Hello, I'm Professor Amanda Almosara, and this is our Constitutional Law class. In today's lesson, we will study the prerogatives of members of the National Congress and the constitutional considerations regarding the loss of mandate. Very well, starting then with the prerogatives of members of the National Congress, the Constitution establishes prerogatives for members of the National Congress.
And you might be wondering: "But, Professor, why these prerogatives? Why these privileges for deputies and senators? " In fact, these prerogatives are aimed at protecting a representative and democratic system.
They are situations that preserve representativeness, preserve democracy. So, they do have a much more positive than negative intent. It's not because it's a prerogative that it's some technically privilege that others don't possess.
They are attributions specific to members of the National Congress that stem precisely from the mandate they hold and the function they occupy. These prerogatives can be material prerogatives, formal prerogatives, procedural prerogatives, and even prerogatives by forum or what we call special forum. Let's begin then with the study of material prerogatives.
Very well. Material prerogatives are provided for in Article 53, caput of the Constitution, and it is very important that we comment on them. Article 53 establishes that both deputies and senators are inviolable civilly and criminally for any of their opinions, words, and votes.
So, be careful, the inviolability is civil and criminal, whatever the opinion, word, and vote. Have you ever seen a deputy or senator on the podium giving that little speech? Very well.
What he says there does not constitute any civil or criminal offense. It may constitute a breach of parliamentary decorum, as we have already discussed. Now, a crime or a civil offense that may eventually generate compensation?
No. Very well. Observations regarding this prerogative of a material nature.
Why material? Because it relates to content. Opinion, speech, or vote content.
For federal deputies and senators, there doesn't need to be a connection to parliamentary activity. If the opinion, speech, or vote is internal, that is, within the house, within the Chamber, the Senate, on the podium, then it doesn't even need to be connected to parliamentary activity. They can go in there, start badmouthing their neighbor , and that doesn't constitute either a criminal or civil offense.
Now, if they are outside of their activities, outside the house, no, within their activities or within their work, it needs to be connected to parliamentary activity. So, if they are on a television program, in a congress, and they express an opinion, a vote, specifically a deliberation— technically it wouldn't be a vote, but a deliberation, a manifestation of understanding—it has to be connected to parliamentary activity to be inviolable. So, if it's directly linked to the exercise of the activity, there are no civil or criminal consequences.
Now, be careful, because this prerogative of a material nature is different for city councilors. For city councilors, there is indeed a prerogative of a material nature, but for them, it must necessarily be internal and connected to the legislative activity they perform within their house. Therefore, it is much more limited at the municipal level than at the level of the National Congress, where it can be internal, doesn't even need to be connected to parliamentary activity, and can be external, provided it is connected to parliamentary activity.
So, civil and criminal inviolability applies to deputies and senators. Very well. Another interesting point is that the Constitution establishes a limitation on the duty to testify for federal deputies and senators.
What does this mean? Deputies and senators are not obliged to testify about information they receive or that is provided in the course of their mandate, nor about people who have entrusted or confided information to them because of the office they hold. So, there is protection and a limitation on the duty to testify.
Therefore, a deputy or senator cannot be compelled to testify if the information they obtained stems directly from the exercise of their mandate. Professor, I want to check this. Article 53, paragraph 6 of the Constitution.
Very well. So, the first prerogative is the material prerogative , that is, regarding the content, not characterizing either civil or criminal wrongdoing, opinions, words, and votes. The second is the formal or also called procedural immunity, which we have a breakdown as formal or procedural immunity.
What do we have? The first rule, the first rule is that from the issuance of the diploma, both for deputies and senators, then members of Congress, in general, cannot be arrested, except if the arrest is in flagrante delicto and for a non-bailable crime. Write that down.
So , from the issuance of the diploma, members of Congress cannot be arrested, except if they are arrested in flagrante delicto and for a non-bailable crime. OK? If they are then arrested in flagrante delicto and for a non-bailable crime, it has to be the same for both criteria.
So, in flagrante delicto and for a non-bailable crime. The case files will be sent to the respective house within 24 hours. That is, if it's a deputy, it's the Chamber of Deputies.
If it's a senator, it's the Senate. And the house will decide by a majority of its members whether the arrest will be upheld or not. So, the house decides on the arrest of the deputy or senator by a majority of its members.
This rule limiting arrest applies from the issuance of the diploma. Very well. Now , another rule that also relates to the issue of formal or procedural immunity concerns any accusations against deputies and senators.
