It's a very radical conclusion. And the problem is it's very hard to see what's wrong with the argument. The argument seems like a good one.
And it has seemed that way to everyone who read this paper since 1972. Today we're talking about an absolutely revolutionary paper published by a philosopher named Peter Singer in 1972. The name of the paper is famine, affluence and morality.
And the basic idea is that the moral stance that you have, your attitude towards your moral obligations um and the things that you may or may not do in your life and the attitude that all of your friends and all of your relatives have. The general moral outlook that everyone around you has is deeply and profoundly wrong. And the crazy thing about this paper is that on the surface at least it's very persuasive he seems Singer seems to be right.
It seems to be once you go through the argument that he lays out, it seems to be that we need to completely rework our entire society and more specifically, forget about society for a minute, you need to completely rework your life if your life is going to be a moral one. And sort of what makes the paper so radical is that I can say all of these things that the thesis of the paper is that you need to completely rework your life without knowing anything about you. I know virtually nothing about your life and your moral outlook and your values and the kinds of things that you do on a day-to-day basis.
I can basically make some assumptions about my audience. You know, general assumptions. You live in a broadly capitalistic society, let's assume, you know, there are government regulations and that sort of thing.
And you live sometime in the beginningish of the 21st century. That's basically enough. If that's true of you, then Singer thinks that your whole life needs to be reworked if you're going to live in a morally acceptable way.
Okay. If we're going to understand this argument, then we need one distinction to start out. This is a technical distinction, but there's really only one technical term.
Here you go. We're talking about the distinction between the supererogatory and the obligatory. Imagine this.
You're getting together with a group of friends or co-workers or something like that. And uh you decide, you know what, this is a pretty early gathering. It's a pretty early meeting.
And so, wouldn't it be nice if I went and got everyone some coffee and danishes because some people are going to be rushing out of their house and they're not going to have time to eat breakfast. And so, when everyone shows up, surprise, surprise, there is some coffee and donuts and and treats or whatever that you brought for everyone and you paid for and you're just giving it to them and you say, "Hey guys, I brought these for you. I want you to have them.
" That act, that action is super derogatory. It's extra. It's super.
You didn't have to do it, but it was a really nice thing to do. It was an extra thing that you did and it was a good thing to do. It was not obligatory.
Something is obligatory if you have to do it. Right? So, if someone is assigned in the group to bring coffee and breakfast to every early morning meeting and you signed up, you promised, you committed to bringing coffee and breakfast on that day.
Well, then bringing coffee and breakfast is obligatory. And of course, it would be nice if everyone thanked you for bringing those things, even if you agreed or promised to do it. It wasn't extra.
It was something you had to do. You had committed to it. You were obliged to do it.
One more example just to bring out this distinction. And this example may date this video. So, it may give you a sense of when uh when I'm making this video, but anyway, at the time of the recording of this video, there's something going on in supermarkets where when you check out in the supermarket and you're paying for your groceries or whatever, um well, there's some of the payment is obligatory, right?
You have to pay for the things that you are buying. But then there's this extra payment. They say when you're checking out, they're like, "Would you like to donate $1 to?
" And then they name some charity. Would you like to add $1 to your bill here at the supermarket? That additional payment, that's extra.
You don't have to do it. It's up to you. It's super derogatory.
If you do do it, it's good. That's a nice thing that you did, right? But you didn't have to.
Superogatory. That's what that word means. Okay.
Here's the claim of this paper. The claim is that there are these organizations that exist in the world now. Now, in 1972, says Singer, right?
And these organizations like Oxfam, right, and UNICEF, these are organizations that take money from people who live in relatively wealthy places on the planet. And they they take that money and they use it to do amazing things for people who are suffering under things like famines. Right?
If there's a famine in some place in the world, there's not enough food and people are literally starving to death. They are dying because they don't have enough food. So someone donates a little bit of money and these organizations take that money and a very high percentage of that money with a great deal of efficiency gets transported to this other place on the planet where there's a famine and literal people's lives are saved.
Normally we, you and I and all of your relatives and all of your friends, everyone in our society, in our broader society, we think of these sorts of acts. Giving charity in this way, giving money to Oxfam or UNICEF or whatever, we think of these things as superogatory. Giving to charity is superogatory.
It's nice, it's good, but you don't have to do it. If on any given occasion you don't do it, you're not a bad person. It's not like you failed to live up to some obligation that you had.
Singer says, "No, here's an argument that proves Singer thinks that giving to charity, giving extra money to famine relief, if you're affluent, if you have extra money, is something that you must do. You must do it in the same way that you must not murder or you must catch someone if they're if they're falling and you can just reach out your arms and catch them and save them. You must do it.
