Anti-Satellite Weapons, Deterrence And Sino-American Space Relations

[Music] thank you all for attending uh my name is Neil jock I'm the host of this series and it's pleasure to welcome you all to he Michael crepon today uh you can obviously hear me without the use of this mic but we need to use the mic for the recording so that they have a full uh necessary sound effects so uh it's kind of a pkin mic but um we'll work with it as is so I'm very pleased uh to Welcome Michael kpon from Washington co-founder of the Stimson Center currently an independent scholar both working

for Stimson and doing a lot of work Michael's a good example of sort of the um the policy Insider he hasn't been involved as a policy maker for a while he was back in uh some decades ago I dare say but he's uh been working on the inside of how people think about policy in Washington for several decades and understand the the makings of policy and Comes to us with um some very uh interesting thoughts about the issue of space competition with China I Ur encourage you to look at his testimony from last week when

he testified in front of the house armed services committee um it's available on the web January 28th 2014 so it was just last week that he he gave his testimony and you can also find additional thoughts from people who take a counter of view to Michaels uh uh at the same time that Also testified um not an advertisement for them since I'm being a good host but um in any case I also encourage you to take a look at a couple of books he's done most recently deterent stability and escalation control in South Asia which

speaks to another of uh Michael's areas of Interest this is a book he edited and then perhaps more interestingly uh his uh uh single authored book better safe than S sorry the ironies of living with The bomb but I think these capture Michael's expansive attention to polic issues um and help uh sort of put in perspective uh a practitioner and observer and Scholar who's been sitting in Washington looking at policies developed for several decades now and uh is I think uniquely positioned based on his uh intellect and policy Acumen to um provide us uh you

know to to write these books so thank you for those and with that said let me um turn things over to Michael kpon Michael thank you for joining us in Berkeley thank you NE you know you're very very fortunate here at Berkeley because you have people available to you who have been in the arena they've tried to make policy they've tried to inform policy uh from both the intelligence community and state department National Security Council staff the Pentagon so there are two guys here in the room who are just immense immensely talented uh and they're

here so why not bother them um Neil uh I don't know if you know his background but he he came from Lawrence Liver Livermore he's worked in the state department policy planning he's worked on the NSC staff he's work worked uh in the intelligence Community as the National Intelligence officer for South Asia so that's the go-to person for South Asia and Afghanistan by the way so he's over here and his office is right down the wall down the hall and Michael knock is here at Berkeley and Michael has um he's worked on everything I'm about

to talk about and he knows more about everything I'm going to talk about than I do and he's been at the Pentagon he was at the arms control disarming agency he's negotiated with the Chinese He's negotiated with the Soviets so bother him too uh if you have questions about these matters it's good to be back at Berkeley I was here as a student in the summer of 1969 and and my hair was longer then than it is now so let's talk about space let's talk about China let's talk about how a status quo power that

depends very greatly on Space deals with a rising Power that is increasing its capabilities in space across the board so a lot of people are worrying about China China is flexing its muscles a little bit more uh earlier last year a Chinese Battalion set up camp 7 miles across the line of actual control dividing India and China and you know just set up tents for 3 weeks that was that was very upsetting to New Delhi and China's Naval capabilities are growing and we are seeing some of the same Dynamics Visa V China that we saw

with the Soviet Union way back when I was a student at Berkeley in the late 60s where there are close encounters between Naval vessels uh there is a real possibility that hulls will scrape and this worries some people and not just in the United States but friends of ours in the region and neighbors of China and then China has a very active Space Program across the board you've read about a moon landing not everybody is able to do that to have a Rover explore the surface of the Moon you've probably read in the paper or

on the Internet that China carried out a successful test and blowing up one of its old satellites which created quite a debris field which is a hazard to every space fairing Nation and they're also testing multi-purpose Technologies as are we that could be applied for mil military purposes or they could be used for very benign purposes so what is China up to and can we and China work out a Cooperative as well as a competitive relationship without getting into a frus in space that's what I want you to think about The United States unlike China

has some experience in how to manage a cooperative and competitive relationship in space we did it with a peer competitor not with a rising power maybe that made it a little bit easier but we and the Soviets uh engaged in a space race to get to the moon to land humans on the moon we engaged in a Ferocious nuclear arms competition just fero ferocious between the two of us uh we produced Berkeley also has something to do with this but we produced over 70,000 nuclear warheads in this competition think about that it far out ways

the competition we're looking at with China particularly in the nuclear Dimension but it was an ideological competition it was a geopolitical competition we're competing with China in a region we competed with the Soviet Union everywhere we had very very very close encounters with nuclear danger with the Soviet Union we had crisis that some people in this room lived Through and we also competed on the Global Commons of the high seas and in space we didn't have that cyber thing going on back then but we had just about all the rest of it and we somehow