So, there is no constitutional limitation on the possibility of prosecuting deputies and senators. Now, if an accusation is received by a deputy against a deputy or senator for a crime committed after their swearing-in, then be careful. If there is an accusation, and technically the accusation is made by the Public Prosecutor's Office as the instrument that triggers the criminal action, then there is an accusation against a senator or a deputy for a crime that occurred after their swearing-in.
The Supreme Court, upon receiving this accusation, notifies the house to which that parliamentarian belongs, the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate. And the respective house, on the initiative of the party. And that's where, by a majority vote of its members.
And when we say majority, absolute majority, the final decision can even halt the proceedings. So, if there's an accusation, the Supreme Court of Science, and the house, by a majority vote of its members, can halt—not dismiss, but suspend, pause the proceedings. So, technically, the process against a deputy or senator continues normally, regardless of authorization.
What can happen is that with the communication from the Supreme Court informing the house that a process has been initiated and the accusation has been received, the house can take the initiative by an absolute majority of its members to halt this process. Now, with this process halted, with this action suspended, the statute of limitations is also suspended. And it's obvious, right?
While the process is suspended, the statute of limitations is also suspended. Professor, for how long does this suspension last? This suspension lasts as long as the mandate lasts.
Okay? So, don't confuse the issue of the possibility of suspending criminal proceedings with the issue of imprisonment, which is constitutionally restricted. Another important observation: we saw the prerogative of a material nature, which should not be confused with a formal prerogative.
City councilors do not have formal procedural prerogatives, neither regarding imprisonment nor the suspension of proceedings. They only have material prerogatives, and only if they are directly related to legislative activity and carried out within the respective house. Now, for state deputies, they have immunity, which would be a material immunity regarding content, but they do not have formal immunity for crimes committed before their swearing-in.
So, there's a slight difference. Formal immunity applies to state deputies, that is, the issue of suspending proceedings for crimes committed after their swearing-in. Before that, they do not have immunity.
Another interesting issue is the special jurisdiction, also called jurisdiction by prerogative of function, provided for in the Constitution, in article 53, paragraph one. The Constitution, in article 53, paragraph one, establishes that deputies and senators, from the moment their diplomas are issued, will be subject to trial before the Supreme Federal Court. This means that they have a special jurisdiction due to their position.
Therefore, from the moment their diplomas are issued, deputies and senators will be judged before the Supreme Federal Court. Be careful, because in this case, the special jurisdiction applies to all crimes committed before or after the diploma is issued. The only concern we saw earlier is that it applies to crimes committed after the diploma is issued.
So, one thing is the special jurisdiction, this possibility of pausing the criminal proceedings. This possibility of suspension is only for crimes committed after the diploma is issued, which could involve a biased accusation or one intended to tarnish the image of the parliamentarian. That's why it's a possibility that causes concern.
Now, regarding the special jurisdiction due to position, trial by the Supreme Court, it doesn't matter if it's before or after the diploma is issued. The Supreme Court has an attractive jurisdiction. It is sufficient for an individual to hold the office of deputy or senator for the cases to go up and proceed before the Supreme Federal Court.
Very well. A very important point here concerns the jurisprudence of the STF. According to the jurisprudence of the STF, even if I have a deputy or a senator who has the prerogative of office and this privileged jurisdiction, they cannot, for reasons of personal conviction, renounce this constitutional guarantee.
What does this mean? The Supreme Court said: "This prerogative of office does not belong to the individual, the physical person occupying the mandate, but rather to the very status of the mandate. Therefore, an individual could not renounce the privilege of jurisdiction, saying: 'I don't want to be judged by the Supreme Court, I want to be judged by a single judge.
' The Supreme Court said that this renunciation of the prerogative of office is not possible. Okay? Another interesting point: the immunities of deputies and senators also remain in effect during a state of siege.
Now, during a state of siege, they can be suspended, but it requires a 2/3 vote of the members of the house to suspend the immunities or constitutional guarantees. Now, this suspension is only for acts committed within the precincts of Congress that are incompatible with the execution of the state of siege. It is a preservation of the very identity of the State and the unanimity of the democratic representation of the legislature.
OK? I hope you enjoyed this lesson and I invite you to our next meeting. We will talk about.
. . " Restrictions on parliamentarians and also questions regarding the loss of their mandate.
Thank you for your attention and until our next meeting.