That's the thesis. Okay. So, Singer has an argument for this thesis, an argument for this conclusion, but we're going to get to the argument in one minute.
First, let's just skip to the end of the paper and see his statement of that conclusion. Here's what he says. Here's what Singer says.
Because giving money is regarded as an act of charity, it is not thought that there is anything wrong with not giving. The charitable man or if we want we want because this was written in 1972, we can say the charitable person. The charitable person may be praised, but the person who is not charitable is not condemned.
People do not feel in any way ashamed or guilty about spending money on new clothes or a new car instead of giving it to famine relief. Indeed, the alternative does not occur to them. What's the alternative?
The alternative is not getting those new clothes and not getting that new car and instead taking that money that you would have spent on new clothes and just well wearing your old clothes and taking that money and giving it to an organization that will help people that will save people who are dying of famine. Right? That possibility the possibility of not spending money on luxuries does not occur to most people or to virtually anyone.
This way of looking at the matter cannot be justified. This way of looking at the matter is the way that we all look at the matter. That is we think that giving money to famine relief is superogatory.
It's nice. It's an extra thing that cannot be justified. The only thing according to Singer that can be justified and we're going to get to the argument for this conclusion.
The only thing that can be justified is the way of thinking where you think that giving to famine relief instead of buying new clothes or a new car or whatever, giving to famine relief is obligatory. That's the only way of thinking that can be justified. The upshot or the punchline is this.
If you don't give to famine relief, Singer thinks you've done something wrong. You've done something evil, bad. Every time you buy new clothes that you don't absolutely need, or you buy a new car when you could just drive your old car, or you buy a cup of coffee that someone else made for you because it's more convenient for them to make it for you and it tastes a little better than if you were to make it at home.
Every time you do any of those things, you're doing something wrong. You're doing something bad. We don't think this way.
No one in our society, not in 1972. And even though this is a super famous paper, you've maybe never heard of it. And so it didn't seep into the whole society even now, right?
People don't think that buying new clothes or buying a cup of coffee from a coffee shop is a bad thing to do, an evil thing to do, a wrong thing to do. But Singer thinks that it is. And here's his argument for that conclusion.
Okay, here's the argument. Singer doesn't lay out the argument like this with four premises and one conclusion or anything. Uh, I'm pulling these out of the paper, but this is indeed the argument.
Here's how it goes. Let's take it one step at a time. One, if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening without thereby sacrificing anything of moral significance, then we must morally do it.
That is, prevent that very bad thing from happening. Okay, that's premise one. I'll just give you a hint.
This is going to be the most controversial claim, right? It's a very general claim. It's talking about, you know, very bad things.
It's got this big category of very bad things. And then it's got this other category of things with, you know, things that you might sacrifice that are not of moral significance. That's another big category.
It's a big grand claim about what you must do morally. And it's a very general claim. So one is going to be the most controversial claim in this argument.
So we'll come back to this. If you're looking for this claim, by the way, in the reading, then go to page 235. There's one big paragraph in the middle of page 235.
And this claim happens not phrased exactly like this but basically like this at the sort of end of that paragraph. Anyway, let's keep going. Step two, hunger, disease, and other sources of suffering, disability, and death are very bad.
Okay, those are some examples of very bad things. We see how this is going to connect up with the first premise, right? we've got a bunch of very bad things.
And it's said in the first premise that if it's in your power, if it's in our power to prevent something very bad, well then we've got to do that thing. We've got to prevent those things. So these are going to be the things that we're going to need to prevent.
This argument is going to claim it's just specifying some very bad things. And premise two, by the way, seems totally plausible. Hunger, disease, and other sources of suffering, disability, and death are very bad.
Yes, that's plausible. Hunger is very bad. Real hunger, where someone doesn't have enough food to eat.
And disease and other things that cause people to suffer or become disabled or die. All of that is bad. Yep.
Okay, good job. Premise two, very plausible. Premise three, the luxuries on which we spend money are not of moral significance.
So the kinds of luxuries he's talking about are these luxuries, right? Buying new clothes when your old clothes, although out of fashion or a little tattered or whatever, are perfectly good. Or buying a new car when your old car, although not as good as a new car, is still a good enough car.
Right? or the example that I gave earlier, buying a cup of coffee when you could make the coffee at home. Really, going to any restaurant ever, right, counts as a luxury in this sense.
