The end of the Cold War the, in a sense, the collapse of one side, led the other side to gloat. There was a sense in which the West had won. The end of the Cold War announced the supremacy of one system and there was no question that the side that was still standing did have a kind of resilience and underlying legitimacy that the other side did not have.
In fact, one famous American writer Valeria do you remember his name? >> I believe his name was Francis Fukuyama. >> Fukuyama, that's right.
And, a famous American writer announced that the end of the cold war was, was the end of history. We had now culminated into a world what we were all liberals, we're all democrats. It was a triumphalist discourse and of course, it's the one that if you think about from the point of view of many Russians who watched the collapse of the regime and the gloating in the west and particularly in Washington taking advantage of the weakness of Soviet power that's given rise to a renascent Russian nationalism nowadays.
What I want to say is now thinking historically, to urge a little bit of caution, urge some humility about these kind of triumphalist prognostications when we really don't understand what's happening historically. Because, in fact, what happened was the end of the Cold War, it may have cleared the slate of old antagonisms, but it also pulled back the veil on new kinds of divides that people like Francis Fukuyama simply didn't understand was happening, right? The emergence of a new strain, among other things, a political Islam, a new ideological divide.
So, while at the western end of Eurasia things were shaking up the communist regimes. We see in throughout the Middle East, the rising tide of political Islam. We also see transformations happening in the eastern end of Eurasia, in China.
Students in China and in Beijing in particular, had begun to agitate in 1986. A very important year, and it's already a sign of the role that globalization is going to play on local and national politics, was the television. That TV's had become increasingly widespread in China in the 1980's.
In, by 1985, there were over 40 million televisions already in households around China, which including other things, began to cover elections in Taiwan, which was perplexing for many Chinese viewers. And this specter of these kinds of transformations many of them censored, it's worth saying, but many of them also percolating through was giving rise to a democratic movement within China but with very different outcomes. Rising domestic, querying and questioning of authorities in Beijing which gave rise to China's own version of the great year of 1989, an uprising, a democratic uprising against communist authority in China centered on the important square of Tienanmen in Beijing.
This uprising, and this is an iconic photograph of that event in which one man stands before a column of army tanks, stopping the repressionist tanks wasn't a in a sense, a model of a new kind of civic defiance against one party state. This movement led by students but soon rallying civil forces from all over China focused on Beijing, was eventually crushed. Especially the night of June the fourth, 1989, in which the Chinese military opened fire on its own people at the, in the capital of Beijing.
This was a shock. To the world. Much of this was telegraphed, televised and photographed.
And the question arises, why did the Chinese repress the movements where the Soviets did not. What accounts for the differences in the trajectories? Remember, a point we've been making in global history.
Not all stories of globalization forced governments and societies to go down one road, they can take many paths. Well, first of all, what was very important for the Chinese was that by the time the democratic movements erupted all over China in nineteen, well, they began earlier but it really culminated by 1989. Chinese authorities could witness what was happening in eastern Europe.
That the reforms lead to the crumpling of the entire system and that they did not want to see happen. The Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping had watched events in eastern Europe very closely. Indeed, the day of the massacre on June fourth, Poland was staging elections that would eventually bring down communist rule in Poland.
The first elections in eastern Europe since the Soviet occupations. They were simultaneous with each other, and Deng Xiaoping was very aware of what was happening, that was important. In fact, Deng Xiaoping, I should say, considered Gorbachev a fool for letting it go.
Second, was that China had begun a process of sequencing its reforms in a very different way than Moscow. In Beijing, the ruling regime after 1976 began the process of economic reforms before ever embarking on political reforms. In fact, one might say that the political reforms never really happened but the economic reforms are allowed to grow deeper and deeper and deeper.
Beginning, most especially in 1968 with a kind of agrarian reform. Agrarian reform allowing private landholders to sell their products in local, and regional, and national markets. That led to an explosion of food output, the lowering of prices, the decline of scarcities for food and this was very important for emboldening people's loyalty to the government.
The second was that, China had embarked from the late 1970's really using the Japanese model of capitalism as a precedent, some people in the so-called West should resist the tendency to congratulate themselves for serving as a model for capitalism. In fact, the Japanese model was very important. What was important for the Chinese was here was a model of economic opening and of trade and export orientation that worked very well for Japan, and we could do it too.
China could compete by becoming a manufacturing export country for the rest of the world. A whole series of reforms from free trade zones, to his, to growth poles. What it meant was that the Chinese economy was soon, by the early 1980's, on track to ten percent economic growth rates per anum whereas the Soviet Union was crumbling.
The result was then that the economy in China by the late 1980's was very dynamic, whereas the economy in the Soviet Bloc was folding in on itself. That's an important, we don't want to overstress and say it was only to do with the economic reforms, but it, it meant that the regime did enjoy more legitimacy behind the lines than the Soviet Regime had. But I should say, that it was not only the communist blocks that faced challenges.
Political Islam was challenging what used to be the, the, the, the apparent solidity of a lot of the pro-Western Middle Eastern countries. Even in American backyard, insurgents were rising up as in Mexico in 1994 and 1995 in the poor province of Chiapas, which borders on Guatemala. Peasants rose up to defy the authority of another one-party state, a pro-Western one-party state which was the Mexican regime.
