I haven't gotten to any questions on Consciousness but in your theory how is consciousness defined and where does it fit in every Quantum of the universe is conscious because it's a syntactic a syntor is a generalization of a computational acceptor it's a protoc computational gener generalization of what in computation theory is called an acceptor okay an acceptor is just a a a a processing unit that accepts input from the external environment applies a kind of syntactic filter in it to decide what gets through and in what form and then you know processes it and returns
it to the environment so that's basically what it what it comes down to and if you took a take a look at the in the structure of the syntact because it's performing that recognition function okay it has to be conscious every Quantum of the universe is conscious okay but it's a generic form of Consciousness that it inherits from the global operator descriptor right we have a more complex form of Consciousness because we have more inherent complexity in our terminal embodiments and more self-modeling capacity because of that we have a very complex brain that encodes all
of our memories and thoughts and everything else and allows us to separate and resolve them okay so that's how AIT DAV also wants to know have you heard of the work of Jonathan M in particular tractatus logical cicus which proposes an exploration of ctmu in the matter of in the matter of binstein well I i' I've never met Jonathan but I know who he is and I know he's done some writing on the ctmu he's an intelligent fellow and uh he's you know he's actually written a book or two and uh as far as I
know he's still a member of our of our groups but it's like I said I've never met him we've had a few conferences I would have liked Jonathan to come to a couple of them but he did send me a copy of this book DAV again has another okay would you be willing to have a discussion with Kurt so theories of everything with Kurt with personalities like Bernardo castrop Thomas Campbell or Eric Weinstein uh yeah I'm open to to whatever you might have in mind but there are you know there a couple of people that
are probably on your list of interviewees with whom I have had you know peripheral reactions or interactions in the past and some of these people of I I think as I recall Bernardo castri was pretty darn CH sniky he was on I think he was on one of Jack sarfatti's lists and there was a kind of a an antagonism going on there and uh I made a couple of comments and uh got a couple of what I regretted as pretty pricity responses at Bernard and uh I remember being slightly rubbed the wrong way by it
but you know that's water under the bridge so sure I participated in a discussion that Berard I was in yeah he didn't he start writing for Scientific American or something that atheistic rag I don't know but I do know that he's a sweetheart and I don't think I think if he was picking a fight with you then it's I think you may be thinking of the wrong person I don't think that no I'm not okay I'll look for the I'll look for a copy of the email if you want to see it but but but
anyway when I when I say pnic I'm not saying that he was insulting or that he was especially Nast I'm just saying that it was a little bit disagreeable that's all I see I see oh well that's what you want in an adversary I think it's because he' become you know embroiled in some kind of argument with with Jack or somebody else in the distributions Stephen Nik asks I've taken the view that information and logical rule set are the only necessary ontological components and operate equally regardless of substrate that is whether it's material or Consciousness
essentially idealism materal materialism is a false dichotomy okay that's not a question read the first part read the first part of that com I've taken the view that information and logical rule set are the only necessary information and logical what rule set oh logical rule set okay okay so I've taken the view that information and logical rule set are the only necessary ontological components and they operate equally regardless of the substrate so whether it's Consciousness or material information and logical r rues set are primary so then he's saying that even so he's saying essentially that
idealism materialism is a false dichotomy so what are your thoughts on that it's not a question I just want to hear what occurs to you well you know it is a false dichotomy in a sense that all of those things are coupled you know uh information and logic there is no information without a logical rule set language is the medium of information and language has syntax and that's a logical rule set especially where your language includes the language of logic itself so those two things are are very closely coupled you can't separate them dualistically and
put one on one side one on the other and say we've got a complete dichotomy here in that sense he's right about their they're being a false dichotomy um as far as reducing all of reality to just information and logical rules Set uh that emits a lot of structure that probably deserves mention but it could just be that he didn't have the time dve all doubt what would be an example of a structure that's not captured in information or logical rule set well you've got all kinds of read the ctm there are many many pages
of structure that are missing from that characterization um but one thing that can be said for it is that that information mappings are also captured in these little Quant these these these State transition events of syntaur of syntactic operators and Tel operators it can all be be captured uh and so it's not really a move okay Karan Dudley says great choice of guests number one so she's referring to she or he is referring to you number one in your opinion which of the major philosophers came the closest to discovering and expressing the true nature of
reality came the closest okay uh well there were a number of very very good ones I mean if you look back uh just so many Pythagoras came up with something that looked a little bit a little bit like cesis and and uh Aristotle followed up on that and and uh liet also had there was much to be said for what he did um Whitehead with his process philosophy also uh very good bergson had some good ideas you've got uh there are just a number of philosophers out there that uh you know butus had some good
things going for him Plato of course uh just all kinds of them I mean heraclitis SN Dudley same person number two as you know girdles in completeness theorem say that they apply to all sufficiently expressive formal systems so why should one think girdles theorems don't apply to the ctmu they do apply to the ctmu that's that's why the ctmu formulated the way it is okay to get around it's why it's generative you can generate new axim in the ctmu okay you don't need to derive uh everything in the ctmu from some finite set of AXS
exactly what Goodell's theorem say so there seems to be a bit of misunderstanding about what the ctmu actually says can the generative grammar introduce an uncountably infinite amount of axioms yeah it can it can introduce uh an infinite set of axioms if that's what you're asking but uncountably infinite is what I'm wondering anything anything in which the elements can be distinguished is countable you can count them one by one count count count okay the fact of the matter is real numbers are uncountable because you never have to complete one of them you never have to
write out all the little decimal space if you want to be able to distinguish things they're countable okay just like you know counting you know peanuts okay one two 3 four five all right that's the that's the respect in which the countable uncountable distinction is actually mathematically valid and if you've got separate axioms that are distinguishable obviously they are countable and if you have an infinite potentially infinite or unlimited number of them than they are countably infinite Timothy O'Brien asks please ask him how Liv's monadology relates to the ctmu well monad you know monads are
it's an old Greek concept that goes back quite a ways and and uh liet um you know he had a he had a good there's actually some logical complexity to liet's monadology that I should you know I could actually write a paper about it but let's just put it this way Way It Is it Is Well it's excellent philosophy I'm actually you know monad liet is one of the philosophers for which I have uh the most respect let's just say that Ike freden says Kurt this may be a useful question what role do the requirements
of the existence of difference relations play in the metaph formal reasoning of the ctmu the metaphysical requirements of difference relations did you say yeah okay he has a bracket which says well that would be synesis would be the metaphysical requirement of difference relationship that would be that be that the difference relationship be defined within a cionic relation okay which means that you need you know basically the ctmu to to make sense Stephen olis has a great question that's more General are there any Arenas where Chris feels dumb or average you know it all depends on
it sometimes I roll out of bed feeling pretty stupid about nearly everything um my mind is not always you know functioning in Peak efficiency so there are times when I feel pretty much incompetent no matter what I do but there are times when uh all the mirrors are you know cocked at the right angles and all the lights are on then I sometimes feel as though I could pretty much handle anything so it just varies with the time of day I guess you'd have if you enjoyed that clip then the full podcast is out right
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