worse than the pilots probably realized not only had the number three engine on the right side ingested loads of debris and therefore failed but one of the right trailing Edge flaps had also been completely removed and the entire right main landing gear with its door still attached had been entirely torn off and thrown more than 400 m away from the point of impact the loss of the right main landing gear was especially devastating because it severed hydraulic lines belonging to both of the 727s Redundant hydraulic system A and B which Now quickly started losing pressure now you might ask how it was possible that damage to One landing gear could end up depleting both hydraulic systems but this had to do with the fact that whilst the landing gear retraction was handled by hydraulic system a alone the brakes were handled primarily by System B and it is hard to design a system with redundancy for entire airplane part being ripped off so the aircraft was now climbing but in a very precarious state with theal loss of lift on the right wing of Trust on the right engine and rapidly depleting hydraulic pressures as the aircraft struggled to gain altitude the ground proximity warning system repeatedly started announcing caution terrain and the captain soon suggested that they should turn around for an immediate Landing even though they were well over Maximum Landing weight now thinking about a plan is generally a good idea but they were nowhere near that stage in their decision- making instead here it was all about keeping the aircraft in the air a deviating in other words the first officer now tried to raise the gear and it turns out that there actually was enough pressure left to raise the remaining boogies but the right gear obviously indicated unsafe since it was no longer attached to the airplane when he saw that the first officer called out uh right gear but at the same time the captain also said shut down engine number three was the flight engineer called out I lost hydraulic a this was a truly chaotic nightmare situation and when faced with something like this something known as short-term decision making is put to the test that's when there isn't enough time to reach for checklist or fully discuss what's going on instead the actions need to be prioritized and executed based on experience training and Technical knowledge but if any of those are lacking like in this case where the crew was faced with multiple failures likely never seen together in a training scenario Panic can very quickly start to set in and when the is panic bad decisions will be taken as the captain tried to figure out what to do next the first officer suggested that they lower the gear again and without almost any hesitation the captain just agreed now this course of action really makes no sense if you think about it with the airplane struggling to climb due to the loss of lift and thrust the last thing you want is to extend the landing gear since that would immediately increase the drag and make it even harder to maintain the safe air speed and keep the airplane under control all but given the captain's very fast reaction to the first officer's suggestion it seems likely that putting the gear back down was a panicked response to the unsafe gear indication and not something that the pilots actually took some time to analyze before doing and this action would definitely make things much worse for them as we will soon see by the time the gear was now lowered again almost all of the hydraulic fluid had been lost from both the main hydraulic systems the boing 72 7 has backup manual control cables for the elevators aerons and Pitch trim but these require the pilots to move them using muscle power and that requires a lot of strength for every input on top of that the 727s Roder doesn't have a cable operated backup instead it's powered by both main hydraulic systems as well as a third independent standby system that can be activated by flipping the standby Rudder switch on the AFT overhead panel in the event of an engine f we Pilots know that the first important things to do is to use the rudder to cancel out the Ying movement costed by the asymmetric trust but of course what they were now facing was no ordinary engine failure since the right main gear had been removed causing the total loss of both main hydraulic systems this now meant that the normal redundancy for the r control had been completely lost this inter turn meant that the airplane now started Ying towards the failed right engine as the asymmetric Trust pushed the nose that way and the normal counteraction of this moment using the left Rudder was made impossible unless the flight engineer would activate that standby brother switch if he would have done so it would have been theoretically possible to get the plane back under control and maybe even make an emergency landing at a later point but unfortunately amid the chaos and panic this never happened and I actually don't really blame him like I said before this was a scenario none of them would have ever seen before and activating that switch would have formed part of an emergency checklist that normally would have been done after having properly identify the malfunction something that they just didn't have time to do in this scenario and now since the landing year was down causing loads of extra drag the airplane also started to lose its speed and at lower speeds Control Authority from the flight controls have reduced even more the captain tried to keep the wings level by using the aons but the Y was still getting worse and since their speed was now also dropping he was losing Aon Authority as he fought to maintain control the first officer applied maximum power on the remaining engines while both Pilots called for each other to fly it gently the airplane climbed to a maximum altitude of 790 ft at which point its speed had just dropped too much and it now started descending Instead This caused multiple terrain warnings to again blare out in the cockpit and the captain ALS also warned that they were on the verge of stalling meanwhile the flight engineer frantically began to try to dump fuel to reduce the weight of the airplane but it was too late for that since to dump fuel in any meaningful amount takes a lot of time time that they just didn't have the fuel jettison valves still opened up and fuel started pouring out from the wings but it really didn't help as the airplane now embarked on a slow descending right hand turn the captain claimed that the plane wasn't accelerating and they now also asked the first offic to raise the landing gear again likely finally realizing that in their initial Panic they had made a very bad mistake in extending it but of course when the first officer tried to raise the gear it wouldn't come back up since there was now no hydraulic fluid left to lift it it was likely at this point it became clear they were both out of time and out of options impact was now imminent the pilot started engaging in panic back and forth discussions about racing or lowering the gear even though there was nothing that they could do about it and as that was happening the stick Shaker had now also started rattling away confirming the captain's earlier comments about the aircraft being close to a stall but the captain kept trying desperately to remain Airborne despite insufficient air speed and a still worsening ya now just a few dozen meters above the ground seconds later the speed finally became so low that it couldn't support flight with this increasing Bank angle the aircraft stalled meaning an uncontrolled loss of lift which caused a final steep Bank over to the right and straight into the ground within viewing distance from the airport and the entire flight had at this point lasted only 2 minutes and 23 seconds now the aircraft impacted with its nose and right wing first causing it to immediately roll over inverted before both Wings separated and the cockpit snapped off a large explosion then consumed most of the wreckage as the fuel load completely combusted and the severed cockpit came to AR rest away from the Flames but even though that was the case four out of the people on board had died instantly from the impact forces and one succumbed to his injuries later at the hospital but the mechanic actually managed to survive and despite suffering serious injuries he was somehow able to escape from the wreckage where he was soon assisted by bystanders and Rescuers I's accident investigation group concluded that the causes of the accident were inadequate flight Planning by the crew and the airline improper decision making by the flight crew and the captain's improper rotation technique the illegal use of a 727 at an unapproved airport the airlines failure to modify the takeoff cards the excessive weight the lack oversight from the civil aviation Authority and the crew's failure to activate the stam by Brother hydraulic system were all cited as contributing factors but while the flly crew made several serious mistakes here it's also obvious that this accident could likely only have taken place within the dangerously LAX operating culture at Aeros sura the investigators therefore made several recommendations mostly just suggesting that Aeros sura should comply with basic regulations and that the civil aviation Authority should actually enforce them which seems like a pretty low bar to reach if you ask me but if there is one thing that I want everyone to take away from this video whether you're pilot an airline manager or you work in some other industry where safety is important it's this if you start to recognize frequent omissions or little breaches of procedures even if they don't seem all that significant at the moment it's a sign that the holes in the Swiss cheese are now growing bigger if that kind of culture is allowed to last long enough then an accident become not only possible but almost inevitable margins are there to minimize the impact of unforce errors and if they are taken away or ignored eventually bad things will happen now this video was made possible partly by the supporting members of my patreon crew who makes it possible for me to hire new team members and expand into even bigger and better Productions if you enjoy this content you can join us as well using the link in the description below which is patreon.
