Turkey was supposed to be Russia’s friend. For years, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan walked a fine line, balancing between NATO and Moscow. He kept trade open, refused to sanction Russia, and even bought weapons from Putin’s military.
But now? Everything has changed. In a move that even the U.
S. didn’t see coming, Turkey is starting to shift—and it’s not in Russia’s favor. Erdoğan has stopped playing neutral.
He’s openly backing Ukraine’s territorial integrity, making life harder for Putin, and pulling Turkey further into NATO’s sphere of influence. The big question is—why? Is Turkey turning on Russia for good, or is this just another strategic play by Erdoğan to secure more power for himself?
And if Turkey is truly breaking away from Russia’s grip, what does that mean for the war in Ukraine and the future of NATO? Let’s break it all down. Of course, the main actor behind the sudden shift in allegiances is the current Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan.
To understand his actions, we’ll need to delve a bit deeper into why exactly Turkey and Russia have this complicated relationship. For that, we need to go slightly further back in time. To the 11th century, in fact.
Crimea originally didn’t belong to either the Russians or the Ukrainians. The region first came under Turkic influence through the Cumans, a nomadic people who settled there around the 11th century. Later, the Mongol-led Golden Horde ruled Crimea, laying the groundwork for the rise of the Crimean Khanate in the 15th century.
This Tatar-led state, though independent in theory, soon found itself under Ottoman suzerainty. By 1475, the Ottoman Empire had seized Crimea’s major coastal cities, including Kaffa, a crucial trading port. While the Crimean Khanate remained semi-autonomous, its rulers swore allegiance to the sultan in Istanbul.
Crimea became a key military asset for the Ottomans, providing skilled Tatar cavalry for their campaigns. The peninsula also served as a launching point for raids into Russian and Polish territories, fueling the slave trade that enriched the empire. This arrangement lasted for over 300 years.
The 18th century, however, marked a turning point. The Russian Empire, expanding aggressively under Peter the Great and later Catherine the Great, saw Crimea as a gateway to warm-water ports. A series of wars between Russia and the Ottomans culminated in the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, which nominally granted Crimea independence.
In reality, it was a stepping stone for Russian annexation, which officially occurred in 1783. The Ottomans, weakened and unable to prevent this loss, had to accept a bitter defeat. Even after losing Crimea, Turkey’s strategic interest in the peninsula remained strong.
The Crimean War (which lasted from 1853 to 1856) saw the Ottoman Empire, backed by Britain and France, fighting Russia to curb its expansion. While the war ended in a temporary setback for Moscow, Crimea remained firmly in Russian hands. Meanwhile, the Crimean Tatars, long aligned with the Ottomans, faced increasing persecution.
Waves of them fled to Ottoman lands, particularly modern-day Turkey, further diminishing the region’s Turkic identity. The Soviet era brought even greater suffering. In 1944, Stalin accused the Crimean Tatars of Nazi collaboration and ordered their mass deportation to Central Asia.
Entire families were forced onto cattle trains, and tens of thousands perished due to starvation, disease, and brutal conditions. For decades, Tatars were banned from returning, and their homeland was repopulated with ethnic Russians. It was estimated that between 150,000 and 200,000 people were displaced from their homes and forced to move deeper into Asia.
It wasn’t until the early 1990s, during the Soviet Union’s collapse, that many Tatars finally made their way back to Crimea. So why is Crimea so important to all the parties involved? Well, there are a few major reasons, the first being the region’s vital access to the Black Sea.
When Russia annexed the region in 2014, it regained the ability to create a new fleet in the Black Sea, which could be used to exert influence, mainly militarily and politically, in Eastern Europe. By securing Crimea, Russia has annexed one of the arguably most important areas of modern Ukraine. Not only does Crimea provide ready access to the Black Sea, it also has plenty of natural resources.
As a prime example, Crimea’s surrounding waters in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov hold substantial oil and natural gas reserves. Before Russia’s annexation, Ukraine was developing these offshore fields as part of its broader energy independence strategy, which would’ve reduced its reliance on Russian gas imports. The most notable energy assets include: The Skifska and Foroska gas fields, estimated to contain billions of cubic meters of natural gas, The Odessa gas field, a major offshore natural gas production site in the northwest Black Sea, and the Crimean Shelf, which has significant untapped hydrocarbon potential.
By annexing Crimea, Russia took control of these reserves, significantly expanding its energy dominance in the Black Sea. Ukrainian energy companies, such as Chornomornaftogaz, lost control of offshore extraction sites, which were quickly seized by Russian-backed authorities. Not only did this make Ukraine much more dependent on energy imports, but it also allowed Russia to build a practical monopoly on producing and refining oil and natural gas in the central and eastern parts of Europe.