I mean, you can always just for less money make food at home. This connects with the idea of moral significance or of some things not being of moral significance, right? Sacrificing sacrificing anything of moral significance.
That's part of the first premise also. So, premise three is specifying the kinds of things that aren't of moral significance. And once we understand what Singer means by luxuries, he's right.
These things are not of moral significance. They're not a big deal. If you go without them, you're not really worse off.
Four, by donating money to relief agencies like Oxfam, we could prevent hunger, disease, and other sources of suffering, disability, and death. Well, that's just saying that there's a very specific way, an easy way, right, to prevent these things which premise two established were very bad. Premise four.
Is it true? By donating money to relief agencies like Oxfam, we could prevent hunger, disease, and other sources of suffering, disability, and death. Yes.
Premise four is true. This is true. These organizations do do this.
You can give them the money and then they will prevent these things. This premise 4 is just an empirical claim. It's just a claim about whether these organizations actually do the thing that they say they're going to do.
And the answer is yes, they do do it. Okay. And then here's the conclusion.
And we've already reached this conclusion. We've already talked through this conclusion. Therefore, we must must.
Where is it? Where is it? Must.
We are obligated. It's not super derogatory. It's not extra.
This is something you have to do. And so the conclusion gets us something you have to do. We must morally donate the money that we spend on luxuries to relief agencies.
And we don't get to spend them on luxuries. This is the argument. Okay.
So now is a good time to re-emphasize how radical this conclusion is. We're about to assess the argument. We're really going to focus almost entirely on premise one because premise one is the only controversial premise and the argument.
Everything else, steps two, three, and four. I mean, these just seem to be obviously correct, obviously true statements, and the argument is is valid. So, well, one is the only option that we could argue against, and we're going to try to argue against it.
And Singer is going to say, "No, and none of those arguments work. " Okay, but focusing again on the conclusion for a minute before we get back to premise one, this is pretty radical. No one thinks that we have a moral obligation.
No one, none of your friends, none of your family think that you must not buy a cup of coffee, you must not buy a new car, you must not buy new clothes. Instead, you must take all of that money and donate it to some organization like Oxfam, one of these relief agencies. No one lives their life like this or very few people.
Peter Singer, by the way, he's still alive. I met him, right? We had dinner once.
He gave a talk and then I Anyway, I know him. I'm I you know I know celebrities. Um Peter Singer who's still alive kind of lives his life like this.
He donates a very significant non-trivial portion of his income which is not enormous. It's not an enormous income to relief agencies. He does this.
He does not live a luxurious life. Not a life that we would normally call luxurious. Okay.
So there's one and then maybe there's I don't know a few of his friends who he convinced. But most people don't live their life like this. The conclusion of this paper, is that most people, you included, are doing something bad every day and you don't even realize it.
Okay, enough about how radical this conclusion is or whatever and how much it departs from your day-to-day life. Let's get to premise one. This is the controversial premise.
What does Singer say to support such a broad sweeping claim? Here's what he says. This is a rather famous example that Singer gives to support premise one.
Here it is. If I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wait in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant.
While the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing. Okay, got the example right? There's a shallow pond or a fountain.
When I teach this class on campus, every college campus uh including the one where I work uh in North Carolina, every college campus has like a fountain somewhere, right? There's a fountain there. A small child is drowning in the fountain and will die.
You are walking by. You can easily step in and save the child. The cost to you will be just a few moments and well your clothes are going to get wet or muddy, right?
Muddy if it's a pond or wet if it's a fountain or whatever. This sacrifice, by the way, is not of moral significance, right? It is insignificant that your clothes are going to get a little wet.
Oh, and you're on your way to something where you didn't want your clothes to be wet. Okay, that's not a very significant sacrifice. But the death of the child, the drowning death of the child in almost all circumstances would be a very bad thing.
Well, the thought is go from this example. If you agree with what Singer says about this example, and I suggest of course that you do, if someone just showed up at a meeting and said, "Hey, there was this kid drowning. Uh, but I didn't want to have wet clothes for this gathering, so I just let the kid drown and die.
" You would be horrified. You would think that this person was evil, that they had done an evil thing. You would not let your friends or family associate with this kind of person.
Well, if you agree with Singer about this specific case, then Singer says we should be able to abstract from this case to a more general principle, and you should hold this more general principle. And the more general principle is premise one of the argument. The idea is that well, a child drowning in a pond, that's a very bad thing.
But it's not bad because it has to do with water or children. You know, an adult drowning and dying is also a bad thing or even an adult dying by some other means is a bad thing. Right?
