Greetings to the participants of the 7th Course of Extension and Initiation of Combat and Armored Simulation. I am Colonel Matos Barboza, Commander of the South Training Center, Military Organization of the Brazilian Army, based in Santa Maria, Rio Grande do Sul. It is with great satisfaction that I, together with the other instructors of the South Training Center, participate in this course.
The subject of my presentation is the use of combat simulation in the training and certification of the Brazilian Army's readiness forces. My goals are to present the purpose of the training and to present the simulation systems used in the training and certification of the Brazilian Army's readiness forces. To achieve these goals, I will follow the following summary, addressing the mission of the South Training Center, the readiness and certification system, the methodology of training exercises and the constructive, virtual and live simulations, as well as the fire support simulator.
So, my presentation begins with the mission of the South Training Center. Our mission is to contribute to the training of troops of any nature, preferably armored and mechanized, and in the certification of these troops for their employment, considering the broad spectrum of military operations and the imitation of combat, using the means of combat simulation. International crises can arise at the will of the country, which requires an adequate level of readiness of its armed forces.
This implies the maintenance of troops and private strategic reserves in the operational readiness situation with mobility, which allows them to move quickly to any part of the national territory or abroad. So, this system of readiness of the land force must be able to generate forces in employment conditions to meet these needs related to external defense, to fulfill specific missions abroad, for example, the rescue of nationals in a country in crisis. Or to provide troops for the readiness system of the United Nations peacekeeping capacity, to provide troops for a peace mission, for example, Haiti, where our army participated in the past, or other missions that are demanded by Brazilian participation as a result of commitments with the United Nations.
They participate in the training of the military organization, which is a component of the readiness force, the military organization itself, with its means, and the training center, supporting this military organization. Each level of operational training corresponds to a level of training. So, we have operational training, what we call operationality, operational efficiency and combat power.
They are presented in an increasing way, from top to bottom. So, these levels of operational training correspond to the training levels, which we call organic preparation, the second level, the complete preparation, and the third and last level, the specific preparation. Operationality is the ability that an operational military organization acquires to act as an integrated whole, in order to fulfill the missions envisaged in its doctrinal basis, inherent to its nature and scale.
It was cited as the basic quality for which the ground force retains its ability to evolve, when necessary, to a higher level of operational training. Operationality corresponds to the level of training of organic preparation, which is an adequate level of training that gives the military organization the minimum ability to act collectively. In turn, operational efficiency is identified with the collective performance of the military organization.
The organization must perform tasks, do them better and better, with greater development, with a greater economy of means and time, which will only be achieved with greater development of training. Organic preparation of the military organization is not simply sought, but its complete preparation. This complete preparation is an adequate level of training that confers conditions of efficiency to fulfill all the combat missions fundamental to the nature and scale of the military organization.
Operational efficiency, as it is developed outside the battlefield, will not be able to mean the certainty of war effectiveness. For it to prevail under combat tensions and pressures, it must be conducted and supported by two factors that we say are indispensable, the professional value of the commander and the moral value of the troop. Operational efficiency, the professional value of the commander and the moral value of the troop will generate, in the next and last level, the combat power that, after all, will be the ultimate quality of the military instrument of war.
And in the face of a crisis, characterized by an enemy and an operational environment, against which and where the ground force will be employed, specific preparation is made. So, only defined the enemy and the place where the force will be employed, it is possible to make this specific preparation. In this way, it obtains the necessary combat power to face the threat presented.
So this would be the last level of training, specific preparation and operational training. Regarding the methodology of training exercises with the support of simulation tools, in this slide I show how we assemble the observation sheets to know if that trained troop has reached the training levels that were selected. So we have two main documents that we use to assemble these observation sheets, which are the training programs, we call PPA, and the manuals of doctrine.
These training programs list the fundamental combat missions of a unit. These combat missions are provided at the doctrinal base of this combat unit. From them will also be deduced the missions of their subunits and subordinate factions.
The execution of campaign exercises based on these combat missions will develop in the trained squad the collective performance necessary for it to perform typical operations of its squad and of its nature, as well as for it to participate in operations of greater value, conducted by the superior squads. From each fundamental combat mission arises a training objective, which is characterized by three elements, the task to be carried out, the conditions of execution and the minimum standard. These training objectives and elements are all described in the PPA.