Why does this concern Turkey, though? Well, Turkey has historically relied heavily on Russian natural gas to meet its energy needs. In 2021, Russia supplied approximately 44.
9% of Turkey’s domestic gas demand. This dependency has been decreasing over the past decade. The Russian share of Turkey’s total natural gas imports fell from 60% in 2013 to 39% in 2022.
Despite this decline in percentage terms, the absolute volume of natural gas imported from Russia has remained relatively stable. After Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, Turkey's natural gas imports from Russia took on new strategic importance. While Western nations enacted sanctions on Moscow, Turkey chose to maintain its energy ties.
At the time, over 55% of Turkey’s natural gas came from Russia, flowing through the Blue Stream and Western Line pipelines. The annexation didn’t immediately disrupt these supplies, but it reinforced the delicate balance Turkey had to maintain. With such a high level of dependency, any geopolitical shift could threaten its energy security.
That balance didn’t last long. In 2015, Turkey shot down a Russian Su-24 fighter jet near the Syrian border, triggering a full-blown crisis between the two countries. Moscow responded with harsh economic sanctions, cutting trade and restricting tourism.
Suddenly, the gas that had seemed so reliable became a potential weapon. Turkey had no choice—it had to rethink its energy strategy. The first step?
Finding new suppliers. Azerbaijan quickly became a bigger player in Turkey’s energy mix. The launch of the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) in 2019 gave Turkey direct access to Azerbaijani gas, reducing its reliance on Russian pipelines.
But Azerbaijan alone couldn’t replace Russia’s vast supply. Turkey needed more options, and fast. That’s when liquefied natural gas (LNG) entered the picture.
Imports from the U. S. , Qatar, and Algeria surged as Turkey expanded its LNG infrastructure.
Even as Turkey diversified, it didn’t cut ties with Russian energy entirely. In fact, the two countries struck an even bigger deal. The TurkStream pipeline, completed in 2020, created a new route for Russian gas, bypassing Ukraine and strengthening Turkey’s role as an energy hub.
The irony was clear—while Turkey worked to reduce its dependency, it also became a key transit point for Russian gas to Europe. Then came 2022. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
This put Turkey in an even tougher position. European countries slashed Russian gas imports, but Turkey continued buying, taking advantage of deep discounts. The war only underscored what had become obvious since Crimea—relying too much on Russian gas was a dangerous game.
The pressure to shift away from Moscow wasn’t just about politics anymore; it was about long-term energy security. Where did that leave Turkey? Still walking a tightrope.
It continues to buy Russian gas while expanding its LNG capacity and deepening partnerships with Azerbaijan and other suppliers. This situation was further complicated due to the fact that Turkey is in NATO. Turkey’s obligations to NATO have repeatedly forced it to step back from aligning too closely with Moscow.
While Russian natural gas remained a crucial part of Turkey’s energy supply, the country’s military commitments to the alliance have made it impossible to fully embrace Russia as a strategic partner. Every time tensions between Russia and NATO escalate, Turkey is reminded of where its true security interests lie. The annexation of Crimea was one of the first major tests of this.
As a NATO member, Turkey was expected to stand with the alliance in condemning Russia’s actions. While it stopped short of imposing sanctions, it voiced strong support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and denounced the persecution of Crimean Tatars. And all the while, Turkey kept buying Russian gas, walking a fine line between economic necessity and geopolitical loyalty.
Things became even more complicated in 2015. When Turkey shot down a Russian Su-24 fighter jet that violated its airspace near the Syrian border, Russia retaliated with economic sanctions. Gas supplies were not directly cut, but the crisis proved how vulnerable Turkey was to Russian pressure.
The incident also reinforced NATO’s role in defending Turkish airspace—when tensions flared, Turkey had no choice but to lean on its allies. Despite these setbacks, Turkey and Russia found ways to cooperate. The completion of the TurkStream pipeline in 2020 deepened their energy relationship, allowing Russia to bypass Ukraine and send gas directly to Turkey and Southern Europe.
However, just as their energy ties strengthened, NATO’s concerns about Turkey’s military purchases from Russia began to strain relations. When Turkey bought Russian S-400 missile defense systems, NATO responded with harsh consequences, including removing Turkey from the F-35 fighter jet program. The message was clear: relying too much on Russia, even for defense, would come at a steep price.