worked out rules of the road for space we cooperated as well as competed we had the docking of a us and a Soviet Spaceship in 1975 Apollo so we we cooperate with Russia to this day every day on the International Space Station and you know our relations with Russia aren't so good in other areas but we do cooperate in space we avoided a surprise attack which a lot of people worried about in space we avoided a bolt out of the blue Attack which a lot of people worried about in terms of our nuclear competition some

people today talk about a space Pearl Harbor how do we how do we prevent a space Pearl Harbor with China we are so dependent on Space our military is so dependent on Space when we move forces into Harm's Way those forces get help from space when those forces need to communicate they get help from space if those forces need to Target somebody or some thing on The surface of the Earth they get help from space if they need a weather forecast which is crucial when you're operating in strange lands you get help from space so

we are so so dependent on space and you are who are not in the military are so dependent on Space are we vulnerable in space absolutely are we vulnerable to nuclear attack you bet and somehow we have managed to avoid being attacked despite our Vulnerabilities so far so far so how if Lessons Learned how did we manage to avoid this surprise attack and being disadvantaged um from an attack on our Assets in space well one reason we managed to avoid this Dreadful outcome is because we and our opponent back in the Cold War days are

PE our Pure competitor we managed to accept we didn't like it But we accepted the fact that we were vulnerable in space we accepted the fact that if either one of us messed with the other guys satellites we could expect something similar in in return second reason we accepted and the Soviets accepted the concept that we could not wall off fighting in space from fighting elsewhere because our military forces And our nuclear forces were joined at the hip with Assets in space so the Poss possbility indeed the probability of uncontrolled escalation was acknowledged vulnerability possibility

of escalation that could not be controlled by national leaders those were two really big factors there was another really big factor and that is that we and the Soviet possessed all kinds of capabilities to mess with each other in space if the need arose we did not need dedicated capabilities to kill or injure satellites we could borrow capability that was designed for some other reason so if you had a ballistic missile of sufficient range and you could track objects in space and both we and the Soviets had these capabilities you could do damage you could

do severe damage and we learned early on in this competition that the damage we could do if need be could have longlasting and unexpectedly negative effects I'll give you an example and I'm this is a pop quiz and I think there may be a couple of people in this Room um who remember uh top 40 instrumental hit called tstar am I getting any positive feedback here on tstar the instrumental maybe not oh there's somebody okay Telstar was a broadcast satellite one of the very first ones and it excited a lot of people because it allowed

the first Direct broadcast from Europe to be shown on our television sets and so we could see all these fabulous um British bands that were coming up uh this was in 1962 and in 1962 the United States and the Soviet Union were still testing nuclear weapons in the atmosphere and one of our tests was a pretty powerful one and it Killed tstar the satellite and it killed five other satellites there weren't many up there at that time they weren't all ours so we learned early on that yeah we could mess up satellites in low earth

orbit with a nuclear detonation but the effects would be indiscriminate we couldn't control the effects and it could blow back on us another example much later dur during The Reagan Administration when the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union had ramped up the United States conducted an anti-satellite test so like the Chinese did in 2007 a very old satellite wasn't worth very much anymore and we tested hit to kill technology kinetic energy destruction of a satellite and this is really not you Don't need too many tests to demonstrate that capability you may not

get it right the first time but you'll get it right if you are a a major space fairing nation and we did a test back then of one of our satellites now back then our tracking capabilities weren't as good as they are now so we're not exactly sure how many pieces of debris um resulted from that test Um but we do know that one of those pieces of debris nearly killed the newly launched International Space Station 14 years later now the space station on average gets maneuvered out of the way of a piece of debris

once a year on average lately the debris that we're dodging is from the Chinese test in 2007 which created a horrific debris field and unfortunately it was pretty High up so we have to wait decades more for this to clear out there were 200 satellites below that test so we learned during the Cold War that we were vulnerable we couldn't escape vulnerability except at the margins and we certainly couldn't escape vulnerability to somebody who really wanted to do us harm and was willing to accept the consequences we we understood that the Soviets understood it we

understood that certain kinds of activities in space would cause longlasting indiscriminate effects which we wish to avoid and they wish to avoid and yet we retain the capability to do serious damage because it was part and parcel of our nuclear deterrent uh as well as other multi-purpose military capabilities that we could apply to space if if the need Arose so we managed to compete and cooperate with the Soviet Union in space can we manage to compete and cooperate with a rising China in space I think it's fair to assume that if we and China have

a significant crisis or indeed the risk of military contact uh conflict it will probably happen in a global comment it's not going to be on the Chinese land mass I don't think it's going to be um I don't see it happening Visa Taiwan but could well happen at Sea could happen in space could happen with cyber on the one hand our satellites and the Chinese satellites are as vulnerable if not more vulner vulnerable today to than the US and Soviet Satellites were back then back then you know we we had some ballistic missile Defenses um