And eventually too, beginning the process of sapping the legitimacy of the Mexican government leading to full scale elections and a tran, democratic transition in the year 2000 in Mexico, which was it's own democratic revolution. 1994, 1995 then one might say was a fabulous year of possibility and opening. But remember, the dialectic that we've been talking about, the point, counter point process in history, it was also a terrible year.
A year of great sadness. Well, some states were making transitions to democracy, other states were collapsing altogether, right? Roads through political, the political roads to globalization are many, they don't all converge.
In Afghanistan, the Taliban took over. And in sub-Saharan Africa, so many civil wars seem to be intensifying, falling into the hands of warlords. And nowhere was this more tragic than in the small country of Rwanda.
Four decades after the genocide of the Second World War, we see a genocide happen in Africa. So, while the world, and particularly the West, bathed itself in promises never to forget what has happened to the Jews while TV cameras and reporters were telling the world that in Rwanda, a massacre was happening. And in fact, the leader of the United Nations Peace Forces in Rwanda was sending cables to New York to say a massacre is happening and we can intervene and save the population of Tutsis from Hutu mobs who were going around butchering people with machetes, the world did nothing.
I should say, the governments of the United States, France, and others chose to do absolutely nothing. So, Romeo Dallaire who was the head of the U. N.
Peacekeeping forces in Rwanda desperately calling out for help and got nothing. In 80 days of butchery, 800,000 people, almost all of them Tutsis, were killed. Including many Hutus, I should say, who were trying to defend their neighbors from being butchered by mobs.
The result was, in Rwanda, a catastrophic refugee crisis. In fact, while globalization, we begin to see the specter of mass refugee camps of stateless people becoming a phenomena on the, on the world's global political geography. So, there are limits as this case happen of the power of global public opinion.
It doesn't always lead to humanitarian intervention. And yet, it was also in Africa where we see the role that global public opinion does play a constructive role in enabling democratic forces to take hold. And this is, best exemplified in the case of South Africa.
Whereas the massacre at Sharpeville that I've talked about in an earlier lecture, in the early 1960's was lived at the margins of global public opinion in the early 1960's. By the 1980's, the world became increasingly obsessed with the apartheid regime in South Africa leading to boycott movements, pressures on universities and organizations to divest their holdings from firms that were involved in business in South Africa. Forcing on the government of the day to open up and eventually to allow a democratic elections in South Africa.
Most important, the leader of this movement within South Africa itself was a man called Nelson Mandela. He had been part of the wing of the African National Congress. Remember, we talked about the African National Congress in an earlier lecture who had taken up armed resistance against apartheid and had served in the prison at Robin Island for 27 years.
White minority rule in South Africa under pressure from global boycotts and public opinion to open up embarked on negotiations with the ANC and Nelson Mandela, whom they released from prison. And the opening finally began in 1990, culminating in these historic elections in April of 1994, which would sweep the ANC and Nelson Mandela to power. So globalization, many people presume, often means that nation states are no longer relevant.
That in a sense, the power of those, those structures that were born of an earlier age of revolutions where sovereign nations states that would be self determining, would guard the peace or conflicts of the world was had reigned supreme for several centuries and now globalization was sweeping the nation state aside in favor of a new kind of, transnational political tie that economic forces undermine the sovereignty of nation states, that cultural forces undermined The power of states to act unilaterally over it's citizens, and of course, new political movements like public opinion, shaped by the images that you've been looking at in this course, all drained away the unilateral powers of the states. But the most recent economic difficulties that we're living through, do remind us that states do have important roles in economic life. They often performed the functions that markets are unable to do.
This has been something that's been around for a very long time as you now know. The failure of states and their conflicts, as we saw in the case of Africa, also remind us of the importance that states with the capacity to uphold the rule of law are a cornerstone for any regime that respects human rights, including the rights to live on this planet. Doing something about the effects of the kind of economic model that globalization has embraced.
Particularly, as we consume more and more natural resources, a theme we have been exploring throughout this course. Only states, in the end, can really enforce the laws. Now, what compels the states to do this does depend more and more on global forces.
But, nation states are still relevant, very relevant, in this matter. History reminds us of surprises, of the unintended consequences, of the paradoxes. Hegel, the great German philosopher, called this the cunning of history.
And he invoked the image of an owl, right? That accompanies Minerva, this Roman God, with special powers to be able to see in the dark, that's what the owl can do, right? The symbol of wisdom.
And he has a famous line in one of his books in which he argues that the owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk, that the owl can see into the dark. The owl is the only creature able to see into the dark and the rest of us though, can only take make sense of what's happened in history in retrospect. Now, we are at the dusk of several hundred years of history.
What I would like for you all there is to let the stories of world history remind you of the uses and abuses of power, the uses and abuses of history itself to be able to make the distinctions between them. Let the images and memories of Mary Wollstonecraft, to Nelson Mandela, the prophets of rights for those who lack them, let them stand as Presidents to talk about possibilities for futures that are not yet inscribed. Let them remind you of the struggles of the past, these should not be forgotten, among other things, because they're not yet over.