After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Turkey refused to join Western sanctions on Russian energy. Yet, it did close the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits to Russian warships, limiting Moscow’s military operations in the Black Sea. At the same time, Turkey supplied Ukraine with Bayraktar drones, which played a key role in resisting Russian advances.
These moves distanced Turkey further from Russia, proving that when push came to shove, NATO security interests outweighed economic dependency. And it’s this assurance that NATO will defend Turkey that ultimately forces it to put aside its Russian influence and stay with the Western world. This is more of a symptom of how Russia has mismanaged its geopolitical alliances by attacking Ukraine.
The invasion didn’t just damage Russia’s standing in the West—it also weakened its alliances with key global partners. Once seen as a strategic power broker that used its plentiful oil and gas reserves to leverage beneficial deals, Russia has steadily alienated its allies, diminished its influence, and pushed neutral countries closer to NATO. Every diplomatic misstep, battlefield failure, and economic strain has only reinforced the perception that Moscow is no longer a reliable or dominant force.
Meanwhile, NATO has capitalized on these fractures, expanding its influence and strengthening its alliances in ways that would have seemed impossible before the war. One of the biggest blows to Russia’s global standing has been the loss of credibility as a military power. Before the invasion, Moscow positioned itself as a dominant force, capable of challenging the West.
As the war dragged on, its underwhelming battlefield performance, heavy casualties, and logistical failures exposed serious weaknesses. Countries that once saw Russia as a powerful security partner—such as Armenia, Kazakhstan, and even China—began reconsidering their ties. When Russia failed to support Armenia in its 2023 conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, it sent a clear message: Moscow couldn’t even protect a close ally, let alone project power globally.
Russia’s economic dependence on China and India also became a vulnerability. As Western sanctions cut off Russian oil and gas exports to Europe, Moscow turned to Beijing and New Delhi as alternative buyers. While these countries continued purchasing Russian energy, they did so at massive discounts, taking advantage of Moscow’s desperation.
China, once seen as an equal partner in a multipolar world, began treating Russia more like a junior partner—a dramatic shift from their pre-war relationship. India, meanwhile, maintained ties but strengthened its military cooperation with the U. S.
, signaling that its long-term security interests lay with the West rather than Moscow. The war also strained Russia’s long-standing influence in Central Asia. Countries like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan distanced themselves, refusing to recognize Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territories and seeking closer economic ties with China, Turkey, and the West.
Kazakhstan, traditionally a loyal Moscow ally, openly defied Russia by refusing to support the war and increasing cooperation with NATO members. This shift significantly weakened Russia’s control over its post-Soviet sphere of influence. Perhaps the biggest geopolitical win for NATO came in northern Europe, where Russia’s aggression forced Sweden and Finland to abandon their neutrality and join the alliance.
Before the war, the idea of Finland—a country that shares a 1,300-kilometer border with Russia—joining NATO would have been unthinkable. Russia’s invasion erased decades of hesitation. In 2023, Finland formally became a member NATO, doubling the alliance’s direct border with Russia.
Sweden followed in 2024, further expanding NATO’s strategic reach in the Baltic region. What was meant to weaken NATO had the opposite effect—it strengthened and expanded it. Meanwhile, Turkey, despite its historically complicated relationship with NATO, aligned more closely with the alliance due to Russia’s actions.
While Turkey did stall the ascension of Finland and Sweden into the alliance for a full two years, on paper this had nothing to do with Russia’s ongoing affairs. Considering the timeline where both countries became full NATO members a year into the war, it’s clear that Turkey had decided that there was very little it could gain from unashamedly favoring Russia in global geopolitics. This was mainly due to Russia’s aforementioned failure to capitalize on the enormous numerical advantages that it possessed at the start of the conflict.
By all counts, Russia had roughly double the total manpower and in some cases 10 times the military troops Ukraine had when the invasion started. The original plan for Russia was to claim victory over Ukraine within a few weeks by performing a few debilitating strikes on the Ukrainian government. When that failed, Russia faltered and seemed to stumble on what route to take for its strategy.
What should’ve been a quick invasion was initially repelled, to the point where most of the Russian gains in the West of the country were completely annulled by the end of 2022. While it wasn’t as obvious at that point, the war turned out to be a complete disaster for Russia, so much so that Turkey bailed as one of Russia’s key so-called friends who also had a part in Western alliances. This meant that Russia could no longer leverage Turkey’s dependence on Russian oil and gas to dictate NATO’s policies and sanctions (or lack thereof).