The training objectives are described in sheets of the standard programs, the PPA, and in it are contained the incidents that will occur in the situation created, which will indicate the arbitration of the exercise and the opposing force, the actions that must be carried out to cause a certain reaction in that squad that is in training. The manuals of doctrine will contain the information of the knowledge, which are basic for the performance of the task of that squad and those soldiers, individually or collectively. This is where the knowledge of how to carry out all actions in combat is located.
So the training program will indicate the form of execution and the objectives, as well as the minimum standards. And the manuals of doctrine, the various manuals that teach the art of war and how to do things, both together will give the subsidies for the assembly of the observation sheets that the observers and the training controllers will fill out, marking the execution or not of each item of this sheet. These sheets will compose the certification notebooks for each type and nature of squad that is trained.
When filling out these observation sheets, it is worth noting that the training is not simply an assessment. The assessment is part of the training process, which encompasses this assessment, which is more comprehensive. Training is therefore more comprehensive than assessing.
Through tools of analysis and feedback, we assist each commander in the execution of the assessment of their own squad. The use of the term "training" minimizes the moral effect generated by the "test" in the trained squad. It facilitates the assimilation of knowledge and training tasks, since the error is not penalized.
The assessment is a tool of the process. It allows feedback from training to the commander, enabling the rectification or ratification of the procedures that were adopted. However, using the term "assessment" generates the negative reinforcement of preparing for the test.
It inhibits the initiative and, in turn, the development of leadership, as it focuses on the mention. It is better not to do than to do wrong and have a bad mention. So, it is preferable that it is not regarded as an assessment.
Training needs feedback. And this feedback is only possible if we fill the observation sheets according to the expected performance and return the result of the assessment to the trained squad. So, the assessment is necessary for the training, since it will enable the commander of that trained squad and his own squad to correct the items that were observed.
But the term "assessment" should not be taken as an end in itself. It is just an instrument for training. Another important distinction to be made is that it is between instruction and teaching and training.
Instruction and teaching is simply knowing how to do. So, in instruction and teaching, I learn to do things, no matter the time or the way, whether it is efficient or not, with which I do that thing. In training, the ability to perform tasks and achieve goals in an effective way is sought, using as few resources, time and energy as possible.
It is not enough to simply know how to do. The organization must perform tasks and do them better and better, with greater development, with greater economy of means and time, which will only be achieved with greater development of training. So, what is the difference between an instruction center and a training center?
Let's also consider that an education establishment, military training, or a military organization of the troop body can also be considered an instruction center, as they administer individual instruction and teaching. So, on the left side of the slide, we have the activities that are carried out in an instruction center and its objectives. This instruction center is in charge of individual instruction, from the one that initiates the formation of the basic combatant and the evolution of this instruction with the insertion of this basic combatant into the collective, where the combat group, the platoon, the company, will act collectively.
And after the teaching, a basic training is done and an advanced training of these constituted fractions. The training center does not work on individual instruction, it already receives that troop with the individual instruction carried out and the teaching of the individual and collective tasks already administered. So, the individual does not go to the training center to learn the tasks, he goes to the training center to perform those tasks with greater development, in less time and with greater efficiency.
We work the troops and fractions already constituted in platoons, subunits, units and so on, improving their collective performance using simulation means. In this graph, we have the contribution that the simulation means provide to the training of the troops. So this line does not grow, it lists the traditional exercises for the training of the troops.
And as these exercises increase in complexity, the number of means used and the level of difficulty for the assembly of these exercises increases. When I use the simulation means, I exponentially increase the realism, without increasing excessively the used means and the difficulty for the assembly of the exercise. What is sought is to get as close as possible to what would be the real combat.
And the simulation means will allow you to get as close as possible to all aspects involved in real combat. This, by traditional means, is quite difficult, since the effects generated in real combat, many of them are undesirable effects and if they really occurred, there would be great damage to the troop and the material. So now I start to address some conceptual aspects related to combat and that are inserted in the simulation exercises to train as close as possible to real combat.
In war, there are antagonistic wills, friction. This requires your commanders, assisted by their advisors, the mastery of the art of preparing and applying the power to overcome the obstacles of all order, achieve, conquer and preserve the fixed objectives. Guess which word is perhaps the most important in war?