for a short period of time now we have a lot of ballistic missile defense capability and it's growing and it's it's it's not just in the continental United States it's also at Sea and it's in forward deployed areas because our our friends and allies are looking for some reassurance and ballistic missile defenses serve serve that Purpose By the way they could also be applied against Satellites so that part is the same cold war today vulnerability is the same the retention of capability to do damage to each other is the same in fact it's probably greater

than it was back then what we don't understand and which is crucial to understand is whether or not the Chinese leadership will reach the same conclusions as the Soviet leadership reached about the pro possibility of uncontrolled Escalation the redlines the sensitivities remember the Chinese political leadership they're Nephites when it comes to rling with a major power I mean we and the Soviets regrettably did it more than once but the Chinese leadership this is going to be a new game for them some people in this room Michael especially will remember that when we First started negotiating

with the Soviet Union on nuclear arms control there were some real disconnects between the Kremlin leadership and the Soviet general staff and the Strategic rocket forces they weren't on the same page and indeed we had reason to question whether the Kremlin leadership had strong Understandings of Soviet military Doctrine and test practices and operations and the possibility of things going haywire when we first started talking to the Soviets about their strategic capabilities the Soviet general staff would you know would would take would take the US negotiator aside and say hey you're not supposed to say these

things they're Secrets so what we don't know now but which many people suspect is that there isn't the best understanding between the party leadership government leaders and the military leadership that's one good thing that negotiations can do for you it kind of forces different parts of a government to get together and talk to one another And it forces them to sit down with the military leadership and work out a negotiating position but there are no negotiations in the offing with China on nuclear stuff or on Space there seems to be the same deep reluctance on

the part of the pla leadership to engage the United States as there was with the Soviet general staff way back in the 60s the Pla seems to think that they're playing catchup ball that if they engage with the United States they will lose the ad Vantage of secrecy and if they do a deal with the United States they may seal themselves into a position of inferior capability so we don't have the forcing function of negotiations with China to try and get a good read on their Sensibility ities their Sensitivities their what are they thinking about

do they understand if they mess with our satellites that all hell could break loose they view it as a freebie it would be good to have these conversations there is a strategic and economic dialogue between between the United States and China it's now been institutionalized I think but it's not the the subjects of Nuclear and space Michael can correct me on this I don't think they figure very prominently in in this dialogue is that a fear not at all not at all so I was being polite Michael says not Michael says not at all so

we don't have that um Channel to to open things up a bit the United States and our European friends Are supportive of something called a code of conduct for responsible space fairing nations in fact the European Union which is taking the lead has actually drafted several versions of this code of conduct and you can access it easily enough on the internet we have codes of conduct for the Global Commons of the high seas with the Soviet Union Russia other Countries have reached a similar type of agreement we call it the incident at sea agreement it

was negotiated way back in 1972 after we had all of these close calls on and under the water and you can look up the incident at C agreement to see what kind of Provisions there are we have a similar set of understandings with Moscow for Dangerous military practices involving ground forces and Air Forces operating in close proximity there are no rules of the roads so to speak for space none well that's an exaggeration there is an outer space treaty that was signed way back in 1967 that's the last significant treaty perhaps the only significant treaty

that has been negotiated for space it has some rules you're not Supposed to use weapons of mass destruction in space but all the weapons I've been talking to you about the hit to kill Technologies or lasers or Jammers or whatever ballistic missile defense interceptors that's not weapons of mass destruction no rules space is getting pretty crowded in some places crowded with satellites and crowded with debris we are Close to having dead zones in space in the same way that we have dead zones in the ocean now the dead zones in space would be the result

of debris and the more collisions there are in Space the greater the likelihood that there will be dead zones we we need a traffic management system for space none of you would even be able to get on an airplane to fly across an Ocean uh without a traffic management system and handoffs and warnings of collisions but we don't have a traffic management system for space we've got the beginnings of one we need a debris mitigation system for space if we keep every launch that goes up for whatever reason is going to create debris we can't

stop that but we can stop certain practices in space that Are hugely debris creating including these tests so a code of conduct provides consultative measures it provides debris mitigation measures it provides con the beginnings I think of a traffic management system but that's going to take a long time China and Russia have proposed a hugely ambitious and unverifiable Treaty for space which does not stop them from developing Space Warfare capabilities including Asad systems anti-satellite systems this treaty is not going anywhere but recently last fall in fact for the first time Moscow and Beijing have said

they agree in principle to the notion of a code of conduct for space they don't agree yet to the specific language that the Europeans and The US and Japan and a bunch of other space fairing Nations have already said we can live with this it's okay for us so how do we get this code of conduct to become a reality how do we set norms for responsible behavior in space because we don't have treaties to do this and treaties are unlikely codes of conduct are the way to go to set rules of the road now