What's relevant here is not that it's a child or that it's a water involving death. It's that this is a easily preventable death. The death is a bad thing.
And the fact that your clothes would get muddy, that's a morally insignificant thing. But the fact that it's your clothes and it's mud, that doesn't matter if it's something else that you have to sacrifice. If, for example, instead of your clothes getting wet or muddy, your, I don't know, your car is going to get dirty or you're going to lose your shoelaces.
The shoelaces will be gone forever. You'll have to sacrifice your shoelaces and you'll have to get whole new shoelaces, and that'll be kind of a pain in the butt. The point is this, the difference between one way of dying and another way of dying or one morally insignificant sacrifice and another morally insignificant sacrifice, the difference between these doesn't matter.
So you can go from a a specific case like this to a general claim like one. And the thought is if you agree with Singer about this specific case, then you have to accept premise one of the argument. Okay.
So there are two ways in which you might think you can't go from this example to this premise. Or another way to put this point is you might think that there are two big differences between this shallow pond example and the example of giving up your luxuries. The luxuries in your life, a new car, a cup of coffee, that sort of thing, a massage.
There's a difference between this example and giving up those things to save someone from a famine. There's two ways in which there might be a relevant difference. These are the two relevant differences that Singer considers and responds to.
Here they are. Okay, here's the first potentially relevant difference. Proximity.
In the shallow pond example, you're right next to the child. You're very close to this child. Whereas in your day-today life, you are not right next to you're not near the people who are dying of famine or of whatever other very terrible things that organizations like Oxfam fight against.
Well, is that a morally relevant difference? Is that a way in which we block this example from generalizing to something like premise one? Singer thinks no.
It used to be that proximity made a significant moral difference because it used to be that a great distance prevented people from knowing about about very bad things. It used to be that if there was some very bad thing happening on the other side of the world several hundred years ago, you could never know about that very bad thing or you couldn't find out about it for months or years. But now now proximity is irrelevant to your knowledge of very bad things because there's very efficient forms of communication.
You can know about a famine going on in another country while it's going on with enough time to do something about it. Proximity also used to be relevant before these organizations existed. It used to be the case that you weren't able to sacrifice some luxury in order to save someone from a famine because well it was very hard to get things across the world and there weren't organizations set up that had built very efficient systems for taking a few dollars from you and literally saving a person's life on the other side of the planet.
So proximity used to matter. It used to be a morally relevant difference between the pond example and the famine example, but it's not anymore, says Singer. So, this difference of proximity does not prevent your intuition, your thoughts, your moral thoughts about an example like this from translating over to a very general claim like one.
Here's the other potential difference. If you're trying to block this example from getting the result ultimately that you have to give up all the luxuries in your life, you might say, "Look, in this shallow pond example, we're led to assume that there's no one else that could save the child. There are no others who are capable of saving the child.
" But in the case of famine relief, anyone could give money to Oxfam, right? There's all these other people present. And the thought is, well, in the cases where there's all these other people present, it doesn't fall on you.
You don't get the obligation to to be the one who, you know, save someone's life when they're dying of famine. Here's what Singer says in response to that. He says, 'L the presence of others who could help is sort of relevant because their presence typically leads to they're actually helping those other people actually helping prevent the very bad thing.
So if there were other people who saw the child drowning in the shallow pond, well then very likely one of those other people would save the child and then you wouldn't have to save the child. And if then you showed up and you s at the meeting and said, "Hey, there was this kid drowning in the pond. " And you know, whoever was going to go in and save the kid was going to get their clothes wet.
And someone says, "Your clothes aren't wet. Are you an evil monster? " And you say, "No, no, there were other people there and someone else saved the kid.
" And they'd say, "Oh, okay. Wow, that must have been something. Let's get on to our frat party or whatever we were about to do.
" The point is the presence of others is only relevant if those other people are going to do something. If they're not going to do anything, then it seems like at least to Singer, the obligation is on you. If there's other people who are able to see that this child is drowning, but these other people care a great great deal about getting their clothes wet or muddy and they're not going to step in to save the child.
And you know this and they say this to you. Well, does the fact that they're there and they could save the child excuse you from your duty to save the child? No.
If you show up at the meeting and you say, "I was going to save this kid, but there were these other people there. " And they say, "Who saved the child? " And you say, "No one saved the child.
The child drowned. The child is dead now. " Everyone would say, "You're a monster.
You're an evil person. You should have saved the child. " You say, "Yeah, but there were other people there.
" Doesn't matter. the other people didn't do anything about it. So that means you have to do something about it.