The condition of war is essentially given by this word. Many efforts are dedicated to the construction of concepts, processes and methodologies of support to it. Factors of decision, exam of situation, line of action, matrix of decision, process of integration, terrain, weather conditions, enemy, civil considerations and decision-making process These are terms and expressions, all in support of the decision.
The conduct of war is then given by means of a sequence of decisions. What to do, how to do, where to attack, when? The decision-making process is one of the most important aspects of the conduct of war.
Right or wrong decisions seal the fate of battles. That is why there are the commanders' advisors, that is why there is the greater state that will help you decide. Those who manage to make and implement the right decisions more quickly will gain the decisive advantage, as they will influence the environment before the opponent can use the available information to make decisions.
John Boyd was an F-86 Sabre fighter pilot in the Korean War. Although he had not shot down any aircraft in that conflict, he was invited to serve at the most prestigious fighter pilot school in the United States of America. During the early 1960s, along with a civil mathematician, he created several air combat theories.
Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense of George Bush, called him to work on the plans for Operation Desert Storm, helping to develop the strategy for the invasion of Iraq in the Gulf War of 1991. Boyd had a substantial influence on the maneuver called Left Hook. Few know that it is believed to be called OODA Loop.
The idea was, piloting through sudden and unexpected agile maneuvers, to keep the enemy always trying to guess his intentions and confuse him, thus delaying the opponent's decision-making process in such a way as to make him unable to predict the position of his aircraft. The concept was generalized as a war theory and gave rise to the presentation Patterns of Conflict, first published in the 1970s, popularizing the now well-known OODA loop. Observe, guide, decide and act.
You are in a hunt and observe your enemy ahead and behind you. You orient yourself, evaluate what your aircraft can do at this moment and what your enemy is capable of doing and what is likely he will do. In this case, you conclude that it is more likely that the enemy will follow a straight path.
And you know that if your aircraft makes a dive, you can easily reduce the distance and put it within reach of your machine gun. Then you decide to make a dive and get closer. Then you dive and put it within reach of your weapons.
This is the part of acting. Now, the enemy aircraft detects you and immediately before you open fire on it, it brakes hard and turns to the left. This observation makes you reorient yourself.
You can't make the curve with him because he's too fast. However, your knowledge of the limitations of your enemy's aircraft and your own tells you that your opponent has lost a lot of energy in that braking and that you can go up, turn and dive to position yourself behind him. So you do that.
So you observed the braking, oriented yourself, decided and acted. Therefore, now going through your OODA loop a second time. Your enemy went through OODA Loop once, which resulted in that braking and curve.
And during the curve, he started a second loop, but was stuck in the observe phase of the second loop, because it is difficult to follow you in this specific maneuver. Even if he can follow, he will still be in the orientation phase of that second loop, while you are in the act phase of your second loop. As the fight progresses, the one who runs the loop faster will be at an advantage, because it will force the other person to react.
Therefore, it will dictate the fight. If you can go through the loop faster than the opponent, it will cause ambiguity, uncertainty, distrust and confusion in your mind. Time is extended for him and at the same time, because you can go through it faster, time is compressed for you.
So you are in front of his decision cycle, and he gets confused, he goes back inside instead of out, he collapses mentally. Boyd recognized that the canopy, the cockpit in Saber's bubble, gave better situational awareness to American pilots, and the totally hydraulic controls allowed them to transition from offensive maneuvers to defensive maneuvers faster than Soviet pilots. So this is the ODA cycle that we know in the doctrine of the Brazilian Army and also well known in the business world, in the academic world.
Observe, orient, decide and act. The speed at which the cycle will be used will not, however, be enough to ensure its effectiveness. If the perception of the environment is false, inadequate or incomplete, if the information is analyzed incorrectly, or if the actions implemented do not correspond to the decision taken, the cycle does not affect the environment according to the commander's intention, sinning in this case for quality and not for speed.
In this slide I would like to present a graphic representation of the decision cycle. The physical perspective is a tangible real world where military operations take place at sea, in the air, on land, in space. Information and communication systems exist in this perspective for operations to take place.