Without rules there are no rule Breakers in space but even if you do have rules there no it's no guarantee that everybody's going to play by the rules but you have more of a basis to deal with rule Breakers when you have rules is this codona going to happen anytime soon is it going to happen during the Obama Administration uh I don't know for it to Happen uh the Obama Administration has to make it a high priority and it has a lot of high priorities it has to use embarrassment if you are a responsible spacefaring

Nation why not sign up to these rules it does not have inducements that's a problem in my view there aren't there aren't a whole lot of inducements China has to do this for its own reasons not because it's getting something from the United States and for China to sign up then the party leadership the government leaders have to turn to the p and say we want this this a good thing to do are they ready to do that there's there's I'm not for I'm I'm not counting it out but so far I don't see that

willpower so that's where we are we are there's a lot in motion Here friction between a a status quo power and a rising power it's on the table the utilization of space for wonderful purposes as well as military purposes that's on the table civil military relations and their evolution in China that's on the table so I hope I've given you something to think about thank you for your attentiveness Thank you very much Michael um before I turn to the floor for questions um let me just make a couple of comments couple of announcements we always

have a little reception after these uh seminars to allow people to meet with each other a little informally or to um descend on the speaker and ask questions that they didn't get to ask from the floor or as is often the case the speaker doesn't fully answer the question I'm sure that won't be the case here but it allows you Then to probe a little bit more with the speaker and also to have a glass of wine and some snacks before dinner uh the second thing is um this is part of the Institute of international

studies US foreign policy series uh Michael's our first Speaker for the year and for the spring semester the next schedule speaker and there may be others but the next schedule speaker is Victor Chaw who will be speaking about North Korea Victor will be coming here on April 8th A Tuesday our normal days we try and have these on Thursdays but he'll be here on Tuesday April 8 uh again at 4:00 in this room to talk about North Korea and the challenges that presents for US foreign policy so uh with that said um let me um

open the uh floor up and uh take questions for anyone who would like to um uh speak up and I'm going to pass the microphone around again not for uh our benefit inside the room but rather for the recording and uh for those who Watch recordings uh it's always frustrating when someone asks a question from the floor and first you don't know who it is and second you don't know what they said so be patient while I bring the microphone to you uh and I'll start all the way in the back and if you wouldn't

mind please identify yourself both for the record and also for the rest of us in the room thank you thank you thank you for this very Informative talk um I'm UT Shin from geography here on campus um I have two questions it's first I would like to hear more uh it's uh about how you describe the collaborative relationship between us and and Soviet Union in you know ear you know during the Cold War in during the 60s and 70s exactly what's the content of those collaboration um so that's one thing that I'm very curious about

and very intrigued by you know because of your Comments and secondly I wonder what would be your comments on not just us government but the private capital in the US in their competition you know in space especially in the moon for all you know I've heard that in even in Silicon Valley here they got this Rare Earth you know drive and you know uh imagination or in some sometimes in act real practices trying to get something you know from from there so I'm just wondering how would that play into these Equation about you know foreign

policy but now we have the private capital also rather anxious uh in doing that yeah thank you for those questions the primary vehicle for cooperation between the United States in the Soviet Union was our manspace programs and cos anyone who's been in Spa I have never been to space but but everyone who Has comes back a little changed sometimes a lot changed and there is a bond between those who have explored the cosmos and this was a natural way for us to develop a Cooperative relationship along alongside the competitive one and when President Nixon went

to Moscow in 1972 to sign some treaties important agreements F the first the Anti-ballistic missile treaty the treaty that basically said we are going to accept Mutual vulnerability and he also signed a companion agreement the first one to limit or slow the growth of our nuclear forces and Soviet nuclear forces at that Summit he signed an agreement with breev to have our astronauts and Soviet cosmonauts meet in space and have a Handshake in space so it took 3 years to arrange this it was not so simple because we were developing our spacecraft quite separately and

we had to figure out how to do this properly and safely and that handshake symbolized quite a lot it did not prevent subsequent intensification of our competition but it was it did have a dampening effect for Space and it led to the cooperation to this day you know the International Space Station has a cosmonaut and an astronaut on it all the time and we were dependent until very recently on Russia for Supply vehicles to the space station so that was the cooperation and NASA and its counterpart in the Soviet Union were crucial in developing this