The fact that there are other people who could help in the case of famine, in the case of a drowning child is itself irrelevant. What matters is if someone else does help and then there's no more need for you because all the children have been saved or all the people have been saved from famine. A lot of people donate to organizations like Oxfam, some amount of money or other, but there's still plenty of people left who need to be saved.
And so you have an obligation to them according to Singer. The fact that there are other people who aren't helping also, that just seems totally irrelevant. Okay, a few ending notes.
One, how much do we have to give? I mean, it's one thing to give up, you know, one cup of coffee, right, made at a fancy coffee place, right? But do I have to give up all the coffee that I might ever buy?
Do I have to never buy coffee and never get a new car and never get new clothes? Am I allowed no luxuries at all? Do I have to give away so much of my money that I'm reduced to the level of the person who's suffering from this famine or near to that level?
Singer says maybe yes. He considers two versions of premise one, right? And this is more specific and it's in the paper.
Um I think it happens on where does it happen? It happens on page 231. He considers two versions of premise one.
a stronger principle and a weaker principle. And this is the weaker one, right? According to the weaker principle, you just have to give up some luxuries.
You don't have to reduce yourself all the way down to the level that's near equivalent to the people that you're saving. But according to the stronger principle, you do. And Singer actually thinks this argument basically works for the stronger principle.
You have to give up a lot. Here's an objection, an additional objection that Singer considers. He considers this on pages 236, 237, 238.
If you're looking in the text, this is just too demanding. This is too much to ask for people to give up all these things. To that, Singer says a couple things.
One thing he says is, look, that is a standard, you know, objection to utilitarianism. And Singer is himself a utilitarian or at least he's a consequentialist. I can't remember.
Anyway, he's close to a utilitarian and he could be for the purposes of this paper. So, well, it's a standard objection against utilitarianism that it's too demanding, but Singer just thinks that this is a very weak objection. Maybe morality is very demanding.
The argument seems to work. The fact that you don't like the conclusion, which is really what the too demanding objection comes to, the fact that you don't like the conclusion is not an argument that the conclusion is false. He considers another argument.
This is on page 239. Another argument that goes like this. If private individuals start donating money to famine relief, then governments will stop.
And if governments stop donating money because the private individuals have got it taken care of, well then very bad things will result um there won't be enough money because the governments are the real source of the money or whatever. Sing response to this part of his response is to just say don't worry about it. Not that many people are going to start giving.
It's not going to prevent governments from donating money. Governments don't give that much money to begin with. And if you give every dollar that you have, that's not enough to affect how much governments give, you're not going to solve this problem on your own.
And if your only objection is, hey, if I give all my money, I'll totally solve the problem. That's just a weak objection. Yes, you'll totally solve the problem.
Good. Solve it. The last objection that Singer considers, this happens on page 240 in the reading, is the thought that well look, if you donate all this money to famine relief, it's just famine relief.
It's going to help these people. It's going to save their lives. Sure, but there'll be another famine in a few years from now.
Maybe in that place, maybe in a different place. You're just postponing these famines. Singer says, "No, you're not.
those famines are going to happen one way or another. And if you donate the money to help people who are dying of this famine today, and when he wrote this paper in 1972, there was a specific famine that he was talking about. If you donate the money, you will save these particular people's lives.
And the fact that there's going to be more famines in the future, maybe that affect these people, maybe that affect other people, it just seems irrelevant. Think back to the shallow pond example. This child is drowning in the pond.
You don't want to get your pants wet or muddy. So you say, "Well, look, if I save this child now, then this child is probably just going to stumble into some other pond later and die anyway. " You would seem absurdly callous.
you would seem evil. Singer says you would be evil and if you don't donate all of this money that you spend on luxuries, then you are evil. That's what Singer says.
Okay. So, I think we can agree that the conclusion of this argument is radical. It's wild.
It seems to show that everyone that you know is a terrible person, is roughly as terrible as someone who would let a child drown and die because they didn't want to get their clothes muddy. That's what the argument seems to show. That's a new thing.
like you probably don't think that you and your family are evil, but the argument seems to show that it's a very radical conclusion and the problem is it's very hard to see what's wrong with the argument. The argument seems like a good one and it has seemed that way to everyone who read this paper since 1972. There are responses to it and there are philosophers who try very hard and have very clever, careful things to say to try to show that this argument doesn't actually work.
But at least until we get to read some of those arguments, you should try to see if there's anything wrong with this argument yourself. Peter Singer, by the way, he's still alive. I met him, right?
We had dinner once. He gave a talk and then I Anyway, I know him. I'm I you know I know celebrities.