The logical perspective is where information is created, manipulated, shared and stored. It connects the physical real world with the human consciousness, the cognitive perspective, both as a source of input, stimuli, and as a means to transmit outputs, intention, direction, decisions. The cognitive perspective exists in the mind, where the individual processes the information received according to a single set of norms, morals, beliefs, culture and values.
The information is processed to make decisions that are communicated back through the logical perspective to the physical world. In a similar way, our decision cycle can be represented in relation to the opponent, as shown in this figure. Intelligence, surveillance, recognition and acquisition of targets are activities that synchronize and integrate planning and operation of sensors to explore and obtain information about the opponent.
Information management activities seek to provide correct information to the right person and with opportunity to facilitate situational awareness and decision making. The third type of activity is related to the decision cycle of friendly and enemy troops. The efficient performance of these three activities as a whole will provide superiority of information, which, when achieved, will result in a degree of domination of the information environment, allowing the operation to be conducted without effective opposition.
And taking this opportunity, I make a link with a very current subject, leaving for reflection of lords and ladies, how much artificial intelligence will accelerate this decision cycle, and what consequences this will bring to military operations. This training of the decision cycle, planning and operation conduct, command and control and situational awareness, is what we work with constructive simulation. The officers of the greater state present proposals to the commander, advising him on the decisions.
The greater state also develops plans based on the hypothesis of the evolution of the situation. These plans will help the commander to make decisions and reduce the reaction time. The greater state transforms the commander's decisions and guidelines into plans and orders that will be issued to the troops.
On the left, we have the commanders and their greater states, which are the object of the training. They are located in command posts and combat situation on the ground. On the right, we have the simulated troops in the software, controlled and operated remotely in the South Training Center.
The commander's decisions are transmitted to the simulated troops, and the software generates the results of the actions and combats. These results are transmitted by the commanders of the simulated troops to the command posts as combat information. This information builds the troops' situational awareness in training, causing new decisions.
Now I'm going to talk about virtual simulation. It is allowed to perform tactical training up to a sub-unit level, including support. These are exercises developed in three or four weeks, depending on the simulation modalities used.
It is worth making a distinction between some types of simulators. The first is between procedure simulators and synthetic simulators. Procedure simulators are simulators that reproduces, with a high level of fidelity, the systems and materials of real military use.
They aim at the full training of the operation and operation of the equipment. They use a replica in natural size of the equipment, of the cabin or simulated compartment. They have instruments, panels and controls identical to real equipment.
They present a system that provides feedback or equivalent forces to real equipment. They aim at individual or garrison technical training and focus on the communication interface with the simulator. On the other hand, synthetic simulators are equipment that reproduces, in a compact way, real equipment, its operation and operation.
They integrate a virtual scenario to equipment with panels, instruments and controls similar to simulated military use material, with different levels of fidelity. They aim at technical and tactical training of garrisons and small fractions. On the left we have a procedure simulator, on the right a synthetic simulator.
This chart makes a summary of the simulators. Procedure simulators have a higher level of fidelity and target audience, individual or garrison. While synthetic simulators have a lower level of fidelity and target audience, garrison or squadron.
When procedure training is not the core of the training exercise, it is not necessary to use simulators with a high level of fidelity to the existing objects in the cabin of what is being simulated. Therefore, it is enough to use synthetic simulators when the goal is to train the decisions, behaviors and tactical conduct of that garrison or squadron. At the South Training Center, we use tactical virtual simulators.
These are professional simulation programs installed on commercial computers, which enable tactical training at various scales. There is no need to use special peripherals or similar to real ones. At the Center, we use a software called VBS3, manufactured by Bohemia Interact, Czech Republic.
It has as characteristics the use of artificial intelligence to simulate troops and behaviors. It has tools for editing scenarios, post-action analysis tools, extension and customization, communication tools and compatibility with other simulation systems through high-level architecture (HLA). It is an interactive simulator in real time for the training of techniques, tactics and procedures.
It has a high degree of realism, command and control exercise, and also allows a realistic decision-making process. With a focus on tactical employment of the fractions, cognitive training of the commanders of the fraction. It allows to train the coordination of the movement, the command and control of the commanders with their troops and the coordination of fire.