Pathway to cooperation the Congress has passed a pro this this current Omnibus appropriation bill and previous I think the previous two uh congresses have said to the Obama Administration you cannot have NASA engage with China on any bilateral matter so we don't now have this opportunity with China to cooperate in our space fairing Ventures at least not in a bilateral Way there still could be some very interesting projects science projects environmental monitoring projects monitoring the power coming off the Sun that can create Havoc to our instruments here on Earth there are still some projects that

we might pursue with China in a multilateral way that could help but right now it's forbidden by the Congress to do so Bilaterally so you mentioned multilateral Poss oh hi I'm Mary Steiner with the United Nations Association at the East Bay and uh wondered what you meant by multilateral possibilities with that include the United Nations UNESCO other kinds of agencies I think it most likely would would would involve space agencies from other countries um but the products of this collaboration could be useful for all Kinds of folks including un agencies uh I'm Matthew hartog I'm

with uh Stanford Medical School um and an amateur sinologist I grew up with these pictures of the poet Bureau standing on the deis there and they always called them the Sphinx but the Chinese Sphinx is eminently more uh Sphinx like how inscrutable inscrutable how close are you or any of your knowledgeable friends To understand ing the Sphinx of Chinese leadership I'm not even in the ballpark you know but we do have a data point that I think can maybe open the window a little bit and the data point is this 2007 debris causing Asad test

now the the the Chinese had tried to do this successfully earlier and didn't get it quite right and of course our intelligence Community was well aware of these preparations the failed efforts And the preparations for what was to become a successful effort and our government chose not Michael correct me if I'm wrong here but I I think our government chose not to engage the Chinese leadership ahead of time and say are you are you cognizant of the consequences of this test if you are successful are you aware of what might happen and the dangers it

could pose to Chinese man space flight and Chinese satellites let alone everybody else's I believe we chose not to do that and we could speculate about why so the test happened and initially there's Silence from Beijing and people who are amateurs amateur space Watchers and satellite Watchers [Music] are Following the beginnings of the debris consequences and you can tell when a satellite which should be here is no longer there people can do this you don't have to have a clearance and so obviously word gets out and the Chinese foreign Ministry is Silent and it was

silent how long two weeks it was silent for two weeks and finally issues a statement a lot of people are upset issues a statement the it calls it an experiment a test and experiment pla is silent so I have some friends who are sinologists and who go there and talk to people to try and find out what the Civil military aspects of this were Robert Gates's um Memoir says that he thinks the Chinese leadership was in the dark my friends tell me that's not true that there was a briefing about the anti-satellite program in in

general uh and the capabilities that were being developed did the Chinese leadership we all know this Yeah it's so important to know what questions to ask did the Chinese leadership ask the military what are the debris consequences of this test I don't know I have a guess though that they didn't would it have changed the test I mean the pla felt the need I'm sure to demonstrate this capability would it have changed would They have chosen another Target with fewer debris consequences after the Chinese tested we tested a very agile missile defense system against a

dead satellite that was about to enter the Earth's atmosphere so there were very short-lived debris consequences but I think we made a point in that test supposedly the test was done for Public safety reasons because the satellite had its full a full tank of nasty chemicals because it was it was a failed it was a failed launch but I have a hunch it wasn't just for Public Safety purposes so there are ways to test capabilities without creating debris effects I think the Chinese are now doing this and we have these capabilities Too all our questions

have been coming from the left side of the room um but I'm pleased to see that the right side of the room is now responding as well I don't want Michael to get the wrong impression that Berkeley is a leftist Bastion uh Dean Wilkening from Livermore National Lab uh my question is about how to avoid a conflict that destroys satellites in space um your arguments about code of Conduct seem Ben to me it sounded like earlier you were making a deterrence argument both we and the Chinese are vulnerable both we and the Chinese have capabilities

whether they're dedicated or other capabilities to destroy satellites uh risks of escalation therefore it's not likely to happen the problem with that line of argument it seems to me is the asymmetry of dependence on satellites in other words if it does escalate and us and Chinese Satellites are in some sense equally destroyed that would have a much larger impact on US military capabilities than Chinese if the conflict is around the Chinese periphery say a naval engagement so uh I'm not sure how much comfort I take from your arguments before that this Mutual vulnerability and reciprocal

capability to do each other harm in space is going to prevent the destruction or prevent the escalation of a conflict that leads to the destruction Or disablement of satellites so if you could clarify that you are absolutely right Dean that there is an asymmetry of dependence every year that passes that asymmetry closes so we are now looking at a number of Chinese space launches annually that is very competitive with Us if you look at relative dependence on Space compared to GDP there is actually rough equivalence now um if you look at space or fraction of