With Turkey out of the picture, the road was clear for NATO to begin its figurative counteroffensive by increasing the rate of donations to Ukraine. This led to Russia making desperate moves after similarly benign statements about its sovereignty being threatened. And with the latest comments from Erdogan himself stating that Turkey steadfastly supports Ukrainian territorial integrity, it’s pretty clear how little Russia’s threats have affected NATO’s decisions.
Even Russia’s few remaining allies, such as Iran and North Korea, offer little real strategic benefit. While they supply Moscow with drones, ammunition, and limited economic support, they do not compensate for the loss of European markets, Central Asian allies, or military credibility. Instead, these partnerships reinforce Russia’s growing isolation.
A case in point was the fact that North Korean troops that were sent to Kursk had little to no effect on the state or the progress of the war. Upon their arrival in regions like Kursk, roughly 10,000 to 12,000 troops were thrust into active combat roles. Unfortunately for them, their lack of preparation for modern warfare, especially in countering drone operations, rendered them vulnerable.
Reports indicate that North Korean units suffered heavy casualties due to their inability to adapt to the advanced tactics employed by Ukrainian forces. In some reports, it’s suggested that the North Korean battalions lost more than 3,000 troops over the course of only four months. This not only diminished their effectiveness but also strained Russian military resources, as efforts had to be redirected to support and replenish these underperforming units.
The anticipated boost in manpower from North Korean forces did not translate into a strategic advantage for Russia. Instead, the integration of these troops into the Russian meat grinder of a military strategy introduced further logistical errors. Ultimately, the downfall of North Korean troops could be said to be one of the nails in the coffin of Russia trying to get a country, any country, on its side in the war.
With North Korea practically impotent, Turkey turning to the West, and China heavily favoring trying to appear as neutral as possible, Russia has lost pretty much every ounce of geopolitical support it once had. Of course, Russia is still getting economic boons via trade with China, India, and other BRICS countries, but some of these deals are heavily unfavorable for Russia. Nevertheless, the writing is on the wall that Russia will have to continue alone.
Which brings us to the question of a possible peace deal, and how Turkey might contribute to that. Turkey, despite facing criticism from Western allies, has carefully navigated a complex diplomatic path, demonstrating its ability to mediate between opposing sides—a strategy that seemed to have worked at least somewhat. One of its earliest efforts came in March 2022, when Turkey hosted a high-profile meeting in Antalya between the foreign ministers of Russia and Ukraine.
Although the talks ultimately failed to produce a meaningful result, this was the first direct diplomatic engagement between the two nations since the conflict began and started Turkey’s role as an early broker of dialogue. A more impactful achievement was the Black Sea Grain Initiative, born out of urgent concerns over food security as the war disrupted global grain exports. The war triggered severe grain shortages and an escalating food crisis due to Ukraine being the world’s seventh-largest grain producer and relying on the Black Sea to send its cargo ships out, which was now blocked by the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
Recognizing the humanitarian stakes, Turkey and the United Nations brokered a deal on July 22, 2022, establishing a secure shipping corridor for Ukrainian grain exports. This initiative proved to be a lifeline for 349 million people, helping stabilize food markets and sustain Ukraine’s economy amid the ongoing war. Turkey’s diplomatic outreach extended beyond economic relief—it also played a crucial role in de-escalation efforts.
In November 2022, Ankara facilitated a rare meeting between U. S. and Russian intelligence chiefs, focused on addressing nuclear threats.
More recently, Turkey’s mediation efforts proved instrumental in negotiating a high-profile prisoner exchange between Russia and Ukraine. Turkey’s ability to play this balancing role stems from its unique position of being both in NATO and yet relatively close to Russia. In truth, this has more to do with Erdogan’s movement toward the country being less dependent on alliances with other nations and more culturally uniform.
This is a similar philosophy that Putin himself has outlined in a 2021 article, which somewhat falsely equates Ukrainians and Russians as being the same people. Erdogan is applying this concept to Turkey itself, trying to create a country that is more economically, politically, and militarily active. This has made Turkey one of Europe’s largest militaries, which is only helped by the country’s favorable geographic position that allows it to essentially cut off access to the Black Sea at will.
This leads to Turkey having a surprising amount of potential to influence the politics of the War in Ukraine, and its previous mediation efforts underline that. With that said, it’s unclear how exactly Turkey will approach peace talks, as Russia, Ukraine, and even the U. S.
and the rest of NATO have yet to create a specific plan that tries to satisfy both parties. But whenever that does happen, it’s likely going to feature a Russia with no allies in Europe. What do you think?
Will Turkey be the one to broker peace in the War in Ukraine? Or is this just a power move by Erdogan to reap more political goodwill? Thanks for watching and leave your comments below.