So, the trained troops, whether they are platoons or subunits, companies, squads, all in one room, each operating a simulator, they interact within the same scenario. So, the observations of the effects of the fights, the results of the fights, they are shared by all members of that fraction that act collectively. Live Simulation Live Simulation is the state-of-the-art in simulation types, as it reaches the apex of training, preceding real combat, since it tests the command at all levels and enables the maximum realism in a controlled environment.
Live Simulation is used to train fractions in techniques, tactics and procedures in operations, in the development of leadership, to achieve combat power, to certify troops and as a tool of support for operational research. Live Simulation is the type of simulation in which real agents are involved, operating real systems (armaments, equipment, vehicles, aircraft) in the real world, with the support of sensors, laser countermeasures and other instruments that allow to follow the fighters and simulate the effects of the engagements. With the use of suitable equipment, it is also possible to integrate with other simulation systems.
The Tactical Engagement Simulation Devices (D7) are the tools that allow Live Simulation to be effectively used in the observation of an event in an objective way, obtaining data capable of recreating a combat scenario without the occurrence of real damage. The Fire Support Simulator has the permission to train groups of field artillery and heavy 120mm mortar platoons, organic infantry and cavalry units, in addition to enabling the execution of fire planning and coordination exercises in the field of division artillery and army artillery command. It has a specific focus on the function of firefighting, employing a mixture of live, virtual and constructive simulation.
The artillery pieces execute the shot in the real field and the result of these shots is simulated by the computer and presented on a projection screen. The soldiers in this room, called an observation well, observe the impacts of the shots on the ground and on the targets and make the necessary corrections of this shot, so that these corrections transmitted again to the pieces of artillery on the ground are made and the shot falls on the targets. This is the architecture of the Fire Support Simulator and we will see how it works in the next video.
The set of equipment, installations and operating system allows the integration of the artillery subsystems through the simulation for the creation and application of varied scenarios. These provide the user troop with the training of a complete shooting mission. All activities are monitored and evaluated by the exercise control center, which stimulates the evolution of learning and training of the user troop, optimizing the results in the execution of missions.
By applying modern simulation resources in training, the CIMAF SU is an important tool for the improvement of the operational capacity and development of our human resources. In this way, the CIMAF SU becomes an excellent tool for the preparation of troops in search of capacities for a new force. After approaching the existing simulators in the training center, I start to address the pillars of combat simulation.
The first of them is the existence of an opposing force, which is a force created to test other forces. It has the mission of performing tactical actions as an enemy in training exercises, in order to give greater realism to the training. It develops differentiated techniques to create difficulty and realism to the force evaluated in the exercise.
It must have freedom of action and initiative to produce the friction necessary for the trained force to be forced to adopt combat conduct. The second pillar is the existence of the observer and controller of the training, which is a military of the training center designed for the monitoring and coordination of the exercise. The third pillar is the simulation device, through which the combat effects will be simulated and they will also provide the result of the clashes between the opposing force and the trained force.
They allow the collection and analysis of the objective data of the training troop performance. Finally, the post-action analysis is conducted by the commander, the observer-controller or the director of the exercise. A post-action analysis is a debate carried out shortly after the exercise or after a training combat action.
It is based on the analysis of the actions carried out by the evaluated by means of their reflections. This participation in the process provides great teachings, thanks to the study of errors and hits in the actions. A post-action analysis must be conducted in order to enable the reflection of the instructor on his decisions, that is, whether he has chosen or not the best solution for a given situation.
The post-action analysis is then an analytical method, of a formative nature, which aims, with the active participation of the evaluated elements themselves, to point out procedures and operational techniques that, if rectified, will allow the improvement of the activities of preparation and employment. From all that has been said, we can conclude that there are great advantages to the use of combat simulation in the training of the Brazilian Army troops. Combat simulation constitutes an important tool for the preparation of the ground force.
As such, the simulation system attenuates some of the possible obstacles to preparation, including the high cost of ammunition, restricted training areas, the risks of accidents and the restrictions related to the environment. At the same time, combat simulation allows the troop to immerse itself in scenarios that are close to real combat, giving great fidelity to training. Through repetition and feedback on errors and hits, it contributes to the trained force improving its efficiency and effectiveness in performing its tasks and combat missions.
This concludes my presentation. Other subjects on combat simulation will be administered by the instructors of the South Training Center. I take this opportunity to invite you to visit our Center here in Santa Maria.
Thank you very much.