GDP that some space activi I'm not sure I'd have to reread the this was from gper and from Philip saunders's book I think it's it's what space contributes to GDP is actually kind Of we're we're we're about there and that too will shift uh as Chinese dependency on Space growth so actually I could flip your argument a little bit by saying every year that passes Chinese vulnerability grows to try and reinforce my deterrence point but the deterrence argument rests on a mutual Acceptance of escalatory risk and that also depends on on civil the relationship between

civil and Military Authority which is a black box to us so we can't depend solely on the deterrence argument there are other things we need to do um resiliency disaggregation of satellite capability you know there are some things we can do at the margins to make it harder to do damage To key satellites we've got lots of ways to respond if the need arises uh we need diplomatic engagement which we do not now have on these issues um so you know that's that's my answer there's one more thing and that is that the the Chinese

tactics that we worry most about access to denial area denial also they're space dependent it's not as if they have a Free ride in carrying out their military plans if they decide to do so hi my name is Mary McVey I'm a student at the public policy school here where I'm lucky enough to get to study with uh Michael KN here and I was curious about your hearing at the house armed services committee and I apolog that I I didn't watch it but I have not yet um what did you walk away as seen as

the um the main Congressional interest in the subject and more importantly any Intent in the future well the the the the interest was in highlighting China's what's called counterspace capabilities their ability to mess us up in space so the uh the two Republican subcommittee chairs who convened the hearing really wanted to highlight China's growing capabilities to mess us up and there's a lot of skepticism on Capitol Hill as Michael Ken ATT test better than I not just to treaties but even to codes of conduct rules of the road type agreements that limit in their view

are freedom of action so if something limits our military's freedom of action uh it's going to have opposition on Capitol Hill now it's hard to set rules of the road when you have complete freedom of Action and when you demand complete freedom of action that's kind of like a non secador because other space fairing Nations will also demand freedom of action if you are uh so that's that's a bit of the flavor of it but I heard so many Echoes that reminded me of the cold war competition with the Soviet Union just applied to China

that's on um so hello my name is Naomi eagle and I'm a peace and conflict Studies major here at Berkeley and going back to the EU code of conduct I was wondering if you could speak about what contributions Civil Society might be able to make to help bring us closer to actually achieving a code of conduct I I so few people even know that this thing's out there and and so one thing Civil Society could do would be to call attention to the Possibility of dead zones in space and how that would affect our everyday

lives let alone the capabilities of our military uh which are trying to protect our national security and the security of our friends and allies it's hard to do that globally when you can't rely on space so I think the first thing is is to is to call attention to the possibility of dead zones in Space and I think the parallel with we have a dead zone in the Gulf of Mexico that's huge some of you may have explored how that came to be but we're not going to fix it any time soon call attention to

the possibility of a dead zone in space or the possibility of forever pinball effects based on debris Hits with satellites did you see the movie Gravity I think that helped I think that helped the the other thing is it's hard for the US government to embarrass another major power we try to avoid that government policy that's why we have diplomats but Civil Society is not as constrained as the government And I do believe that we won't get Beijing to sign up to a code of conduct unless we embarrass them a bit you say you're you

are a responsible stakeholder where are you on this issue why don't you support a code of conduct why aren't you willing to sign up to this one I think those are two things that could be Worthwhile my name is Summer I'm a undergrad student here majoring in po s history and my question is also somewhat related to the civil society which just mentioned we know that Simpson Center is dedicated to is a think tank that dedicated to the uh space security I'm wondering that if there is like a equivalent uh nonprofit organization in China that's

also dedicated and working with the government to improve space security And if there is then um if both the government are somewhat reluctant to talk with each other directly about this issue is there a chance that we can get the Civil Society part the NGO part to convince the government to and actually let the two parties sit down and actually start to discuss about this there are there are workshops uh there's a workshop every other year In in China that is devoted to space and related military issues ballistic missile defense topics come up a lot

at this Workshop but it's also an opportunity to talk about space security and the code of conduct uh people there is interaction there are NOS here who are active in this field not many but some and you know we all have websites and we all put content on our websites and we all can track who's accessing our Websites so there there are indirect ways to get messages across to our colleagues in China but the real the most important contacts are between government leaders and milit Ary leaders and that is very hard the the pla is

is like I say they're they're where the the the Soviet general staff was back in the 60s and that is dangerous that there's So little communication what happens when you develop Norms it's a there's a process takes a long time and it's hard to do but there's a process almost of socialization that comes from communication because you start off on completely different wavelengths if we were on the same wavelength there'd be no need to Talk but over time with enough with enough conversation contact negoti iation delegations clearing customs over time you get better your predictive

qualities get better you you get to a better understanding of sensitivities red lines are they thinking I hope they're not thinking They could do this and there'd be no problem I hope they understand what the consequence are of doing X Y and Z you you get that through this iterative process and it's happening with NOS some not enough it's not happening happening nearly enough between governments and militaries Michael's response reminded me that I neglected to mention at the beginning that Michael also uh is featured on arms control walk Online so he regularly writes in that

venue so you don't have to buy a book but you can also go online and get his thoughts as well as others but do buy books don't don't hi uh I'm Brandon V riswick I'm a computer science undergrad here so I'm kind of interested in the cyber security aspect of all this and that if I wanted to kill satellites you can just go up and turn on all the reaction control events and now they can't change orbits Anymore and that seems to kind of be China's Style of cyber security and cyber attacks um is that

more of a concern than like direct kinetic kill stuff or not would you hand that microphone over to [Laughter] Michael cyber security is a big big big concern we're definitely not on the same wavelength on that subject um and My hunch after the recent Revelations of the nsa's capabilities is that the Chinese military think they're playing catch up ball I mean we're we've got capability too um I'm Cadet urov with UC Berkeley army RC um my question is uh related mainly to the economic relations between the US and China um there's uh China's our biggest

trading partner um I was wondering how uh you perceive that trade To continue or possibly change um pending the current uh interspace competition yeah thank you for asking that question because that's such an important aspect of this and it's a huge difference between the Cold War and today because we had next to no economic interaction with the Soviet Union um so there was no connectivity there no restraints related to commercial win-win Situations uh there was no M Mutual hostage relationship having to do with economic ties there was just a mutual hostage relationship having to do

with Nuclear So if we switch to China we have we have this Mutual hostage relationship with economics trade finance that we didn't have before you would like to think it's a restraining Factor but you can't depend on it you can't depend on it being a restraining Factor um but it's something we got going for us now with China I think that didn't exist back in my day uh I was wondering if you would want to comment on on oh I'm sorry Frank renberg chair of the Marine chapter of the world affairs Council I was wondering

if you wanted to comment on cultural issues I think overcoming Chinese mistrust of the West in general not to mention the United states only is a work Of decades it's my impression that Chinese children are educated in the exploitation of their country by the West in the 19th and early 20th century uh they're encouraged to participate in demonstrations against the Japanese when there's an argument over two or three silly rock-like islands and just from my own experience as a former Foreign Service Officer I always found it easy to communicate to enjoy myself with Russian diplomats

Helped by little vodka of course and the Chinese were always much more distant you would meet with them but there was a sort of barrier there to any communication and I think that has toe prevent problems uh present problems excuse me particularly as you've noted with the general staff pla leaon yeah strategic Affairs can't be divorced from cultural Affairs and cultural understanding but you know there's so Many Chinese students here good that's good but they're young they're young but they they're a powerful powerful force the potential there is just awesome so you know it I

I'm a neop fite with China I mean I've been to China I I'm guessing I don't know maybe eight times over the years uh So I I'm a beginner uh but it was the same same way discovering the Soviet Union just took a it it takes a while to build up capability and the capability to read somebody and understand somebody is way harder than the capability to learn about what their throw weight is or what their satellite constellations are just you're right this is the work of generation but in the meantime we have to Avoid

the use of force against each other I'm R ho I'm a student of physics and business here at brookley I was curious about the private space exploration aspect of it because it seems it seems to me that it's relevant because any agreement would have to cover both public space exploration and space projects as well as private ones so I i' just like your comments on that I you know the satellite Industry does not have a seat at the table for these talks about a code of conduct but the Administration has reached out to satellite industry

to familiarize them with what we're trying to do as a government to create rules of the road my sense in talking to Industry is that the number one concern is will this cost us more money will there be a regulatory burden I think this applies both to the Old satellite industry and the the Silicon Valley New Wave industry in Space the the answer is that responsible behavior in space May indeed cost you money so instead of using the last two gallons of gas for your satellite to pull X number of additional money gaining Maneuvers before

your satellite dies and becomes an Obstacle in whatever orbit it is it resides you use that gas so to speak the fuel to get out of the way to park in a safe place and not become a debris Hazard and make way in that slot for a newly functioning profit taking satellite so sometimes responsible behavior costs more and requires more of you I am of an age where I remember where the automobile industry Took exception and opposed safety measures for the automobile you know seat belts and airbags they were extra costs of assembly and now

you know that's the that's that's okay we nobody argues with that and those costs are built into our transactions so I think the analogy is that if a code of conduct comes into being there will be some additional burden to mitigate the debris Consequences of what you do in space and how you launch and also this parking problem that we are having in some areas of orbital Endeavor couple more questions and then we'll break for our reception uh hello I'm Jared Hazelton I'm an eek political science double major and uh two questions somewhat related to

the talk one was a lot of your previous papers from say' 03 and 20 11 talk about the implications of soft Power in space and the unique feature that that provides in areas like the ISS but a lot of the talk has focused on issues such as we are cooperating with Russia on the ISS now even though relations are sort of stagnant I'm curious how that doesn't really Jive in a sensible kind of manner if you get what I mean it seems to me that issues of space don't seem unique to overall relations and or

do not spill over to cause a positive effect they Just lead to these compartmentalized scenarios such as cooperating on the ISS and second is you talk about the code of conduct but you've also mentioned things like the wolf clause which bans cooperation with China bilaterally and other issues such as Congress opposing it but also the pla being different from Chinese over the top leadership and their CMR relations I'm curious that even if the code of conduct was licated or was Initiated what proof or what reason would there be that it would be even sufficient even

though something's better than nothing or arguably so how would those issues be implicated by the code of conduct how would it resolve any of them right I you know you may be right about the lack of spillover effect so yeah we cooperate every day on this space station does that what re does that Spill over you you you I have to think harder about that and I don't have a methodology where I can point to broader consequences I really have an it's more of a of a gut instinct than an approvable method so there were

times during the Cold war competition in space where Things were really troubling there were 60 of these anti-satellite tests a little bit more than 60 a lot of them were unsuccessful uh so it's not as if there were not troubling things going on in space Now 60 is a small number compared to nuclear weapon tests so there we're talking a thousand plus but 60 is not a trivial Number Strategic Defense Initiative concerns over Soviet space activities there were you can go into the library and pull out these documents called Soviet military power that the Reagan

Administration put out every year a lot of it would be on space and you know you could stand your hair up on end and yet worst cases were avoided I have to think even if I can't prove that the Cooperative parts of our relationship with the Soviet Union in Space were helpful they certainly weren't harmful we could argue whether they were neutral or helpful I I tend toward the helpful side of things what was the next what was your other question even if you were able to oh you're right okay got it isues you descri

I think the answer one of one way to answer your question is how do we develop Norms of responsible Behavior when there are no enforcement mechanisms so you we have traffic regulations we have the highway California Highway Patrol we've got local law enforcement they can pull you over give you a ticket so we have rules we have Norms you're supposed to drive on the right hand side of the road stop at stop lights and and stop signs we have laws and we have enforcement and Yet we still have reckless driving okay so now let's look

at space where we really don't have enforcement we just have payback and we're trying to set Norms of responsible behavior knowing that people can break them which is why we have capability for Payback so after this Chinese ASAT test that created this humongous debris field there was hope that nobody else Would do that again yeah there were these tests in the past the six plus years ago the Chinese did this nobody's done it since at least not in that way do we have the makings of a norm here well One requirement is that everybody understands

how dangerous and indiscriminately dangerous this practice is so we get something to work on because all space fairing Nations Have equities that are placed at risk but if I wanted to clarify a norm and I don't have a treaty to do that with then one way to strengthen a nent norm is by means of this code of conduct and there are other ways too declaratory statements I promise never to do this again unless you know I'm fighting a war in which case the the Norms Change I don't know there are different ways to reinforce Norms

which is what I'd like you to think about in this case one final question I'm Gabriel a history major here at Cal undergrad and um one of my main questions is uh who do you see taking the initiative in uh creating enforcement and creating these um I don't want to use the word maybe dant with China because we see the US and the East Asia pivot but yet it seems more militarily instead of getting to The peace table and creating relaxation with the Open Seas and that's just my main question who do you see creating

initiative you know it's very hard to promote a relaxation of tensions with a major power if it's not a bipartisan effort so if the political parties as represented in Washington are not on board a diplomatic Initiative with a major power it's it's it's really hard to sustain so and you know the Nixon Administration made the Breakthrough with China it made the Breakthrough with the Soviet Union in terms of nuclear arms control it made the Breakthrough with Moscow in terms of space but within a decade the this the the impetus for Dayon was in very bad

shape and when a Democratic president one that I worked for tried to pick up this banner and move it along with the Soviet Union um the the Republican Party had shifted and was deeply skeptical of the Enterprise indeed even before President Carter took office his predecessor President Ford stopped using the word Dayon in public so fast forward to China we the the wolf amendment was mentioned the one that bars bilateral engagement with Beijing on for certain parts of the US government including NASA I I think this is yet another example where the sh a sharp

partisan divide uh reduces the freedom of action of an Administration that wishes to open doors in China I mean the pla is a tough tough door to open but it's even tougher when you have members of Congress saying don't even try and that's a fair that that that that sentiment is a significant sentiment on Capitol Hill before we adjourn let me also Mention another program that IIs uh sponsors the annual Sanford elberg lecture and on March 19th we'll be having George Packer uh staff writer for the New Yorker uh speaking on the unwinding and inner

history of the new America so I encourage you to prend that that will be in the sudara die uh uh Hall of the bonau auditorium over on the far side of Campus he's fabulous he is awesome Michael thank you very much you're awesome as well and please join Me thank [Applause] [Music] you